Rynasko v. New York University

Filing 83

OPINION AND ORDER re: 73 LETTER MOTION to Expedite Class Certification Briefing addressed to Judge George B. Daniels from Keara M. Gordon dated November 6, 2023. LETTER MOTION for Discovery to be Bifurcated addressed to J udge George B. Daniels from Keara M. Gordon dated November 6, 2023. filed by New York University. For the reasons set forth above, the Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows: 1. For the next 90 days, i.e., until February 20, 202 4, the parties shall focus their efforts on discovery related to class certification ("Class Discovery"), which shall consist of the following: a. Discovery specific to Hall-Landers, including: (i) documents in their possession, custody, and control concerning their claims; (ii) Hall-Landers' deposition; (iii) NYU's account statements reflecting tuition and fees with respect to Hall-Landers; and (iv) NYU records reflecting Hall-Landers access to and use of facilities and services during the Spring Semester 2020; b. NYU's re-production of documents in Garcia relevant to the Fee Claims; c. Documents sufficient to show NYUs tuition policies and practices during the Spring Semester 2020; d. Documents sufficient t o show NYUs COVID-19 Policies during the Spring Semester 2020; e. Documents sufficient to show Tischs marketing materials, course catalogs, and policies and procedures; f. Depositions of: (i) a Rule 30(b)(6) representative of NYU; (ii) a Rule 30(b) (6) representative of Tisch; and (iii) a Rule 30(b)(6) representative of NYUs Bursar's Office; and g. Other categories of documents and information or witnesses mutually agreed by the parties.2. Until May 16, 2024, discovery other than Class D iscovery, as defined in paragraph 1, is held in abeyance. 3. By March 21, 2024, Hall-Landers shall file the Class Motion. 4. By April 22, 2024, Defendants shall file their opposition to the Class Motion. 5. By May 6, 2024, Hall-Landers shall file any reply in further support of the Class Motion. 6. By May 13, 2024, the parties shall file a joint letter of no longer than five (5) pages setting forth their positions as to which, if any, merits discovery may proceed while the Class Motion is pen ding. 7. On Thursday, May 16, 2024 at 10:00 am, the Court will hold an in-person conference in Courtroom 18A 500 Pearl Street, New York, New York. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to close ECF No. 73. SO ORDERED. (Motions due by 3/21/202 4., Responses due by 4/22/2024, Replies due by 5/6/2024., Status Conference set for 5/16/2024 at 10:00 AM in Courtroom 18A, 500 Pearl Street, New York, NY 10007 before Magistrate Judge Sarah L. Cave.) (Signed by Magistrate Judge Sarah L. Cave on 11/22/2023) (jca)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
CASEY E. HALL-LANDERS, individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated
v.

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 20 Civ. 3250 (GBD) (SLC)

Plaintiff,

OPINION & ORDER

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY,
Defendant.
SARAH L. CAVE, United States Magistrate Judge.
I.INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Casey E. Hall-Sanders (“Hall-Landers” or “Plaintiff”)1 brings this putative class
action against Defendant New York University (“NYU”) asserting claims for breach of contract,
unjust enrichment, conversion, and money had and received seeking a refund of tuition and fees
in connection with NYU’s decision to move all classes to remote learning in response to the
COVID-19 pandemic. (ECF No. 66 (the “SAC”)). Before the Court is NYU’s letter-motion
requesting bifurcation of class action discovery from merits discovery, which Hall-Landers
opposes. (ECF Nos. 73 (the “Motion”); 74 (the “Opposition”)). As explained more fully below,
the Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
II.BACKGROUND
This action is one of several post-COVID lawsuits against universities “seeking partial
refunds of the tuition and fees that students pre-paid, allegedly for in-person learning and other,
non-academic services.” Garcia de León v. N.Y. Univ., No. 21 Civ. 5005 (CM), 2022 WL 2237452,

