Edwardo v. The Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence et al

Filing 40

OPINION AND ORDER re: 32 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint in Lieu of an Answer Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12 (b)(2) and (b)(6). filed by The Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence, Louis E Gelineau, St. Anthony&# 039;s Church Corporation North Providence. For the reasons set forth above, Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is GRANTED. Although Plaintiff has not sought leave to amend the Second Amended Complaint, the Court f inds that amendment would not be appropriate in these circumstances. Generally speaking, courts should "freely give" leave to amend," see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); nevertheless, "leave to amend a complaint may be denied when amend ment would be futile." Nielsen v. Rabin, 746 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Such is the case here, where Plaintiff has already amended his pleadings twice and the Court cannot conceive how, given the nature of Plaintiff's claims, an amendment would cure the Court's lack of personal jurisdiction over Defendants. See, e.g., Taormina v. Thrifty Car Rental, No. 16 Civ. 3255 (VEC), 2016 WL 7392214, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2016) ("Because the Plaintiff has not demonstrated personal jurisdiction, leave to amend would be futile."). In closing, the Court wishes to make clear that this Opinion should not be read to minimize or excuse the execrable conduct detailed in the Second Amended Complaint or Defend ants' alleged roles in perpetuating the same. That the Court does not possess personal jurisdiction over Defendants in this action is not reflective of the Court's perception of the gravity of Plaintiff's allegations. The history of ad olescent sexual abuse is a scourge on the Roman Catholic Church with which it must continually reckon. But even for well-intentioned reasons, the Court may not extend its jurisdiction beyond the bounds of the law. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate all pending motions, adjourn all remaining dates, and close this case. (Signed by Judge Katherine Polk Failla on 1/8/2022) (rro) Transmission to Orders and Judgments Clerk for processing.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
PHILIP EDWARDO,
Plaintiff,
-v.-

21 Civ. 1514 (KPF)

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF
PROVIDENCE; ST. ANTHONY’S CHURCH
CORPORATION NORTH PROVIDENCE;
and LOUIS E. GELINEAU,

OPINION AND ORDER

Defendants.
KATHERINE POLK FAILLA, District Judge:
The operative complaint in this case depicts a harrowing, years-long
campaign of sexual abuse perpetrated on a vulnerable child by his parish
priest. Plaintiff Philip Edwardo recounts that from approximately 1978 to
1984, when he was between 12 and 17 years old, he became ensnared in a
cycle of sexual abuse and exploitation at the hands of Father Philip Magaldi, a
now-deceased Rhode Island priest. Invoking the suspended statute of
limitations for victims of child sexual abuse under the New York Child Victims
Act, Plaintiff brings suit against The Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence
(“RCB”), St. Anthony’s Church Corporation North Providence (“St. Anthony’s”),
and retired Bishop Louis E. Gelineau (“Bishop Gelineau,” and together with
RCB and St. Anthony’s, “Defendants”) for their roles in enabling Fr. Magaldi’s
reign of abuse and molestation.
Defendants move to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint on the
grounds that: (i) this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over any Defendant, all

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of whom are based in Rhode Island; and (ii) Plaintiff’s claims are barred by a
Rhode Island state court decision dismissing parallel claims brought by
Plaintiff against Defendants and others. Because the Court finds that it lacks
personal jurisdiction over Defendants, it grants their motion to dismiss.
BACKGROUND 1
A.

Factual Background 2
1.

The Parties

Philip Edwardo is an adult male citizen of the United States, currently
residing in Palm Beach County, Florida. (SAC ¶ 4). During the relevant time
period, Plaintiff was a resident of Rhode Island and was a minor under the age
of 18 years old. (Id.). Plaintiff served as an altar boy and was employed in
various capacities at St. Anthony’s, a parish of the Roman Catholic Church
located in Providence, Rhode Island. (Id. at ¶¶ 1, 5, 23). Fr. Magaldi was
employed as a diocesan priest at St. Anthony’s. (Id. at ¶¶ 1, 5, 21).

1

The facts in this Opinion are drawn from Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”
(Dkt. #30)), the well-pleaded allegations of which are taken as true for purposes of this
motion. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2008); see
also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The Court also considers the exhibits
attached to the Declaration of William E. Vita in support of Defendants’ motion to
dismiss (“Vita Decl., Ex. [ ]” (Dkt. #33)), which exhibits consist primarily of court
documents filed in a related action brought by Plaintiff in Rhode Island.
For ease of reference, the Court refers to Defendants’ memorandum of law in support of
their motion to dismiss as “Def. Br.” (Dkt. #35); Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendants’
motion to dismiss as “Pl. Opp.” (Dkt. #38); and Defendants’ reply brief as “Def. Reply”
(Dkt. #39).

2

The instant motion centers on complex issues of personal jurisdiction and claim
preclusion. Because resolution of these issues does not require recitation of the more
salacious allegations in the Second Amended Complaint, this Opinion recounts the
facts at the level of generality necessary to decide the motion.

2

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Louis Gelineau, a resident of Rhode Island, was formerly the Bishop of
Providence and Administrator of the Diocese of Providence. (SAC ¶¶ 6-7). As
Bishop during the relevant period, Bishop Gelineau was the highest official
representative of the Diocese of Providence. (Id. at ¶¶ 7-8). In this role, he
governed the diocese, including by exercising legislative, executive, and judicial
power. (Id. at ¶ 8). Additionally, Bishop Gelineau approved fundraising for St.
Anthony’s and was responsible for hiring, training, assigning, and supervising
diocesan candidates accepted for admission to the priesthood, seminarians,
deacons, and priests. (Id. at ¶¶ 8-9). He was also tasked with responding to
reports of alleged abuse and sexual misconduct against priests within the
diocese. (Id. at ¶ 9). And his supervisory responsibilities included oversight of
St. Anthony’s parish, as well as Fr. Magaldi individually. (Id. at ¶ 10).
The Roman Catholic Bishop of Providence is organized as a corporation
sole under the laws of the State of Rhode Island, with its principal place of
business in Providence, Rhode Island. (SAC ¶¶ 11, 12). The RCB is the
primary corporate entity through which Bishop Gelineau and the Diocese of
Providence conducted their business. (Id. at ¶ 14). The RCB’s business
includes revenue-producing activities, such as soliciting money and charitable
contributions to support their operation and services. (Id. at ¶ 15). Both Fr.
Magaldi and Bishop Gelineau engaged in fundraising activities on behalf of the
RCB. (Id.). Under the RCB’s supervision, the Diocese of Providence hired
employees, including Plaintiff and Fr. Magaldi, to work at individual churches
within the diocese. (Id. at ¶ 16).
3

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St. Anthony’s Church Corporation North Providence is a corporation
organized under the laws of the State of Rhode Island, with its principal place
of business in North Providence, Rhode Island. (SAC ¶¶ 17-18). St. Anthony’s
is a parish within the Diocese of Providence that was operated, managed, and
maintained by Bishop Gelineau and the RCB during the relevant period. (Id. at
¶¶ 19, 21). As the pastor of St. Anthony’s, Fr. Magaldi was responsible for the
day-to-day operation of that parish, a role that included interacting with altar
boys, soliciting funds, maintaining records, and hiring persons to fill various
roles within the church. (Id. at ¶ 21). Plaintiff held various roles at St.
Anthony’s, including altar boy and sexton. (Id. at ¶ 23). In his capacity as an
employee of St. Anthony’s, Plaintiff’s responsibilities included cleaning and
repairing the church building, working in the rectory, acting as Fr. Magaldi’s
driver, and assisting Fr. Magaldi with ad hoc errands and tasks. (Id.).
2.

