Wager v. G4S Secure Integration, LLC

Filing 174

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 155 Motion for Discovery. For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiffs motion for attorneys' fees, Docket Entry No. 155, is granted and an award of $77,838.25 in attorneys' fees and $1,383.37 in expenses is warranted. The plaintiff shall file her application for attorneys' fees in connection with the instant fee application, no longer than five double-spaced pages accompanied by evidence, on or before September 30, 2021. Any challen ge to the reasonableness of the fee application, no longer than five double-spaced pages, must be filed on or before October 7, 2021, and any reply, no longer than three double-spaced pages, may be filed on or before October 10, 2021. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Magistrate Judge Kevin Nathaniel Fox on 9/23/2021) (va)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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ASHLY WAGER,
:
Plaintiff,

:

-against-

:

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

G4S SECURE INTEGRATION, LLC,

:

19-CV-3547 (MKV) (KNF)

Defendant.
:
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KEVIN NATHANIEL FOX
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
By an order dated January 28, 2021, the assigned district judge remanded the matter to
the undersigned to determine “whether any of the three exceptions under Rule 37(a)(5)(A)
apply— and defers to Magistrate Judge Fox to determine whether Defendant has rebutted the
presumption of a mandatory fee award.” Docket Entry No. 132. Before the Court is the
plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs “incurred in connection with Plaintiff’s discovery
motions resulting in the Court’s November 27, 2020 Order (ECF 125) against Defendant G4S
Secure Integration, LLC,” pursuant to Rule 37(a)(5)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The defendant opposes the motion.
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
The plaintiff asserts that none of the three exceptions to Rule 37(a)(5)(A) of the Federal
Rules of Civil procedure applies. She seeks $77,838.25 in attorneys’ fees and $1,383.37 in
expenses based on the actual rates she agreed to pay and has paid her counsel, Dunnington
Bartholow & Miller, LLP, to enforce the defendant’s compliance with its discovery obligations.
According to the plaintiff, the hourly rates requested are in line with those prevailing in the
community for similar services by lawyers of comparable skills, experience and reputation: (a)
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$425 in 2020 and $475 in 2021 for Samuel Blaustein (“Blaustein”), a partner; (b) $325 in 2020
and $350 in 2021 for Sixtine Bousquet-Lambert (“Bousquet-Lambert”), an associate”; and (c)
$195 in 2020 and $225 in 2021 for Cristopher Vidulich (“Vidulich”), a paralegal. Blaustein
served as a principal drafter of the motion to compel.
Following a clerkship in this district, Mr. Blaustein has been admitted to practice
in this district for more than twelve (12) years during which time he has litigated
cases concerning labor and employment laws. Id. ¶¶ 14–15. Mr. Blaustein has been
recognized by Super Lawyers® as a “Rising Star” since 2014, and a “Top Rated
General Litigation Attorney in New York, NY”. Id. ¶ 16. Mr. Blaustein graduated
from Brooklyn Law School in 2007, and served as a law clerk for the Hon. Laura
Taylor Swain and the Hon. George B. Daniels in the Southern District of New York
from June 2009 to September 2010. Id. ¶¶ 14–15. Mr. Blaustein’s hourly rates are
commensurate with the prevailing market rates charged by other lawyers at private
firms having similar skill, experience and reputation. In 2019 the Honorable
Barbara C. Moses of this Court approved Mr. Blaustein’s proposed rate of $400 per
hour for work completed in prior years in Joint Stock Co. Channel One Russia
Worldwide v. Infomir LLC, No. 16CV1318GBDBCM, 2019 WL 11825219, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. June 13, 2019). See also Sanson v. City of New York, 19 Civ. 2569 (AT),
2021 WL 1191566, at *3 (Mar. 30, 2021) (citations omitted) (acknowledging that
“[t]he customary rate for experienced litigators ranges from about $400 to $600 per
hour in civil rights cases”); Balu v. City of New York, 12 Civ. 1071, 2016 WL
884666, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2016) (setting rate of $450 per hour for
experienced trial counsel in an employment discrimination case.); see also Bravia
Capital Partners, Inc. v. Fike, 296 F.R.D. at 143–145 (awarding, in 2013, a
reasonable hourly rate of $375 to a law firm partner, who was the principal drafter
of the motion to compel, with 15 years of experience); Mazzei v. Money Store, 2015
WL 2129675, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 2015) (awarding hourly rate of $450 to
attorney with fifteen years of experience in the area of complex litigation in federal
and state courts). Moreover, applying the Johnson Factors to the rates requested
for Mr. Blaustein, the Court should find that his rates are appropriate in light of the
time and effort put into the Motion to Compel—consisting of an exhaustive, 32page Memorandum of Law, and two sworn declarations attaching a combined
forty-three (43) exhibits. See Blaustein Decl. ¶ 20. Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel,
moreover, concerned numerous discovery disputes that were vigorously disputed
between the parties, including G4S’ deficient response to Wager’s requests for
document and ESI [electronically stored information] discovery, failure to produce
critical documents pertaining to Wager’s termination and outstanding commissions
and refusal to allow Wager to conduct a forensic analysis of the device known as
“Ron’s iPhone” in contravention of this Court’s previous orders; G4S’ objections
to Wager’s post-deposition discovery requests made on May 26, 2020; G4S’ May
8, 2020 objections to Wager’s proposed nonparty subpoenas; and G4S’ failure to
provide Wager with a complete and updated privilege log. Finally, Wager
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succeeded in obtaining every single item of relief requested in her Motion to
Compel, with the sole exception of her motion for an updated and completed
privilege log, which the Court denied as moot after compelling G4S to produce
certain documents and ESI. (Fee Order at 6).
The plaintiff seeks an hourly rate of $325 and $350 for work performed by Bousquet-Lambert,
her standard billing rates.
Ms. Bousquet-Lambert received her law license in 2012 and a Master’s Degree in
law in 2013 from the University Pantheon-Assas in Paris, France; a Master’s
