Samuels v. The Urban Assembly, Inc. et al

Filing 59

OPINION & ORDER re: 24 MOTION to Dismiss . filed by Urban Assembly Charter School for Computer Science, The Urban Assembly, Inc., David Noah, 19 FIRST MOTION to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). filed by Urban Assembly Charter School for Computer Science, The Urban Assembly, Inc., David Noah. For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part. The Court denies Defendants' motion to dismiss as to all claims except for Samuels' retaliation claims brought under the NYSHRL and the First Amendment, which the Court dismisses. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motions pending at Dkt. Nos. 19 and 24. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Ronnie Abrams on 8/30/2024) (ks)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
MELISSA SAMUELS,
Plaintiff,
No. 23-CV-1379 (RA)

v.
URBAN ASSEMBLY CHARTER SCHOOL
FOR COMPUTER SCIENCE d/b/a COMP SCI
HIGH and DAVID NOAH, individually,

OPINION & ORDER

Defendants.
RONNIE ABRAMS, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Melissa Samuels brings this action against her former employers, Defendants
Urban Assembly Charter School for Computer Science and David Noah. Samuels alleges that,
after sustaining an on-the-job injury and requesting temporary medical leave, Defendants
terminated her employment, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the New
York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), the New York City Human Rights Law
(“NYCHRL”), the New York Labor Law (“NYLL”), and the First Amendment. Now before the
Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). For the reasons that follow, the motion is granted in part and denied in part. In particular,
Defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied as to all claims except for Samuels’ retaliation claims
brought under the NYSHRL and the First Amendment, which the Court dismisses.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following facts are drawn from the Second Amended Complaint, which includes
“materials incorporated in it by reference, and documents that, although not incorporated by
reference, are integral to the complaint.” Sierra Club v. Con-Strux, LLC, 911 F.3d 85, 88 (2d Cir.

2018).1 For the purposes of this motion, the Court “accept[s] all factual allegations as true and
draw[s] all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Id.2
Defendant Urban Assembly, a non-for-profit high school, and Defendant Noah, the
school’s founding principal, hired Samuels to be a math teacher in August 2021. See Second Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 8–20. Since then, Samuels asserts that she “succeeded in her role,” receiving a raise in
2022 and “never reciev[ing] any criticism or negative feedback regarding her work performance.”
Id. ¶¶ 22–24.
On June 9, 2022, one of Samuels’ students “threw a hard ball that hit Samuels in the head,
causing a concussion.” Id. ¶ 25. Upon being struck, Samuels immediately reported the incident
and her injuries to Defendants. Id. ¶ 33. Although Noah “instructed Samuels to not give the police
any information about the student who had assaulted her,” she nonetheless began reporting the
incident to the police. Id. ¶¶ 34–35. Samuels asserts that Noah then physically confronted her,
“approach[ing] her within a few inches of her face . . . and angrily ask[ing] if she really wanted to
get a kid involved in the criminal justice system.” Id. ¶¶ 35, 38. In response to Noah’s alleged
“attempt[] to prevent her from reporting the incident,” Samuels “objected” and continued to report

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The Court will consider four documents that the complaint refers to and quotes from but does not attach as exhibits:
(1) a June 10, 2022 email and doctor’s note; (2) a June 11, 2022 email; (3) a June 12, 2022 email; and (4) a June 16,
2022 email. See Dkt. No. 26 (“Casparie Decl.”), Exs. B, C, D; Dkt. No. 23 (“Second Am. Compl.”) ¶¶ 45–49. The
Court finds that the complaint incorporates by reference the June 11th email, given that it includes extensive quotations
from this email, and its use of the document is “far more substantial than a mere passing reference.” See Trump v.
Vance, 977 F.3d 198, 210 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020); see also Second Am. Compl. ¶ 47. With regard to the remaining emails,
Samuels relies heavily on them in supporting her claims, and the Court thus finds them to be integral. See United
States ex rel. Foreman v. AECOM, 19 F.4th 85, 106 (2d Cir. 2021) (“For a document to be considered integral to the
complaint, the plaintiff must rely on the terms and effect of a document in drafting the complaint.”); Jacobson v.
Conflict Int’l, Inc., No. 22-CV-10177, 2024 WL 1348863, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2024) (“[C]ourts may . . . consider
non-legal documents integral if they are necessary predicates for the claim.”); see also Compl. ¶¶ 45–46, 48–49; Dkt.
No. 27 (“Pl. Br.”) at 8–11.

2

Unless otherwise indicated, this opinion and order omits all internal quotation marks, citations, footnotes, omissions,
emphases, and alterations in quoted text.

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the incident to the police officers present. Id. ¶ 40. Soon after, Samuels left Urban Assembly in an
ambulance and the school “disabled her school email and system access.” Id. ¶¶ 42–43.
After being transported to the emergency room, id. ¶ 42, Samuels was allegedly
“diagnosed with a head injury, neck pain, and concussion,” id. ¶ 26. Her symptoms included
blurred vision, which prevented her from “read[ing] from her phone or computer screen” and
restricted her ability “to operate a car or navigate public transportation.” Id. ¶¶ 27–28. For example,
Samuels was “unable to drive herself to the hospital for a PET scan the day following her injuries.”
Id. ¶ 29. She also says that she experienced “severe, persistent head and neck pain,” which
“impacted her ability to bend her neck and rotate her head,” including “even minor head and neck
movements.” Id. ¶ 30. Her head and neck pain also “impacted her ability to sleep, . . . read,
concentrate, and think.” Id. ¶¶ 31–32.
A day later, on June 10, 2022, Noah messaged Samuels: “I [h]ope your head is feeling
better. I assume you’re not coming in so you can recuperate.” Id. ¶ 44. Samuels responded as
follows: “After being as[s]aulted on campus I sought medical care, and was discharged this
evening to recuperate. Please see the attached physician letter excusing me from work for ten days.
This includes not being able to participate in tomorrow’s Algebra 1 Regents Prep session.”
Casparie Decl., Ex. B.; see Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 45–46. The email included an attached doctor’s
note from Malcolm Johnson MD, stating that “Melissa Samuels was seen and treated in our
emergency department on 6/10/2022. Please excuse the absence. She may return to work on
6/21/2022. If you have any questions or concerns, please don’t hesitate to call.” Casparie Decl.,
Ex. B.
The next morning, on June 11, 2022, Noah sent Samuels a reply email:
You were not assaulted. [A student] accidently hit you with a nerf ball while he was
throwing it at [another student] in a raucous classroom. . . . [I]t was an accident, it
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was a nerf ball, and he is a child in a school. It’s one thing for him to face
consequences or for you to ask to be moved out of the advisory. It’s entirely another
to make what I believe is a bad faith assault claim. . . . Your account was
temporarily disabled because I was sincerely afraid that you were sharing a
student’s personal information without parental consent or cause[.] . . . I’m not sure
why you are doing this, but if it’s just to avoid coming to work, let’s please
talk. . . . I suggest a virtual meeting to come to a shared understanding about next
steps[.] . . . In the unlikely event you are unable to meet until the 21st, please plan
on meeting in my office at 8:15.
Id., Ex. B.; see also Second Am. Compl. ¶ 47. The next day, on June 12, 2022, Noah emailed
Samuels again:
After further review of your doctor’s note and consultation with our school’s
counsel, I will need further documentation to excuse your absence beyond
Friday[.] . . . [B]eyond Friday, the note doesn’t contain any indication of your
condition and your request for an accommodation that involves not working at all
for 10 days doesn’t appear to be supported by the note (which, again, lacks a
diagnosis or any details). I remain open to discussing the matter with you directly
via phone or video chat so we can actually come to some shared understanding
about what happened and what happens next. But, in the absence of such a
conversation and further documentation, this week will have to be considered
unpaid[.]
Casparie Decl., Ex. C; see also Second Am. Compl. ¶ 48. Four days later, on June 16, 2022, “while
Noah knew Samuels remained on medical leave recuperating from injuries,” Defendants
terminated Samuels’ employment. Id. ¶ 49. Noah sent Samuels the following termination email:
I haven’t heard from you other than a brief email last Friday and you haven’t
responded to my several requests to speak. Comp Sci High is terminating your
employment effective today. We are doing so out of concern for the safety of our
students and families, and given your lack of communication and the several
attendance issues you had in recent weeks (in which you left early without
communication). . . . [P]lease either return your keys and computer via mail or drop
them off[.]
Casparie Decl., Ex. D; see also Second Am. Compl. ¶ 49. Samuels also asserts that Defendants
“withheld approximately $1,700 from her final paycheck, which represented the approximate
value of a laptop it issued to Samuels, despite her having returned the laptop to Urban Assembly.”
Id. ¶ 52.
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On February 17, 2023, Samuels filed this action against Defendants, see Dkt. No. 1, and
on March 1, 2023, she filed an amended complaint to correct an error in the corporate Defendant’s
name, see Dkt. Nos. 3, 22. Samuels filed a second amended complaint—the now operative
complaint—on October 2, 2023. See Second Am. Compl. She principally asserts that Defendants
unlawfully terminated her employment, bringing employment discrimination, failure to
accommodate, and retaliation claims under the ADA, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL. She also
alleges that Defendants retaliated against her under the NYLL § 740 and the First Amendment,
and that Urban Assembly unlawfully deducted $1,700 from her wages in violation of the NYLL.
Defendants now bring a motion to dismiss, arguing that Samuels fails to state a claim under any
statute.
LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint
must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Where a complaint
pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between
possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the question is
“not whether [the plaintiff] will ultimately prevail,” but “whether [her] complaint [is] sufficient to
cross the federal court’s threshold.” Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 529–30 (2011). In answering
this question, the Court must “accept as true all factual allegations . . . but [is] not required to credit
conclusory allegations or legal conclusions couched as factual . . . allegations.” Dane v.
UnitedHealthcare Ins. Co., 974 F.3d 183, 188 (2d Cir. 2020).

