Beata Music LLC v. Dino Danelli et al

Filing 195

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER re: 160 MOTION for Attorney Fees . filed by Beata Music LLC, Gene Cornish, Felix Cavaliere, 184 SECOND MOTION for Summary Judgment Per Court Order ECF No. 181. filed by Beata Music LLC. Th e Court has considered all of the arguments raised by the parties. To the extent not specifically addressed above, the arguments are either moot or without merit. For the reasons explained above, the movants' motion for attorney's fees is d enied, and Beata's motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part. In particular, summary judgment is denied as to Beata's first claim. Summary judgment is granted with respect to Beata's second and third claims. Sum mary judgment is also granted with respect to Beata's fourth and sixth claims, but only to the extent explained above. Beata's fifth claim is dismissed without prejudice. Beata should notify the Court by May 16, 2022 whether it intends t o proceed to trial on its first claim. If Beata does not intend to proceed to trial, it should submit a proposed judgment with respect to Brigati and Danelli by May 16, 2022. The Clerk is directed to close Docket Nos. 160 and 184. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge John G. Koeltl on 5/9/2022) (ks)

Case 1:18-cv-06354-JGK Document 195 Filed 05/10/22 Page 1 of 17

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
BEATA MUSIC LLC,

18-cv-6354 (JGK)

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER

- against DINO DANELLI, EDDIE BRIGATI, and
DOES 2-10, inclusive,
Defendants.
DINO DANELLI and EDDIE BRIGATI,
Counterclaim Plaintiffs,
- against BEATA MUSIC LLC, FELIX CAVALIERE,
and GENE CORNISH,
Counterclaim Defendants.
JOHN G. KOELTL, District Judge:

These motions mark another chapter in a long-running
trademark dispute over the mark associated with the famous music
group The Rascals. The prior harmony among the parties has
turned to discord.
The background of this litigation is set forth in detail in
this Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order dated January 6, 2022,
see Beata Music LLC v. Danelli, No. 18-cv-6354, 2022 WL 61862,
at *1-3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2022)

("Beata II"), with which the

Case 1:18-cv-06354-JGK Document 195 Filed 05/10/22 Page 2 of 17

Court assumes familiarity.

1

In that decision, the Court granted

the motion for summary judgment brought by Beata Music LLC
("Beatan), Felix Cavaliere, and Gene Cornish (together, "the
movantsn) dismissing all the counterclaims asserted by Eddie
Brigati. In an earlier Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court
granted (1) the movants' motion to dismiss the claims asserted
by Dino Danelli (the fourth Rascal) for failure to prosecute,
and (2) Beata's motion for a default judgment against Danelli.
See 2021 WL 195708 (S.D.N. Y. Jan. 20, 2021)

("Beata In).

Now before the Court is the movants' motion for attorney's
fees and Beata's motion for summary judgment with respect to its
own claims. For the reasons explained below, the motion for
attorney's fees is denied and the motion for summary judgment is
granted in part and denied in part.

I.
The movants move for attorney's fees pursuant to the Lanham
Act, which provides that, "The court in exceptional cases may
award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.n 15
U.S.C.

§

1117 (a)

.2

Unless otherwise noted, this Memorandum Opinion and Order omits all
alterations, citations, footnotes, and internal quotation marks in quoted
text.
2 At the outset, Brigati argues that the movants' motion is premature because
there is currently no final judgment in the case under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 54. This argument is unpersuasive because Rule 54(d) (2) (B), which
generally governs the timing of a motion for attorney's fees, only explicitly
sets a deadline by which a motion for attorney's fees must be filed; it does
not prohibit the filing of such a motion before the entry of judgment. See
Keister v. PPL Corp., 677 F. App' x 63, 68-69 ( 3d Cir. 2017) ( "Under Rule 54,
1

2

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A prevailing party is "one who has been awarded some relief
by the court." Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va.
Dep't of Health and Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603