The Court employs the pronouns “they” and “them” when referring to Hall-Landers. (See, e.g.,
ECF No. 66 ¶¶ 18, 24–26, 98).
1

at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2022) (“Garcia II”) (denying motion for class certification and dismissing
complaint without prejudice for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction). 2

The factual

background of this action, originally filed by Christina Rynasko (“Rynasko”), the parent of an NYU
student, is set forth in the memorandum decision and order of the Honorable George B. Daniels
dated April 21, 2021, and the subsequent decision by the Second Circuit, and is incorporated by
reference. See Rynasko v. N.Y. Univ., 63 F.4th 186, 190–92 (2d Cir. 2023) (“Rynasko II”), aff’g in
part, rev’g in part, and remanding, Rynasko v. N.Y. Univ., No. 20 Civ. 3250 (GBD), 2021 WL
1565614, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2021) (“Rynasko I”). In Rynasko I, Judge Daniels granted NYU’s
motion to dismiss Rynasko’s Complaint on the ground that she lacked standing to bring her
claims, and denied leave to amend to add Hall-Landers as a plaintiff, finding that they failed to
state a claim for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, money had and received, or conversion.
Rynasko I, 2021 WL 1565614, at *1, 3–4. In Rynasko II, the Second Circuit affirmed Judge Daniels’
holding that Rynasko lacked standing and found that she failed to state a claim for conversion,
but found that Hall-Landers’s proposed amendments stated plausible claims for breach of
contract, unjust enrichment, and money had and received, and therefore vacated the denial of
leave to amend and remanded for further proceedings. Rynasko II, 62 F.4th at 193–202.
Following remand, on September 19, 2023, Hall-Landers filed the SAC, replacing Rynasko
as the putative representative of proposed classes of NYU students who paid tuition and fees for
the Spring Semester 2020 for in-person educational and on-campus services that NYU failed to

See also Zagoria v. N.Y. Univ., No. 20 Civ. 3610 (GBD) (SLC) (S.D.N.Y.) (filed May 8, 2020); Morales v. N.Y.
Univ., No. 20 Civ. 4418 (GBD) (S.D.N.Y.) (filed June 9, 2020); Romankow v. N.Y. Univ., No. 20 Civ. 4616
(GBD) (S.D.N.Y.) (filed June 16, 2020); Freeman v. N.Y. Univ., No. 21 Civ. 1029 (GBD) (S.D.N.Y.) (removed
to Federal Court on Feb. 4, 2021). On November 12, 2020, Judge Daniels denied without prejudice Plaintiff
Zagoria’s motion to consolidate his case with this action, Morales, and Romankow. (ECF No. 39).
2