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DISCUSSION
I.

Employment Discrimination Claims
Samuels first alleges that Defendants unlawfully discriminated against her because of her

disability by terminating her employment while she recuperated from her injuries, in violation of
the ADA, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL. See Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 51, 54, 82, 104.
Defendants argue that these claims should be dismissed because she does not plausibly allege that
she was disabled as defined by the relevant statutes and because she did not provide medical
documentation explaining the nature of her disability. See Dkt. No. 25 (“Def. Br.”) at 1, 5–8.
Samuels has, at this stage, stated an employment discrimination claim under all three statutes.
A.

ADA Employment Discrimination Claim Against Defendant Urban Assembly

Title I of the ADA prohibits discrimination “against a qualified individual on the basis of
disability in regard to . . . [the] discharge of employees . . . and other terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). “The elements of [an employment
discrimination] claim under the ADA are that: (1) the employer is subject to the ADA; (2) the
plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the ADA or perceived to be so by her employer; (3) she
was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable
accommodation; (4) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (5) the adverse action was
imposed because of her disability.” Davis v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 804 F.3d 231, 235 (2d
Cir. 2015). Although “[a] claim for discrimination under the ADA is ultimately subject to the
burden-shifting analysis” the Supreme Court established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973), “to survive a motion to dismiss, [the plaintiff] need only allege facts to
support her prima facie case.” Morey v. Windsong Radiology Grp., P.C., 794 F. App’x 30, 32 (2d
Cir. 2019); see also Dooley v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 636 F. App’x 16, 21 (2d Cir. 2015) (“[A]

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plaintiff is not required to plead a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas . . . to defeat a
motion to dismiss.”); Germain v. Nielsen Consumer LLC, 655 F. Supp. 3d 164, 182 (S.D.N.Y.
2023); Evans v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., No. 22-CV-7901, 2023 WL 8034449, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2023).
As an initial matter, the parties do not dispute that Urban Assembly is subject to the ADA
or that Samuels suffered an adverse employment action under the ADA.3 Defendants do appear to
dispute the three remaining elements of an employment discrimination claim: that Samuels is
disabled within the meaning of the ADA; that she is qualified to perform the essential functions of
the job (with or without reasonable accommodation); and that the adverse action was taken because
of her disability. The Court considers each in turn.
1. Disabled Within the Meaning of the ADA
The ADA defines “disability” as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more major life activities of [an] individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A).4 “[M]ajor life

3
Given that the ADA “cannot provide for individual liability,” Samuels properly brings her ADA claims against only
the corporate defendant, Urban Assembly. See Spiegel v. Schulmann, 604 F.3d 72, 79 (2d Cir. 2010); Garvey v. Town
of Clarkstown, New York, No. 13-CV-8305, 2018 WL 1026379, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2018), aff’d sub nom. Garvey
v. Sullivan, 773 F. App’x 634 (2d Cir. 2019). Samuels also plausibly alleges that Urban Assembly is subject to the
ADA, since Urban Assembly is an educational non-profit corporation that “employ[s] more than 14 employees.” See
Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 10–11; Pavel v. Plymouth Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 198 F. App’x 38, 40–41 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting
that the ADA applies to employers who have 15 or more employees); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5). Moreover, because
termination qualifies as an adverse employment action under the ADA, see Limauro v. Consol. Edison Co. of New
York, Inc., No. 20-CV-03558, 2021 WL 466952, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2021), Samuels plausibly alleges that she
suffered an adverse employment action, see Second Am. Compl. ¶ 49.
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Although the ADA includes alternative definitions for the term “disability,” Samuels here appears to allege only an
“actual disability” under § 12102(1)(A), as opposed to having a “record of such an impairment” under § 12102(1)(B)
or “being regarded as having such an impairment” under § 12102(1)(C). See Hamilton v. Westchester Cnty., 3 F.4th
86, 92 n.4 (2d Cir. 2021). First, Samuels does not assert that she “has a history of” any substantial impairment sufficient
to allege a disability under the “record of” definition. Sam-Sekur v. Whitmore Grp., Ltd., No. 11-CV-4938, 2012 WL
2244325, at *7 n.4 (E.D.N.Y. June 15, 2012). Second, the “regarded as” definition does “not apply to impairments
that are transitory and minor,” which include impairments “with an actual or expected duration of 6 months or less.”
42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B). Given that Samuels does not allege that her injuries lasted—or were expected to last—over
six months, and because she does not otherwise contend that her injuries were not “transitory and minor” as defined
by the ADA, the Court construes her complaint as alleging only an “actual disability” under § 12102(1)(A). See SamSekur, 2012 WL 2244325, at *7; Hamilton, 3 F.4th at 92 n.4.

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activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing,
hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning,
reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” Id. § 12102(2)(A). The ADA also
provides that the definition of disability “shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of
individuals . . . to the maximum extent permitted by the [ADA’s] terms.” Id. § 12102(4)(A). For
example, as set forth in the statute’s implementing regulations, the term “substantially limits” is to
be “construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage” and “is not meant to be a demanding
standard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i). “An impairment need not prevent, or significantly or
severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered
substantially limiting,” and the “primary object of attention in cases brought under the ADA should
be whether . . . discrimination has occurred, not whether an individual’s impairment substantially
limits a major life activity.” Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iii)–(iv). Accordingly, the Second Circuit has noted
that “the substantial-limitation requirement in the definition of ‘disability’ is not an exacting one.”
Woolf v. Strada, 949 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 2020).
When Congress amended the ADA in 2008, it relaxed preexisting temporal requirements
for establishing a disability under § 12102(1)(A). Hamilton, 3 F.4th at 92; see ADA Amendments
Act (the “ADAAA”), Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553. Although the definition of “disability”
was previously interpreted to require a “permanent or long term” impairment, today no such
requirement exists. Hamilton, 3 F.4th at 92. A “disability” under the amended statute “now covers
impairments lasting or expected to last less than six months” and “[t]he statute does not suggest
that there is any duration that is too short.” Id. at 93–94. “Put another way, [an] actual disability
claim under the ADA cannot fail solely because [a plaintiff] did not allege a permanent or chronic
disability.” Patterson v. EmblemHealth Inc., No. 22-CV-2177, 2023 WL 5671531, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.