Plaintiff’s Relationship with Fr. Magaldi

Plaintiff was raised in a devout Roman Catholic household, as part of a
family that observed and participated in religious traditions through parishes
within the Diocese of Providence. (SAC ¶ 32). As such, Plaintiff viewed priests
with reverence and respect, trusting them to be holy and chaste men who acted
in the best interests of their parishioners. (Id.).
Plaintiff’s relationship with Fr. Magaldi began at St. Anthony’s in or
around 1977 or 1978. (SAC ¶¶ 40-41). According to Plaintiff, from the outset
of their relationship, Fr. Magaldi served as a mentor and confidant, providing
Plaintiff with religious instruction and spiritual guidance. (Id.). Over time, Fr.
4

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Magaldi learned of Plaintiff’s personal vulnerabilities, which knowledge he later
exploited to perpetuate and cover up his sexual abuse of Plaintiff over a period
of years. (Id. at ¶ 41). As one example, in 1979 or 1980, Fr. Magaldi learned
that Plaintiff’s mother had a serious drinking problem, which added significant
strain to Plaintiff’s home life. (Id. at ¶ 46). Preying on Plaintiff’s difficult
familial situation, Fr. Magaldi offered St. Anthony’s rectory and church as a
refuge for Plaintiff to escape his troubles. (Id. at ¶ 47).
The sexual abuse of Plaintiff by Fr. Magaldi began in the spring of 1980.
(SAC ¶ 53). 3 After taking Plaintiff to a restaurant for lunch, Fr. Magaldi
brought Plaintiff to a spa, where he raped him in a steam room. (Id. at ¶ 54).
From that point on, Fr. Magaldi’s abusive conduct escalated, as did the
number of instances of sexual assault. (Id. at ¶¶ 56, 59-60). Fr. Magaldi also
forced Plaintiff to drink alcohol to induce compliance with his abuse. (Id. at
¶¶ 56-58). On one occasion, when Plaintiff told Fr. Magaldi to stop fondling
him, Fr. Magaldi threatened to reveal to Plaintiff’s father that Plaintiff had
consumed alcohol to the point of intoxication — a salient threat, given the
issues Plaintiff’s mother had with alcohol. (Id. at ¶ 61). Plaintiff estimates that
between 1978 (when he was 12 years old) and 1984 (when he was 17 years

3

The Second Amended Complaint contains several allegations of sexual abuse before
1980 committed by priests within the Diocese of Providence against child victims
besides Plaintiff. (See SAC ¶¶ 34-38). These include allegations that Fr. James M. Silva
molested at least seven boys between 1960 and 1980 (id. at ¶ 36); Fr. Edmund Micarelli
abused at least seven boys — one for seven years — prior to 1962 (id. at ¶ 37); and Fr.
William C. O’Connell pleaded guilty to sexually abusing three boys between 1965 and
1972 (id. at ¶ 38). In addition to the allegations concerning Fr. Magaldi’s abuse of
Plaintiff, the Second Amended Complaint includes claims that Fr. Magaldi assaulted a
14-year-old boy in the early 1970s. (Id. at ¶ 39).

5

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old), he was sexually abused between 100 and 300 times by Fr. Magaldi. (Id. at
¶ 64).
3.

The Trip to New York

In the summer of 1983, Fr. Magaldi took Plaintiff on a trip to New York
City, during which he sexually assaulted Plaintiff in the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel.
(SAC ¶¶ 70, 81). The purpose of this trip was for Fr. Magaldi to meet with
Claus von Bülow, a Danish-born socialite, to discuss the latter’s conviction for
the attempted murder of his wife. (Id. at ¶¶ 66-69). 4 Following von Bülow’s
conviction, Fr. Magaldi had urged David Marriott — a penitent of Fr. Magaldi’s
at St. Anthony’s — to come forward with ostensibly exculpatory evidence in
support of von Bülow. (Id. at ¶ 67). 5 When Marriott’s credibility came into
question, Marriott suggested that Fr. Magaldi could corroborate the
information Marriott provided because years earlier he had confided the same
information to Fr. Magaldi during confessions at St. Anthony’s. (Id. at ¶ 68). 6
4

As set forth in the Second Amended Complaint, von Bülow was found guilty in 1982 of
attempting to murder his wife, Martha (known as “Sunny”), by injecting her with
insulin. (SAC ¶ 66). Sunny, the heiress to a utilities fortune, was found unconscious in
the couple’s home in Newport, Rhode Island, in 1980 and fell into an irreversible coma.
(Id.). The prosecution’s theory of her death was that von Bülow wanted Sunny out of
the picture so that he could be with his mistress. (Id.).

5

Marriott claimed in an affidavit that he had personally delivered drugs and hypodermic
syringes to Sunny and von Bülow’s stepson, Alexander von Auersperg. (SAC ¶ 67). In
seeking a new trial following his conviction, von Bülow’s defense attorneys intended to
use Marriott’s affidavit in support of their arguments that Sunny had abused drugs and
that von Auersperg had framed von Bülow for Sunny’s death. (Id.).

6

Marriott wanted Fr. Magaldi to attest to the fact that three years prior to von Bülow’s
conviction, Marriott had confessed to Fr. Magaldi that he had delivered drugs, needles,
and hypodermic syringes to von Auersperg at least six times in 1978 and 1979. (SAC
¶ 68). Fr. Magaldi eventually provided his own affidavit relaying the supposed details of
Marriott’s confessions. (Id. at ¶¶ 70-71). Thereafter, Fr. Magaldi was charged with
perjury, and it was alleged that he and Marriott fabricated accounts of meeting von
Auersperg and of Marriott’s delivery of drugs to the von Bülow household. (Id. at ¶ 74
n.1).

6

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Fr. Magaldi agreed to meet with von Bülow in New York City to discuss the
testimony he could provide to aid von Bülow’s defense. (Id. at ¶ 70). In turn,
Plaintiff agreed to drive Fr. Magaldi to a train station in Connecticut and escort
him to New York on the train. (Id. at ¶ 76). Defendants arranged for Fr.
Magaldi and Plaintiff to stay in a two-bedroom suite at the Waldorf-Astoria. (Id.
at ¶ 76).
Fr. Magaldi and Plaintiff met von Bülow at his New York City apartment,
where they discussed von Bülow’s criminal case and his offer to make a
charitable donation on behalf of Fr. Magaldi. (SAC ¶ 77). Fr. Magaldi then
provided a telephonic summary of the meeting to Bishop Gelineau. (Id. at
¶ 78). Later that evening, Fr. Magaldi and Plaintiff returned to the hotel, where
Fr. Magaldi insisted that Plaintiff accompany him to a hotel lounge and
provided him alcohol to drink. (Id. at ¶ 80). Plaintiff eventually retired to his
own room in their hotel suite. (Id. at ¶¶ 76, 80). At dawn, Fr. Magaldi woke
Plaintiff up and raped him in his hotel room. (Id. at ¶ 81). Later that same
day, Fr. Magaldi sexually abused Plaintiff while he was taking a shower. (Id.).
4.