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provide and for which NYU failed to provide refunds. (ECF No. 66 ¶¶ 103–04 (the “Proposed
Classes”)). Hall-Landers, a graduate who majored in dance at NYU’s Tisch School of the Arts
(“Tisch”), alleges that they “enrolled at NYU to obtain the full experience of live, in-person course
and direct interactions with instructors and students.” (Id. ¶¶ 16–17). Because of the global
COVID-19 pandemic, NYU suspended all in-person classes as of March 11, 2020, following which
“[c]lasses that continued were only offered in an online format, with no in-person instruction.”
(Id. ¶¶ 3, 5–6). Because of NYU’s conversion to online classes and closure of its facilities after
March 11, 2020, NYU “did not deliver the in-person educational services, facilities, access and/or
opportunities that Plaintiff and the members of the [Proposed Classes] contracted and paid for.”
(Id. ¶ 7; see id. ¶¶ 22, 28–29). For example, Plaintiff “was deprived of access to the dance studio
as a result of NYU’s closure[,]” “had to take classes at off hours (sometimes 6 a.m.) or record the
class, which deprived them of the ability to obtain in-person professor feedback[,]” and “had to
purchase a ballet [barre] out-of-pocket for their instruction at home[.]” (Id. ¶¶ 22–24). Plaintiff
was also deprived of “access to physical therapy services related to their dance instruction” and
“vital collaborations with other students that were part of their classes.” (Id. ¶¶ 25–26).
In the SAC, Hall-Landers asserts four claims. (ECF No. 66 ¶¶ 113–56). First, they allege
that NYU, through “statements on its website and in its handbooks, policy manuals, brochures,
course catalogs, advertisements, and other promotional materials[,]” promised, offered, and
committed to provide “in-person educational services, experiences, opportunities, and other
related services[,]” in exchange for payment of tuition and fees by Hall-Landers and members of
the Proposed Classes. (Id. ¶¶ 116–17). Hall-Landers alleges that NYU “materially breached the
parties’ contractual agreement by failing to provide in-person educational services for the
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entirety of the Spring Semester 2020[,]” damaging Hall-Landers and the members of the
Proposed Classes to the extent of the pro-rated portion of Spring Semester 2020 tuition and fees
for educational services that NYU did not provide. (Id. ¶¶ 124–29 (the “Breach of Contract
Claim”)). Second, Hall-Landers alleges that they and the members of the Proposed Classes
“entered into an implied contract by accepting [NYU’s] offer to register for on-campus classes
and use of [NYU’s] facilities in accordance with [its] usual and customary practice of providing
on-campus courses[,]” but NYU breached this implied contract by “mov[ing] all classes to online
classes, restrict[ing] or eliminat[ing] Plaintiff’s and [members of the Proposed Classes’] ability to
access university facilities, and/or evict[ing] Plaintiff and [members of the Proposed Classes] from
campus housing[,]” thus depriving them of “the benefit of their bargains with” NYU. (Id. ¶¶ 132–
37 (the “Implied Contract Claim”)). Third, Hall-Landers alleges that it would be unjust and
inequitable for NYU to retain “the full benefit of the tuition and a majority of the mandatory fee
payments by Plaintiff and the members of the [Proposed Classes] for the semester” when it
“failed to provide the in-person and on-campus live education and access to NYU’s services and
facilities for which tuition and mandatory fees were paid.” (Id. ¶¶ 144, 147 (the “Unjust
Enrichment Claim”)). Fourth, Hall-Landers alleges that NYU has retained the monies that they
and the members of the Proposed Classes paid “for the Spring Semester 2020 while not providing
in-person educational services, activities, opportunities, resources, and facilities for with those
monies were paid.” (Id. ¶¶ 149–56 (the “Money Had & Received Claim”)). Hall-Landers seeks on
behalf of themselves and the Proposed Classes compensatory and punitive damages,
prejudgment interest, restitution, injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees and costs. (Id. at 47). The
sole basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction over this action is the Class Action Fairness Act
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of 2005, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A) (“CAFA”), which requires at least one member of the Proposed
Classes to be a citizen of a different state than NYU, more than 100 members of the class, and an
aggregate amount in controversy greater than $5,000,000.00 exclusive of interest and costs. (Id.
¶ 31). See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(2)–(6); see also Garcia II, 2022 WL 2237452, at *17 n.7 (discussing
CAFA requirements).
On November 2, 2023, NYU filed an answer to the SAC. (ECF No. 72). On November 6,
2023, NYU filed the Motion and Hall-Landers filed the Opposition. (ECF Nos. 73; 74). Following
a conference with the parties on November 7, 2023, Judge Daniels referred the action to the
undersigned for general pretrial supervision and settlement. (ECF Nos. 75; 77; ECF min. entry
Nov. 7, 2023). On November 16, 2023, the Court heard further argument from the parties and
took the Motion under advisement. (ECF Nos. 76; 82; ECF min. entry Nov. 16, 2023).
III.DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
On “a showing of good cause[,] a district court has considerable discretion to stay
discovery pursuant to Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Integrated Sys. &
Power, Inc. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., No. 09 Civ. 5874 (RPP), 2009 WL 2777076, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
1, 2009); accord Roper v. City of New York, No. 15 Civ. 8899 (PAE) (GWG), 2017 WL 462270, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2017). 3 “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(d) also allows the Court to control
the sequence and timing of discovery, particularly where resolution of a preliminary matter may
decide the entire case.” Roper, 2017 WL 462270, at *1; see Thrower v. Pozzi, No. 99 Civ. 5871
(GBD), 2002 WL91612, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2002); Ass’n Fe Y Allegria v. Rep. of Ecuador, No. 98