8

Sept. 1, 2023). To determine whether a plaintiff has plausibly alleged that she is disabled, courts
must instead conduct a “fact-specific inquiry.” Parada v. Banco Indus. De Venezuela, C.A., 753
F.3d 62, 69–70 (2d Cir. 2014) (noting that whether an impairment substantially limits a major life
activity depends on “the totality of the circumstances”); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iv) (“The
determination . . . requires an individualized assessment.”).
Samuels plausibly alleges that she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA. Accepting
her factual allegations as true, as the Court must, see Sierra Club, 911 F.3d at 88, she has
adequately pled a physical impairment that substantially limits at least one major life activity. After
sustaining a “head injury, neck pain, and [a] concussion,” which allegedly produced “severe,
persistent head and neck pain,” Samuels asserts that she was substantially limited in her ability to
perform manual tasks, to see, to sleep, to read, to concentrate, and to think. Second Am. Compl.
¶¶ 26–32. To be sure, courts in this District have rejected similar ADA claims where a plaintiff
simply provides “a bare recital of the statutory definition of disability without reference to any
specific factual allegations of a substantial limitation to a major life activity.” Koonce v. Whole
Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., No. 22-CV-10418, 2023 WL 8355926, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2023);
Zuckerman v. GW Acquisition LLC, No. 20-CV-8742, 2021 WL 4267815, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
20, 2021). Here, however, Samuels provides at least some specific examples of her substantial
limitations: after the incident, she claims she “could not . . . read from her phone or computer
screen,” Second Am. Compl. ¶ 28, was “unable to drive herself to the hospital,” id. ¶ 29, was
“unable to perform even minor head and neck movements without severe pain,” id. ¶ 30, and that
her pain “prevent[ed] her from sleeping and frequently [woke] her from sleep,” id. ¶ 31.5 Taken

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Defendants argue that short-term injuries (including concussions) do not qualify as disabilities under the ADA, see
Def. Br. at 1; Dkt. No. 28 (“Def. Reply Br.”) at 3–4, but the cases Defendants cite rely on pre-ADAAA case law or
outdated regulations, see, e.g., Tongalson v. Dreyfus Serv. Corp., No. 04-CV-2308, 2005 WL 356805, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.

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together, these allegations support a plausible inference that Samuels’ injuries substantially limited
her ability to perform major life activities. See Patterson, 2023 WL 5671531, at *5; McCrae v.
H.N.S. Mgmt. Co., No. 3:22-CV-217, 2022 WL 16635390, at *5 (D. Conn. Nov. 2, 2022).
Although Defendants rightly note that Samuels’ doctor’s note fails to provide a medical diagnosis
or identify a specific disability, see Def. Br at 6–7, at this early stage, Samuels’ assertions are
sufficient to “nudge [her] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 570. Accordingly, the Court finds that she plausibly alleges that she is disabled within the
meaning of the ADA.
2. Qualified to Perform the Essential Functions of the Job
The ADA also requires a plaintiff to plausibly allege that “she was otherwise qualified to
perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation.” Davis, 804
F.3d at 235. On a motion to dismiss, “[t]he qualification element of a disability-discrimination
claim requires only a ‘minimal showing’ that the plaintiff ‘possesses the basic skills necessary for
performance of [the] job.’” Limauro, 2021 WL 466952, at *6 (quoting Owens v. N.Y.C. Hous.
Auth., 934 F.2d 405, 409 (2d Cir. 1991)). Indeed, there is no requirement at this stage that a plaintiff
describe the position’s “essential job functions.” Id. That determination “is a question reserved for
later proceedings.” Id.; see also McBride v. BIC Consumer Prod. Mfg. Co., 583 F.3d 92, 98 (2d
Cir. 2009). All a plaintiff must do to succeed is to “allege facts that raise an inference that [she]
was qualified” for the position. Limauro, 2021 WL 466952, at *6.

Feb. 14, 2005) (citing a now-inoperative interpretive guideline stating that “temporary, non-chronic impairments of
short duration,” such as concussions, “are usually not disabilities”). Since the 2008 amendments, courts have found
that non-chronic head and neck injuries can constitute a “disability” within the meaning of the ADA. See, e.g., Kopchik
v. Town of E. Fishkill, New York, 759 F. App’x 31, 33, 37 (2d Cir. 2018); Chesebro v. Town of Guilderland, No. 18CV-1294, 2019 WL 3891024, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2019); cf. Koonce, 2023 WL 8355926, at *3 (holding that a
plaintiff’s “lingering symptoms from his concussion” did not constitute a substantial limitation where his symptoms
“only . . . delayed him from [driving to work] for five to ten minutes”).

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Samuels has done so. According to the complaint, she has a Bachelor of Arts in
Neuroscience and Behavior from Columbia University and a Master of Arts in Middle Childhood
Education from Brooklyn College. See Second Am. Compl. ¶ 17. Before working at Urban
Assembly, she previously worked as a teacher for six years and she has “approximately 11 years
of experience in education.” Id. ¶ 18. After being hired by Defendants, Samuels “succeeded in her
role and received positive feedback based on her performance.” Id. ¶ 22. She also received a raise
in 2022 and allegedly “never received any criticism or negative feedback regarding her work
performance.” Id. ¶¶ 23–24; see also Farmer v. Shake Shack Enterprises, LLC, 473 F. Supp. 3d
309, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (finding a plaintiff qualified where she “allege[d] that [she] received a
raise during her short tenure”); cf. Graves v. Finch Pruyn & Co., 457 F.3d 181, 186 n.6 (2d Cir.
2006). At this stage, therefore, the Court finds that Samuels plausibly raises the inference that she
was qualified for the position.
3.

Adverse Action Taken Because of Plaintiff’s Disability

Finally, to plausibly allege that the adverse action was taken “because of” the plaintiff’s
disability, the ADA requires the plaintiff to “give plausible support to a minimal inference of
discriminatory motivation.” Dooley, 636 F. App’x at 21; see also Davis, 804 F.3d at 235 (holding
that, with respect to whether “the adverse action was imposed because of [the plaintiff’s]
disability,” the “plaintiff must show that the adverse employment action took place under
circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination”). A “strong showing of temporal
proximity between evidence of a plaintiff’s disability and an adverse action can raise an inference
of discrimination.” Devany v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 18-CV-6684, 2021 WL 4481911, at
*13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2021). In particular, “the temporal proximity of an employee’s disclosure
of a disability to [her] termination support an inference of discrimination” in ADA employment

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discrimination cases. Zelasko v. NYC Dep’t of Educ., No. 20-CV-5316, 2021 WL 2635121, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. June 25, 2021). “[G]aps of two months or less . . . between disclosure of a disability
and an adverse action” are generally sufficient to raise a minimal inference at the pleading stage.
Kamiel v. Hai St. Kitchen & Co. LLC, No. 19-CV-5336, 2023 WL 2473333, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
13, 2023) (collecting cases).
Because Defendants terminated Samuels’ employment just seven days after she was
injured—and just six days after she requested medical leave to recuperate—she plausibly raises an
inference of discrimination. Indeed, courts in this District have denied motions to dismiss under
similar circumstances. In Crosby v. Stew Leonard’s Yonkers LLC, for example, a district court
found that a plaintiff raised “sufficient facts to support a minimal inference of discriminatory
motivation” where he “was terminated approximately two weeks after [his] . . . hospitalization”
and the defendants “expected [him] to work while on medical leave.” 695 F. Supp. 3d 551, 568
(S.D.N.Y. 2023); see also Kamiel, 2023 WL 2473333, at *5 (“The period between [the plaintiff’s]
disclosure of her disability and termination . . . is well-pled to have been five weeks—easily short
enough under the case law to give rise to an inference of causation.”). To be sure, Defendants point
to numerous other reasons why their decision to terminate Samuels’ employment may not have
been made with discriminatory animus—her doctor’s note failed to provide a diagnosis or any
details, she failed to respond to Defendants’ emails requesting additional medical documentation,
and Noah was “sincerely afraid that [she was] sharing a student’s personal information without
parental consent or cause.” Def. Br. at 3, 6–7. However, at this early stage, the close proximity
between her injury, her request for accommodation, and her firing is “sufficient to raise a[]
[minimal] inference that [she] was fired because of [her] disability.” Limauro, 2021 WL 466952,
at *7.

