Brown v. Zeta Charter School

Filing 27

OPINION AND ORDER re: 18 MOTION to Dismiss the Complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). filed by Zeta Charter School. It is hereby ORDERED that Defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED. It is not clear from the C omplaint and Opposition that amendment would be futile. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims are dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff may file a letter by October 23, 2024, regarding her claims. Specifically, Plaintiff should describe whether she e ver filed an appeal about her daughter being removed from Zeta and, in general, who she spoke to about her daughter's removal. Plaintiff may also describe the damages she wants (for example, for medical bills or other expenses related to her daughter's care). If no such letter is filed by October 23, 2024, then the case will be dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to close the motion at ECF No. 18. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Dale E. Ho on 9/23/2024) (ks)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
CYNTHIA BROWN,
Plaintiff,
v.
ZETA CHARTER SCHOOL,

23 Civ. 5593 (DEH)
OPINION AND ORDER

Defendant.
DALE E. HO, United States District Judge:
On June 29, 2023, Plaintiff filed this action, proceeding pro se. 1 In substance, Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant, the operator of several charter schools, 2 treated her daughter poorly and
removed her from the school she was attending due to her mental disability. 3 Plaintiff also
alleges that Defendant allowed a third party to pick up her daughter from school and that
Defendant defamed her daughter by referring to her mental disability. 4 Defendant moves to
dismiss.5 For the reasons given below, Defendant’s motion is GRANTED, though Plaintiff may
seek leave to amend. Plaintiff is directed to the final section of this Opinion and Order for
information on how to do so.

1

See Compl., ECF No. 1.

2

Plaintiff sued “Zeta Charter School” and Defendant states that the correct corporate entity is
“Zeta Charter Schools – New York City.” See Mem. of L. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss 2
n.1, ECF No. 19. From the zip code given by Plaintiff when filing this action, the Court
understands that Plaintiff’s daughter attended Zeta Bronx Mount Eden Early Childhood School,
a charter school operated by Defendant in Bronx County, NY.

3

See Compl. 5.

4

See Opp’n 3, ECF No. 23.

5

See ECF No. 18.

I.

BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from the Complaint and presumed to be true solely for

purposes of adjudicating Defendant’s motion to dismiss. 6 Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, her
submissions are construed liberally to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest. 7 The
Court also incorporates factual allegations made in Plaintiff’s submission in opposition to the
motion. 8
Plaintiff’s daughter attended a Zeta Charter School (“Zeta”) from September to October
2022. 9 Plaintiff’s daughter has special needs, including a mental disability and speech delay. 10
She has received an Individualized Education Plan (an “IEP”) under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (the “IDEA”). 11 Plaintiff informed Zeta that her child has an
intellectual disability. 12

6

See Cornelio v. Connecticut, 32 F.4th 160, 168 (2d Cir. 2022). In all quotations from cases,
citations, footnotes, brackets, ellipses, and emphases are omitted unless otherwise indicated. All
references to Rules are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
7

See Saeli v. Chautauqua County, 36 F.4th 445, 457 (2d Cir. 2022).

8

See Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 122 n.1 (2d Cir. 2013) (“A district court deciding a motion
to dismiss may consider factual allegations made by a pro se party in his papers opposing the
motion.”).
9

Compl. 5.

10

Id. at 6; Opp’n 3.

11

Opp’n 3; see also N.J. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 18 Civ. 6173, 2021 WL 965323, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2021) (noting that under the IDEA “school districts are required to create an
individualized education program (‘IEP’) for each . . . child with disabilities” and defining an
IEP as “a written statement that sets out the child’s present educational performance, establishes
annual and short-term objectives for improvements in that performance, and describes the
specially designed instruction and services that will enable the child to meet those objectives”).
12

Compl. 5.
2

Plaintiff states that school staff told her it was within their rights to deny her daughter an
education at Zeta because she was not smart enough. 13 Additionally, Zeta’s staff started picking
on Plaintiff’s child when they realized she was moving more slowly than others. 14 Plaintiff
states that Zeta’s references to her daughter’s disabilities were defamatory. 15
Because Defendant refused to allow Plaintiff’s daughter to attend their school, she has a
speech delay, detachment issues, and a severe fear of abandonment. 16 Plaintiff’s daughter is also
suffering from depression and emotional distress, for which she is receiving therapy, and does
not understand why Zeta will not permit her to come back. 17 Finally, Plaintiff also states that
Zeta staff did not take any action when a parent of another student at the school endangered her
child by physically removing her from the school premises. 18
As a result of these events, Plaintiff seeks $150,000 in monetary damages to compensate
her daughter for the alleged discrimination and pain and suffering she experienced, explaining
that she already has special needs and “deserves more,” 19 which the Court construes as a request
for injunctive relief.

13

Compl. 5; Opp’n 3.

14

Compl. 5.

15

Id.

16

Opp’n 2-3; Compl. 6.

17

Compl. 6.

18

See Opp’n 3.

19

Compl. 6.
3

II.