3

Internal citations and quotation marks are omitted from case citations unless otherwise indicated.
5

Civ. 8650 (BSJ), 1999 WL 147716, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 1999). In determining whether to
exercise its discretion to grant a stay of discovery, the Court “must look to the particular
circumstances and posture of each case.” Alford v. City of New York, No. 11 Civ. 6222 (ERK)
(MDG), 2012 WL 947498, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2012). As the moving party, NYU bears the
burden of demonstrating good cause under Rule 26(c). See Roper, 2017 WL 462270, at *1.
In the context of putative class actions, good case may be found “where the resolution of
a single issue may resolve the case and render trial on the other issue[s] unnecessary[,]”or where
“a narrow, potentially dispositive issue” that is “totally distinct from class issues” has the
potential to render the named plaintiff’s claims non-actionable. Charvat v. Plymouth Rock
Energy, LLC, No. 15 Civ. 4106 (JMA) (SIL), 2016 WL 207677, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2016).
Bifurcation, however, “is the exception, not the rule.” Cunningham v. Big Think Cap. Inc., No. 21
Civ. 2162 (DRH) (JMW), 2021 WL 4407749, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2021). In addition, “courts
will not bifurcate if bifurcation will simply delay class certification or obfuscate the issue of what
discovery relates to the class as opposed to the named plaintiff.” Id.
Also relevant to the question of bifurcation is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b), which
permits a district court, “[f]or convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize,
[to] order a separate trial of one or more separate issues” or claims. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b). The
Second Circuit has recognized that Rule 42(b):
affords a trial court the discretion to order separate trials where such an order will
further convenience, avoid prejudice, or promote efficiency. Therefore,
bifurcation may be appropriate where, for example, the litigation of the first issue
might eliminate the need to litigate the second issue, or where one party will be
prejudiced by evidence presented against another party.

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Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, 170 F.3d 311, 316 (2d Cir. 1999). Finally, it is well-settled that
“[a] district court has broad latitude to determine the scope of discovery and to manage the
discovery process.” See EM Ltd. v. Rep. of Argentina, 695 F.3d 201, 207 (2d Cir. 2012).
B. Application
1. The Parties’ Arguments
In the Motion, NYU asks the Court to bifurcate class discovery from merits discovery and
“expedite[] class certification briefing to determine whether the Court has subject matter
jurisdiction over this case.” (ECF No. 73 at 1). NYU also asks the Court to stay merits discovery
until Hall-Landers’ class certification motion (the “Class Motion”)—which has not yet been filed—
is decided. (Id. at 3; see ECF No. 77 at 6 (NYU’s counsel arguing that, to decide class certification,
“we don’t need to do [] the next step, which is then have 50,000 different analyses as pertain to
each putative class member, what their individual contract was.”)). NYU argues that because the
Court lacks federal subject matter jurisdiction over Hall-Landers’ individual claims—which do not
meet the $75,000 amount in controversy threshold under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)—and the sole basis
for jurisdiction is CAFA, if Hall-Landers does not “meet their burden to demonstrate that class
certification is appropriate, the Court would not have jurisdiction over their claims.” (ECF No. 73
at 2–3; see ECF No. 81 at 5 (Hall-Landers’ counsel conceding that CAFA is the “only basis for
federal subject matter jurisdiction”); id. at 11.4 “[T]o promote efficiency and preserve the Court’s
and the parties’ resources,” NYU asks the Court to: (1) set an expedited briefing schedule for the

Because Hall-Landers does not assert any federal law claims, federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 does not exist.