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Accordingly, Samuels states an employment discrimination claim under the ADA against
Urban Assembly, and Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim is denied.
B.

NYSHRL Employment Discrimination Claims Against Both Defendants

Similar to the ADA, the NYSHRL prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability. See
N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(b). The NYSHRL is “interpreted coextensively” with the ADA.
Schwartz v. Middletown City Sch. Dist., No. 23-CV-1248, 2024 WL 1257095, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 25, 2024). Thus, “NYSHRL claims are analyzed as ADA claims,” Fox v. Costco Wholesale
Corp., 918 F.3d 65, 76 (2d Cir. 2019), and are governed by the same legal standards, Kopchik v.
Town of E. Fishkill, New York, 759 F. App’x 31, 37 (2d Cir. 2018); Kinneary v. City of New York,
601 F.3d 151, 158 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that “the same elements that must be proven to establish
an ADA claim must be also demonstrated to prove claims under [the] NYSHRL”).
One difference between the ADA and the NYSHRL is that the state law’s definition of
disability “is not limited to impairments that substantially limit one or more major life activities.”
Murphy v. New York State Pub. Emps. Fed’n, No. 17-CV-628, 2022 WL 4324435, at *18
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2022). The NYSHRL instead only requires a “physical . . . impairment . . .
which prevents the exercise of a normal bodily function.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 292(21); see
McCowan v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 689 F. Supp. 2d 390, 402 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[U]nder state
law, a disability need only be a demonstrable impairment; it does not have to substantially limit a
major life activity.”). Here, Samuels plausibly alleges a disability within the meaning of the
NYSHRL, given her allegedly “severe, persistent head and neck pain [that] impacted her ability
to bend her neck and rotate her head.” Second Am. Compl. ¶ 30. Therefore, for the same reasons
as discussed above, Samuels states a claim for employment discrimination in violation of the
NYSHRL. Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim is thus denied.

13

C.

NYCHRL Employment Discrimination Claims Against Both Defendants

The NYCHRL also protects against disability-based discrimination. N.Y.C. Admin. Code
§§ 8-102, 8-107. Defining disability as “any impairment of any system of the body,” id. § 8-102,
the NYCHRL provides even “greater protection against disability-based discrimination” than its
federal and state counterparts, McKenna v. Santander Inv. Sec., Inc., No. 21-CV-941, 2022 WL
2986588, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 2022). The NYCHRL is a “one-way ratchet, by which
interpretations of state and federal civil rights statutes can serve only as a floor below which the
[NYCHRL] cannot fall.” Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 109
(2d Cir. 2013). “Practically speaking, because the NYCHRL is more protective . . . , a claim is
automatically stated under the NYCHRL if it is stated under the federal and state statutes.”
Limauro, 2021 WL 466952, at *4. Here, because Samuels states an employment discrimination
claim under the ADA and the NYSHRL, she also states a claim under the NYCHRL. Defendants’
motion to dismiss this claim is thus denied.
II.

Failure to Accommodate Claims
Samuels next alleges that Defendants failed to accommodate her disability by terminating

her employment rather than approve her requested medical leave, in violation of the ADA, the
NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL. See Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 66, 87, 109. Defendants argue that
Samuels fails to state a claim under any statute because she never requested an accommodation
and refused to participate in an “interactive dialogue” with Defendants. See Def. Br. at 6–8.
Samuels has, at this stage, plausibly alleged a failure to accommodate claim under all three statutes.
A.

ADA Failure to Accommodate Claim Against Defendant Urban Assembly

The ADA prohibits employers from “not making reasonable accommodations to the known
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an . . .

14

employee.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). “To plead a failure-to-accommodate claim, a plaintiff
must allege that (1) plaintiff is a person with a disability under the meaning of the ADA; (2) an
employer covered by the statute had notice of her disability; (3) with reasonable accommodation,
plaintiff could perform the essential functions of the job at issue; and (4) the employer has refused
to make such accommodations.” Dooley, 636 F. App’x at 18.
The term “reasonable accommodation” is defined as “[m]odifications or adjustments that
enable a[n] . . . employee with a disability to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment
as are enjoyed by its other similarly situated employees without disabilities,” which can include
“[j]ob restructuring[,] part-time[,] or modified work schedules.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)–(2).
Courts “have concluded that a leave of absence may be a reasonable accommodation where it is
finite and will be reasonably likely to enable the employee to return to work.” Graves, 457 F.3d at
186 n.6 (collecting cases).
At the motion to dismiss stage, “[a]ll that plaintiffs must do . . . is plead the existence of a
plausible accommodation, the costs of which, facially, do not clearly exceed its benefits.” Shaywitz
v. Am. Bd. of Psychiatry & Neurology, 675 F. Supp. 2d 376, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). “In other words,
a plaintiff bears only the burden of identifying an accommodation which is reasonable.” Limauro,
2021 WL 466952, at *8. Here, Samuels states a failure to accommodate claim against Urban
Assembly under the ADA.
First, as discussed above with respect to her employment discrimination claim, Samuels
adequately pleads a disability within the meaning of the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A).
Second, Samuels plausibly alleges that Defendants had notice of her disability. Because
“[t]he notice requirement is rooted in common sense,” a duty to accommodate attaches “if the
disability is obvious—which is to say, if the employer knew or reasonably should have known that

15

the employee was disabled.” Brady v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 531 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2008). In
this case, Samuels alleges facts from which it can plausibly be inferred that Defendants had notice
of her “physical . . . limitations.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).6 Moreover, “an employee’s request
for an accommodation triggers a duty on the part of the employer to investigate that request and
determine its feasibility.” Graves, 457 F.3d at 185. Because Samuels requested an accommodation
due to her disability, see Casparie Decl., Ex. B, she has met her burden on a motion to dismiss.
Third, with reasonable accommodation, Samuels has plausibly alleged that she could
perform the essential functions of her job. As discussed above, “at the motion-to-dismiss stage,”
Samuels’ allegations need only “raise[] an inference that [her] requests were reasonable in light of
[her] disabilities.” Limauro, 2021 WL 466952, at *8. She has done so. Samuels alleges that she
could have successfully performed her job duties “[h]ad Urban Assembly provided [her] with [the]
reasonable accommodation” of approving a temporary medical leave. Second Am. Compl. ¶ 65.
The doctor’s note similarly states that Samuels “may return to work on 6/21/2022,” Casparie Decl.,
Ex. B, supporting a plausible inference that Samuels was qualified to perform her job after taking
a temporary medical leave. Courts have found that medical leave can constitute a reasonable
accommodation under the ADA. See Graves, 457 F.3d at 186 n.6; see also Seigel v. Structure Tone
Org., No. 19-CV-7307, 2022 WL 14746408, at *11 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2022) (“Defendants
may persuasively argue plaintiff’s requested leave was too long or his likelihood of rehabilitating
too uncertain to be reasonable, but those questions of fact must be decided by a jury.”); Simmons

6

According to the complaint, Samuels was injured by a student at Urban Assembly and while on its premises. Second
Am. Compl. ¶ 25. She immediately reported her injuries to Urban Assembly and was then transported to the emergency
room by ambulance. Id. ¶¶ 33, 42. The next day, Noah emailed Samuels, indicating that he “assume[d]” that she was
“not coming in so [she] can recuperate.” Id. ¶ 44. Samuels responded by email, explaining that she was discharged
from the hospital to recuperate for ten days. Casparie Decl., Ex. B. Although it did not include a diagnosis, the doctor’s
note confirmed that Samuels was “seen and treated” in the emergency room and advised that she be given ten days to
recuperate before returning to work. Id. Finally, Noah stated that he understood her email to be a “request for an
accommodation that involves not working at all for 10 days.” Id., Ex. C.