Degree in English and U.S. business law in 2014 from the University PantheonSorbonne in Paris, France; and a LL.M. from Fordham Law School in 2015.
Declaration of Sixtine Bousquet-Lambert (“Bousquet-Lambert Decl.”) ¶ 4. Ms.
Bousquet-Lambert has been admitted to practice in New York State for nearly five
years and is also admitted to practice in France. Id. ¶ 3. She has over five years of
experience litigating commercial disputes in state and federal courts. For instance,
Ms. Bousquet-Lambert successfully argued before the Appellate Division, First
Department, obtaining a unanimous reversal of two New York Supreme Court
orders and an award of summary judgment in a Dunnington client’s favor.
iPAYMENT, Inc., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Andrew Silverman, et al.,
DefendantsRespondents., 2021 NY Slip Op 66211(U) (1st Dept. May 18, 2021).
Bousquet-Lambert Decl. ¶ 5. The rates requested for Ms. Bousquet-Lambert’s
work on the Motion to Compel are the same as those paid by Ms. Wager in the
normal course. Moreover, Ms. Bousquet-Lambert’s hourly rate is within the range
of hourly rates awarded to similarly experienced attorneys in this District. Abraham
v. Leigh, 17 Civ. 5429 (KPF), 2020 WL 5512718, *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2020)
(awarding rate of $325 per hour to law firm associate with five years of experience);
see also Herbalist & Alchemist, Inc. v. Alurent Prod, Inc., No. 16 Civ. 9204 (ER),
2018 WL 3329857, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 5, 2018) (holding that an hourly rate of
$325 was reasonable for a mid-level associate and was within the range of rates that
have been approved for law firm associates in this District).
The plaintiff seeks $195 and $220 for Vidulich, who “is a graduate of Cornell University, and
has approximately five and a half years of experience as a paralegal. The requested hourly rates
are reasonable in light of Mr. Vidulich’s experience.”
According to the plaintiff, the hours expended in connection with the motion to compel
are reasonable: (i) 32.95 by Blaustein, 13.3 by Bousquet-Lambert and 2 by Vidulich on a “PreMotion letter and correspondence with opposing counsel re: discovery disputes and subpoenas”;
(ii) 20.8 by Blaustein, 4.3 by Bousquet-Lambert and 1.75 by Vidulich on a “Pre-Motion letter
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and correspondence with opposing counsel re: discovery”; (iii) 60.35 by Blaustein, 42.5 by
Bousquet-Lambert and 5 by Vidulich on a “Motion to Compel”; and (iv) 15.1 by Blaustein, 4.3
by Bousquet-Lambert and 1.5 by Vidulich on “Objections to Judge Fox’s Order.” The plaintiff
requests $1,383.37 in expenses for Westlaw and Pacer services. Moreover, the plaintiff requests
“that the Court grant her leave to submit evidence to G4S of the reasonable fees and expenses
incurred in connection with the instant fee application and, in the event of a further dispute
between the parties as to the amount of fees and expenses, to schedule an inquest awarding
Wager’s reasonable expenses, including attorneys’ fees and costs, incurred in the filing of her fee
application.” In support of the motion, the plaintiff submitted declarations by Blaustein with
exhibits and Bousquet-Lambert.
DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION
The defendant opposes the motion asserting that the plaintiff “failed to seek disclosure of
specific documents prior to filing her motion to compel.” The plaintiff’s counsel “repeatedly
demanded vague categories of documents, such as “HR documents” concerning the plaintiff.
“While objecting to such vague requests, G4S has also produced all responsive documents
uncovered by a good faith search.”
The defendant contends that its “positions regarding discovery production have all been
substantially justified, as demonstrated by the briefing to this Court.” “There are three categories
of disputed discovery underlying Plaintiff’s motion, including: (1) native commission
statements; (2) a forensic image of Ron Posner’s [‘Posner’] iPhone; and (3) non-party subpoenas
to Dr. Sara E. Boyd [‘Dr. Boyd’], Access Control Technologies [‘ACT’], and Stephen Tukavkin
[‘Tukavkin’]. ECF No. 125, p. 2.” According to the defendant,
[o]ver the last two years, Plaintiff has insisted that G4S had not produced
commission statements, despite G4S expressly identifying the exact location of the
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production to Plaintiff’s counsel via email on numerous occasions without a
response. It was not until the parties’ mediation on March 17, 2021, that Plaintiff
explained she was seeking commission statements in native format. Approximately
one week after Plaintiff properly articulated her request, G4S complied by
producing Plaintiff’s monthly commission statements in native format as G4S
005651-005662, in addition to commission statements of several other G4S
employees. Plaintiff should not be awarded fees in connection with her request for
commission statements because G4S’ position was reasonable in that it produced
the commission statements at the inception of this case, identified the commission
statements for Plaintiff in its production, and subsequently produced them again in
native format at Plaintiff’s request. There is no basis to sanction G4S for Plaintiff’s
failure to communicate the alleged deficiencies in its production before seeking
relief from this Court.
Concerning the issue of Posner’s iPhone, the plaintiff refused to cooperate with the
defendant who “preserved a forensic image of Ron Posner’s personal iPhone consistent with
Judge Woods’ Order in December 2019.” While Judge Woods never ordered production of the
forensic image, the defendant attempted to work with the plaintiff to identify a mutually
agreeable scope of information contained on Posner’s iPhone, including proposing a protective
order in April 2020, to preserve irrelevant and personal information on Posner’s personal device,
which the plaintiff refused. On May 8, 2020, the plaintiff served discovery requests concerning
Posner’s personal iPhone, and the defendant reiterated its objections regarding the scope and the
need for a protective order, which the plaintiff refused to negotiate or “informally limit the scope
of ESI from Posner’s personal device to resolve the dispute.” Moreover, the defendant proposed
a forensic expert to extract relevant information from Posner’s personal device and invited the
plaintiff to suggest another method to identify relevant data, which the plaintiff ignored. When
the “Court ordered production of the forensic image,” the defendant “complied in requesting that
the parties’ forensic expert send a copy of the image directly to Plaintiff’s counsel.” The
defendant was justified and acted reasonably in preserving a copy of Posner’s personal device

