G & G Closed Circuit Events, LLC v. Cofie et al

Filing 64

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: For the foregoing reasons, we award damages in the amount of $5,600.00 for defendants' copyright violation, plus an additional $5,352.50 in attorneys' fees. The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff and close this case. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald on 11/22/2024) (sgz) Transmission to Orders and Judgments Clerk for processing.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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G&G CLOSED CIRCUIT EVENTS, LLC,
Plaintiff,
- against -

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

PRINCE COFIE, individually d/b/a
ADINKRA BAR & RESTAURANT and
P. COF LLC, an unknown business
entity d/b/a ADINKRA BAR & RESTAURANT,

21 Civ. 6920 (NRB)

Defendants.
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NAOMI REICE BUCHWALD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff

G&G

Closed

Circuit

Events,

LLC,

the

exclusive

rights holder of a pay-per-view boxing match, brought this action
under 47 U.S.C. §§ 553 and 605 against defendants P. Cof LLC, the
owner

and

operator

of

the

Adinkra

Bar

&

Restaurant

(the

“Restaurant”), and Prince Cofie, P. Cof LLC’s principal, for
displaying the boxing match on two televisions at the Restaurant
without the requisite commercial license.

Currently before the

Court is plaintiff’s request for damages and attorneys’ fees.

See

ECF No. 59.

For the reasons below, we award plaintiff a total of

$10,952.50,

consisting

of

$5,600.00

in

statutory

damages

and

$5,352.50 in attorneys’ fees.
BACKGROUND
A. Procedural Background
On April 3, 2024, this Court granted plaintiff’s motion for
partial summary judgment on the issue of liability.
1

See ECF No.

56.

The parties provided subsequent briefing on damages and

attorneys’ fees, with plaintiff filing its opening brief on August
27,

2024,

ECF

No.

59

(“Brief”),

defendants

submitting

their

opposition on October 30, 2024, ECF No. 62 (“Opp.”), and plaintiff
providing its reply on November 6, 2024, ECF No. 63 (“Reply”).
B. Factual Background
The facts relevant to the determination of damages are as
follows.

On September 11, 2018, the Restaurant advertised on its

Facebook page that it would be broadcasting a pay-per-view boxing
match between Gennedy Golovkin and Saul Alvarez (the “match”).
See ECF No. 56 at 1.

On September 15, 2024, the Restaurant

displayed the match on two televisions to approximately fifty
paying patrons.

Id. at 6–7.

For a commercial venue like the Restaurant to lawfully show
the match, it was required to procure a sublicense from plaintiff
for a fee.

Id. at 6.

Defendants did not do this.

Id.

Instead,

Mr. Cofie ordered the match through his personal cable account and
displayed the event at his restaurant.

Id. at 6–7.

LEGAL STANDARD
Section 605 of the Communications Act protects against “the
interception

of

cable-borne,

as

well

as

over-the-air,

pay

television where cable-borne transmissions originate as satellite
transmissions.”

Top Rank, Inc. v. Ortiz, No. 01 Civ. 8427, 2003

WL 1960211, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2003) (citing Cablevision
2

Sys. New York City Corp. v. Lokshin, 980 F. Supp. 107, 112
(E.D.N.Y. 1997)). Section 605 provides for penalties “of not less
than $1,000 or more than $10,000, as the court considers just” for
each violation of section 605(a), 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(c)(i)(II),
and for an additional amount not exceeding $100,000 where the
violations were committed “willfully and for purposes of direct or
indirect commercial advantage or private financial gain,” id. §
605(e)(3)(c)(ii).

With respect to willfulness, “the question for

the court is whether the defendant has exhibited disregard for the
governing statute and an indifference for its requirements.”

Joe

Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Levin, No. 18 Civ. 9389, 2019 WL 3050852,
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2019) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).

In addition, Section 605 directs the Court to

award “full costs,” including reasonable attorneys’ fees, “to an
aggrieved party who prevails.”

47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(b)(iii).

“District courts enjoy wide discretion in setting statutory
damages.”