16

v. Success Acad. Charter Sch., Inc., No. 21-CV-10367, 2023 WL 3304107, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. May
8, 2023) (denying defendant’s “motion for summary judgment as to [plaintiff’s] claim that
[defendant] failed to provide her with the reasonable accommodation of short-term leave”). Given
that Samuels’ requested leave was “finite” and was “reasonably likely to enable [her] to return to
work,” Graves, 457 F.3d at 186 n.6, she plausibly alleges a reasonable accommodation with which
she would have been able to perform the essential functions of her job.
Fourth, Samuels plausibly alleges that Defendants refused to make a reasonable
accommodation. The question of “[w]hether the employer definitively failed to accommodate a
reasonable request . . . [is a] fact-intensive question[]” that is “reserved for later proceedings.”
Limauro, 2021 WL 466952, at *7–8. At the motion to dismiss stage, Samuels need only identify a
reasonable accommodation and plausibly allege that Defendants denied it. See id. at *8–9. She has
done so, asserting that she requested medical leave on June 10, 2022 and that Defendants
terminated her position on June 16, 2022—just four days after Noah asked Samuels to submit
additional medical documentation. See Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 45–49. The Court rejects
Defendants’ argument that Samuels “did not ‘request’ any accommodation,” “simply declar[ing]
that she would be absent pursuant to a physician letter.” Def. Br. at 7. The doctor’s letter explicitly
recommended that Samuels be granted a leave of absence, Casparie Decl., Ex. B, which Noah
understood to be a “request for an accommodation,” id., Ex. C. Defendants also argue that
“Plaintiff was not denied a reasonable accommodation because [she] refused to participate in” an
“interactive dialogue” under the ADA. Def. Br. at 7. Although they rightly note that, “where a
breakdown in [the] interactive process was manifestly the employee’s fault, a failure-to-

17

accommodate claim might be deemed frivolous,”7 Tafolla v. Heilig, 80 F.4th 111, 122 (2d Cir.
2023), Bost v. Nassau Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., No. 22-2547, 2023 WL 6366053, at *2 (2d Cir.
Sept. 29, 2023), this fact-intensive inquiry is premature, Limauro, 2021 WL 466952, at *7–8. At
this stage, Samuels has met her burden to plausibly allege that Defendants refused to reasonably
accommodate her disability.
Accordingly, Samuels states a failure to accommodate claim under the ADA against Urban
Assembly. Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim is thus denied.
B.

NYSHRL Failure to Accommodate Claim Against Both Defendants

Like the ADA, the NYSHRL prohibits employers from “refus[ing] to provide reasonable
accommodations to the known disabilities . . . of an employee.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(3)(a).
“Claims under the NYSHRL for a failure to accommodate are governed by the same legal
standards as federal ADA claims.” McKenna, 2022 WL 2986588, at *7; see Fox, 918 F.3d at 76.
Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim is thus denied for the same reasons as discussed above.
C.

NYCHRL Failure to Accommodate Claim Against Both Defendants

The NYCHRL similarly requires that employers “provide a reasonable accommodation to
enable a person with a disability to satisfy the essential requisites of a job.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code
§ 8-107. As also discussed above, the NYCHRL is “more protective than its state and federal
counterparts.” Limauro, 2021 WL 466952, at *4; see Mihalik, 715 F.3d at 109. The Court therefore
finds that Samuels states a failure to accommodate claim under the NYCHRL. Defendants’ motion
to dismiss this claim is thus also denied.

7
As the Second Circuit has explained, “the ADA envisions an interactive process by which employers and employees
work together to assess whether an employee’s disability can be reasonably accommodated.” Tafolla v. Heilig, 80
F.4th 111, 122 (2d Cir. 2023). “[A]n employer’s failure to engage in a good faith interactive process can be introduced
as evidence tending to show . . . that the employer has refused to make a reasonable accommodation.” Sheng v.
M&TBank Corp., 848 F.3d 78, 87 (2d Cir. 2017).

18

III.

Retaliation Claims Under the ADA, NYSHRL, and NYCHRL
Samuels next asserts that Defendants unlawfully retaliated against her by terminating her

employment in response to her request for reasonable accommodation, in violation of the ADA,
NYSHRL, and NYCHRL. Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 72, 92, 116. Defendants argue that Samuels
fails to state a claim because she does not plausibly allege that she engaged in protected activity
under any statute. Def. Br. at 8–9. Samuels plausibly alleges a retaliation claim under the ADA
and the NYCHRL, but fails to do so under the NYSHRL.
A.

ADA Retaliation Claim Against Defendant Urban Assembly

The ADA provides that “[n]o person shall discriminate against any individual because such
individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by [the ADA] or because such individual
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under [the ADA].” 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). To state a retaliation claim under the ADA, a
plaintiff must plausibly allege that “(1) [she] was engaged in an activity protected by the ADA,
(2) the employer was aware of that activity, (3) an employment action adverse to the plaintiff
occurred, and (4) there existed a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse
employment action.” Bost, 2023 WL 6366053, at *2. “Requesting a reasonable accommodation
for a disability constitutes a protected activity under the ADA.” Dolac v. Cnty. of Erie, No. 202044-CV, 2021 WL 5267722, at *2 (2d Cir. Nov. 12, 2021).
Samuels states a claim for retaliation under the ADA. First, she plausibly alleges that she
was engaged in protected activity because, as discussed above, she requested temporary medical
leave as a reasonable accommodation. See Graves, 457 F.3d at 186 n.6. Second, Defendants were
aware that she requested medical leave. Casparie Decl., Exs. B, C, D. Third, Defendants terminated
Samuels’ employment, which constitutes an adverse employment action under the ADA. See

19

Gorman v. Covidien, LLC, 146 F. Supp. 3d 509, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). Fourth, she plausibly alleges
a “causal connection” between her request for medical leave and her termination. Although
Defendants may ultimately succeed by “articulat[ing] some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason”
for her termination, McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802—such as her refusal to provide
additional medical documentation, engage in an interactive process of accommodating her claimed
disability, and Noah’s fear that she was sharing a student’s personal information without parental
consent or cause—Samuels has met her burden on a motion to dismiss. Because Defendants
terminated her employment just six days after her request for reasonable accommodation, “the
extremely close temporal proximity between the protected activity and adverse employment action
satisfies causation” at this early stage. Flieger v. E. Suffolk Boces, No. 13-CV-6282, 2016 WL
3527519, at *17 (E.D.N.Y. June 23, 2016), aff’d, 693 F. App’x 14 (2d Cir. 2017); see Limauro,
2021 WL 466952, at *10 (“Since [defendant] fired [plaintiff] three days after he requested an
accommodation for his physical disabilities, this is enough to raise an inference that [it did so]
because he engaged in the protected activity.”). Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss this
claim is denied.
B.

