Allbrooks v. New York State Department of Corrections et al

Filing 8

ORDER OF DISMISSAL: The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this order to Plaintiff and note service on the docket. Plaintiff's amended complaint, filed IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). (Signed by Judge Louis L. Stanton on 3/31/2021) (sac) Transmission to Docket Assistant Clerk for processing.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
THOMAS ALLBROOKS,
Plaintiff,
20-CV-8602 (LLS)

-againstNEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, et al.,

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Defendants.
LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff, who is incarcerated at Groveland Correcctional Facility, is proceeding pro se
and in forma pauperis (IFP). Plaintiff filed this complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that
Defendants violated his constitutional rights. By order dated December 9, 2020, the Court
directed Plaintiff to amend his complaint to address deficiencies in his original pleading. Plaintiff
filed an amended complaint, and the Court has reviewed it. The action is dismissed for failure to
state a claim.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought
by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a
governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP
complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639
(2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

BACKGROUND
In Plaintiff’s original complaint, he alleged that another inmate assaulted him in the south
yard at Fishkill Correctional Facility while two corrections officers, who were stationed in the
yard, talked to each other and ignored the yard activity. In the order directing Plaintiff to amend,
the Court construed the complaint as asserting a claim that the officers failed to protect him, in
violation of the Eighth Amendment, and granted Plaintiff leave to state facts suggesting that the
officers showed deliberate indifference to a substaintial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff’s safety.
In the amended complaint, Plaintiff restates the same facts alleged in the original
complaint; that is, he alleges that the two officers (1) “should have been paying closer attention
to the activities of the yard”; (2) “were negligent in their duties . . . by paying no attention to the
going’s on of that yard”; and (3) in their “direct inaction and negligent behavior allowed him to
be cut by another inmate.” (ECF 6, at 4.) He also alleges that “had these officers been doing their
job properly and paying attention to the activities of the yard they would have seen that plaintiff
had gotten cut and would have been able to ap[p]rehend the suspect/offender at the time of said
incident.” (Id.)
DISCUSSION
To state a failure-to-protect claim, a plaintiff must allege facts suggesting that a
correction officer “has knowledge that an inmate faces a substantial risk of serious harm and he
disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate the harm.” Darnell v. Pineiro,
849 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2017); see also Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1994)
(“Deliberate indifference requires more than negligence, but less than conduct undertaken for the
very purpose of causing harm.”). The mere negligence of a correctional official is not a basis for
a claim of a federal constitutional violation under § 1983. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,
335-36 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986).
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Here, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts suggesting that either correction officer was aware
of any risk to Plaintiff before he was assaulted, and failed to take reasonable measures to protect
him from that harm. Rather, Plaintiff argues that the officers were, at most, negligent in
performing their duties before and after the assault. But Plaintiff must state facts suggesting that
the officers’ subjective intent amounted to more than mere negligence. Thus, he fails to state a
failiure-to-protect claim against the correction officers.
District courts generally grant a pro se plaintiff leave to amend a complaint to cure its
defects, but leave to amend may be denied if the plaintiff has already been given an opportunity
to amend but has failed to cure the complaint’s deficiencies. See Ruotolo v. City of New York,
514 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2008); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Because
Plaintiff has already been given an opportunity to amend, the Court declines to grant Plaintiff
another opportunity.
A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims
when it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
Generally, “when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and
only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction.”
Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988)). Having dismissed the federal
claims over which the Court has original jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise its
supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims Plaintiff may be asserting. See Kolari v. New
York-Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Subsection (c) of § 1367 ‘confirms
the discretionary nature of supplemental jurisdiction by enumerating the circumstances in which
district courts can refuse its exercise.’”) (quoting City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522
U.S. 156, 173 (1997)).

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CONCLUSION
The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this order to Plaintiff and note service on
the docket. Plaintiff’s amended complaint, filed IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), is dismissed
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
SO ORDERED.
Dated:

March 31, 2021
New York, New York
Louis L. Stanton
U.S.D.J.

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