Defendants’ Role in Concealing Plaintiff’s Abuse

Plaintiff contends that over a period of decades, Defendants enabled and
concealed the abuse of young boys like Plaintiff, choosing to protect the
reputations of abusive priests, including Fr. Magaldi, at the expense of their
victims. (SAC ¶¶ 34, 92). By the 1960s and 1970s, numerous Roman Catholic
bishops, including Bishop Gelineau, were on notice that priests were sexually
abusing children via recurrent and predictable patterns of behavior. (Id. at
7

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¶¶ 34-35). For instance, Bishop Gelineau received several complaints from
parents and children about abuse and inappropriate touching by priests within
the Diocese of Providence, and yet he repeatedly failed to investigate such
allegations, neglected to remove priests from positions providing them with
unrestricted access to children, and continued to allow priests to take young
boys on trips. (Id. at ¶¶ 35-38). More broadly, Defendants fostered the
misperception that abusive clerics remained in good standing in the Diocese
by, inter alia: (i) allowing them to lead vacation trips that included minors,
without an accompanying parent, in New York and other states; (ii) continually
assigning them to duties involving minors; (iii) replacing certain offending
clerics in positions that involved child contact with other abusive clerics;
(iv) allowing offending clerics to publicly announce explanations for leaving an
assignment or position that elided their sexual abuse; (v) promoting offending
clerics within the church hierarchy; (vi) privately assuring parents that issues
involving sexual abuse would be “taken care of”; (vii) directing non-offending
priests to confidentially report sexual abuse to Defendants; (viii) providing and
subsidizing living arrangements for offending clerics after removal from their
assignments; and (ix) continuing to list offending clerics in official directories
with euphemisms, such as “absent on leave” or “advanced studies,” that
downplayed their abusive conduct. (Id. at ¶ 92).
As a result of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiff was lulled into a false sense
of security and believed that he and his family were safe among priests,
including Fr. Magaldi. (SAC ¶ 93). Defendants’ actions further created an air
8

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of plausible deniability that permitted them to cast aside parishioners’ worries
about abusive clerical conduct as isolated instances of misconduct, rather than
an endemic problem. (Id.). Plaintiff, his family, and others relied on
Defendants’ representations that the Diocese of Providence’s clerics were in
good standing and wrongly believed they could rely on Defendants to protect
them and future victims by disciplining abusive clerics. (Id. at ¶ 94).
B.

Procedural Background
1.

The Instant Action

On September 29, 2020, Plaintiff filed the initial complaint in this action
in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York. (Dkt. #41). On January 25, 2021, the parties stipulated that service of the summons
and complaint would be effective as of the stipulation’s execution date. (Dkt.
#4-2). Thereafter, on February 19, 2021, Defendants noticed the removal of
this action to federal court, asserting diversity jurisdiction. (Dkt. #4).
On March 1, 2021, Defendants filed a letter requesting a pre-motion
conference on their anticipated motion to dismiss, which letter previewed their
personal jurisdiction and res judicata arguments. (Dkt. #10). On March 5,
2021, Plaintiff filled a responsive letter, arguing that Defendants’ proposed
motion to dismiss would be premature while time remained for Plaintiff to move
to remand or to amend his pleadings. (Dkt. #13). On March 8, 2021, the
Court denied Defendants’ request for a pre-motion conference, without
prejudice to its renewal, and gave Plaintiff until March 22, 2021, to either move

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to remand the case back to state court, file an amended complaint, or inform
the Court that he would proceed with the original complaint. (Dkt. #14).
Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on March 22, 2021. (Dkt. #15).
One week later, on March 29, 2021, Defendants renewed their request for a
pre-motion conference regarding their contemplated motion to dismiss, which
previewed the same personal jurisdiction and claim preclusion arguments as
their previous letter. (Dkt. #16). Plaintiff filed a letter in response on April 1,
2021. (Dkt. #18). On April 6, 2021, the Court convened the initial pretrial
conference in this matter, during which the Court set a briefing schedule for
Defendants’ motion to dismiss. (See Minute Entry of April 6, 2021). The
resulting schedule included an opportunity for Plaintiff to amend his pleadings
further. (Id.).
On April 30, 2021, Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint, which
is the operative pleading in this matter. (Dkt. #30). Defendants filed their
motion to dismiss and supporting papers on May 28, 2021. (Dkt. #31-35).
Plaintiff filed his opposition brief on June 30, 2021. (Dkt. #38). Defendants
filed their reply papers on July 16, 2021. (Dkt. #39).
2.

The Rhode Island Action 7

Significantly, the instant case is not Plaintiff’s only — or even his first —
litigation concerning these issues. One year before filing this lawsuit, on

7

On a motion to dismiss, a court may take judicial notice of related lawsuits, judicial
decisions, and litigation filings. See Gertskis v. U.S. E.E.O.C., No. 11 Civ. 5830 (JMF),
2013 WL 1148924, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2013) (“A district court reviewing a motion
to dismiss may also consider documents of which it may take judicial notice, including

10

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September 30, 2019, Plaintiff filed suit in Rhode Island Superior Court against
Bishop Gelineau, RCB, and St. Anthony’s, as well as others affiliated with the
Roman Catholic Church (the “Rhode Island Action”). 8 On November 25, 2019,
Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint in the Rhode Island Action, which
pleading asserted claims related to the sexual abuse and exploitation Plaintiff
had endured while affiliated with St. Anthony’s. (Vita Decl., Ex. B (“Rhode
Island Amended Complaint”)). In particular, Count XII of the Rhode Island
Amended Complaint alleged negligence and breach of duty against Defendants
and others under the New York Child Victims Act, based on Fr. Magaldi’s
alleged sexual abuse of Plaintiff in New York. (Id. at 134-35; see also id. at 114
(describing visit to New York)).
The defendants in the Rhode Island Action filed a motion to dismiss on
December 19, 2019. (Vita Decl., Ex. C (“Rhode Island Motion to Dismiss”)). In
their briefing on the motion, the Rhode Island defendants argued that because
Rhode Island bore the “most significant relationship” to the events and parties
in that suit, choice of law principles dictated that Rhode Island’s statute of
limitations should govern all of Plaintiff’s claims, even those related to abuse
that occurred in New York. (Id. at 19 n.13). Plaintiff filed his opposition brief

pleadings and prior decisions in related lawsuits.”), aff’d sub nom. Gertskis v. E.E.O.C.,
594 F. App’x 719 (2d Cir. 2014) (summary order).
8

Defendants included a subset of documents from the Rhode Island Action as exhibits
on this motion. (See Vita Decl., Ex. B-G). The Court obtained additional information
related to the Rhode Island Action from the Rhode Island Judiciary Public Portal. See
https://publicportal.courts.ri.gov/PublicPortal. The record numbers for the trial court
and Rhode Island Supreme Court proceedings in the Rhode Island Action are “PC-201909894” and “SU-2021-0041-A,” respectively.

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in the Rhode Island Action on June 4, 2020, in which he focused principally on
his claims under Rhode Island law. (Vita Decl., Ex. D (“Plaintiff’s Rhode Island
Opposition”)). Plaintiff’s only reference to New York law in the Rhode Island
Opposition was in a footnote, which mentioned that New York had “enacted
and extended a window in which such claims [relating to childhood sexual
abuse] can be brought.” (Id. at 33 n.22). On July 16, 2020, the Rhode Island
defendants filed their reply memorandum in support of their motion to dismiss.
On August 17, 2020, Plaintiff submitted a rebuttal memorandum
addressing the constitutionality of the Rhode Island statute that purported to
revive certain otherwise-time-barred claims of sexual assault. (Vita Decl.,
Ex. E (“Plaintiff Rebuttal Memorandum”)). In this submission, Plaintiff noted
that the Rhode Island “Defendants have never developed a substantive
argument in support of their position in favor of dismissal of Count XII of
[Plaintiff’s] complaint,” which counseled in favor of denying their motion to
dismiss his claims under New York law. (Id. at 9-10 n.6).
On September 30, 2020, Justice Netti C. Vogel held oral argument on the
Rhode Island defendants’ motion to dismiss. (Vita Decl., Ex. F (“Rhode Island
Hearing”)). 9 Neither party made arguments regarding Plaintiff’s New York claim
at oral argument. (See generally id.). On October 16, 2020, Justice Vogel
issued an opinion in the Rhode Island Action granting Defendants’ motion to
dismiss. (See Vita Decl., Ex. G (“Rhode Island Decision”)). Of note, Justice

9

Plaintiff initiated the instant action in New York State Supreme Court on the eve of oral
argument in the Rhode Island Action.