NYSHRL Retaliation Claim Against Both Defendants

The NYSHRL also makes it unlawful “to retaliate or discriminate against any person
because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden under [the NYSHRL] or because he or she
has filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under [the NYSHRL].” N.Y. Exec.
Law § 296(7). Courts evaluate ADA retaliation and NYSHRL retaliation claims under the same
legal framework, but the NYSHRL statute “differ[s] from the ADA as to what qualifies as a
‘protected activity.’” Limauro, 2021 WL 466952, at *9. Unlike the ADA, under the NYSHRL, “a
request for reasonable accommodation is not a protected activity for purposes of a retaliation

20

claim.” Id. at *10 (quoting Witchard v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 960 N.Y.S. 2d 402, 403–04 (App.
Div. 1st Dep’t 2013)); see also, e.g., Marshall v. Westchester Med. Ctr. Health Network, No. 22CV-7990, 2024 WL 665200, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2024); Weekes v. JetBlue Airways Corp.,
No. 21-CV-1965, 2022 WL 4291371, at *13 n.13 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2022); D’Amico v. City of
New York, 73 N.Y.S.3d 540, 558–59 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2018) (holding that “[t]he motion court
properly held that plaintiff failed to allege that he engaged in any protected activity as a predicate
for his retaliation claims,” given that his “request for a reasonable accommodation” did not
“constitute[] protected activit[y] for purposes of the State . . . HRL[]”). “[C]ourts have
distinguished between requests for accommodation in the first instance, which do not constitute
protected activity, and complaints about or opposition to the denial of such requests, which may
constitute protected activity.” Piligian v. Ichan Sch. of Med. at Mount Sinai, No. 17-CV-1975,
2020 WL 6561663, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2020) (collecting cases). However, “a plaintiff who
alleges that [she] was fired because [she] had merely requested an accommodation – without
complaining about an otherwise unlawful activity that was already taking place – does not state a
claim under the NYSHRL.” Limauro, 2021 WL 466952, at *10.
Here, Samuels asserts that her accommodation request should be “considered protected
activity” under the NYSHRL and that her “allegations that she requested . . . medical leave for her
injuries suffice . . . at the motion to dismiss stage.” Pl. Br. at 11. The Court disagrees. Although
the complaint also asserts, in a conclusory manner, that Samuels “opposed unlawful conduct . . .
under the NYSHRL,” Second Am. Compl. ¶ 93, she fails to state “practices forbidden under” the
NYSHRL which she “opposed,” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(7). Given that she does not plausibly allege
that she engaged in any protected activity under the statute, Samuels fails to state a NYSHRL
retaliation claim. Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim is thus granted.

21

C.

NYCHRL Retaliation Claim Against Both Defendants

To prevail on a retaliation claim under the NYCHRL, the plaintiff “must plausibly allege
(1) that [s]he engaged in a protected activity of which [her] employer was aware; (2) that [s]he
suffered an adverse action that would be reasonably likely to deter a person from engaging in a
protected activity; and (3) that there was a causal connection between the protected activity and
the action.” See Patterson, 2023 WL 5671531, at *8. Unlike the NYSHRL, the NYCHRL forbids
employers from “retaliat[ing]” against individuals who “request[] a reasonable accommodation”
pursuant to the statute. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107; see also Limauro, 2021 WL 466952, at *10
(“New York City . . . amended its Human Rights Law, effective November 11, 2019, to make clear
that requesting a reasonable accommodation is a protected activity under the NYCHRL.”).
Accordingly, for the same reasons as discussed above with regard to her ADA claim, the Court
finds that Samuels has stated a NYCHRL retaliation claim, and Defendants’ motion to dismiss this
claim is denied.
IV.

NYSHRL and NYCHRL Aiding and Abetting Claims Against Defendant Noah
Samuels next brings aiding and abetting claims against Noah under the NYSHRL and

NYCHRL, alleging that he “knowingly and substantially assisted [Urban Assembly] in its
violations of the NYSHRL and NYCHRL.” Second Am. Compl. ¶ 124. Defendants argue that
Noah cannot be held liable for aiding and abetting “[b]ecause there was no primary violation of
[either] statute[].” Def. Br. at 9. Samuels plausibly alleges aiding and abetting claims under the
NYSHRL and the NYCHRL, but fails to do so with regard to her NYSHRL retaliation aiding and
abetting claim.
In addition to direct liability, the NYSHRL and NYCHRL each provide for aider-andabettor liability, N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(6); N.Y.C Admin. Code § 8-107(6), allowing “an

22

individual employee [to] be held liable for aiding and abetting [the] discriminatory conduct” of a
corporate employer, Farmer, 473 F. Supp. 3d at 337; see Malena v. Victoria’s Secret Direct, LLC,
886 F. Supp. 2d 349, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).8 “The same standard governs aiding and abetting
claims under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL ‘because the language of the two laws is virtually
identical.’” McHenry v. Fox News Network, LLC, 510 F. Supp. 3d 51, 68 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (quoting
Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 158 (2d Cir. 2004)). First, “a precondition to a valid aiding
and abetting claim under the NYSHRL or NYCHRL is a demonstration of a valid primary claim
for discrimination or retaliation” against the corporate employer. Sanchez v. L’Oreal USA, Inc.,
No. 21-CV-3229, 2022 WL 1556402, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2022). Second, “a plaintiff must
allege that the [individual] defendant actually participated in the unlawful conduct such that the
aider and abettor share[s] the intent or purpose of the principal actor.” Everett v. New York City
Dep’t of Educ., No. 21-CV-7043, 2023 WL 5629295, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2023).
Samuels states an aiding and abetting claim against Noah under both statutes. First, as
discussed above, she plausibly alleges discrimination and failure to accommodate claims under the
NYSHRL, and discrimination, failure to accommodate, and retaliation claims under the NYCHRL.
Second, she pleads sufficient facts to suggest that Noah “actually participated” in Urban
Assembly’s unlawful conduct. Id. Samuels asserts, for example, that Noah was Urban Assembly’s
founding principal, that he had “the ability to affect the terms and conditions” of her employment,
and that he “did so by . . . terminating her employment.” Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 13–14; see
Casparie Decl., Exs. B, C, D.9 Defendants’ motion to dismiss these claims is thus denied, with one

8

Although “there can be no aider-and-abettor liability as to . . . [c]orporate [d]efendants for aiding and abetting their
own conduct,” a plaintiff may properly bring both “direct and aiding and abetting liability” claims against individual
defendants. Malena, 886 F. Supp. 2d at 368.
9
Defendants argue that Samuels has abandoned this claim because her “opposition fails to address [the relevant]
portion of Defendants’ initial motion papers.” Def. Reply Br. at 2. But Samuels did, in fact, respond to Defendants’

23

exception: because Samuels fails to state an underlying NYSHRL retaliation claim, she cannot
state a NYSHRL retaliation aider and abettor claim as a matter of law. See Sanchez, 2022 WL
1556402, at *5.
V.

NYLL Section 740 Claim Against Both Defendants
Samuels also brings a NYLL whistleblower claim, alleging that Defendants unlawfully

retaliated against her because she filed a police report and objected to Noah’s instructions to “not
give the police any information about the student who had assaulted her.” Second Am. Compl.
¶¶ 33–34. Defendants argue that Samuels fails to state a claim because she does not identify any
law, rule, or regulation that Defendants violated, and because the police report concerned the
conduct of a student, not Urban Assembly. Samuels plausibly alleges a retaliation claim under
NYLL § 740.
The NYLL forbids employers from “tak[ing] any retaliatory action against an employee
. . . because such employee . . . discloses, or threatens to disclose to a supervisor or to a public
body an activity, policy or practice of the employer that the employee reasonably believes is in
violation of law, rule or regulation.” N.Y. Lab. Law § 740(2)(a).10 The statute also proscribes
retaliation because an employee “objects to, or refuses to participate in any such activity, policy
or practice.” Id. § 740(2)(c). To state a claim under § 740, a plaintiff must plausibly allege:
“(1) [an] activity protected by the statute; (2) [a] retaliatory action; and (3) some causal connection
between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Callahan v. HSBC Sec. (USA) Inc., No. 22-

arguments as to this claim. See Pl. Br. at 6 (“Because Samuels has adequately plead her [claims] . . . under the
NYSHRL and NYCHRL, Defendants’ sole basis for requesting dismissal for her aiding and abetting claims under
those statutes—that she failed to state an underlying violation—should also be rejected.”).
10

For the purposes of this statute, “law, rule or regulation” is defined as “(i) any duly enacted federal, state or local
statute or ordinance or executive order; (ii) any rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to such statute or ordinance
or executive order; or (iii) any judicial or administrative decision, ruling or order.” N.Y. Lab. Law § 740(1)(c). A
“public body” includes “any federal, state, or local law enforcement agency, prosecutorial office, or police or peace
officer.” Id. § 740(1)(d)(iv).

