Farooqi v. New York City Department Of Education et al

Filing 26

OPINION AND ORDER: The defendants are granted judgment on Farooqi's alienage and race discrimination claims brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. The only claim that remains is for FMLA retaliation. A concurrently filed Order sets forth the schedule for the litigation of that claim. (Signed by Judge Denise L. Cote on 4/9/2020) (jca) Transmission to Orders and Judgments Clerk for processing.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------------- X
:
MAHMOODA FAROOQI,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
-v:
:
NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION;
:
KINSLEY KWATENG, individually; CLIVE
:
PRYCE, individually; and JOHN LACROIX, :
individually,
:
:
Defendants.
:
:
-------------------------------------- X
APPEARANCES:

19cv3436 (DLC)
OPINION AND ORDER

For plaintiff:
Ambrose Wotorson, Jr.
Law Office of Ambrose Wotorson
225 Broadway, Fl. 41
New York, NY 10007
[phone]
For defendants:
Shaina Claire Wood
Corporation Counsel Office of New York
100 Church Street
New York, NY 10007
[phone]
DENISE COTE, District Judge:
Plaintiff Mahmooda Farooqi commenced this action on April
17, 2019 to redress allegedly discriminatory and retaliatory
employment practices by the New York City Department of
Education (“DOE”) and three administrators at the Benjamin

Banneker Academy for Community Development (“Benjamin Banneker”)
in Brooklyn, New York, where Farooqi was employed as a Chemistry
teacher until the events giving rise to this litigation.

The

defendants have brought a Rule 12(c), Fed. R. Civ. P., motion to
dismiss all but one of the claims brought in this action.
Several of Farooqi’s claims were dismissed on the record at
a 2019 conference.

This Opinion addresses the defendants’

motion to dismiss Farooqi’s 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 claims
for alienage and race discrimination.

For the reasons stated

below, the defendants’ motion to dismiss these claims is granted
as well.
Background
The following facts are taken from the complaint and
documents integral to the complaint.

Farooqi was born in India

and identifies as East Asian Indian.

She has been employed by

DOE since 2001, and worked as a Chemistry teacher at Benjamin
Banneker from 2006 until 2018.
On July 5, 2018, DOE preferred eight charges against
Farooqi.

Five specifications charged that, over a several week

period in February 2018, Farooqi engaged in incidents of
corporal punishment or made unnecessary physical contact with at
least five students in her class.
Farooqi with failure to supervise.

One specification charged
The remaining specifications

charged Farooqi with interfering with her students’ ability to

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participate and with their mental, emotional, and physical wellbeing.

DOE sought her termination from employment.

Pursuant to Section 3020-a of the New York Education Law, a
hearing in connection with these charges occurred over the
course of twelve days between November 2018 and February 2019.
See N.Y. Educ. Law § 3020-a.

The Opinion and Award that issued

on March 19, 2019 (the “Section 3020-a Opinion”) explained that
both parties were represented by counsel in the hearing and had
an opportunity to offer evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and
make arguments in support of their respective positions.
The hearing arbitrator sustained one of the five charges of
corporal punishment, as well as a charge of classroom
abandonment.

The arbitrator declined to terminate Farooqi’s

employment but imposed a $6,000 fine and required that she
receive certain training, at the DOE’s expense.

Since the

Section 3020-a hearing, Farooqi has been reassigned from
Benjamin Banneker and is performing clerical work.
Farooqi brought this action on April 17, 2019.

On April

25, Farooqi filed an amended complaint, which alleged claims of
age discrimination, malicious abuse of process, and stigma plus
discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; alienage and
race discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983;
and retaliation under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”).

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On October 15, 2019, the defendants moved to dismiss all of
the claims except for the FMLA retaliation claim.

The motion

principally asserts that the claims are barred because the
arbitrator ruled that Farooqi had engaged in some of the
misconduct with which she was charged.