(2001). "The

essence of being a prevailing party is achieving a material
alteration of the legal relationship of the parties that is
judicially sanctioned." Lifeguard Licensing Corp. v. Kozak, 371
F. Supp. 3d 114, 130 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). In Beata II, the Court
concluded that Brigati's counterclaims failed as a matter of law
because; among other reasons:

( 1) Brigati has- no common law

trademark rights in the RASCALS mark,

(2) Brigati abandoned any

interest he had in the RASCALS mark, and (3) the 1990 and 1992
settlement agreements between some of the parties do not require
at least three of the band members to consent to any of the band
members performing as The Rascals. See Beata II, 2022 WL 61862,
at *7-8, *11. Those rulings materially altered the legal
relationship between the parties. Moreover, as explained in
Section II of this Memorandum Opinion and Order, those rulings
also ensured that Beata would prevail on certain of its

a motion for attorney's fees shall 'be filed no later than 14 days after the
entry of judgment.' Nothing in the text of the rule indicates that filing
before entry of judgment is improper and Russo offers no legal authority to
persuade us otherwise."). Rule 54 (d) (2) (B) also makes clear that its timing
provision applies '' [u] nless a statute or a court order provides otherwise."
In this case, the Court ordered full briefing on the motion for attorney's
fees after it was filed. ECF No. 161. Finally, resolving the motion now does
not present concerns of judicial economy because counsel for the movants
represented at the April 4, 2022 conference that the movants will not seek
further attorney's fees in this case. Accordingly, the Court will resolve the
motion for attorney's fees, and the movants can renew the motion after the
entry of judgment if circumstances change.

3

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declaratory judgment claims. Accordingly, although a final
judgment has not yet been entered in this case, the movants are
prevailing parties. 3
In Sleepy's LLC v. Select Comfort Wholesale Corp., 909 F.3d
519, 530-31 (2d Cir. 2018), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the standard set out by the Supreme Court in Octane
Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545 (2014)
for determining whether an award of attorney's fees is
ap~ropriite under the P~tent Act also ~pplies to clai~s for
attorney's fees under the Lanham Act. Accordingly, to prevail on
their motion for attorney's fees, the movants must show that
this case is "one that stands out from others with respect to
the substantive strength of a party's litigating position
(considering both the governing law and the facts of the case)
or the unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated." Id.
at 554.
Courts applying this standard consider factors including
"frivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness (both in
the factual and legal components of the case) and the need in
particular circumstances to advance considerations of

3 The movants are also prevailing parties with respect to Danelli because the
Court held that the rnovants are entitled to a default judgment against
Danelli. See KX Tech LLC v. Oilmen LLC, No. 3:16-cv-745, 2017 WL 2798248, at
*6 n.7 (D. Conn. July 13, 2017); Shariff v. Alsaydi, No. 11-cv-6377, 2013 WL
4432218, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2013). However, in their motion for
attorney's fees, the movants focus on Brigati's counterclaims, which were
briefed by the parties and resolved by the Court in Beata II.

4

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compensation and deterrence." Id. at 554 n.6. "[W]here a party
has set forth some good-faith argument in favor of its position,
it will generally not be found to have advanced exceptionally
meritless claims." Hockeyline, Inc. v. STATS LLC, No. 13-cv1446, 2017 WL 1743022, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2017).
"[A]lthough Octane Fitness denies that for a case to be
exceptional there must be independently sanctionable misconduct,
most post-Octane cases awarding fees continue to involve
substantial litigation misconduct." Id.; see also Hello I Am
Elliot, Inc. v. Sine, No. 19-cv-6905, 2021 WL 1191971, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2021)

(asking whether the claimants had

improper, ulterior motives in bringing suit). "District courts
may determine whether a case is 'exceptional' in the case-bycase exercise of their discretion, considering the totality of
the circumstances." Octane, 572 U.S. at 554. Of course, "not all
unsuccessful litigated claims are objectively unreasonable."
Dominick R. Pilla, Architecture-Eng'g P.C. v. Gilat, No. 19-cv2255, 2022 WL 1003852, at *28 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2022).
The movants have failed to establish that this case is
exceptional. The movants argue that Brigati's motivations for
asserting his counterclaims were improper, but there is no
evidence in the record supporting this assertion. Indeed, the
only evidence cited by the movants is that Brigati answered
truthfully at his deposition that he stopped performing with The