24

CV-8621, 2024 WL 1157075, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2024). At this stage, a plaintiff “must
identify the particular activities, policies or practices in which the employer allegedly engaged, so
that the complaint provides the employer with notice of the alleged . . . conduct,” but she need not
“identify the specific law, rule, or regulation” that she reasonably believed the defendant was
violating. Komorek v. Conflict Int’l, Inc., No. 22-CV-9467, 2024 WL 1484249, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 29, 2024); Webb-Weber v. Cmty. Action for Hum. Servs., Inc., 15 N.E.3d 1172, 1174 (N.Y.
2014).
Samuels asserts that, after reporting her injury to Defendants, Noah “instructed [her] to not
give the police any information about the student who had assaulted her.” Second Am. Compl.
¶ 34. When she began reporting the alleged assault to the police, she says Noah “angrily asked if
she really wanted to get a kid involved in the criminal justice system.” Id. ¶ 35. Samuels maintains
that she understood Noah’s actions to be an “attempt[] to prevent her from reporting the incident
to the police,” id. ¶ 38, and that she “objected” to this attempt by continuing to “report[] the
incident to the police officers present,” id. ¶ 40. Samuels now argues that she has stated a NYLL
retaliation claim because she “objected to . . . Defendants’ attempts to prevent her from filing a
police report . . . under the reasonable belief that Defendants’ attempts to prevent her from filing
a police report was in violation of [a] law, rule, or regulation.” Pl. Br. at 13. In response to this
protected activity, Defendants “disabled her school email and system access” and fired her seven
days later. See Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 43, 49.
Defendants argue that this claim should be dismissed because Samuels fails to “identify
any law, rule or regulation that Defendants violated” and because “the police report was about the
conduct of a student . . . not the activities, policies, or practices of [Urban Assembly].” Def. Reply
Br. at 7. The Court disagrees. First, Samuels plausibly alleges that she participated in an activity

25

protected under the statute. To be sure, Samuels does not assert that she “disclose[d] . . . to a public
body an activity, policy or practice of the employer.” N.Y. Lab. Law § 740(2)(a). As Defendants
rightly note, Samuels reported a student’s conduct to the police, and she does not aver that she
reported any unlawful conduct by Urban Assembly or Noah. See Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 33–41.
Nevertheless, § 740 independently proscribes retaliation against an employee because that
employee “objects to, or refuses to participate in any . . . activity, policy or practice” that “the
employee reasonably believes is in violation of law, rule or regulation.” N.Y. Lab. Law § 740(2);
see Goldberg v. Bespoke Real Est. LLC, No. 23-CV-5614, 2024 WL 1256006, at *10 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 25, 2024). Samuels identifies a specific activity, namely that Defendants “attempted to
prevent” her from filing a police report about an Urban Assembly student and forbade her from
“giv[ing] the police any information” about that student. See Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 34, 38; see
also id. ¶ 39 (alleging that Samuels’ supervisor “told her that she could not disclose the identity of
the student that assaulted her to police”). Samuels, moreover, plausibly alleges that she “object[ed]
to, or refuse[d] to participate in” Defendants’ activity, N.Y. Lab. Law § 740(2)(c), because she
reported the assault to the police even after Noah “instructed [her]” not to do so. Second Am.
Compl. ¶ 34; see Casparie Decl., Ex. B (explaining that Noah was “afraid” that Samuels “shar[ed]
a student’s personal information [to the police] without parental consent or cause”). The complaint
thus contains sufficiently specific allegations to provide Defendants “with notice of the alleged . . .
conduct” to which Samuels objected. Komorek, 2024 WL 1484249, at *6.11

11

As discussed above, because “[t]he plain language of Labor Law § 740(2)(a) does not impose any requirement that
a plaintiff identify the specific law, rule or regulation violated as part of a section 740 claim,” Webb-Weber, 15 N.E.3d
at 1174, Samuels has met her burden at this early stage. “To be sure, in order to recover under a Labor Law § 740
theory, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that an actual violation occurred, as opposed to merely establishing that
the plaintiff possessed a reasonable belief that a violation occurred. . . . However, for pleading purposes, the complaint
need not specify the actual law, rule or regulation violated.” Id.

26

Second, Samuels plausibly alleges that Defendants took a “retaliatory action” against her.
Pursuant to the NYLL, “retaliatory action[s]” include “adverse employment actions . . . against an
employee in the terms of conditions of employment,” such as “discharge.” N.Y. Lab. Law
§ 740(1)(e). Defendants’ decision to terminate her employment thus constitutes a retaliatory action
under the statute.
Third, she plausibly alleges “some causal connection between the protected activity and
the adverse action.” Callahan, 2024 WL 1157075, at *6. Not only was Samuels fired a week after
she objected to Noah’s instructions, but Noah’s emails also support a plausible causal connection
between Samuels’ police report and her subsequent termination. In his June 11th email, for
instance, Noah explained that he disabled her email account because he “was sincerely afraid that
[she was] sharing a student’s personal information without parental consent or cause, and given
what [she] did, more generally concerned about [her] mental state.” Casparie Decl., Ex. B. (noting
that he believed Samuels “ma[d]e . . . a bad faith assault claim”). When Noah terminated Samuels’
employment, he also explained that he did so “out of concern for the safety of [the school’s]
students and families.” Id., Ex. D. Taken together, these allegations plausibly suggest that Samuels
was fired because she objected to Noah’s instructions not to file a police report.
Samuels thus states a retaliation claim under the NYLL, and Defendants’ motion to dismiss
this claim is denied.
VI.

First Amendment Retaliation Claim Against Both Defendants
Samuels next asserts a First Amendment retaliation claim, alleging that Defendants fired

her because she filed a police report, which was “activity protected by the First Amendment.”
Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 137–38. Defendants contend that Samuels fails to state a claim, arguing
that, although “42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows individuals to sue government officials acting under color

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of state law for retaliating against the exercise of [F]irst [A]mendment rights, there is no analogous
provision authorizing suits against private entities, to [which] the First Amendment does not
apply.” Def. Br. at 12. The Court agrees with Defendants that Samuels fails to plausibly allege a
First Amendment retaliation claim.
Section 1983 provides that “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . , subjects . . . any citizen of the United States . . . to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege that (1) the challenged conduct was attributable at least in part to a person who was acting
under color of state law and (2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right guaranteed under the
Constitution of the United States.” Snider v. Dylag, 188 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1999). In other words,
“a plaintiff must allege facts indicating that some official action has caused the plaintiff to be
deprived of . . . her constitutional rights.” Colombo v. O’Connell, 310 F.3d 115, 117 (2d Cir. 2002)
(per curiam).
Actions under § 1983 are permitted only against state actors or those acting under “color
of state law.” Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 835 (1982); Tancredi v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.,
316 F.3d 308, 312 (2d Cir. 2003) (“A plaintiff pressing a claim of violation of his constitutional
rights under § 1983 is . . . required to show state action.”). The statute provides no remedy for
“merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999). In some circumstances, however, “[c]onduct that is formally
‘private’ may become so entwined with governmental policies or so impregnated with a
governmental character that it can be regarded as governmental action.” Fabrikant v. French, 691
F.3d 193, 206 (2d Cir. 2012). “To establish that a private actor’s conduct is to be deemed state

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action, a § 1983 plaintiff must demonstrate that the State was involved in the specific activity
giving rise to his or her cause of action; it is not enough to show merely that the State was involved
in ‘some activity’ of the private entity ‘alleged to have inflicted injury upon [the] plaintiff.’”
Dawkins v. Biondi Educ. Ctr., 164 F. Supp. 3d 518, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting Sybalski v.
Indep. Grp. Home Living Program, Inc., 546 F.3d 255, 257–58 (2d Cir. 2008)). Critically, “a
private entity does not become a state actor for purposes of § 1983 merely on the basis of the
private entity’s creation, funding, licensing, or regulation by the government.” Fabrikant, 691 F.3d
at 207. “The fundamental question . . . is whether the private entity’s challenged actions are ‘fairly
attributable’ to the state.” Id. (quoting Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 838).
Samuels fails to plausibly allege that Defendants are state actors or otherwise acted under
color of state law when they terminated her employment. According to the complaint, “Urban
Assembly is a not-for-profit corporation registered in New York and permitted to do business in
New York.” Second Am. Compl. ¶ 10. Samuels “offers no specific allegation that Defendants are
regulated by the State in the school’s personnel matters, including employment termination.”
Dawkins, 164 F. Supp. 3d at 526. She further fails to specify why Defendants’ termination decision
was “fairly attributable” to the state, Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 838, or if it was “compelled or
even influenced by any state regulation,” Dawkins, 164 F. Supp. 3d at 527. Samuels instead argues
that some courts have “held that charter school employees are considered public employees for
purposes of First Amendment retaliation claims.” Pl. Br. at 15 (citing Coleman v. Utah State
Charter Sch. Bd., No. 2:10-CV-1186, 2011 WL 4527421, at *5 (D. Utah Sept. 28, 2011)).12 But