Castillo v. G&M Realty L.P., 950 F.3d 155, 171 (2d Cir.

2020) (citation omitted).

In the Second Circuit, courts employ

the Bryant approach “[w]hen determining the amount of statutory
damages to award for copyright infringement” and will “consider:
(1) the infringer's state of mind; (2) the expenses saved, and
profits earned, by the infringer; (3) the revenue lost by the
copyright holder; (4) the deterrent effect on the infringer and
third

parties;

(5)

the

infringer's
3

cooperation

in

providing

evidence concerning the value of the infringing material; and (6)
the conduct and attitude of the parties.”

Bryant v. Media Right

Productions, Inc., 603 F.3d 135, 144 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing N.A.S.
Impor. Corp. v. Chenson Enter., Inc., 968 F.2d 250, 252–53 (2d
Cir.1992)); see also 3 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer
on Copyright § 14.04(B), at 14–41 (1991).

Overall, when awarding

statutory damages, a court should not merely seek to “compel[]
restitution of profit and reparation for injury” but should also
aim to “discourage wrongful conduct” in the future. F.W. Woolworth
Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 233 (1952).
DISCUSSION
A. Statutory Damages
Plaintiff asks this Court to assess damages using either a
licensing fee or per-person method.

Under the former approach,

plaintiff seeks (1) $5,600 in baseline statutory damages, which
reflects a two-times multiplier of the original $2,800 commercial
fee for the match; plus (2) enhanced statutory damages of $14,000,
or

two

and

one-half

times

statutory

purportedly willful conduct.

damages

for

See Brief at 3–4.

defendants’

Under the per-

person method, plaintiff advocates for (1) baseline statutory
damages of $5,000, which reflects a $100 fee for each of the 50
patrons estimated to be in attendance; plus (2) enhanced statutory
damages of $12,500, which is two and one-half times statutory
damage.

Brief

at

7.

Since
4

plaintiff’s

proposed

damages

calculation methods are naturally embedded in the Bryant approach,
the Court proceeds with Bryant’s multi-factor analysis.
With respect to the first Bryant factor, plaintiff has not
sufficiently established that defendants willfully infringed its
copyright.

Copyright infringement is “willful” if the plaintiff

shows “(1) that the defendant was actually aware of the infringing
activity, or (2) that the defendant’s actions were the result of
‘reckless disregard’ for, or ‘willful blindness’ to, the copyright
holder’s rights.”

Island Software & Computer Services, Inc. v.

Microsoft Corp., 413 F.3d 257, 263 (2d Cir. 2005) (citations
omitted).

A defendant’s willfulness “need not be proven directly

but may be inferred from the defendant’s conduct.”
Corp., 968 F.2d at 252.

N.A.S. Import,

Here, there is neither direct nor

circumstantial evidence of willfulness.

This entire litigation is

premised upon a “single event aired at [a] small establishment
[in] 2018, which permanently closed its doors years ago.”
3.

Opp. at

The venue itself “did not have any employees” on the date of

the violation, nor did it have any satellite service or devices
attached to its televisions.

Id. at 2.

And while the venue was

technically “in operation” at the time of the match, it “was not
open consistently” because Mr. Cofie “was an active member of the
military, and had periods of time that he was out of the country.”
Id.

Moreover, there is “zero evidence of repeated [licensing]

violations by [d]efendants,” who have “never been accused of any
5

kind of signal theft or the like by any entity.”

Id. at 2–3.

While it is true that defendants “required a $20.00 cover charge
for admission” and advertised that it would be showing the fight,
see Brief at 4, these actions do not, standing alone, show that
defendants willfully sought to flout or undermine the tenets of
the Communications Act.
Next, we turn to the second and third Bryant factors.

To the

extent possible, an award of “statutory damages should bear some
relation to actual damages suffered.”

RSO Records, Inc. v. Peri,

596 F. Supp. 849, 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).

It is thus common for

courts to tether a statutory damages award to the copyright owner’s
loss of the fair market value of the licensing fees.

See On Davis

v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 166 (2d Cir. 2001).