5

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Rascals in 1970. ECF No. 164, at 6. But, as explained in Beata

g, Brigati had a non-frivolous argument that he did not abandon
his interest in the RASCALS mark at least because he continues
to receive royalties from the group's recorded music. See 2022
WL 61862, at *7. There is no evidence suggesting that Brigati
asserted his counterclaims for any reason other than enforcing
the rights that he believed in good faith he had in the RASCALS
mark. Cf. Hello I Am Elliot, 2021 WL 1191971, at *7. In light of
the longstanding dispute over the RASCALS mark and the marketing
of the band members' performances, it was reasonable for Brigati
to assert his purported rights in the mark, especially during
litigation that was initiated by Beata. Accordingly, there is no
evidence of bad faith or an improper ulterior motive in this
case.
The movants also claim that Brigati's counterclaims were
objectively unreasonable and frivolous, but in support of this
argument the movants simply reiterate the reasons the Court
ruled against Brigati. That Brigati's arguments were losing ones
does not mean they lacked an arguable basis in law or fact.
There were factors that favored Brigati's trademark infringement
claims, even though those claims ultimately failed: for example,
the movants did use promotional materials that included
Brigati's image and likeness for a 2018 tour, and Brigati
continues to receive royalties from the band's recorded music.

6

Case 1:18-cv-06354-JGK Document 195 Filed 05/10/22 Page 7 of 17

See Beata II, 2022 WL 61862, at *7-8. The movants state that
"The Court found that [Brigati's] breach of contract claim was
frivolous for failure to allege any damages,ll ECF No. 164, at 4,
but that is not true. The Court did not find Brigati's contract
claims to be frivolous; rather, the Court concluded that
Brigati's contract claims failed as a matter of law because,
among other reasons, Brigati had failed to offer any evidence of
damages. See Beata II, 2022 WL 61862, at *5. The Court also
exercised its discretion to impose an evidentiary sanction
against Brigati pursuant to Rule 37 that prevented him from
making any subsequent offer of proof with respect to damages.
See id. But the Court's imposition of this evidentiary sanction
against Brigati does not mean that Brigati's claims were
objectively unreasonable or that the claims lacked an arguable
basis in law or fact. While Brigati's claims failed for multiple
independent reasons and "this case was not ultimately a close
one,

[Brigati's] arguments and claims were not so frivolous or

objectively unreasonable that no party could see an opening
through which the arguments could be squeezed.ll Dominick R.
Pilla, 2022 WL 1003852, at *28.
The other relevant factors also cut against a finding that
this case is exceptional. There are no allegations of litigation
misconduct. And while the movants argue that deterrence favors
an award of fees, this argument is unavailing. The fact that

7

Case 1:18-cv-06354-JGK Document 195 Filed 05/10/22 Page 8 of 17

Brigati's counsel at one time also represented Danelli, who has
stopped participating in this litigation, does not reflect in
any way on Brigati's litigation conduct. The movants also state
that, "This sort of litigation should not be encouraged," ECF
No. 164, at 6, but Beata-one of the movants-initiated this case,
and parties to federal litigation are in fact required to raise
all claims arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is
the subject matter of the opposing party's claims. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 13 (a).
Accordingly, this case is not exceptional within the
meaning of the Lanham Act and the movants are not entitled to
attorney's fees.

II.
Beata also moves for summary judgment with respect to five
of its six claims. 4 "The court shall grant summary judgment if
the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.n Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the
initial burden of "informing the district court of the basis for
its motion" and identifying the materials in the record that "it
believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). At
In its motion for swnmary judgment, Beata states that, "[w]ith a subsequent
filing,u Beata will request that the Court dismiss its trademark dilution
claim (its fifth cause of action) without prejudice. ECF No. 184, at 11.
4

8

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the summary judgment stage, the court must resolve all
ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the
moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587

(1986). "Only disputes over facts that

might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law
will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986).

