Darwin v. Newburgh Operations, LLC et al

Filing 91

MEMORANDUM ORDER re: 76 MOTION for Summary Judgment . filed by Tzvi Barax, Newburgh Operations, LLC. For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied as to Plaintiff's claims for failure t o accommodate (under federal, state, and local law), discrimination (under federal, state, and local law), retaliation (under state and local law), and related aiding and abetting claims against Defendant Barax premised on her alleged accelerated termination period from January 25, 2021, to March 3, 2021, which are the only remaining claims in this action. As stated in the January Order, Defendants' motion is granted as to Plaintiff's entire federal retaliation claim and all othe r claims premised on the March 3, 2021, employment termination. This Memorandum Order resolves docket entry no. 76. The Court will refer the parties to the Mediation Program for settlement purposes by separate order. The parties must file a joint s tatus report, which must include Plaintiff's statement as to whether and to what extent she intends to prosecute further her claims against Defendants by April 18, 2025. Following that update and to the extent necessary, the Court will issue a separate Pretrial Scheduling Order setting the final pretrial conference and deadlines in this case. The parties are directed to confer and make submissions in advance of any final pretrial conference in accordance with the Scheduling Order. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Laura Taylor Swain on 3/6/2025) (ar)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
ROBIN DARWIN,
Plaintiff,
No. 22-CV-0872-LTS

-againstNEWBURGH OPERATIONS, LLC, et al.
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM ORDER

Plaintiff Robin Darwin (“Plaintiff” or “Darwin”) brings this action against
Defendants Newburgh Operations, LLC, d/b/a Sapphire Nursing at Meadow Hill (“Sapphire”)
and Tzvi Barax (“Barax”) (collectively, “Defendants”), asserting causes of action for disability
discrimination, failure to accommodate, and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities
Act (42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.), the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”) (N.Y.
Exec. Law § 290 et seq.), and the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”) (N.Y.C.
Admin. Code § 8-101 et seq.). Plaintiff alleges that Sapphire unlawfully terminated her
employment because of her disability. (Docket entry no. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 42-49.) Plaintiff also
pleads causes of action against Barax for aiding and abetting her discriminatory treatment, and
against all Defendants for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
On January 15, 2025, the Court issued a Memorandum Order (docket entry no. 86
(the “January Order”)) granting in part Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, dismissing
Plaintiff’s claims based on her March 3, 2021 termination, and holding in abeyance a final
determination on Plaintiff’s claims for failure to accommodate (under federal, state, and local
law), discrimination (under federal, state, and local law) and retaliation (under state and local
law) premised on her alleged accelerated termination period from January 25, 2021, to March 3,

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2021, pending supplemental briefing. (January Order at 27.) The Court has considered the
parties’ submissions carefully and, for the following reasons, denies Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment as to the remaining claims.
BACKGROUND
The relevant background of this case is described in the January Order, familiarity
with which is presumed for purposes of this order.
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is to be granted in favor of a moving party “if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is considered material if it “might
affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,” and an issue of fact is a genuine one
where “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., Inc., 258 F.3d 62, 69 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). To defeat a summary judgment motion, the
nonmoving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to
the material facts[,] and they may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated
speculation.” Caladora v. Calabrese, 298 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). The
nonmoving party “may not rely on mere conclusory allegations nor speculation, but instead must
offer some hard evidence showing that its version of the events is not wholly fanciful.” Golden
Pac. Bancorp v. FDIC, 375 F.3d 196, 200 (2d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). In a motion for
summary judgment, however, all evidence must be viewed “in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party,” Nieblas-Love v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 165 F. Supp. 3d 51, 64 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)
(citation omitted), and the Court is “required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible

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factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought,” Terry v.
Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir. 2003) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Where the
party opposing summary judgment “fails to properly address [the moving] party’s assertion of
fact . . . the Court may . . . consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(e)(2).
Discrimination Claims
In the January Order, the Court ordered the parties to provide supplemental
briefing addressing whether the record framed any triable issues of fact arising from the
acceleration of the termination of Plaintiff’s employment from January 25, 2021 to March 3,
2021, in light of an intervening change of law in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346
(2024), and in consideration of the Court’s finding that the termination of Plaintiff’s employment
as of March 3, 2021 did not violate her rights. (January Order at 26.) Under the standard
clarified by Muldrow, a plaintiff pleading employment discrimination need only show “some
harm” with respect to an “identifiable term or condition of employment” to establish an adverse
employment action. 601 U.S. at 354-55. The Court clarified that plaintiffs are not required to
show “that the harm incurred was ‘significant,’ [o]r serious or substantial.” Id. at 355.
Definitionally, the standard for a plaintiff to prevail on a discrimination or retaliation claim under
New York state and local law is more lenient than the federal counterparts of such laws. See YaChen Chen v. City Univ. of N.Y., 805 F.3d 59, 75 (2d Cir. 2015); Shaughnessy v. Scotiabank, No.
22-CV-10870-LAP, 2024 WL 1350083, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2024). Therefore, if Darwin
has a triable discrimination claim under federal law, she necessarily has a triable claim under
NYSHRL and NYCHRL.