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Vogel found Plaintiff’s claims against Bishop Gelineau, RCB, and St. Anthony’s
to be time-barred because the legislative amendment that expanded Rhode
Island’s statute of limitations for claims based upon childhood sexual abuse
applied retroactively only as to defendants deemed “perpetrators.” (Id. at 2-3).
Having found that Bishop Gelineau, RCB, and St. Anthony’s were “nonperpetrators” under Rhode Island law, Justice Vogel held that the statute of
limitations for Plaintiff’s claims against them had run. (Id.). In her decision,
Justice Vogel noted the existence of Plaintiff’s Count XII brought under New
York Law, but did not engage in a separate choice of law analysis or otherwise
independently assess the New York claim. (See id. at 10 n.4). Justice Vogel
granted the Rhode Island Defendants’ motion to dismiss in its entirety. (Id. at
21).
On December 2, 2020, Plaintiff noticed his appeal of the Rhode Island
Decision to the Rhode Island Supreme Court. On May 10, 2021, Plaintiff filed
a pre-briefing statement of the case under Article I, Rule 12A(1) of the Rhode
Island Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure. (Def. Reply, Ex. A
(“Plaintiff’s Rule 12A Statement”)). Foreshadowing his arguments on appeal,
Plaintiff contended that Justice Vogel had “overlooked Plaintiff’s New York
claim,” and, relatedly, that “[t]he statute of limitations under [the New York
Child Victims Act] has not yet run.” (Id. at 13). As of the date of this Opinion,
Plaintiff’s appeal in the Rhode Island Supreme Court remained pending.

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DISCUSSION
A.

Motions to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(2)
On a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), “the plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing that the court has jurisdiction over the defendant.” DiStefano v.
Carozzi N. Am., Inc., 286 F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Bank Brussels
Lambert v. Fiddler Gonzalez & Rodriguez, 171 F.3d 779, 784 (2d Cir. 1999)). “A
plaintiff must establish the court’s jurisdiction with respect to each claim
asserted[.]” Charles Schwab Corp. v. Bank of Am. Corp., 883 F.3d 68, 83 (2d
Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Prior to discovery, a plaintiff
challenged by a jurisdiction testing motion may defeat the motion by pleading
in good faith, legally sufficient allegations of jurisdiction. At that preliminary
stage, the plaintiff’s prima facie showing may be established solely by
allegations.” Dorchester Fin. Sec., Inc. v. Banco BRJ, S.A., 722 F.3d 81, 84-85
(2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (citation omitted).
All jurisdictional allegations “are construed in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff and doubts are resolved in the plaintiff’s favor[.]” A.I. Trade Fin.,
Inc. v. Petra Bank, 989 F.2d 76, 79-80 (2d Cir. 1993) (citation omitted).
However, the court “will not draw argumentative inferences in the plaintiff’s
favor” and need not “accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation[.]” In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 714 F.3d 659, 673 (2d

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Cir. 2013) (citations omitted); accord Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian
Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50, 59 (2d Cir. 2012). 10
District courts deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction engage in a two-part analysis. First, the court must establish
whether there is “a statutory basis for exercising personal jurisdiction.” Marvel
Characters, Inc. v. Kirby, 726 F.3d 119, 128 (2d Cir. 2013). In making this
determination, the court “applies the forum state’s personal jurisdiction rules,”
unless a federal statute “specifically provide[s] for national service of process.”
PDK Labs, Inc. v. Friedlander, 103 F.3d 1105, 1108 (2d Cir. 1997) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Second, the court must decide whether
“the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant comports with the Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution.” Sonera Holding B.V. v.
Çukurova Holding A.S., 750 F.3d 221, 224 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (citation
omitted).
There are “two categories of personal jurisdiction: general and specific
personal jurisdiction. General, all-purpose jurisdiction permits a court to hear
‘any and all claims’ against an entity. Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand,
permits adjudicatory authority only over issues that aris[e] out of or relat[e] to

10

Both sides have submitted affidavits in support of their respective positions on personal
jurisdiction, which the Court may consider in connection with Defendants’ motion
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2). (See Vita Decl., Ex. A (Affidavit of Rev. Timothy D. Reilly
(“Reilly Affidavit”)); Pl. Ex. A (Affidavit of Philip Edwardo (“Edwardo Affidavit”))). See
Vasquez v. Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp., Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 3d 241, 245 n.1
(S.D.N.Y. 2020) (“On a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule
12(b)(2), the Court may look beyond the four corners of the complaint and consider
materials outside of the pleadings, including accompanying affidavits, declarations, and
other written materials.”).

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the [defendant’s] contacts with the forum.” Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768
F.3d 122, 134 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff only asserts only specific personal jurisdiction over Defendants.
B.

The Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction over Defendants
The Court begins — and ultimately ends — with Plaintiff’s proffered

bases for personal jurisdiction over Defendants. Plaintiff identifies two sections
of New York’s long-arm statute as providing for specific personal jurisdiction
over Defendants in this case. (See Pl. Opp. 7-20). 11 As his primary foothold for
personal jurisdiction, Plaintiff relies on C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(2), which permits a
court to exercise jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who “in person or through
an agent … commits a tortious act within the state.” In Plaintiff’s estimation,
Fr. Magaldi’s sexual abuse of Plaintiff in New York can be attributed to
Defendants through principles of agency, because Fr. Magaldi travelled to New
York in his official capacity and remained at all relevant times under
Defendants’ supervision and control. (Id. at 8-16).
Plaintiff’s second statutory basis for personal jurisdiction is C.P.L.R.
§ 302(a)(1), which permits a court to exercise personal jurisdiction “over any
non-domiciliary ... who in person or through an agent ... transacts any
business within the state,” so long as the cause of action “aris[es] from” that

11

Under New York Law, specific personal jurisdiction is governed by New York Civil
Practice Law & Rules (“C.P.L.R.”) § 302(a), which empowers New York courts to exercise
jurisdiction over non-domiciliaries when a plaintiff’s cause of action “aris[es] from” one
of four specified types of contact with New York. See C.P.R.L. § 302(a)(1)-(4). As
discussed infra, Plaintiff invokes two of these categories of contacts in asserting
personal jurisdiction over Defendants: (i) the commission of tortious acts in New York,
id. § 302(a)(2); and (ii) the transaction of business in New York, id. § 302(a)(1).

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transaction. On this point, Plaintiff argues that Fr. Magaldi and Plaintiff “were
on church business” in New York, because they were required to travel as part
of their jobs with Defendants for the dual purpose of fundraising and
discussing matters that Fr. Magaldi learned during the Sacrament of
Confession. (Pl. Opp. 1-2, 10). Further, Plaintiff argues that because “[Fr.]
Magaldi’s business activity on behalf of the church was a factual cause of his
presence in New York and without the direction of supervision of the
Defendants, [Fr.] Magaldi would not have been able to sexually assault
[Plaintiff] while in New York,” Plaintiff’s claims “arise out of” Defendants’
business contacts with New York. (Id. at 19-20).
Defendants counter that neither provision of New York’s long-arm statute
permits this Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over them. 12 With respect
to Section 302(a)(2), Defendants note that Plaintiff has not alleged that
Defendants, themselves, committed any tortious acts in New York and argue
that Fr. Magaldi was not acting as their agent when he sexually assaulted
Plaintiff. (Def. Br. 6-8). With respect to Section 302(a)(1), Defendants claim
that Plaintiff has failed to allege adequately that Defendants transacted
business in New York, and thus a fortiori has failed to allege claims arising out
of Defendants’ business in the state. (Id. at 9-13). The Court agrees with
Defendants that neither provision confers personal jurisdiction over
Defendants.
12

Defendant also argues that personal jurisdiction may not be asserted pursuant to
C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3). (Def. Br. 13-15). However, Plaintiff does not claim that this
provision supports personal jurisdiction over Defendants. (See Pl. Opp. 1 n.4).