LEGAL STANDARDS
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 20 “In assessing the
complaint, [a court] must construe it liberally, accepting all factual allegations therein as true and
drawing all reasonable inferences in the [plaintiff’s] favor.” 21 However, a court must disregard
any “conclusory allegations, such as ‘formulaic recitations of the elements of a cause of
action.’” 22 When reviewing pro se pleadings, a Court must interpret them to raise the “strongest
arguments that they suggest.” 23
III.

DISCUSSION
Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED for the reasons given below.
Plaintiff proceeds pro se. A pro se litigant’s filings must be construed liberally to raise

the strongest possible arguments they suggest, but they nonetheless must raise a plausible claim
for relief. 24 Pleadings prepared by pro se litigants are held “to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” 25 A pro se party is not required to identify specific laws
that she seeks relief under or claims that she alleges, only facts in support of such claims. 26 The

20

Sacerdote v. N.Y. Univ., 9 F.4th 95, 106 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009)).

21

Id. at 106-07.

22

Id. at 107 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

23

Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006).

24

Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2013).

25

Janczuk v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n., No. 24 Civ 2445, 2024 WL 3228521, at * 1 (S.D.N.Y.
June 26, 2024).
26

See Dingle v. Zon, 189 F. App’x 8, 10 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Because the complaint could support a
claim under RLUIPA—despite that the face of the complaint alleges only specific, constitutional
violations—the district court has an obligation to consider the claim. . . . Factual allegations
alone are what matters [when reviewing pro se filings].”).
4

Court construes the Complaint and Plaintiff’s opposition as raising claims under the IDEA, the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The Court also
construes Plaintiff’s allegations regarding a stranger attempting to remove her daughter from
school as suggesting a claim of negligent supervision. 27
A.

Plaintiff’s Standing for Her Tort Claims (Defamation and Negligent Supervision)
Plaintiff may only bring some of these claims—the claims under the IDEA and the ADA

and Rehabilitation Act—on behalf of her daughter. She may not bring her defamation and
negligent supervision claims in the same manner, due to her pro se status.
Generally, a non-lawyer parent cannot represent their child’s interests pro se. 28 “[A]
district court has a duty to raise this issue sua sponte.” 29 Under this principle, Plaintiff, as a pro
se parent, cannot assert claims for defamation or negligent supervision on behalf of her child. 30
Those claims are therefore dismissed.
In contrast, “a parent has an independent enforceable right under the IDEA and may
pursue a claim on her own behalf[,] . . . [and she] may appear pro se [as to her IDEA] claims on

27

See Mirand v. City of New York, 637 N.E.2d 263, 266 (N.Y. 1994) (stating that, under New
York law, schools must “adequately supervise the students in their charge and . . . will be held
liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision”).
28

See Tindall v. Poultney High Sch. Dist., 414 F.3d 281, 284 (2d Cir. 2005) (“It is . . . a wellestablished general rule in this Circuit that a parent not admitted to the bar cannot bring an action
pro se in federal court on behalf of his or her child.”); accord Peterson on behalf of X.P. v. Lang
Sch., No. 21 Civ. 8683, 2022 WL 540934, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2022) (same).
29

Robinson v. N.Y. State Off. of Child. & Fam. Servs., No. 23 Civ. 4477, 2023 WL 4423559, at
*2 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2023).
30

See also Zimmerman v. Poly Prep Country Day Sch., 888 F. Supp. 2d 317, 340 (E.D.N.Y.
2012) (reasoning, for purposes of a statute of limitations, that a negligent supervision claim is
brought by parents on the child’s behalf).
5

her own behalf as well as [on] her” child’s behalf. 31 “[C]ourts in this Circuit have found that
parents have standing to bring ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims on their own behalves when
their disabled child was the one directly injured, because a parent of a child with a disability has
a particular and personal interest in preventing discrimination against the child.” 32 Plaintiff
therefore has standing to proceed pro se with respect to any claims under the IDEA, the ADA,
and the Rehabilitation Act.
B.

The IDEA
To the extent Plaintiff brings a claim under the IDEA, it is dismissed for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
The IDEA “seeks to ensure children with disabilities receive a free and appropriate public
education.” 33 It does not provide for compensatory damages as a remedy for violations. 34
Rather, under that statute, courts “may award retrospective and/or prospective equitable relief,
including reimbursement of paid expenses or compensatory education.” 35 To attain the goals of
the IDEA, “the law sets forth a number of administrative procedures for children, their parents,
teachers, and school districts to follow when disputes arise.” 36
To bring a claim under the IDEA, a plaintiff must exhaust their administrative remedies
before making a claim for relief in federal court. The IDEA states that “before the filing of a
31

Doe v. E. Lyme Bd. of Educ., 962 F.3d 649, 653 n.2 (2d Cir. 2020); see also Winkelman ex rel.
Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 535 (2007) (“Parents enjoy rights under
IDEA; and they are, as a result, entitled to prosecute IDEA claims on their own behalf.”).
32

Guity v. Riverhead Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 17 Civ. 7008, 2019 WL 13294668, at *5 n.6
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2019).
33

Luna Perez v. Sturgis Public Schs., 598 U.S. 142, 144 (2023).

34

Id. at 147-48; Doe, 962 F.3d at 659.

