Torres v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 27

OPINION & ORDER re: 23 MOTION for Attorney Fees . filed by Carlos A. Torres. For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) is GRANTED. The SSA is directed to approve a payment of $3,000 to Michael A. Aranoff. (Signed by Magistrate Judge Ona T. Wang on 10/26/2023) (rro)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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CARLOS A. TORRES,
Plaintiff,
-againstCOMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
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OPINION & ORDER
18-CV-5247 (OTW)

ONA T. WANG, United States Magistrate Judge:
I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Carlos A. Torres (“Plaintiff”) brought this case seeking review of Defendant

Commissioner of Social Security’s (“Commissioner”) denial of his application for disability
benefits under the Social Security Act. (ECF 2). On December 6, 2018, the parties stipulated to
remand the case to the Commissioner for further administrative proceedings (ECF 19), and on
February 28, 2019, the parties stipulated that Defendant would pay Plaintiff a sum of $972.55
in attorney’s fees and expenses pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”),
28 U.S.C. § 2412, for five hours of attorney time expended in this action, in full satisfaction of
claims made under the EAJA in connection with this case. (See ECF 22; see also ECF 24 at 4). On
remand, the Commissioner issued a March 17, 2020, Notice of Decision finding that Plaintiff
was entitled to disability benefits. (ECF 25 at 3). Before the Court is Plaintiff’s counsel, Michael
S. Aranoff’s (“Mr. Aranoff”), motion for an attorney fee award of $3,000 pursuant to section
406(b) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), filed on April 28, 2022. (See ECF Nos. 23 –
25). The motion was fully briefed on May 13, 2022. (ECF 26). For the following reasons,

Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED. The SSA is directed to approve a payment of $3,000 to Mr.
Aranoff.
II.

DISCUSSION
1. Legal Standard
Section 406(b) of the Social Security Act states:
Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this subchapter
who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may determine and
allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of
25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled by
reason of such judgment, and the Commissioner of Social Security may, notwithstanding
the provisions of section 405(i) of this title, but subject to subsection (d) of this section,
certify the amount of such fee for payment to such attorney out of, and not in addition
to, the amount of such past-due benefits. In case of any such judgment, no other fee
may be payable or certified for payment for such representation except as provided in
this paragraph.

42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). Section 406(b) “does not displace contingent-fee agreements as the
primary means by which fees are set for successfully representing Social Security benefits
claimants in court.” Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002); accord Wells v. Sullivan,
907 F.2d 367, 370 (2d Cir. 1990). Instead, it “calls for court review of such arrangements as an
independent check, to assure that they yield reasonable results in particular cases.” Gisbrecht,
535 U.S. at 807. The Court’s reasonableness analysis looks at three factors: (1) whether the
requested fees exceed the 25 percent limit, (2) whether the contingent fee agreement was
reached through “fraud or overreaching,” and (3) whether the requested fees would represent
a windfall to counsel. Wells, 907 F.2d at 373; see, e.g., Federico v. Acting Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
No. 20-CV-2220 (AT) (OTW), 2023 WL 4471605, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2023).