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and seeking to protect his privacy and the plaintiff should not be rewarded for bad faith conduct
in seeking information on Posner’s iPhone.
The defendant contends that its good-faith objections to the plaintiff’s non-party
subpoena to potential forensic expert Dr. Boyd, ACT and Tukavkin were consistent with Rule 45
and necessary to protect privileged and confidential information. The defendant’s position on
Dr. Boyd’s subpoena is supported by law and the facts of this case, and the plaintiff had no basis
to request privileged and confidential information of an expert witness during fact discovery.
The plaintiff wasted resources by “her unrelenting pursuit of categorically irrelevant information
from Dr. Boyd,” knowing that her disclaimer of any emotional distress damages during her
deposition would obviate the need for Dr. Boyd as an expert witness. The subpoena on ACT
seeking documents regarding disciplinary action or complaints related to the defendant’s
employee Robert DeSimone (“DeSimone”) was also irrelevant, and the defendant was
substantially justified in its position of objecting to it because DeSimone’s conduct during his
employment with ACT did not have any bearing on this action. The plaintiff did not work with
Tukavkin and offered no evidence that he has any knowledge of her claims; thus, sanctions are
not warranted given that discovery sought was irrelevant. The defendant argues that awarding
plaintiff her fees or costs would be unjust due to her proven lack of credibility as a result of her
perjury “at the fraudulent TRO hearing,” and her “statements cannot be taken at face value,
along with her counsel’s unprofessional bullying G4S’s lead counsel.”
The defendant maintains that the requested fees are unreasonable because the conduct of
the plaintiff’s counsel “unnecessarily and significantly increased the cost, labor and time
required in this case, and such misconduct should reduce any award.” That conduct included:
“(1) requesting irrelevant, vague, and overbroad categories of documents; (2) refusing to provide