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1.

Fr. Magaldi’s Tortious Conduct Cannot Be Attributed to
Defendants for Purposes of Section 302(a)(2)

Under Section 302(a)(2), a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
non-domiciliary who “through an agent … commits a tortious act within the
state.” C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(2). In this regard, the Second Circuit has held that “a
defendant’s act or omission must have occurred within the State” in which a
plaintiff seeks the exercise of personal jurisdiction. See Bank Brussels
Lambert, 171 F.3d at 789-90 (internal alterations omitted); see also
Thackurdeen v. Duke Univ., 130 F. Supp. 3d 792, 803-04 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“In
light of controlling Second Circuit precedent, the Court is required to apply the
majority rule requiring the defendant to physically commit the tortious act
within New York.”).
Notwithstanding this requirement, jurisdiction under Section 302(a)(2)
may extend to out-of-state individuals who did not themselves commit a tort in
New York, but “who can be deemed responsible for such a tort based upon
theories of agency or conspiracy.” LaChapelle v. Torres, 1 F. Supp. 3d 163, 169
(S.D.N.Y. 2014); see also Emerald Asset Advisors, LLC v. Schaffer, 895 F. Supp.
2d 418, 430 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“[P]ersonal jurisdiction under Section 302(a)(2)
may also be predicated on acts taken by an agent.”). “Whether a defendant’s
representative is an ‘agent’ for purposes of [Section] 302(a) hinges on whether
the representative acted ‘[i] for the benefit of and [ii] with the knowledge and
consent of [the] defendant and [iii] [the defendant] exercised some control over
[the agent] in the matter.’” LaChapelle, 1 F. Supp. 3d at 169 (quoting Emerald
Asset Advisors, LLC, 895 F. Supp. 2d at 430); see also CutCo Indus., Inc. v.
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Naughton, 806 F.2d 361, 366 (2d Cir. 1986) (explaining that an “agent” for
purposes of C.P.L.R. Section 302(a) is a person who has “acted in the state ‘for
the benefit of, and with the knowledge and consent of’ the non-resident
principal” (citations omitted)). “While the principal need not exercise absolute
control over the decisions or acts of the putative agent, … a sufficient amount
of control ‘may involve the ability of the principal to influence such acts or
decisions by virtue of the parties’ respective roles.’” Maersk, Inc. v. Neewra,
Inc., 554 F. Supp. 2d 424, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (internal citation omitted)
(quoting Scholastic, Inc. v. Stouffer, No. 99 Civ. 11480 (AGS), 2000 WL
1154252, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2000)).
Here, the Court finds that, under New York law, Plaintiff has failed to
allege that Fr. Magaldi either (i) acted for Defendants’ benefit when he
committed the tortious conduct giving rise to the action, or (ii) committed these
tortious acts with Defendants’ knowledge and consent. The Court will discuss
each of these pleading failures in turn.
a.

Fr. Magaldi’s Abuse of Plaintiff in New York Was Not “for
the Benefit of” Defendants

Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendants were not physically present in
New York when Fr. Magaldi abused him. Rather, Plaintiff claims that
“Defendants employed, managed and supervised [Fr.] Magaldi for purposes of
the business trip to New York,” thereby qualifying Fr. Magaldi as Defendants’
agent for purposes of Section 302(a)(2). (Pl. Opp. 10). Plaintiff characterizes
the New York trip as centering around “church business,” because (i) Fr.
Magaldi intended to discuss information he learned from a penitent during
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confession, one of the seven sacraments of the Roman Catholic Church; (ii) Fr.
Magaldi hoped to obtain a charitable donation from St. Anthony’s as a quid pro
quo for assisting von Bülow; and (iii) both Fr. Magaldi and Plaintiff were
required to go to New York as part of their job responsibilities as Defendants’
employees. (Pl. Opp. 2-3). Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges that Bishop Gelineau
(and, by extension, RCB and St. Anthony’s) were aware of and involved in the
New York trip, as evidenced by Fr. Magaldi’s conversations with Bishop
Gelineau before and during the trip. (Edwardo Affidavit ¶¶ 8, 11, 13; SAC
¶ 78). As additional evidence of Defendants’ involvement, Defendants paid for
Fr. Magaldi and Plaintiff’s accommodations in New York. (SAC ¶ 76).
Plaintiff’s argument misconstrues the standard that must be satisfied for
an individual to be deemed an “agent” for purposes of Section 302(a)(2),
particularly the first requirement that the purported agent act “for the benefit
of” the principal. CutCo Indus., Inc., 806 F.2d at 366. To establish that a
purported agent acted “for the benefit of” a principal in this context, it is not
enough that the purported agent merely engage in some activity that benefits
the principal during the time the agent was in the state; rather, the purported
agent’s tortious act itself must benefit the principal in order for the principal to
be deemed responsible for the tort based upon an agency theory. See, e.g.,
Barbarotto Int’l Sales Corp. v. Tullar, 591 N.Y.S.2d 188, 189 (2d Dep’t 1992)
(explaining that “[t]he activities of a representative of a nondomiciliary in New
York may be attributed to it … if it requested the performance of those
activities and the activities benefit it” (emphasis added)); E. N.Y. Sav. Bank v.
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Republic Realty Mortg. Corp., 402 N.Y.S.2d 639, 641 (2d Dep’t 1978) (noting
that activities of a New York agent “will be attributed to the nondomiciliary [for
jurisdictional purposes] if ... those activities benefit it” (emphasis added)); see
also Ramgoolie v. Ramgoolie, No. 16 Civ. 3345 (VEC) (SN), 2016 WL 11281385,
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2016) (finding that Section 302(a)(2) could not serve as
a basis for personal jurisdiction, even though a tortfeasor was defendant’s
agent in New York, because the agent’s tortious acts were “committed for [his]
own benefit,” rather than defendant’s), report and recommendation adopted,
2017 WL 564680 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2017). This understanding of the proper
scope of analysis under Section 302(a)(2) is buttressed by the statute’s plain
language, which permits jurisdiction over a party who, itself, “through an
agent ... commits a tortious act.” C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(2). A principal does not
commit a tort “through an agent,” where an agent engages in tortious conduct
that does not benefit the principal and did not, in any way, further the
principal-agent relationship.
Defendants harp on this point, emphasizing that Fr. Magaldi’s sexual
abuse was driven by “wholly personal motives” outside of his employment
relationship with Defendants. (Def. Br. 7-8; Def. Reply 2-3). In so arguing,
Defendants draw on the line of cases interpreting New York law to find that
sexual misconduct arises from motives personal to the perpetrator and cannot
be attributed to an employer’s business, even when committed in an
employment setting. (See Def. Br. 7-8). Such cases convince the Court that,
under New York law, Fr. Magaldi’s sexual abuse — however reprehensible —
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cannot be considered to have been committed “for the benefit” of Defendants,
and cannot be attributed to Defendants under Section 302(a)(2).
Defendants cite several cases on this point, of which the Court will
discuss three for illustrative purposes. First, in Doe v. Alsaud, a female plaintiff
brought suit against an individual who raped her at the Plaza Hotel, and
against his employer, a Saudi company affiliated with Prince Alsaud of Saudi
Arabia. 12 F. Supp. 3d 674, 676 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). The perpetrator’s job
responsibilities allegedly included “luring unsuspecting women to gratify the
sexual pleasure of the Prince and his entourage” at the Plaza Hotel. Id.
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In dismissing plaintiff’s claim
for vicarious liability against the perpetrator’s employer, Judge Sweet reasoned
that, notwithstanding the nature of the perpetrator’s job responsibilities, his
“own deplorable motivations [in raping the plaintiff] were not part of any
conceivable duty he had to [his employer].” Id. at 677. Even “[i]f Plaintiff had
sufficiently pleaded that [the employer] had direct knowledge of prior sexual
misconduct on the part of [the perpetrator] … that still would not give rise to
respondeat superior liability in the absence of an allegation that the misconduct
was part of any actual responsibility [the perpetrator] had to [his employer].”
Id. at 678.
Second, Defendants cite Poppel v. Estate of Archibald, a case in which
two patients brought suit against a pediatric endocrinologist who engaged in a
decades-long pattern of sexual abuse of patients, many of whom were disabled.
No. 19 Civ. 1403 (ALC), 2020 WL 2749719, at * 1 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 2020).
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Ultimately, Judge Carter rejected the plaintiffs’ attempt to hold the hospital
vicariously liable for the doctor’s misconduct, concluding that the doctor “was
acting in a personal, not a professional, capacity during the alleged
misconduct.” Id. at *5. Much the same as Plaintiff in the instant matter, the
plaintiffs in Poppel had argued that the doctor’s abuse was “inextricably
intertwined and inseparable from” his duties to his employer. Id. The court
rejected this argument, citing to a New York Court of Appeals case that held
that even where an employee “committed a sexual assault while engaged in his
assigned duties,” that conduct constituted a “depart[ure] from his duties for
solely personal motives unrelated to the furtherance of the [employer’s]
business.” Id. (quoting Judith M. v. Sisters of Charity Hosp., 93 N.Y.2d 932,
933 (1999)).
Third, Defendants cite Powers-Barnhard v. Butler, a case in which a
volleyball player brought suit against several defendants, including USA
Volleyball and her out-of-state volleyball club, for claims arising out of sexual,
emotional, and physical abuse committed by her volleyball coach while on a
team trip to New York. No. 19 Civ. 1208 (BKS) (ATB), 2020 WL 4925333, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2020). Judge Sannes ruled that Section 302(a)(2) did not
confer personal jurisdiction over USA Volleyball or the volleyball club, because
even crediting the allegation that it was common knowledge among the
volleyball community that plaintiff’s coach was a predator, the plaintiff did not
“plausibly allege that [the coach] acted for [USA Volleyball’s or the club’s]