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In her supplemental submission, Darwin now argues that she suffered a
sufficiently cognizable harm from the accelerated termination period to sustain an employment
discrimination claim under the recently clarified Muldrow standard. (Docket entry no. 89 (“Pl.
Supp. Mem.”) at 2-3.) Plaintiff provides two persuasive arguments. First, she argues that
sufficient evidence in the record links Darwin’s emotional distress directly to her January 25,
2021, termination. (Id. at 4 (citing docket entry no. 53-1 (“Pl. Dep.”) at 136 (“[S]ince I’ve been
terminated, that contributed to me having anxiety”).) Second, Plaintiff argues that she lost the
“time value of money” from “[t]he backpay Defendants issued, more than one month late.” (Id.
at 6-7.) Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Darwin, the Court is persuaded that the
references to emotional distress, coupled with the delay in payment as a result of the January 25,
2021, termination letter, support a permissible factual inference that Darwin was harmed by the
termination, even without further proof of direct financial or emotional injuries from her loss of
benefits, to satisfy the lenient standard articulated in Muldrow. Therefore, the Court finds that
Darwin has sufficiently alleged harm arising from the January 25, 2021 to March 3, 2021
termination period to sustain discrimination and, as explained below, failure to accommodate
claims under federal, state, and local law and certain of her other claims.
Failure to Accommodate Claims
Because there is a triable fact issue regarding injury resulting from Plaintiff’s
January 25, 2021, to March 3, 2021, termination period, the Court also finds that Plaintiff has
established a triable issue regarding her failure to accommodate claims premised on Defendants’
termination of her employment after her requested medical leave. See Valentine v. Brain &
Spine Surgeons of N.Y., P.C., No. 17-CV-2275-NSR, 2018 WL 1871175, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
16, 2018) (“Terminating an employee soon after a request for an accommodation could certainly

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amount to a denial of that request.”). Because Plaintiff has a viable claim under the ADA, she
also has triable claims under state and local law. See Berger v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 304 F. Supp.
3d 360, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2018); Fernandez v. Windmill Dist. Co., 159 F. Supp. 3d 351, 366
(S.D.N.Y. 2016).
Retaliation Claims
In the January Order, the Court dismissed the entirety of Plaintiff’s federal
retaliation claim because the Muldrow Court left in place the Burlington Northern standard
providing that the anti-retaliation provisions are “meant to capture those (and only those)
employer actions serious enough to ‘dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a
[protected activity].’” Muldrow, 601 U.S. at 357 (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.
White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006)). The Court found that the evidence on record did not satisfy that
higher burden.
Retaliation claims under NYSHRL and NYCHRL, however, do not require the
same level of material harm, and instead only require an injury that is “reasonably likely to deter
a person from engaging in that activity.” Ward v. Cohen Media Pubs. LLC, No. 22-CV-06431JLR, 2023 WL 5353342, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2023) (citation omitted); see Schanfield v.
Sojitz Corp. of Am., 663 F. Supp. 2d 305, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“The standard for retaliation
claims under the NYCHRL differs slightly from the [federal] standard in that there is no
requirement . . . that the employees suffer a materially adverse action . . . the NYCHRL makes
clear that it is illegal for an employer to retaliate in ‘any manner.’” (emphasis in original)); Arazi
v. Cohen Bros. Realty Corp., No. 20-CV- 8837-GHW, 2022 WL 912940, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
28, 2022) (noting the “NYCHRL’s more liberal . . . standard applies” to NYSHRL retaliation
claims following the 2019 statutory amendments). Therefore, for the reasons explained above,

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the Court finds that, viewing the record in the light most favorable to Darwin, she has established
a triable issue regarding the extent of the harm suffered from the January 25, 2021, letter that is
sufficient to sustain a retaliation claim under state and local law. For the reasons stated in the
January Order, Plaintiff has also established a triable issue of fact as to all other elements of her
state and local retaliation claims. Therefore, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment
dismissing these claims is denied.
Aiding and Abetting Claims
Because the Court finds that the underlying primary violations survive summary
judgment, and, as discussed in the January Order, the discriminatory and retaliatory conduct
alleged was at least in part based on his own conduct, the Court also finds that Plaintiff has
established a triable dispute as to the aiding and abetting claims asserted against Barax for failure
to accommodate, discrimination, and retaliation under state and local law.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is
denied as to Plaintiff’s claims for failure to accommodate (under federal, state, and local law),
discrimination (under federal, state, and local law), retaliation (under state and local law), and
related aiding and abetting claims against Defendant Barax premised on her alleged accelerated
termination period from January 25, 2021, to March 3, 2021, which are the only remaining
claims in this action. As stated in the January Order, Defendants’ motion is granted as to
Plaintiff’s entire federal retaliation claim and all other claims premised on the March 3, 2021,
employment termination. This Memorandum Order resolves docket entry no. 76.
The Court will refer the parties to the Mediation Program for settlement purposes
by separate order. The parties must file a joint status report, which must include Plaintiff’s

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statement as to whether and to what extent she intends to prosecute further her claims against
Defendants by April 18, 2025. Following that update and to the extent necessary, the Court will
issue a separate Pretrial Scheduling Order setting the final pretrial conference and deadlines in
this case. The parties are directed to confer and make submissions in advance of any final
pretrial conference in accordance with the Scheduling Order.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: New York, New York
March 6, 2025

DARWIN SUPP. MSJ

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN
Chief United States District Judge

MARCH 6, 2025

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