4

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Class Motion; and (2) set a schedule for discovery related to the Class Motion but stay merits
discovery until the Class Motion is decided. (ECF No. 73 at 3).
Hall-Landers responds that NYU has failed to demonstrate “good cause” for bifurcation
of discovery, which, as noted above, “‘is the exception, not the rule.’” (ECF No. 74 at 1 (quoting
Melville v. HOP Energy, LLC, No. 21 Civ. 10406 (KMK), 2023 WL 4054945, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 11,
2023)). Hall-Landers maintains that “there will be significant overlap between class and merits
issues[,] which would make bifurcation unwieldy and unworkable, and lead to unnecessary
discovery disputes.” (Id. at 2). Hall-Landers cites other tuition and fee refund cases in which
courts have declined to bifurcate class and merits discovery. (Id. at 2–3 (citing, inter alia, Ford v.
Rensselaer Polytech. Inst., No. 20 Civ. 470 (DNH) (CFH), 2022 WL 715779 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 10,
2022)).
2. The Garcia Action
Because the parties vigorously dispute the import of the Honorable Colleen McMahon’s
decisions in the Garcia action, the Court briefly summarizes the allegations, history, and rulings
in that action. Nelcy Mabel Garcia de León (“Garcia”) was a full-time graduate student in the
Master of Social Work program at NYU’s Rockland campus. See Garcia II, 2022 WL 2237452, at
*1. Like Hall-Landers, she brought a putative class action on behalf of herself and others similarly
situated seeking lost tuition and fees arising from NYU’s “decision to suspend all in-person classes
and all in-person university sponsored events in March 2020 in response to COVID-19.” Id. Garcia
asserted claims to recover tuition (the “Tuition Claims”) and fees (the “Fee Claims”). See Garcia
de Leon v. N.Y. Univ., No. 21 Civ. 5005 (CM), 2022 WL 179812, at *7–14 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2022)
(“Garcia I”).
8

On January 20, 2022, Judge McMahon granted NYU’s motion to dismiss the Tuition Claims
but declined to dismiss the Fee Claims. Garcia I, 2022 WL 179812, at *8–14. 5 In light of that
ruling, Judge McMahon noted that Garcia’s “individual claims [were] not federal in nature and
[did] not come close to meeting the threshold for diversity jurisdiction, if diversity even existed
(which, apparently, it [did] not)[,]” and therefore, the only remaining basis for federal jurisdiction
was CAFA. Id. at *15. The court concluded that it was “therefore, imperative that the court
ascertain as quickly as possible whether [the] action [could] be maintained as a class action.” Id.
Judge McMahon accordingly set an expedited schedule for class certification discovery and
briefing, ruling that “[o]nly class-related discovery may go forward during the next 60 days[,]”
with “discovery addressing only the merits [] stayed until the [Garcia’s class certification] motion
[was] decided.” Id. at *16.
The parties proceeded to conduct class discovery, after which Garcia moved for
certification of a “Fees Class,” defined as “all persons who paid fees for or on behalf of students
enrolled at [NYU] who were charged for services, facilities, resources, events and/or activities for
the spring 2020 semester that were not provided in whole or in part.” Garcia II, 2022 WL
2237452, at *1.
Judge McMahon denied Garcia’s class certification motion for three reasons. First, the
court found that Garcia had “not demonstrated, and cannot demonstrate, that she suffered the
same injury as every other NYU student[]” because “the undisputed evidence demonstrate[d]
that students enrolled in different schools across the university paid different types of fees—

Judge McMahon also dismissed Garcia’s claims for injunctive relief and under N.Y. General Business Law
§§ 349 and 350. Garcia I, 2022 WL 179812, at *6–7, 15.