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specific lists of documents or ESI during or as a result of meet and confer conferences; and (3)
only providing specificity through motions seeking to compel documents with this Court.” The
defendant asserts that the requested fees should be reduced significantly “because the time and
costs are facially unreasonable and plaintiff has not produced appropriate time and billing
records for inspection,” making it impossible to analyze what is unreasonable in the time entries.
It is not necessary, however, to carefully scrutinize the billing records here to
conclude that Plaintiff’s purported fees and costs are unreasonable. First, Plaintiff
flatly admits that the Motion to Compel resulted in maximum fees of only
$40,436.25. Plaintiff was only partially successful on this motion, so even that
number must be substantially reduced. Second, Plaintiff improperly included
billing for an administrative employee, which is not allowed by this Court. Thus,
any total must be further reduced by these inappropriate paralegal hours. Third, if
any fees are to be awarded, Plaintiff’s counsel must produce his full native
timekeeping and billing records for inspection, so that G4S’ counsel and this Court
can analyze the reasonableness of those expenditures under the Second Circuit’s
factors, which necessarily begin with an inquiry into: “(1) the time and labor
required.” See Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n v. Cnty. of
Albany, 522 F.3d 182, 190 (2d Cir. 2008). Obviously, it is impossible to determine
what time or labor was required without native timekeeping and billing records.
In support of its opposition to the motion, the defendant submitted a declaration by its attorney.
PLAINTIFF’S REPLY
The plaintiff argues that the defendant: (1) “may not make a collateral challenge to the
discovery order to avoid Judge Vyskocil’s subsequent directives” because it did not seek
reconsideration of the order or otherwise seek any relief in connection with it; (2) “failed to
challenge the ‘lodestar’ amount”; and (3) “has not demonstrated that an exception to the
mandatory fee-shifting provision of Rule 37 is warranted,” as Judge Vyskocil’s order directed.
Having lost on the merits, the defendant now objects belatedly to the fee application on the
grounds that the plaintiff “demanded vague categories of documents,” even though the
documents the plaintiff seeks include “those identified by G4S employees during their

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depositions.” It is not clear what relevance, if any, the defendant’s assertion bears on the
plaintiff’s entitlement to fees. The defendant cannot dispute that the plaintiff sought in good
faith to resolve the discovery dispute before filing her motion to compel, since the plaintiff
received authorization to file her motion. The plaintiff maintains that the defendant’s conduct
was not substantially justified, as the Court overruled its objections to “Project Financials” on
relevance ground as meritless and found that the defendant was not justified in failing to comply
with the Court’s scheduling order. “As acknowledged by the Court, despite its assertion that the
Project Financials contain trade secrets and other confidential information as a basis to withhold
them from production, G4S failed to seek a protective order resulting in a waiver.”
Concerning Posner’s iPhone, “in overruling G4S’ objections and granting Wager’s
motion to compel G4S’ forensic copy of ‘Ron’s iPhone’, the Court found that G4S had produced
no evidence that ‘the majority of the data on Mr. Posner’s personal device, if not all of it, . . .
contain[ed] private and sensitive personal information rather than any evidence to support
Plaintiff’s unsubstantiated allegation[.]’” Furthermore, the Court found that the defendant acted
unreasonably by failing to seek timely a protective order in connection with Posner’s iPhone,
despite its knowledge that the plaintiff did not consent to a proposed joint forensic expert.
“Contrary to G4S’ contentions, the Court also properly overruled G4S’ objections to the Wager
Subpoenas, finding that G4S ‘has no standing to object to the plaintiff’s subpoenas directed to
Dr. Boyd, Tukavkin and ACT because it failed to assert a claim of privilege or a personal right in
connection with those subpoenas, and it has no standing to challenge them on grounds of
relevancy.’” The defendant failed to identify circumstances that would render an award of the
plaintiff’s fees and expenses unjust. The plaintiff requests “leave to seek the fees incurred on