The motion was fully

submitted on November 15.
For the reasons explained on the record at a November 22
conference, the Court granted judgment to the defendants on
Farooqi’s § 1983 claims for age discrimination, malicious abuse
of process, and stigma plus discrimination.

It reserved

judgment, however, on the plaintiff’s §§ 1981 and 1983 claims
for alienage and race discrimination pending an anticipated
decision by the United States Supreme Court on the causation
standard for § 1981 claims.

These two discrimination claims are

the subject of this Opinion.
Discussion
“Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate where material
facts are undisputed and where a judgment on the merits is
possible merely by considering the contents of the
pleadings.”

Sellers v. M.C. Floor Crafters, Inc., 842 F.2d 639,

642 (2d Cir. 1988).

In deciding a motion for judgment on the

pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c), Fed. R. Civ. P., courts “apply
the same standard as that applicable to a motion under Rule
12(b)(6), accepting the allegations contained in the complaint

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as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party.”

Mantena v. Johnson, 809 F.3d 721, 727–28 (2d

Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).

“On a 12(c) motion, the court

considers the complaint, the answer, any written documents
attached to them, and any matter of which the court can take
judicial notice for the factual background of the case.”

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Designs, Inc. v. Old Navy, LLC, 647 F.3d 419, 422 (2d Cir.
2011) (citation omitted).

“A complaint is also deemed to

include any written instrument attached to it as an exhibit,
materials incorporated by reference, and documents that,
although not incorporated by reference, are integral to the
complaint.”

Id. (citation omitted); see also Goel v. Bunge,

Ltd., 820 F.3d 554, 559 (2d Cir. 2016).
To succeed on a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 or
1983, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant’s
discriminatory intent was a “but-for” cause of the adverse
employment action.

Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of African Am.-

Owned Media, No. 18-1171, slip. op. at 13, -- S. Ct. -- (U.S.
Mar. 23, 2020) (§ 1981); Naumovski v. Norris, 934 F.3d 200, 214
(2d Cir. 2019) (§ 1983).

As recently clarified by the Supreme

Court in the context of § 1981, and the Second Circuit in the
context of § 1983, the “motivating factor” standard from Title
VII does not apply.

Comcast, No. 18-1171, slip. op. at 8-12;

Naumovksi, 934 F.3d at 212-14.

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Farooqi asserts that the defendants violated Sections 1981
and 1983 when they brought and pursued disciplinary proceedings
against her that were “motivated, in part,” by her alienage and
race.

That pleading does not state a cause of action.

Moreover, because of the preclusive effect given to the
arbitrator’s findings, Farooqi would be unable to plead that
alienage or race discrimination were a but-for cause of the
disciplinary proceedings.
The hearing arbitrator sustained certain charges against
Farooqi and imposed sanctions on account of her misconduct.
Those determinations have preclusive effect in federal court.1
Burkybile v. Bd. of Educ. of Hastings-On-Hudson Union Free Sch.
Dist., 411 F.3d 306, 310 (2d Cir. 2005).

As a result, Farooqi

cannot establish that the disciplinary action against her would
not have occurred but for her race or alienage.
Farooqi’s sole argument in support of her alienage and race
discrimination claims is that the standard applied to a § 1981
claim requires only that a plaintiff establish that the alleged
discriminatory conduct was motivated in part by racial animus.

For factual findings made at the Section 3020-a hearing to be
given preclusive effect, the plaintiff must have had an
“adequate, full, and fair opportunity to litigate.” Burkybile,
411 F.3d at 312. Farooqi does not argue that she did not have a
full and fair opportunity to litigate the DOE charges.
1

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The Supreme Court’s decision in Comcast makes clear that Farooqi
is wrong.
Conclusion
The defendants are granted judgment on Farooqi’s alienage
and race discrimination claims brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981
and 1983.

The only claim that remains is for FMLA retaliation.

A concurrently filed Order sets forth the schedule for the
litigation of that claim.

Dated:

New York, New York
April 9, 2020
____________________________
DENISE COTE
United States District Judge

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