Here,

defendants’ cost savings -- the inverse of plaintiff’s lost revenue
-- reflect the $2,800 commercial fee it should have paid to
lawfully obtain a sublicense for the match.

See Brief at 4.

And

while there is evidence that defendants earned at least $1,000 in
revenue

from

charging

the

approximately

fifty

patrons

in

attendance a $20 cover charge, see Brief at 4, “[d]efendants had
no profits” to show for the night, see Opp. at 4.
Next, we turn to the fourth Bryant factor.
award

statutory

damages

in

an

amount

that

will

The Court may
“further

the

Copyright Act’s dual objectives of compensating copyright owners
for

past

infringement

and

deterring
6

future

infringement.”

Getaped.com, Inc. v. Cangemi, 188 F. Supp. 2d 398, 403 (S.D.N.Y.
2002).

The Court recognizes that without consequences, others may

feel unrestrained to broadcast content in a commercial setting
without paying for a license.

In the instant case, however,

defendants’ business has shuttered, and there are “no plans to
establish a similar business in the future.”
there is no need for specific deterrence.

Opp. at 4.

Thus,

Further, the Court is

confident that its statutory damages assessment will, on its own,
further the ends of general deterrence.
Finally, both prongs five and six of the Bryant analysis cut
against a stiff damages award.

Defendants did not default, as is

frequently the approach of defendants in this type of case.

See

e.g., G&G Closed Cir. Events, LLC v. Batista, No. 20 Civ. 5073
(NRB), 2021 WL 293150, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2021); see also
Joe Hand Prods., Inc., 2022 W1 3903596, at *3.

Rather, defendants

have fully engaged in this litigation by retaining counsel, filing
an answer, attempting settlement, and briefing motions.

See Opp.

at 5.
In consideration of the foregoing, we find a statutory damages
award of $5,600, or two times the licensing fee, to be appropriate.
See J&J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Ramirez, No. 17 CIV. 6926 (RWS),
2018 WL 1961107, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2018) (“Doubling the
licensing fee results in more proportional damages.”).

Further,

the Court declines to award enhanced statutory damages as there is
7

insufficient evidence of willfulness.

See J & J Sports Prods.,

Inc. v. Mar Y Las Estrellas Rest. Corp, No. 17 Civ. 1190 (MKB)
(ST), 2018 WL 4583489, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2018) (“Mar Y Las
Estrellas appears to be a small business for which statutory
damages will provide a sufficient penalty.”).

As discussed above,

there is no need here for specific deterrence, and the award is
sufficient for general deterrence.

See Joe Hand Promotions, Inc.

v. Hernandez, No. 03 Civ. 6132 (HB), 2004 WL 1488110, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2004) (noting in determining damages that “the
value of deterrence must be balanced against the inequity of
imposing heavy financial burdens on small businesses.

The sting

of an enhanced award should not be greater than deterrence requires
and fairness allows.”).
B. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
Plaintiff seeks attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of
$5,352.50.

ECF 59-3 at 3, Ex. 1.

The requested fee reflects 13.85

hours of attorney time billed at $350 per hour, id. at 4, and 5.05
hours of work done by a paralegal for a total amount of $505, id.
While “[t]here is no precise rule or formula” for determining
whether a request for attorneys’ fees is reasonable, Fogerty v.
Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 (1994), the amounts requested by
plaintiff are commensurate with the individual billing rate stated
in the declaration submitted by plaintiff’s attorneys, ECF No. 593 at ¶ 5, and the amount of work conducted in this case.
8

The Court

finds plaintiff’s fees to be reasonable.

Plaintiff may therefore

recover the full amount of its attorneys’ fees, $5,352.50, under
Section 605(e)(3)(B)(iii).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we award damages in the amount of
$5,600.00 for defendants’ copyright violation, plus an additional
$5,352.50

in

attorneys’

fees.

The

Clerk

of

the

Court

is

respectfully directed to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff and
close this case.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:

November 22, 2024
New York, New York

____________________________
NAOMI REICE BUCHWALD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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