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reply.” In support of the reply, the plaintiff submitted Blaustein’s declaration with exhibit and
Bousquet-Lambert’s declaration.
LEGAL STANDARD
If the motion is granted--or if the disclosure or requested discovery is provided after
the motion was filed--the court must, after giving an opportunity to be heard,
require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion, the party or
attorney advising that conduct, or both to pay the movant's reasonable expenses
incurred in making the motion, including attorney's fees. But the court must not
order this payment if:
(i) the movant filed the motion before attempting in good faith to obtain the
disclosure or discovery without court action;
(ii) the opposing party’s nondisclosure, response, or objection was substantially
justified; or
(iii) other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A).
[T]he test for avoiding the imposition of attorney’s fees for resisting discovery in
district court is whether the resistance was “substantially justified,” Fed. Rules Civ.
Proc. 37(a)(4) and (b)(2)(E). To our knowledge, that has never been described as
meaning “justified to a high degree,” but rather has been said to be satisfied if there
is a “genuine dispute,” Advisory Committee’s Notes on 1970 Amendments to Fed.
Rule Civ. Proc. 37(a)(4), 28 U.S.C. App., p. 601; see, e.g., Quaker Chair Corp. v.
Litton Business Systems, Inc., 71 F.R.D. 527, 535 (SDNY 1976), or “if reasonable
people could differ as to [the appropriateness of the contested action.]”
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565, 108 S. Ct. 2541, 2550 (1988) (citations
omitted).
When exercising their discretion to determine the reasonableness of the attorney’s fees
sought in an action based on a federal question, courts in this Circuit use the “presumptively
reasonable fee” standard. Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n v. County of
Albany, 522 F.3d 182, 190 (2d Cir. 2008). The presumptively reasonable fee, also known as the
lodestar, is “the product of a reasonable hourly rate and the reasonable number of hours required
by the case.” Millea v. Metro-North R.R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 2011). In calculating
the presumptively reasonable fee, a district court must consider, among others, the twelve factors
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articulated in Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). See Arbor
Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass’n, 522 F.3d at 190. Those factors are:
(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3)
the level of skill required to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion
of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the attorney’s
customary hourly rate; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) the time
limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved in
the case and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the
attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature and length of the
professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.
Id. at 186-87 n.3.
A reasonable hourly rate is “the rate prevailing in the [relevant] community for similar services
by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Farbotko v. Clinton Cty.
of N.Y., 433 F.3d 204, 208 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 n.11,
104 S. Ct. 1541, 1547 n.11 (1984)). A fee application that is not supported by evidence of
“contemporaneous time records indicating, for each attorney, the date, the hours expended, and
the nature of the work done” should normally be denied. New York State Ass’n for Retarded
Children, Inc. v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1154 (2d Cir. 1983).
APPLICATION OF LEGAL STANDARD
Whether Any of the Three Exceptions Under Rule 37(a)(5)(A) Applies
(i) Whether the Movant Filed the Motion Before Attempting in Good Faith to
Obtain the Disclosure or Discovery without Court Action
Any assertion by the defendant that the plaintiff filed her motion before attempting in
good faith to obtain discovery without court action is meritless because the Court denied the
plaintiff’s request for a pre-motion conference in connection with her discovery motions, see
Docket Entry No. 112, which triggered the authorization to make a formal motion under Local