Beata's claims implicate the rights of Danelli, against
whom Beata is entitled to a default judgment. See Beata I, 2021
WL 195708, at *3-5. A defaulting defendant is deemed to have
admitted all well-pleaded factual allegations set forth in the
complaint. See S.E.C. v. Razmilovic, 738 F.3d 14, 19 (2d Cir.
2013). "But because a party in default does not admit
conclusions of law, the Court must determine whether those
allegations establish a sound legal basis for liability." Zhen
Ming Chen v. Y Cafe Ave B Inc., No. 18-cv-4193, 2019 WL 2324567,
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2019).
A.
Beata's first claim seeks a declaration that Beata owns the
RASCALS trademark for live performances and the sale of
merchandise at those performances. Beata notes that Cavaliere
and Cornish transferred to Beata any rights they had in the
RASCALS mark for live performances, although Beata does not
specify when this transfer was made. Movants' Statement of

9

Case 1:18-cv-06354-JGK Document 195 Filed 05/10/22 Page 10 of 17

Material Undisputed Facts, ECF No. 133

33. 5 Beata further notes

that Cavaliere toured as "Felix Cavaliere's Rascals" throughout
the 1990s and 2000s. Id.

20. Beata argues that Cavaliere is

the only original member of The Rascals who never left the band
and the only band member "to consistently perform music at all."
ECF No. 184, at 10.
Brigati makes several arguments in response, although some
of his arguments were explicitly rejected by the Court in Beata
II. 6 Brigati claims that Beata's pending trademark application
for the RASCALS mark for live performances and related
merchandise is improper because a similar application by
Cavaliere was dismissed with prejudice in 1991. See Kramer
Deel., Ex. 31, ECF No. 146-1. Brigati argues that the prior
dismissal with prejudice precludes the filing of a subsequent,
similar application by an entity that Cavaliere controls. See
Heidsieck & Co. Monopole S.A. v. Piper-Heidsieck, No. 98-cv7741, 2001 WL 263029, at *4

(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2001)

(applying

doctrine of res judicata to the withdrawal of an opposition to a
trademark application with prejudice); Miller Brewing Co. v. Coy
Int'l Corp., 230 U.S.P.Q. 675, 678

(T.T.A.B. 1986)

(res judicata

prevented applicant from bringing second application that was
5 In support of its motion for summary judgment, Beata relies on the Local
Civil Rule 56.1 statement submitted by the movants in support of their
previous summary judgment motion.
6 For example, Brigati argues that he did not abandon his rights in the
RASCALS mark, ECF No. 188, at 5, 10-11, even though the Court expressly held
to the contrary, Beata II, 2022 WL 61862, at *7.

10

Case 1:18-cv-06354-JGK Document 195 Filed 05/10/22 Page 11 of 17

similar to a prior application that was withdrawn with
prejudice). The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board can address
this issue in the first instance in determining whether to grant
Beata's trademark application. 7 In any event, it is plain that
Beata does not currently have any rights in the RASCALS mark
through registration.
Beata appears to argue that Cavaliere had common law
trademark rights in the RASCALS mark and that those rights have
been assigned to Beata. See, e.g., ECF No. 191, at 2. But
nowhere in its papers does Beata establish (1) that Cavaliere
had common law trademark rights in the RASCALS mark at the time
of the assignment to Beata, or (2)

if so, whether the mark has

been sufficiently exploited since the assignment of those rights
such that Beata continues to hold the rights assigned to it by
Cavaliere. "Common law trademark rights derive from 'initial
appropriation and use accompanied by an intention to continue
exploiting the mark commercially.'

'To prove bona fide usage,

the proponent of the trademark must demonstrate that his use of
the mark has been deliberate and continuous, not sporadic,
casual or transitory.'" Excelled Sheepskin
v. Or. Brewing Co., 897 F.3d 413, 418

&

Leather Coat Corp.

(2d Cir. 2018)

(quoting La

Societe Anonyme des Parfums le Galion v. Jean Patou, Inc., 495

Earlier in this litigation, counsel for Beata represented that this
application "may soon be dismissed." ECF No. 151, at 9.

