Jean-Louis v. Country of North Korea et al
ORDER OF DISMISSAL UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g): The Court denies Plaintiff's request to proceed IFP, and the complaint is dismissed without prejudice under the PLRAs "three-strikes" rule. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Plaintiff rema ins barred from filing any future action IFP while he is in custody unless he is under imminent threat of serious physical injury. The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would not be taken in goo d faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in this case. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Laura Taylor Swain on 8/1/22) (rdz)
Case 1:22-cv-06488-LTS Document 2 Filed 08/01/22 Page 1 of 2
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
JOSEPH W. JEAN-LOUIS,
COUNTRY OF NORTH KOREA;
GOVERNOR STATE OF NEW YORK;
NATIONAL GUARD; METROPOLITAN
ORDER OF DISMISSAL UNDER
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Joseph W. Jean-Louis, who is currently incarcerated at the North Infirmary
Command on Rikers Island, brings this action pro se. He has not filed a request to proceed in
forma pauperis (“IFP”) and prisoner authorization or paid the fees to bring this action. Because
Plaintiff has not paid the fees, the Court assumes that Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed IFP.
Plaintiff is barred, however, from filing any new action IFP while he is a prisoner. See JeanLouis v. Onafer Nuclear Power Plant, No. 12-CV-1071 (JEM) (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2012) (listing
strikes). That order relied on the “three-strikes” provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), which provides that:
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action [IFP] if the prisoner has, on 3 or
more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an
action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds
that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.
Although Plaintiff has filed this new action purportedly seeking IFP status, his complaint
does not show that he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury.1 Instead, Plaintiff alleges
An imminent danger is one “existing at the time the complaint is filed.” Malik v.
McGinnis, 293 F.3d 559, 563 (2d Cir. 2002). A danger “that has dissipated by the time a
Case 1:22-cv-06488-LTS Document 2 Filed 08/01/22 Page 2 of 2
that “the Governor is guilty of not having National Guard New York State stop and search every
van bus truck entering [illegible] the U.S.A. from Canada.” (ECF No. 1 at 2.) Plaintiff is
therefore barred from filing this action IFP.
The Court denies Plaintiff’s request to proceed IFP, and the complaint is dismissed
without prejudice under the PLRA’s “three-strikes” rule. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 2 Plaintiff
remains barred from filing any future action IFP while he is in custody unless he is under
imminent threat of serious physical injury. 3 Id.
The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this order
would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal.
See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in this case.
August 1, 2022
New York, New York
/s/ Laura Taylor Swain
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN
Chief United States District Judge
complaint is filed” is not sufficient. Pettus v. Morgenthau, 554 F.3d 293, 296 (2d Cir. 2009).
Plaintiff may commence a new action by paying the filing fees. If Plaintiff does so, that
complaint will be reviewed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the Court to dismiss any
civil rights complaint from a prisoner if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
The Court may bar any vexatious litigant (including a nonprisoner) from filing future
actions (even if the filing fees are paid) without first obtaining leave from the Court. See In re
Martin-Trigona, 9 F.3d 226, 227-30 (2d Cir. 1993) (discussing sanctions courts may impose on
vexatious litigants, including “leave of court” requirement).
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