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Civil Rule 37.2 of this court. Thus, exception (i) to mandatory fees under Rule 37(a)(5)(A) does
not apply.
(ii) Whether the Opposing Party’s Nondisclosure, Response, or Objection Was
Substantially Justified
For the reasons explained in the plaintiff’s motion papers and articulated in the Court’s
November 27, 2020 order, Docket Entry No. 125, vacated “in part insofar as Magistrate Judge
Fox declined to consider Plaintiff’s request to recover expenses,” Docket Entry No. 132, the
Court finds that the defendant’s objections to the plaintiff’s discovery requests subject to the
motion to compel at issue, were not substantially justified. The defendant’s belated attempt to
reargue the merits of its objections on the grounds that the plaintiff “demanded vague categories
of documents” is meritless. The Court already determined in its November 27, 2020 order that:
(i) the defendant’s objections to “Project Financials” on relevance ground were meritless and
found that the defendant was not justified in failing to comply with the Court’s scheduling order;
(ii) the defendant acted unreasonably by failing to seek timely a protective order in connection
with Posner’s iPhone, despite its knowledge that the plaintiff did not consent to a proposed joint
forensic expert; and (iii) had no standing to object to the plaintiff’s subpoenas directed to Dr.
Boyd, Tukavkin and ACT because it failed to assert a claim of privilege or a personal right in
connection with those subpoenas. Accordingly, exception (ii) to mandatory fees under Rule
37(a)(5)(A) does not apply.
(iii) Whether Other Circumstances Make an Award of Expenses Unjust
The defendant asserts that awarding plaintiff her fees or costs would be unjust due to her
proven lack of credibility as a result of her perjury “at the fraudulent TRO hearing,” and her
“statements cannot be taken at face value, along with her counsel’s unprofessional bullying

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G4S’s lead counsel.” However, the defendant’s assertions that the plaintiff committed perjury,
“at the fraudulent TRO hearing,” and her counsel “unprofessionally bull[ied] G4S’s lead
counsel” have been rejected by the Court’s September 21, 2021 order denying the defendant’s
motion for sanctions based on the same grounds. See Docket Entry No. 173. The defendant did
not establish that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. Thus, exception (iii) to
mandatory fees under Rule 37(a)(5)(A) does not apply.
Whether Requested Hourly Rates Are Reasonable
The defendant does not challenge the requested hourly rates. Upon review of the
plaintiff’s submissions, and based on the attorneys’ and paralegal’s skills, experience and
reputation, and the relevant factors, the Court finds that the following hourly rates are
reasonable: (1) $425 in 2020 and $475 in 2021 for Blaustein; (2) $325 in 2020 and $350 in 2021
for Bousquet-Lambert; and (3) $195 in 2020 and $225 in 2021 for Vidulich.
Whether Requested Hours Are Reasonable
The defendant asserts that the plaintiff failed to submit “native timekeeping and billing
records” without citation to any authority or explanation of the phrase “native timekeeping and
billing records.” Contrary to the defendant’s assertion, the plaintiff submitted detailed billing
invoices containing time entries for each attorney and paralegal, dates of services provided, a
sufficient description of the services provided in connection with the motion to compel and hours
of services provided. The defendant’s assertion that the plaintiff was “only partially successful”
on her motion is baseless because the assigned district judge determined that the “Plaintiff
largely prevailed on her motion” and “the expense-shifting provision under Rule 37(a)(5)(A), not
Rule 37(a)(5)(C), applies.” Docket Entry No. 132. The defendant’s assertion that “Plaintiff
improperly included billing for an administrative employee, which is not allowed by this Court”

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is rejected as unsupported by citation to any legal authority. The defendant did not assert any
other basis for challenging the number of hours requested in connection with the plaintiff’s
motion to compel or justifying any reduction of hours. Upon review of the plaintiff’s
submissions and consideration of the relevant factors, the Court finds that the following hours
are reasonable: (i) 129.2 expended by Blaustein; (ii) 64.4, expended by Bosquet-Lambert; and
(iii) 10.25, expended by Vidulich.
Whether Expenses Are Reasonable
“[W]here an attorney ordinarily charges computer research expenses separately to clients
(rather than treating it as part of overhead), such expenses should be reimbursed in an award of
attorney’s fees.” Banco Cent. Del Paraguay v. Paraguay Humanitarian Found., Inc., No. 01 CIV.
9649 (JFK), 2007 WL 747814, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2007) (citation omitted). The plaintiff’s
counsel charged the plaintiff for Pacer and Westlaw research expenses separately. Thus,
awarding $1,383.37 in expenses is reasonable.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees, Docket Entry No.
155, is granted and an award of $77,838.25 in attorneys’ fees and $1,383.37 in expenses is
warranted. The plaintiff shall file her application for attorneys’ fees in connection with the
instant fee application, no longer than five double-spaced pages accompanied by evidence, on or
before September 30, 2021. Any challenge to the reasonableness of the fee application, no
longer than five double-spaced pages, must be filed on or before October 7, 2021, and any reply,

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no longer than three double-spaced pages, may be filed on or before October 10, 2021.
Dated: New York, New York
September 23, 2021

SO ORDERED:

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