5

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individual to each department or school or program within the institution[]” and “that each
individual school or program made its own decision about what fees to refund or not refund[.]”
Garcia II, 2022 WL 2237452, at *11. Judge McMahon found that these undisputed facts “cut[]
off at the knees any suggestion that the claims of all NYU students could possibly revolve around
a single issue the truth or falsity of which could be resolved ‘at one stroke.’” Id. Similarly, the
court found that Garcia failed to establish that “any other students, let alone ‘all students,’ were
‘uniformly impacted’ by the shutdown and lack of fee refund that she claims to have
experienced[,]” and therefore did not establish that her claim was “typical of the class she
[sought] to represent.” Id. Second, Judge McMahon found that Garcia was an inadequate class
representative and that her proposed class counsel was similarly inadequate. Id. at *13–17.
Third, Judge McMahon found that “individual questions undoubtedly predominate[d] over class
questions in [that] case[,]” such as “‘whether the amount already refunded by NYU [was]
sufficient to redress lack of access to the various activities and services covered by student fees.’”
Id. at *17–18. The court observed that to determine whether NYU’s refunds were sufficient, it
“would have to review each individual fee, each individual refund, and determine whether the
associated services, supplies, or equipment were provided and, if not, whether a sufficient refund
was issued.”

Id. at 18. Accordingly, Judge McMahon denied Garcia’s motion for class

certification and appointment of class plaintiff and class counsel, and, “[b]ecause th[e] case
[could not] be maintained as a class action . . . the lone basis for federal jurisdiction
disappear[ed,]” requiring dismissal of the complaint without prejudice. Id.

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3. Partial bifurcation is warranted.
Viewing Hall-Landers’ claims in the context of Judge McMahon’s rulings in the very similar
Garcia action, the Court finds that NYU has shown good cause for—and efficiency and economy
warrant—partial bifurcation of class and merits discovery.
First, if class certification is denied, the Court will no longer have subject matter
jurisdiction over Hall-Landers’ claims. (See ECF No. 81 at 5). Thus, as in Garcia, it is “imperative
that the [C]ourt ascertain as quickly as possible whether this action can be maintained as a class
action.” Garcia I, 2022 WL 179812, at *15. The presence of this threshold jurisdictional question
renders this action distinguishable from other cases on which Hall-Landers relies to support the
denial of bifurcation. (ECF No. 74 at 2). 6 See Cunningham, 2021 WL 4407749, at *1 (involving
claims under federal statute); Melville, 2023 WL 4054945, at *2 (denying bifurcation in diversity
action but referring to magistrate judge defendant’s request to “narrow the scope of precertification discovery and ‘direct the parties not to conduct a full-blown class-wide merits
discovery’” until after class certification briefing); Loc. 3621, EMS Officers Union, DC-37, AFSCME,
AFL-CIO v. City of New York, No. 18 Civ. 4476 (LJL) (SLC), 2020 WL 1166047, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
11, 2020) 1 (involving federal claims); Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc., No. 09 Civ. 991 (SJ), 2010 WL
2775921, at *1 (denying bifurcation request in diversity action where defendant “made no
showing that discovery relating to class certification is entirely distinct from, and not enmeshed
with, discovery relating to class certification”). Hall-Landers also misplaces their reliance on Ford,

Hall-Landers also cites scheduling orders from several other tuition and fee refund cases, most of which
are pending in courts outside the Second Circuit and in which the courts appear to have set a single fact
discovery deadline. (ECF No. 74 at 3). These scheduling orders do not reflect whether bifurcation was
requested, let alone contain any analysis why bifurcation was not appropriate under the circumstances of
those cases, and therefore are not determinative here.
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where the parties’ proposed schedule “did not bifurcate discovery,” and the court simply ruled
on which categories of class-related discovery would proceed, rejecting some of the plaintiffs’
requests and granting others. 2022 WL 715779, at *4–32. To the extent that the parties have
disputes about whether specific requests fall within the scope of this Order, they may raise them
pursuant to the Court’s discovery dispute practices. 7
Second, NYU is willing to gather and produce documents and information concerning HallLanders. (ECF No. ECF No. 81 at 17). Accordingly, the Court expects that NYU will promptly gather
and produce documents specific to Hall-Landers including, inter alia, statements reflecting tuition
and fees charged and paid, use of NYU facilities and services during the Spring Semester 2020,
and marketing materials and course catalogs concerning the dance program in which HallLanders was enrolled at Tisch.
Third, as NYU acknowledged, a significant portion of the class-wide discovery concerning
Hall-Landers’ Fee Claims has already been gathered and produced and can easily be reproduced
here. (ECF No. ECF No. 81 13–16). This included information concerning approximately 66
different fees that were charged among NYU’s programs during Spring Semester 2020, the
services that NYU continued to provide, admissions materials, NYU’s communications to the
student body regarding COVID-19 policies and procedures, among others. (Id. at 13–17). The
Court will direct NYU to make the entirety of the Garcia production available to Hall-Landers.
Fourth, the Court will work with the parties to manage the scope of discovery concerning
the Tuition Claims—which were not at issue in Garcia—to expedite NYU’s production of the