7

11

Case 1:18-cv-06354-JGK Document 195 Filed 05/10/22 Page 12 of 17

F.2d 1265, 1271-72 (2d Cir. 1974)). While it is plain that
Cavaliere has exploited the RASCALS mark more than the other
original band members, Beata has not demonstrated that Cavaliere
or Beata have an intention to continue exploiting the mark for
live performances. 8 Beata also has not conclusively rebutted
Brigati's argument that Cavaliere abandoned his interest in the
mark. Accordingly, drawing all reasonable inferences against
Beata, there are issues of fact regarding (1) whether Cavaliere
had any common law rights in the RASCALS mark for live
performances to assign to Beata, and (2) whether any such rights
survive today.

9

Accordingly, summary judgment is denied with

respect to Beata's first claim.
B.

Beata's second claim seeks a declaration that neither
Danelli nor Brigati has any enforceable rights in the RASCALS
mark for live performances. With respect to Brigati, this
declaration follows directly from the Court's conclusions in
Beata II. Brigati has abandoned any trademark rights he had in
the RASCALS mark. 2022 WL 61862, at *7.

8

To the contrary, the movants have indicated throughout this litigation that

this case will mark the end of The Rascals.~, ECF No. 151, at 9 ("Beata

filed an intent-to-use application on THE RASCALS for live music and
merchandise, but never filed a statement of use or used the mark. Indeed,
that application may soon be dismissed, and counsel will inform the Court
when it is. These gentlemen will not be playing together again.").
9 Beata also has not established conclusively that Cornish had any common law
rights in the RASCALS mark to assign to Beata.

12

Case 1:18-cv-06354-JGK Document 195 Filed 05/10/22 Page 13 of 17

The Court has ruled that Beata is entitled to a default
judgment against Danelli. Beata I, 2021 WL 195708, at *3-5.
Beata's well-pleaded allegations, which are deemed admitted by
Danelli, establish that Danelli went at least three consecutive
years without using the RASCALS mark. 10 Non-use of a mark for
three consecutive years constitutes "prima facie evidence of
abandonment." 15 U.S.C. § 1127. Having defaulted, Danelli has
put forward no evidence to rebut this "rebuttable presumption of
aband6nment.n See B~ata II, 2022-WL 61862, at *7. Accordingly,
Danelli~like Brigati~has abandoned any rights he had in the
RASCALS mark. Summary judgment is therefore granted with respect
to Beata's second claim.
C.

Beata's third claim seeks a declaration that Beata has not
infringed the rights of Brigati or Danelli in the RASCALS mark.
This declaration, like the declaration sought in Beata's second
claim, follows directly from the Court's prior decisions.
Neither Brigati nor Danelli has any enforceable rights in the
RASCALS mark. Accordingly, summary judgment is granted with
respect to Beata's third claim.

See, e.g., First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 9 i i 17-18 (Danelli left The
Rascals in 1972), 33 (Danelli has not played the drums in a concert setting
since 2013), 34 (after failed negotiations, Danelli declined to participate
in the contemplated 2018 tour).

10

13

Case 1:18-cv-06354-JGK Document 195 Filed 05/10/22 Page 14 of 17

D.

Beata's fourth claim "seeks declaratory judgment .

. that

use of the RASCALS for live concert performances and the sale of
merchandise at such live concert performances does not
constitute false designation of origin.ll First Amended Complaint
("FACll), ECF No. 9

'I[

64. Because neither Brigati nor Danelli has

any enforceable rights in the RASCALS mark, and for the other
reasons explained in Beata II, Beata is entitled to a
declaration that its use of the RASCALS mark for live concert
performances and the sale of merchandise at those performances
does not constitute false designation of origin with respect to
Brigati or Danelli. The Court has no occasion to consider the
rights of non-parties. Summary judgment on this claim is
therefore granted, but the declaration is only applicable to
Brigati and Danelli.
E.

Beata notes that its fifth claim should be dismissed
without prejudice. ECF No. 184, at 2 n.2, 11. The claim is
therefore dismissed without prejudice.
F.