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Although the Second Circuit has not resolved this question, “district courts have considered charter schools to be
state actors for purposes of [§] 1983 claims, in at least some circumstances,” including First Amendment termination
suits. Ibekweh v. Ascend Learning, Inc., No. 22-CV-1587, 2023 WL 6292526, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2023); see
Matwijko v. Bd. of Trustees of Glob. Concepts Charter Sch., No. 04-CV-663A, 2006 WL 2466868, at *5 (W.D.N.Y.
Aug. 24, 2006); but see Rodriguez v. Int’l Leadership Charter Sch., No. 08-CV-1012, 2009 WL 860622, at *2

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the complaint fails to raise facts specifying Urban Assembly’s legal status under New York State
law. Although the school’s full name is “Urban Assembly Charter School for Computer Science,”
Samuels does not assert that the school was chartered pursuant to state law or otherwise specify
how the school’s termination decisions are regulated by the State. See N.Y. Educ. Law
§ 2853(1)(c). In similar cases, plaintiffs have specifically alleged, for instance, that a defendant is
“a public charter school, operating as a 501(c)(3) not-for-profit corporation”; that “the Board of
Trustees of the State University of New York . . . authorized the [s]chool’s charter”; and that the
application for the school’s charter fell under “New York Education Law § 2851.” See Thurber v.
Finn Acad., No. 6:20-CV-6152, 2021 WL 927627, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2021).13 Samuels,
by contrast, merely states that Urban Assembly is a “non-for-profit corporation.” Second Am.
Compl. ¶ 10. Without additional information, she fails to plausibly allege that Defendants acted
under color of state law.
In any event, even if Urban Assembly was a state actor or acted under color of state law,
Samuels fails to state a claim. “[T]he First Amendment protects a public employee’s right, in
certain circumstances, to speak as a citizen addressing matters of public concern.” Garcetti v.
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417 (2006). “Speech addresses a matter of public concern when it relates
to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community, or when it is a subject of
legitimate news interest.” Gordon v. City of New York, 612 F. App’x 629, 631 (2d Cir. 2015).
“Among the relevant considerations in deciding if speech addresses a matter of public concern is
whether the speech was calculated to redress personal grievances or whether it had a broader public

(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2009) (noting in dicta that a New York charter school was “not . . . a state actor for First
Amendment purposes”).
13

See also Ibekweh, 2023 WL 6292526, at *1 (noting that the complaint asserted that the defendant was granted
charter by the State of New York); Matwijko, 2006 WL 2466868, at *1 (stating that the plaintiff’s complaint explained
the governance structure of the defendant’s charter school under state law).

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purpose.” Id.; see Shara v. Maine-Endwell Cent. Sch. Dist., 46 F.4th 77, 85 (2d Cir. 2022)
(“[S]peech does not involve a matter of public concern when it principally focuses on the speaker’s
personal issues or speech that is calculated to redress personal grievances, even if it also
incidentally touches on a matter of general importance.”). Gordon v. City of New York, a case
involving an employee who filed a police report after being assaulted by a coworker, is instructive
here. 612 F. App’x 629 (2d Cir. 2015). In Gordon, the Second Circuit held that “the complaint
contain[ed] no plausible allegation that [the plaintiff’s] statement to the police was anything more
than a simple, individualized assault report.” Id. at 631 (noting that the complaint “fail[ed] to plead
facts suggesting that the police report itself was an attempt to expose” the defendant’s alleged
“policy and custom of covering up workplace violence”). Here, too, Samuels alleges that she
“reported the assault to the police,” Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 35, 40, but she does not assert any
“broader public purpose” for her speech, Gordon, 612 F. App’x at 631; see Gusler v. City of Long
Beach, No. 10-CV-2077, 2016 WL 11493644, at *21 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2016) (“There is simply
nothing about this complaint that purports to speak out on an issue of public importance.”).
Accordingly, she fails to state a First Amendment retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and
Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim is granted.
VII.

NYLL Unlawful Wage Deduction Claim Against Defendant Urban Assembly

Finally, Samuels brings a wage deduction claim under the NYLL, alleging that Urban
Assembly deducted “approximately $1,700 from her final paycheck, which represented the
approximate value of a laptop it issued to Samuels, despite her having returned the laptop to Urban
Assembly.” Second Am. Compl. ¶ 52. Defendants argue that she fails to state a claim because her
“bald assertion that she received a pay deduction . . . is [vague and] conclusory.” Def. Br. at 10.
Samuels plausibly alleges an unlawful wage deduction claim.

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Section 193 of the NYLL “broadly prohibits employers from taking money from their
employees for the employer’s own benefit.” Hart v. Rick’s Cabaret Int’l, Inc., 967 F. Supp. 2d
901, 951 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). The statute provides that “[n]o employer shall make any deduction
from the wages of an employee” unless such deductions are “expressly authorized in writing by
the employee and are for the benefit of the employee.” N.Y. Lab. Law § 193(1)(b). Although the
statute previously required a plaintiff to “allege a specific deduction from wages and not merely a
failure to pay wages,” Goldberg v. Jacquet, 667 F. App’x 313, 314 (2d Cir. 2016), the law was
amended in 2021 to clarify that “[t]here is no exception to liability . . . for the unauthorized failure
to pay wages, benefits or wage supplements,” N.Y. Lab. Law § 193(5); see Fersel v. Paramount
Med. Servs., P.C., No. 18-CV-2448, 2022 WL 14813738, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2022) (noting
that, “[i]n the Sponsoring Memorandum, the bill’s sponsors observed that . . . [t]he purpose of this
remedial amendment is to clarify that . . . the unauthorized failure to pay wages, benefits and wage
supplements has always been encompassed by the prohibitions of section 193”); Gunthorpes v.
IM. Grp., No. 21-CV-5140, 2024 WL 2031191, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2024).
In her complaint, Samuels specifies the approximate value of Defendants’ wage deduction
($1,700) and pleads sufficient facts to suggest that Defendants withheld wages without written
consent. Although Defendants contend that her complaint is “vague and conclusory” such that
Defendants are not “on notice of the actual basis” for her claim, Def. Br. at 10 (quoting Sosnowy
v. A. Perri Farms, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 2d 457, 472 (E.D.N.Y. 2011)), the complaint and documents
provide Defendants with sufficient notice of her allegations. For example, Noah’s June 16th
termination email to Samuels asked her to “return” her school-issued “computer via mail or [to]
drop [it] off at the safety desk” of the school. Casparie Decl., Ex. D. And Samuels avers that
Defendants withheld the approximate cost of that laptop “despite her having returned [it] to Urban

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Assembly.” Second Am. Compl. ¶ 52. Accepting her allegations as true, Sierra Club, 911 F.3d at
88, the Court therefore finds that Samuels plausibly alleges a wage deduction claim under the
NYLL. See Neu v. Amelia U.S. LLC, 208 N.Y.S.3d 183, 184 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2024) (finding
a NYLL § 193 claim well pled where plaintiff alleged “that defendants made partial payments to
plaintiff after his departure which fell short of [his] fully earned amounts”). Defendants’ motion
to dismiss this claim is thus denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in
part. The Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to all claims except for Samuels’
retaliation claims brought under the NYSHRL and the First Amendment, which the Court
dismisses. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motions pending at Dkt.
Nos. 19 and 24.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:

August 30, 2024
New York, New York
Hon. Ronnie Abrams
United States District Judge

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