See Individual Rules and Practices in Civil Cases, available at https://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/hon-sarahl-cave.
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materials most pertinent to class certification, even if such discovery also pertains to the merits.
Cf. Loc. 3621, 2020 WL 1166047, at *6 (narrowing for “efficiency and economy” the scope of
merits discovery that would proceed while class motion was pending).
Fifth, the Court agrees with Hall-Landers that a single Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 30(b)(6) deposition is likely insufficient for class certification purposes. (ECF No. 81 at
30). The Court will therefore permit, in addition to a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of NYU generally,
a deposition of a representative of NYU’s Bursar’s Office, and a representative of Tisch, the school
in which Hall-Landers was enrolled. Hall-Landers may request additional class certification
depositions on a showing of good cause.
Sixth, the Court will set an expedited class certification briefing schedule, with a
conference once briefing is completed to discuss what, if any, additional discovery may proceed
while the motion is pending. See Loc. 3621, 2020 WL 1166047, at *7 (specifying merits discovery
to proceed while class motion was pending).
The Court concludes that this approach—a partial bifurcation to permit the parties to
prioritize class certification discovery—will result in the most efficient use of the parties’ and the
Court’s resources while promoting the prompt resolution of this action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1; Fed.
R. Civ. P. 42(b).

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IV.CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as
follows:
1. For the next 90 days, i.e., until February 20, 2024, the parties shall focus their efforts
on discovery related to class certification (“Class Discovery”), which shall consist of
the following:
a. Discovery specific to Hall-Landers, including: (i) documents in their possession,
custody, and control concerning their claims; (ii) Hall-Landers’ deposition;
(iii) NYU’s account statements reflecting tuition and fees with respect to HallLanders; and (iv) NYU records reflecting Hall-Landers access to and use of
facilities and services during the Spring Semester 2020;
b. NYU’s re-production of documents in Garcia relevant to the Fee Claims;
c. Documents sufficient to show NYU’s tuition policies and practices during the
Spring Semester 2020;
d. Documents sufficient to show NYU’s COVID-19 Policies during the Spring
Semester 2020;
e. Documents sufficient to show Tisch’s marketing materials, course catalogs,
and policies and procedures;
f. Depositions of: (i) a Rule 30(b)(6) representative of NYU; (ii) a Rule 30(b)(6)
representative of Tisch; and (iii) a Rule 30(b)(6) representative of NYU’s
Bursar’s Office; and

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g. Other categories of documents and information or witnesses mutually agreed
by the parties.
2. Until May 16, 2024, discovery other than Class Discovery, as defined in ¶ 1, is held in
abeyance.
3. By March 21, 2024, Hall-Landers shall file the Class Motion.
4. By April 22, 2024, Defendants shall file their opposition to the Class Motion.
5. By May 6, 2024, Hall-Landers shall file any reply in further support of the Class Motion.
6. By May 13, 2024, the parties shall file a joint letter of no longer than five (5) pages
setting forth their positions as to which, if any, merits discovery may proceed while
the Class Motion is pending.
7. On Thursday, May 16, 2024 at 10:00 am, the Court will hold an in-person conference
in Courtroom 18A 500 Pearl Street, New York, New York.
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to close ECF No. 73.
Dated:

New York, New York
November 22, 2023
SO ORDERED.
_________________________
SARAH L. CAVE
United States Magistrate Judge

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