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benefit, with [their] consent, or that [either entity] exercised some control over
[the coach] in the matter.” Id. at *7, 10.
Caselaw makes clear “that sexual misconduct and related tortious
behavior arise from personal motives and do not further an employer’s
business, even when committed within the employment context.” Ross v.
Mitsui Fudosan, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 2d 522, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). Thus, under New
York law, Fr. Magaldi’s sexual abuse cannot be considered to have been “for
the benefit of” the Defendants. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Fr.
Magaldi was not acting as an agent for purposes of Section 302(a)(2) when he
abused Plaintiff in New York.
b.

Fr. Magaldi Did Not Abuse Plaintiff in New York with the
“Knowledge and Consent” of Defendants

While the absence of the first element is sufficient to support a finding
that Fr. Magaldi was not acting as Defendants’ agent when he abused Plaintiff
in New York, the Court observes that Plaintiff faces similar problems with
respect to the second prong of the agency analysis, i.e., “knowledge and
consent.” While the Second Amended Complaint alleges that Defendants knew
of and consented to Fr. Magaldi’s trip to New York (see SAC ¶¶ 20, 26, 78-79),
the law requires the principal to know of and consent to the specific tortious
conduct in order to be held liable for that conduct. Doe v. Roman Cath. Diocese
of Erie, Pa., No. 20 Civ. 257 (LEK) (ML), 2021 WL 5232742, at *5 (N.D.N.Y.
Nov. 10, 2021) (finding the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the Roman
Catholic Diocese of Erie, Pennsylvania, where plaintiff’s claims stemmed from
sexual abuse in New York committed by parish basketball coach). Notably, the
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Second Amended Complaint includes specific allegations that Bishop Gelineau
had been made aware of other priests’ sexual misconduct involving young boys.
(See SAC ¶ 36 (referring to a 1993 affidavit from a parishioner who claimed to
have called Bishop Gelineau about her son being molested by Fr. James M.
Silva); see also id. at ¶ 38 (referencing Bishop Gelineau’s deposition testimony
admitting that between 1978 and 1984, two assistant pastors had complained
about Fr. William C. O’Connell’s pedophilia and molestation)). Plaintiff also
imputes knowledge to “Roman Catholic Bishops in dioceses across the United
States” of a rampant pattern of sexual abuse within the ranks of the Catholic
church. (Id. at ¶ 34). But nowhere does Plaintiff allege that Bishop Gelineau,
RCB, or St. Anthony’s was specifically aware of Fr. Magaldi’s abuse of Plaintiff
or anyone else at the time of the trip to New York in the summer of 1983.
Accordingly, the Court cannot find that Fr. Magaldi’s abuse of Plaintiff was
committed “with the knowledge and consent” of Defendants. 13

13

The Court has carefully considered the reasoning of Love v. West, in which a sister
court in this District recently found personal jurisdiction pursuant to Section 302(a)(2)
in analogous factual circumstances. See No. 19 Civ. 10799 (ER), 2021 WL 431210, at
*5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2021). In Love, two plaintiffs brought suit in New York against the
Catholic Diocese of Jackson, Mississippi, for claims stemming from abuse they had
suffered at the hands of a brother affiliated with the church, who had transported the
plaintiffs to New York to attend a religious summer camp. Id. at *1. In exercising
specific personal jurisdiction over the Diocese, Judge Ramos held that the brother’s
“alleged tortious activity arose from activity that was for the benefit of and with the
knowledge and consent of the Diocese, and the Diocese exercised some control over
[him] in relation to the New York trip, thereby rendering [him] an agent of the Diocese
for the purposes of C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(2).” Id. at *4 (citing Emerald Asset Advisors, LLC v.
Schaffer, 895 F. Supp. 2d 418, 430 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)).
To be clear, this Court is unaware of the precise arguments advanced by the parties in
Love to Judge Ramos. However, the Love decision does not engage with the line of
cases discussed in the text, in which “New York courts consistently have held that
sexual misconduct and related tortious behavior arise from personal motives and do not
further an employer’s business, even when committed within the employment context.”
Ross v. Mitsui Fudosan, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 2d 522, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). Instead, Love

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Plaintiff here is not seeking to impose vicarious liability upon Defendants
for Fr. Magaldi’s tortious conduct. Nevertheless, the Court views the cases
explicating the principles of agency in this context as bearing on Plaintiff’s
current effort to locate a statutory basis on which this Court may exercise
personal jurisdiction over Defendants. Because Plaintiff has not adequately
pleaded that Fr. Magaldi was acting as Defendants’ agent when he engaged in
the tortious conduct giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims, Section 302(a)(2) cannot
serve as the statutory basis for this Court’s personal jurisdiction over
Defendants.
2.

