Schoenadel v. YouGov America, Inc.

Filing 185

ORDER denying 183 Letter Motion to Seal. The motion for reconsideration is DENIED. "The standard for granting a motion for reconsideration is strict," and "[m]otions for reconsideration are generally denied 'unless the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked--matters, in other words that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court." Diakite v. USC/S,2024 WL 2884047, at *I (S.D.N.Y. M ay 14, 2024) (citations omitted). Defendant doesn't identify any new controlling decisions or data. And defendant is wrong that the rationale underpinning the public's right to access judicial documents is entirely undercut by the act of se ttlement. "For cases that settle it is up to the public to decide why the case was brought (and fought) and what exactly was at stake in,it including the question of why the case was settled." Doe 1 v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, NA 742 F. Supp. 3d 387, 396 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2024) (citation omitted). The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motion at ECF No. 183. (Signed by Judge Arun Subramanian on 3/11/2025) (sgz)

Case 1:22-cv-10236-AS

Document 183

Filed 03/10/25

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Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP
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March 10, 2025
VIA ECF
The Honorable Arun Subramanian
United States District Judge
Southern District of New York
Daniel Patrick Moynihan
United States Courthouse
500 Pearl Street
New York, New York 10007
Re:

Schoenadel v. YouGov America Inc., Case No. 22-CV-10236-AS
Defendant’s Letter Motion for Reconsideration of April 19, 2024 Sealing Order and
Request to Redact Certain Filings

Dear Judge Subramanian:
Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP represents Defendant YouGov America Inc. (“YouGov” or
“Defendant”) in connection with the above-referenced action. Defendant hereby moves the Court for
reconsideration of its April 19, 2024 Order denying in part Defendant’s request to remove from the
public docket and permit Defendant to file in redacted form the Declaration of Jordan Deitch (Dkt.
100), the Declaration of Scott Horowitz (Dkt. 101), the Declaration of Tracy Schoenadel (Dkt. 103),
the Declaration of Sara Eddleston (Dkt. 104) (all filed in support of Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition
to YouGov’s Motion for Summary Judgment), as well as Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Local
Rule 56.1 Statement of Undisputed Material Facts and Statement of Additional Material Facts (Dkt.
108), and Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition of Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Dkt. 109) (collectively, the “Summary Judgment Requests”). (Dkt. 115.)
Further, in accordance with Your Honor’s Individual Rules and Practices, Rule 11(C)(iii), Defendant
respectfully asks the Court to redact certain portions of the following filings that post-date the
Summary Judgment Requests (collectively, the “Additional Requests”):
? Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion to Strike (Dkt. 120), including
exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7 (Dkt. 120-1, 120-2, 120-3, 120-4, 120-5, 120-7);
? Defendant’s Reply to Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Local Rule 56.1 Statement of
Undisputed Material Facts (Dkt. 122);
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Case 1:22-cv-10236-AS
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VIA ECF

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Document 183

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The Honorable Arun Subramanian
March 10, 2025

Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Additional Statement of Facts (Dkt. 124);
Supplemental Declarations of Ray Martin (Dkt. 126), Alexander McIntosh (Dkt. 127), and
Marijana Sarac (Dkt. 129);
Defendant’s Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 136);
Defendant’s Reply in Support of Motion to Strike (Dkt. 148); and
Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion in Limine (Dkt. 166).