Beata's sixth claim seeks "an order declaring and adjudging
the rights of the parties when CAVALIERE and CORNISH play under
the name 'The Rascals,' vis-a-vis DANELLI's claimed rights in
under [sic] the 1990 Settlement Agreement and BRIGATI's claimed

14

Case 1:18-cv-06354-JGK Document 195 Filed 05/10/22 Page 15 of 17

rights." FAC 1 76. Beata moves for summary judgment on this
claim but states in its moving brief that, "if the Court wishes
to rule on this issue,

[Beata] would suggest a limited ruling

that there is nothing in the 1990 Settlement Agreement that
precludes Cavaliere and Cornish, or their assignee(s) from
playing live as The Rascals." ECF No. 184, at 11-12. This
statement perhaps stems from Beata's recognition that "The
judicial power does not extend to abstract questions and that
(c]laims based merely upon assumed potential invasions of rights
are not enough to warrant judicial intervention." Pub. Serv.
Comm'n of Utah v. Wycoff Co., Inc., 344 U.S. 237, 242

(1952).

The Court concluded in Beata II that Brigati's breach of
contract claim with respect to the 1990 agreement failed as a
matter of law because (1) Brigati failed to offer any evidence
of damages, and (2) Brigati was neither a party to the 1990
agreement nor an intended third-party beneficiary of that
agreement. See 2022 WL 61862, at *5. Brigati therefore has no
enforceable rights arising from the 1990 agreement.
Beata puts forward no arguments or analysis with respect to
Danelli's rights under the 1990 agreement. However, before he
stopped participating in this litigation, Danelli asserted a
breach of contract claim against Cavaliere and Cornish with
respect to the 1990 agreement, and that claim and the rest of
Danelli's claims were dismissed with prejudice for failure to

15

Case 1:18-cv-06354-JGK Document 195 Filed 05/10/22 Page 16 of 17

prosecute. See Third-Party Complaint, ECF No. 31, at 6; Beata I,
2021 WL 195708, at *3. Because a dismissal for failure to
prosecute operates as an adjudication on the merits, see Fed. R.
Civ. P. 41(b); James v. John Jay College, No. 19-cv-644, 2020 WL
1911211, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2020), res judicata would
prevent Danelli from asserting against Cavaliere or Cornish any
claim relating to the 1990 agreement that was, or could have
been, raised in this action. See id. at *3. 11
Accordingly, summary judgment on Beata's sixth claim is
granted with respect to Brigati, and is granted with respect to

Danelli but only to the extent that Danelli may not assert any
claim against Cavaliere or Cornish relating to the 1990
agreement that was, or could have been, raised in this action.
CONCLUSION

The Court has considered all of the arguments raised by the
parties. To the extent not specifically addressed above, the
arguments are either moot or without merit. For the reasons
explained above, the movants' motion for attorney's fees is
denied, and Beata's motion for summary judgment is granted in
part and denied in part.

In particular, summary judgment is

denied as to Beata's first claim. Summary judgment is granted

with respect to Beata's second and third claims. Summary
Res judicata would not appear to bar a claim by Danelli concerning conduct
that postdates the commencement of this action if that conduct "can support a
cause of action on its own." TechnoMarine SA v. Giftports, Inc., 758 F.3d
493, 503 (2d Cir. 2014); see James, 2020 WL 1911211, at *4.

11

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Case 1:18-cv-06354-JGK Document 195 Filed 05/10/22 Page 17 of 17

judgment is also granted with respect to Beata's fourth and
sixth claims, but only to the extent explained above. Beata's
fifth claim is dismissed without prejudice.
Beata should notify the Court by May 16, 2022 whether it
intends to proceed to trial on its first claim. If Beata does
not intend to proceed to trial, it should submit a proposed
judgment with respect to Brigati and Danelli by May 16, 2022.
The Clerk is directed to close Docket Nos. 160 and 184.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:

New York, New York
May 9, 2022

'.
/ John G. Keel tl
"··--United States District Judge

17