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To assess whether the requested fees would be a windfall, the Court considers: (1) the
ability, expertise, and efficiency of counsel, (2) the nature and length of the relationship with
the claimant, (3) the satisfaction of the disabled claimant with counsel’s services, and (4) the
uncertainty of an award of benefits. Wells, 907 F.2d at 372.
2. Reasonableness of the Requested Fee
Mr. Aranoff’s $3,000 fee award is reasonable. Pursuant to a retainer and contingent fee
agreement, Plaintiff agreed to pay Mr. Aranoff 25 percent of his past-due benefits payable to
him and his auxiliary beneficiaries, as payment for legal services. (ECF 25 at 3). By Notice of
Award letters dated March 27, 2020 (Supplemental Security Income); August 29, 2020 (Social
Security Disability benefits), and September 7, 2020 (auxiliary child benefits for Plaintiff’s child,
Jencarlos Torres Matrille), the Social Security Administration concluded that Plaintiff’s past-due
benefits totaled $154,524.10. (ECF 25 at 4, 12-15). The $3,000 fee award Mr. Aranoff seeks is
far below 25 percent of the past due benefits due to Mr. Torres and his family, a sum of
$38,631.02. Mr. Aranoff represents that he spent five hours representing Plaintiff in this action,
during which he secured an order vacating the administrative decision denying Plaintiff
benefits. (ECF 25 at 4-5). Mr. Aranoff further provides detailed supporting billing records for
that time. (ECF 25 at 9-10, Ex. B). There is no evidence of fraud or overreaching.
The $3000 fee award would not represent a windfall to Mr. Aranoff. First, Mr. Aranoff
has strong credentials in the practice of Social Security law, having dedicated the majority of his
30-year law practice to representing Social Security Disability claimants. (ECF 25 at 6). Second,
Mr. Aranoff was retained by the Plaintiff in December 2018, and was able to secure remand
without a large expenditure of time. (ECF 25 at 6). Third, Mr. Aranoff obtained a successful
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outcome for Plaintiff, who has not expressed any dissatisfaction with Mr. Aranoff’s services.
Fourth, due to multiple denials of Plaintiff’s benefits over a prolonged period, there was
substantial uncertainty as to the result. See, e.g., Federico v. Acting Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2023
WL 4471605, at *2.
3. Timeliness of the Motion
In its response, the Commissioner points out that Mr. Aranoff filed his fees motion on
April 28, 2022, well outside of the 14-day filing period following Plaintiff’s March, August, and
September 2020 Notice of Award letters, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(B), and seeks that the
Court “determine the timeliness” of the motion. (ECF 26 at 2, 6). As the Commissioner correctly
observes, however, a court is free to “enlarge th[e] filing period where circumstances warrant.”
Sinkler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 932 F.3d 83, 89 (2d Cir. 2019). Mr. Aranoff states that he filed his
motion following a period of severe COVID-19 illness and serious medical issues related to
COVID-19. (ECF 25 at 4). Courts have exercised their discretion to enlarge the 14-day filing
period due to COVID-19-related delays. See, e.g., Ward v. Kijakazi, No. 20-CV-5412 (PGG) (JLC),
2023 WL 329210, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2023) (collecting cases). Given that Mr. Aranoff’s client
received Notice of Award letters during the emergence and height of the COVID-19 pandemic,
in March, August, and September 2020, during which time Mr. Aranoff was presumably quite
ill, the Court exercises its discretion to nunc pro tunc extend Mr. Aranoff’s deadline to file his
fees motion, and considers the instant motion timely. See also Williams v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
No. 18-CV-4734 (PKC), 2021 WL 4480536, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2021) (motion filed more
than four months after 14-day filing period deemed timely where attorney was working from
home during the pandemic and experienced mailing delays).
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4. Previous EAJA Award
Where a plaintiff’s counsel received fees for the same work under the EAJA and
42 U.S.C. § 406(b), counsel must refund to the plaintiff the amount of the smaller
fee. See Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796 (“Congress harmonized fees payable by the Government
under EAJA with fees payable under § 406(b) out of the claimant’s past-due Social Security
benefits in this manner: Fee awards may be made under both prescriptions, but the claimant’s
attorney must refund to the claimant the amount of the smaller fee.”) (internal quotations and
citations omitted). Here, the $972.55 in EAJA fees awarded to Plaintiff were used to offset a
debt owed by Plaintiff to the federal government. (ECF 25 at 3). Accordingly, refund of EAJA
fess is not at issue in this case.
III.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)

is GRANTED. The SSA is directed to approve a payment of $3,000 to Michael A. Aranoff.
SO ORDERED.
s/ Ona T. Wang
Ona T. Wang
United States Magistrate Judge

Dated: October 26, 2023
New York, New York

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