Plaintiff’s Claims Do Not Arise out of Any Business Conducted
by Defendants in New York for Purposes of Section 302(a)(1)

The Court next addresses Plaintiff’s alternative jurisdictional argument
under Section 302(a)(1), which empowers a court to exercise personal
jurisdiction over a defendant who “transacts any business within the state,” so
long as the claims against the defendant “aris[e] from” this business. C.P.L.R.
§ 302(a)(1). “To establish personal jurisdiction under [S]ection 302(a)(1), two
requirements must be met: [i] The defendant must have transacted business

appears to presume that an individual’s mere presence in New York “for the benefit of” a
principal is sufficient to confer specific personal jurisdiction over the principal for any
tort committed by the agent in New York. See Love, 2021 WL 431210, at *4 (concluding
that an abusive church employee was an agent for purposes of Section 302(a)(2)
because “the Diocese employed, managed, and supervised [the perpetrator], and …
authorized and funded [his] travel to New York as part of his work”). As explained
supra, the text of Section 302(a)(2) and precedent interpreting this provision leads this
Court to conclude that the tortious conduct itself must be “for the benefit of” the
principal in order to subject the principal to liability under an agency theory. Without
any discussion as to how an employee’s sexual assault in these circumstances
benefitted the principal, the Court does not see the instant matter as an occasion to
controvert the established precedent answering this question in the negative.

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within the state; and [ii] the claim asserted must arise from that business
activity.” Eades v. Kennedy, PC Law Offs., 799 F.3d 161, 168 (2d Cir. 2015)
(quoting Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 732 F.3d 161, 168
(2d Cir. 2013)).
Plaintiff contends that the same “church business” that ostensibly
qualifies Fr. Magaldi as an agent for purposes of Section 302(a)(2) (i.e., the
discussion of information gleaned during confession and the solicitation of
charitable contributions) also constitutes “transacting business” in New York.
(See Pl. Opp. 2-3, 16-20). And because Fr. Magaldi’s “business activity on
behalf of the church was a factual cause of his presence in New York and
without the direction and supervision of the Defendants, [Fr.] Magaldi would
not have been able to sexually assault [Plaintiff] in New York,” Plaintiff argues
that his claims “arise out of” this business transaction. (Id. at 19-20).
Defendants, on the other hand, argue that Plaintiff’s allegations fail on both
prongs of Section 302(a)(1) because: (i) the alleged activities of Defendants in
New York do not constitute “business” under the statute; and (ii) even if they
could be so classified, Plaintiff’s claims relate to sexual misconduct, not
Defendants’ business contacts with New York. (Def. Br. 9-13). As discussed in
the following subsections, Defendants have the better of the legal argument.
a.

The Transaction of Business in New York

The “transacting business” prong of the Section 302(a)(1) analysis
requires “purposeful activity — some act by which the defendant purposefully
avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus
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invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Best Van Lines, Inc. v.
Walker, 490 F.3d 239, 247 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting McKee Elec. Co. v. RaulandBorg Corp., 20 N.Y.2d 377, 382 (1967)). The provision “does not require that
the business in question be commercial in nature.” Id. at 247 n.10 (citing
Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 709 (2d Cir. 2003)).
“Although it is impossible to precisely fix those acts that constitute a
transaction of business ... it is the quality of the defendants’ New York contacts
that is the primary consideration.” Fischbarg v. Doucet, 9 N.Y.3d 375, 380
(2007). In a proper case, a single act within New York will satisfy Section
302(a)(1); where that is not so, “an ongoing course of conduct or relationship in
the state may.” Licci, 673 F.3d at 62 (citations omitted). A court is to consider
the totality of the circumstances surrounding the foreign defendant’s
interactions with the state. Bank Brussels Lambert, 171 F.3d at 787; accord
Farkas v. Farkas, 830 N.Y.S.2d 220, 221 (2d Dep’t 2007).
Here, Fr. Magaldi’s meeting with von Bülow to discuss charitable
contributions and ostensibly exculpatory evidence constitutes the totality of
Defendants’ proffered interactions with New York. Defendants urge the Court
to view Plaintiff’s asserted contacts as falling outside the ambit of Section
302(a)(1) because they are religious or charitable in nature and thus not the
kind of activities that can qualify as “business.” (Def. Br. 9-11; Def. Reply 34). 14 The Court sees no reason to draw a categorical line establishing that

14

For this position, Defendants draw upon cases explicating what constitutes a “business
enterprise” for purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act (the “FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201219. (See Def. Br. 9-11). For instance, in Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary

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religious or charitable activities cannot qualify as “transacting business” for
jurisdictional purposes under Section 302(a)(1). See, e.g., Sills v. Ronald
Reagan Presidential Found., Inc., No. 09 Civ. 1188 (GEL), 2009 WL 1490852,
*6-9 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 2009) (finding personal jurisdiction under Section
302(a)(1) over a defendant whose “transaction of business in New York
[comprised] its concerted and purposeful campaign of solicitation of charitable
donations”).
Defendants mount a stronger argument in attacking the quality of the
forum contacts upon which Plaintiff relies. (See Def. Br. 11-12). Under the
diocesan structure of the Roman Catholic Church, Defendants’ religious
activities are targeted toward the geographic area corresponding to the Diocese
of Providence, which is Rhode Island, not New York. (Reilly Affidavit ¶¶ 3-5).
Defendants analogize to cases in which New York courts have found contacts to
be “too insubstantial” to amount to the transaction of business under Section
302(a)(1). See Etra v. Matta, 61 N.Y.2d 455, 457-59 (1984) (finding New York
contacts of Massachusetts doctor who sent experimental drug to New York and

of Labor, the Supreme Court considered whether a tax-exempt religious foundation
dedicated to “the promotion of Christian faith, virtue, and charity” was an “enterprise
engaged in commerce,” under the FLSA. 471 U.S. 290, 292-97 (1985). In holding that
the foundation qualified as an FLSA “enterprise,” the Supreme Court hinged its analysis
on the foundation’s “commercial activities, [that were] undertaken with a ‘common
business purpose,’” and found that the foundation’s “religious character” did not place
it “beyond the reach of the [FLSA].” Id. at 306.
The Court does not derive much guidance on the meaning of “transacting business” as
it pertains to New York’s long-arm statute from Defendants’ cited FLSA cases. For
starters, the FLSA requires that an entity must constitute an “[e]nterprise engaged in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce,” 29 U.S.C. § 203(s), whereas
Section 302(a)(1) does not expressly limit qualifying business transactions to those that
are commercial in nature. The Court declines to impute such a limitation to New York’s
long-arm statute.

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acted as consultant to New York doctor to be “too insubstantial” to amount to
transaction of business); see also Paterno v. Laser Spine Inst., 24 N.Y.3d 370,
375-81 (2014) (holding that surgical center’s passive online advertisement
viewed by consumer in New York and pre- and post-surgery contacts with
consumer did not constitute transaction of business as required by Section
302(a)(1)). Just as in those cases rejecting the application of Section 302(a)(1),
Defendants argue that resting jurisdiction on Fr. Magaldi’s one visit to von
Bülow in New York City “would set a precedent for almost limitless jurisdiction”
over non-domiciliaries. Paterno, 24 N.Y. 3d at 279 (“We do not interpret the
expanse of C.P.L.R. 302(a)(1) to be boundless in application.”).
This Court similarly strains to see how Fr. Magaldi’s presence in New
York to assist von Bülow with his criminal case represents an act by which
Defendants “purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State.” Best Van Lines, Inc., 490 F.3d at 242. As a general
matter, the provision of testimony in criminal cases does not relate to any
ordinary function of an individual or entity affiliated with the Roman Catholic
Church. That said, the Court recognizes that Fr. Magaldi travelled to New York
in his priestly capacity, with Defendants’ knowledge, hoping to solicit a
charitable contribution from von Bülow. (See SAC ¶¶ 2, 75-78). Given the
unusual nature of Fr. Magaldi’s trip, the overriding purpose of which was
largely divorced from Defendants’ usual operations, the Court is hesitant to
conclude that Fr. Magaldi’s singular meeting with von Bülow reflects
Defendants’ purposeful decision to “invok[e] the benefits and protections of
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[New York’s] laws.” Best Van Lines, Inc., 490 F.3d at 247; see also D & R Glob.
Selections, S.L. v. Bodega Olegario Falcon Pineiro, 29 N.Y.3d 292, 298 (2017) (“A
non-domiciliary defendant transacts business in New York when on his or her
own initiative[,] the non-domiciliary projects himself or herself into this state to
engage in a sustained and substantial transaction of business” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)). Put differently, the Court does not see
this as “the proper case” in which “a single act within New York … satisf[ies]
the requirements of Section 302(a)(1).” Licci, 673 F.3d at 62.
b.