35

Doe, 962 F.3d at 659.

36

Luna Perez, 598 U.S. at 144.
6

civil action under such [other federal] laws seeking relief that is also available under this
subchapter, the procedures under subsections (f) and (g) shall be exhausted.” 37 “[S]ubsections
(f) and (g) provide affected children and their parents with the right to a ‘due process hearing’
before a local or state administrative official, . . . followed by an ‘appeal’ to the state education
agency.” 38 “[U]nless an exception applies, the exhaustion of administrative remedies under the
IDEA is a jurisdictional prerequisite of the statute and that a plaintiff’s failure to exhaust . . .
deprives a court of subject matter jurisdiction over any IDEA claims.” 39
Here, Plaintiff does not include allegations about any administrative process before an
impartial hearing officer or state review officer. 40 Accordingly, the Court cannot conclude that
Plaintiff has exhausted her administrative remedies. The Court therefore lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over any claim under the IDEA.
These requirements apply “only to the extent [a plaintiff] pursues a suit under another
federal law for remedies IDEA also provides.” 41 In other words, this does not foreclose a claim
seeking only compensatory damages. 42 “[B]ecause money damages are not available under the

37

20 U.S.C. §1415.

38

Luna Perez, 598 U.S. at 146.

39

Ventura de Paulino v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 959 F.3d 519, 530 (2d Cir. 2020).

40

“[T]he [IDEA] establishes various procedural safeguards that guarantee” parents of disabled
students “both an opportunity for meaningful input into all decisions affecting their child’s
education and the right to seek review of any decisions they think inappropriate.” Honig v. Doe,
484 U.S. 305, 311-12 (1988). New York State’s administrative review process provides for a
two-step system when a parent requests that a student’s IEP be reviewed, including: “(1) a
review of the matter by an impartial hearing officer; . . . and (2) a possible appeal to a state
review officer, who may modify any determination made by the impartial hearing officer.”
Baldessarre v. Monroe-Woodbury Cent. Sch. Dist., 820 F. Supp. 2d 490, 501 (S.D.N.Y.2011).
41

Luna Perez, 598 U.S. at 146-47.

42

See id.
7

IDEA, claims for money damages alone are not subject to IDEA exhaustion.” 43 Plaintiff can
pursue her claims for damages under Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act independent
of the IDEA’s exhaustion requirements.
C.

The ADA and Rehabilitation Act
To the extent Plaintiff brings claims under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, these

claims are also dismissed, because the type of damages that Plaintiff seeks are not available
under these statutes.
Plaintiff seems to seek money damages only based on her and her daughter’s pain and
suffering. 44 Under the Rehabilitation Act, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Cummings
v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C., damages for emotional harms are not recoverable. 45 In
Cummings, the Supreme Court held that federal laws passed under the Spending Clause, such as
the Rehabilitation Act, do not allow for emotional distress damages. 46 District courts have
subsequently held that the ADA similarly does not allow for emotional distress damages. 47

43

Piotrowski v. Rocky Point Union Free Sch. Dist., No. 18 Civ. 6262, 2023 WL 2710341, at *8
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2023) (citing Luna Perez, 598 U.S. at 147-48).
44

See Compl. 5.

45

596 U.S. 212 (2022).

46

Id. at 230 (“[W]e hold that emotional distress damages are not recoverable under the Spending
Clause antidiscrimination statutes we consider here [including the Rehabilitation Act].”).
47

See, e.g., A.S. v. Mamaroneck Union Free Sch. Dist., No. 21 Civ. 6937, 2024 WL 308211, at
*6 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2024) (“[C]ourts in this Circuit have held, after Cummings, that
emotional distress damages are not available under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act.”);
Doherty v. Bice, No. 18 Civ. 10898, 2023 WL 5103900, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2023) (“[S]ince
emotional distress damages are not recoverable under Title II of the ADA, and Plaintiff only
requests emotional distress damages, the Court dismisses his claim for monetary relief pursuant
to Title II of the ADA with prejudice.”) (collecting cases).
8

That said, compensatory damages remain recoverable under these laws. 48 Compensable
harms include out of pocket expenses, such as medical expenses or therapy costs. To the extent
that Plaintiff seeks damages to recover these costs, she may have a claim under the ADA and
Rehabilitation Act. However, because the Complaint only seeks damages for emotional harm, it
fails to state claim under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act. Defendant’s motion to dismiss any
ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims is therefore granted.
*

*

*

It is hereby ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED. It is not
clear from the Complaint and Opposition that amendment would be futile. Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s claims are dismissed without prejudice.
Plaintiff may file a letter by October 23, 2024, regarding her claims. Specifically,
Plaintiff should describe whether she ever filed an appeal about her daughter being removed
from Zeta and, in general, who she spoke to about her daughter’s removal. Plaintiff may also
describe the damages she wants (for example, for medical bills or other expenses related to her
daughter’s care). If no such letter is filed by October 23, 2024, then the case will be dismissed
with prejudice.
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to close the motion at ECF No. 18.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 23, 2024
New York, New York

DALE E. HO
United States District Judge
48

See, e.g., Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 72-73 (1992).
9