Consistent with Rule 11(C)(iii), the proposed redacted documents have been publicly filed on ECF
and electronically relate to this Letter Request and an unredacted version of the documents with the
proposed redactions highlighted have been contemporaneously filed under seal on ECF and
electronically related to this Letter Request.
As grounds for relief, in light of the Parties’ settlement of all claims in this case, the public’s qualified
right to access judicial documents should now yield to the private interests of innocent third parties.
As discussed below, the benefit gained by continued public access to the damaging and
unsubstantiated allegations contained in these documents is far outweighed by the detriment such
allegations have had—and will continue to have—on the impacted non-parties. Indeed, permitting
unfettered access to these unfounded allegations of unlawful activity and arrests has come at the cost
of substantial reputational harm and ever-increasing emotional and mental distress. Despite settlement
marking the final chapter of this litigation, these individuals—who were not parties to this case—
must continue their fight to repair their tarnished personal and professional reputations. And this fight
is exacting. As a result, these individuals are facing significant psychological and emotional tolls from
the ongoing stigmatization, undermining their ability to lead normal lives, both in their communities
and within their respective professions. The Court should therefore grant the narrowly tailored
requested relief, thereby protecting these third parties from being further victimized by this case.
By way of background, Defendant asked the Court to redact the Summary Judgment Requests
because those documents “contained multiple unsupported allegations of drug use, arrests, and
affairs of third parties,” which implicated the privacy interests of such individuals—interests that
may overcome the presumption of public access. (Dkt. 110, 111 (sealed) at 1-2 (citing Lugosch v.
Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2006).) The Court agreed only with respect
to the alleged affair, concluding that “unlawful activity and arrests are not matters that are
‘traditionally considered private,’” and therefore Defendant failed to carry its burden that such
information warrants redaction. (Dkt. 115 at 3 (citing United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1048
(2d Cir. 1995).) But by amicably resolving this case, Defendant can now meet its burden on the
Summary Judgment Requests as well as the Additional Requests, which similarly seek the
redaction of unsubstantiated allegations of drug use and arrests involving non-parties.
In Amodeo, the Second Circuit explained the rationale underpinning the public’s right to access
judicial documents:
The presumption of access is based on the need for federal courts, although
independent—indeed, particularly because they are independent—to have a
measure of accountability and for the public to have confidence in the

Case 1:22-cv-10236-AS
Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP
VIA ECF

Document 183

Filed 03/10/25

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The Honorable Arun Subramanian
March 10, 2025

administration of justice. Federal courts exercise powers under Article III that
impact upon virtually all citizens, but judges, once nominated and confirmed, serve
for life unless impeached through a process that is politically and practically
inconvenient to invoke. Although courts have a number of internal checks, such as
appellate review by multi-judge tribunals, professional and public monitoring is an
essential feature of democratic control. Monitoring both provides judges with
critical views of their work and deters arbitrary judicial behavior. Without
monitoring, moreover, the public could have no confidence in the
conscientiousness, reasonableness, or honesty of judicial proceedings. Such
monitoring is not possible without access to testimony and documents that are used
in the performance of Article III functions.
Amodeo, 71 F.3d at 1048. In essence, this “presumption of access” permits those outside the judiciary
to monitor how the judiciary wields its power, thereby holding the judiciary accountable for its
conduct and instilling in the public “confidence in the administration of justice.” Id.
This presumption, like any presumption, can be overcome. Amodeo instructs lower courts to weigh
the presumption of access by balancing “the role of the material at issue in the exercise of Article III
judicial power and the resultant value of such information to those monitoring the federal courts.” Id.
at 1049. After weighing these variables, a court must then consider the “countervailing factors” that
cut against the presumption of access, such as “the privacy interests of those resisting disclosure.” Id.
at 1050. The Court advised that “embarrassing conduct with no public ramifications,” information
arising from “personal vendettas,” and “unverified information” weigh against public disclosure. Id.
at 1051.
While the scale tipped in favor of public access in the Court’s April 19, 2024 Order, the Parties’
settlement has now fundamentally altered this balance, resulting in a recalibration that permits the
requested redactions.
To start, the rationale underpinning the public’s right to access unredacted versions of the identified
materials is inapposite to this now-settled case. Whether the public can learn of alleged unlawful
activity and arrests by innocent third parties neither bears on the public’s accountability function nor
bolsters the public’s confidence in the “administration of justice.” See id. at 1048. Moreover, “the
value of this information” to the public was always minimal and is now made even more so by the
settlement. See id. at 1049. Finally, as noted in Defendant’s initial request for redactions, the
countervailing privacy interests of the impacted third parties outweighs the presumption of public
access to this “unverified information” rooted in a “personal vendetta[].”1 (Dkt. 110, 111 (sealed) at
1

To summarize, Defendant argued that the third-party interests here satisfied all three of Amodeo’s
privacy interest factors. (See Dkt. 110, 111 (sealed) at 2 (explaining that Amodeo instructs courts
to evaluate (1) “the degree to which the subject matter is traditionally considered private rather
than public”; (2) the “nature and degree of injury”; and (3) the “reliability of the information.”)
(citing Amodeo, 71 F.3d at 1051).) First, the requested redactions covered drug use and arrests,
unquestionably implicating the privacy interests of these individuals. (Id.) Second, the unsupported
statements regarding the third parties’ alleged drug use and arrests contained salacious and