The Nexus Between Plaintiff’s Claims and Defendants’
Transaction of Business in New York

Section 302(a)(1) also requires that Plaintiff’s cause of action arise from
Defendants’ transaction of business in the state. This means that there must
be “an articulable nexus, or a substantial relationship, between the claim
asserted and the actions that occurred in New York.” Henderson v. I.N.S., 157
F.3d 106, 123 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 130 (2d Cir. 1998)); accord Best Van
Lines, Inc., 490 F.3d at 249. “[T]he ‘arising from’ prong of [S]ection 302(a)(1)
does not require a causal link between the defendant’s New York business
activity and a plaintiff’s injury. Instead, it requires a relatedness between the
transaction and the legal claim such that the latter is not completely unmoored
from the former, regardless of the ultimate merits of the claim.” Licci, 732 F.3d
at 168-69 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[W]hether a
plaintiff’s claim arises from a defendant’s New York contacts depends upon ‘the
nature and elements of the particular causes of action pleaded.’” Id. at 169
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(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[W]here at least one element
arises from the New York contacts, the relationship between the business
transaction and the claim asserted supports specific jurisdiction under the
statute.’” Id. (internal quotation mark and citation omitted).
Even assuming that Fr. Magaldi’s trip constituted Defendants’
purposeful projection into New York, which it did not, it is abundantly clear
that Plaintiff’s claims do not “arise out” of this purported transaction. After all,
Plaintiff brings claims against Defendants for negligence, negligent training and
supervision, negligent retention, breach of fiduciary duty, and intentional and
negligent infliction of emotional distress, stemming from Defendants’ role in Fr.
Magaldi’s sexual abuse of Plaintiff in New York. (SAC ¶¶ 95-152). Defendants’
sole business connection with New York is Fr. Magaldi’s meeting with von
Bülow to discuss a charitable contribution and exculpatory evidence Fr.
Magaldi gleaned from a penitent. (See SAC ¶¶ 2, 75; see also Pl. Opp. 2-3).
Plaintiff’s tort claims bear no connection whatsoever to Fr. Magaldi’s dealings
with von Bülow, inasmuch as Plaintiff does not allege any harm stemming from
the priest’s discussion of sensitive religious matters or solicitation of charitable
contributions. Put simply, the fact that New York was the situs of the sexual
abuse is not sufficient to establish an “articulable nexus between the business
transacted and the cause of action sued upon[.]” Sole Resort, S.A. de C.V. v.
Allure Resorts Mgmt., LLC, 450 F.3d 100, 103 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting McGowan
v. Smith, 52 N.Y.2d 268, 272 (1981)). Instead, “the event giving rise to
[Plaintiff’s] injury” — Fr. Magaldi’s sexual abuse of Plaintiff at the Waldorf
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Astoria Hotel — “had, at best, a tangential relationship to any contacts
[Defendants] had with New York” — the von Bülow meeting. Id. at 104. The
Court thus concludes that Plaintiff’s claims possess “such an attenuated
connection to the New York activity upon which [Plaintiff] attempt[s] to premise
jurisdiction that the disputes [cannot] be characterized as having ‘arisen from’
the New York activity. Id.; cf. Johnson v. Ward, 4 N.Y.3d 516, 520 (2005)
(“Plaintiffs’ cause of action arose out of Defendant’s allegedly negligent driving
in New Jersey, not from the issuance of a New York driver’s license or vehicle
registration.”); Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd., 339 F.2d 317, 321-22 (2d
Cir. 1964) (concluding that plaintiffs’ claim arose from negligent acts
committed in Arizona, and not purchase of bus tickets in New York).
Accordingly, Section 302(a)(1) cannot serve as the statutory basis for this Court
to exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendants.
*

*

*

“Because there is no statutory basis for personal jurisdiction over
[Defendants], the Court need not reach the question of whether the exercise of
jurisdiction comports with due process.” Trodale Holdings LLC v. Bristol
Healthcare Invs., L.P., No. 16 Civ. 4254 (KPF), 2017 WL 5905574, at *10
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2017); see also NuMSP, LLC v. St. Etienne, 462 F. Supp. 3d
330, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (“Because jurisdiction is lacking under New York law,
the Court need not address whether it would be consistent with federal due

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process requirements.”). This Court simply may not exercise personal
jurisdiction over Defendants. 15
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction is GRANTED. Although Plaintiff has not sought leave to
amend the Second Amended Complaint, the Court finds that amendment
would not be appropriate in these circumstances. Generally speaking, courts
should “freely give” leave to amend,” see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); nevertheless,
“leave to amend a complaint may be denied when amendment would be futile.”
Nielsen v. Rabin, 746 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Such is the
case here, where Plaintiff has already amended his pleadings twice and the
Court cannot conceive how, given the nature of Plaintiff’s claims, an
amendment would cure the Court’s lack of personal jurisdiction over

15

The Court recognizes that, in instances in which it determines that it lacks personal
jurisdiction, the preferred course of action is to refrain from considering other
arguments proffered by the movant. See, e.g., Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., 666 F.
Supp. 2d 381, 385-86 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[A]bsent authority to adjudicate, the Court
lacks a legal basis to grant any relief, or even consider the action further.”); Norex
Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 438, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (stating
that dismissal for lack of jurisdiction “moots, and thus terminates, all other pending
motions”).
The Court pauses, however, to note its skepticism that Plaintiff’s action could proceed
in light of the ruling in the Rhode Island Action, in which Justice Vogel dismissed
Plaintiff’s New York law claim predicated on the very same allegations of sexual abuse
that give rise to this action. (See Rhode Island Decision at 10 n.4). If Plaintiff believes
the Rhode Island Superior Court erred in dismissing his claims in that action, his
recourse is to appeal that decision within the Rhode Island Court system, not file a
separate suit in a different court system. See Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452
U.S. 394, 398 (1981) (“A judgment merely voidable because based upon an erroneous
view of the law is not open to collateral attack, but can be corrected only by a direct
review and not by bringing another action upon the same cause [of action].” (quoting
Balt. S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316, 325 (1927))). Indeed, Plaintiff has done just that.
(See Def. Reply, Ex. A (Plaintiff’s Rule 12A Statement)).

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Defendants. See, e.g., Taormina v. Thrifty Car Rental, No. 16 Civ. 3255 (VEC),
2016 WL 7392214, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2016) (“Because the Plaintiff has
not demonstrated personal jurisdiction, leave to amend would be futile.”).
In closing, the Court wishes to make clear that this Opinion should not
be read to minimize or excuse the execrable conduct detailed in the Second
Amended Complaint or Defendants’ alleged roles in perpetuating the same.
That the Court does not possess personal jurisdiction over Defendants in this
action is not reflective of the Court’s perception of the gravity of Plaintiff’s
allegations. The history of adolescent sexual abuse is a scourge on the Roman
Catholic Church with which it must continually reckon. But even for wellintentioned reasons, the Court may not extend its jurisdiction beyond the
bounds of the law.
The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate all pending motions, adjourn
all remaining dates, and close this case.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:

January 8, 2022
New York, New York

__________________________________
KATHERINE POLK FAILLA
United States District Judge

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