McDermott v. This Dog's Life Corp

Filing 53

ORDER granting 52 Letter Motion to Seal. The request to maintain sealing of the redacted portions of Dkt. 46 is granted for substantially the reasons set forth herein. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Magistrate Judge Robert W. Lehrburger on 9/24/2024) (mml)

[document] would materially assist the public in understanding the issues before the
. . . court, and in evaluating the fairness and integrity of the court’s proceedings.’”
Bernstein v. Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, 814 F.3d 132, 139-140 (2d
Cir. 2016) (quoting Newsday LLC v. City. of Nassau, 730 F.3d 156, 166-167 (2d Cir.
2013)).
The Joint Status Letter is not a judicial document at least because the
relevance of the document’s specific contents, if any, to the nature of the proceeding,
is low. Cf. id. Indeed, quite unlike the complaint sought to be sealed in Bernstein,
the Joint Status Letter is not “the cornerstone of [the] case, the very architecture of
the lawsuit.” Cf. id. Nor is the Joint Status Letter akin to a document filed in
connection with a motion for summary judgment, to which “a strong presumption of
access attaches.” Cf. Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 121. The Joint Status Letter would not
materially assist the public in understanding the issues before the Court, and in
evaluating the fairness and integrity of the Court’s proceedings. Cf. Bernstein, 814
F.3d at 132. Accordingly, the Joint Status Letter is not a judicial document.
Even if the Court finds that the Joint Status Letter is a judicial document to
which a presumption of a right of access attaches, any such presumption is entitled
to little weight. Indeed, “[t[he weight to be given the presumption of access must be
governed by the role of the material at issue in the exercise of Article III judicial
power and the resultant value of such information to those monitoring the federal
courts.” See Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 119; accord Bernstein, 814 F.3d at 142. Where, as
here, “a document’s ‘role in the performance of Article III duties’ is ‘negligible . . . the
weight of the presumption is low.” Bernstein, 814 F.3d at 142 (quoting United States
v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1050 (2d Cir. 1995). In other words, a presumption of access
to the Joint Status Letter, if any, is entitled to little weight because the Joint Status
Letter was not presented to the Court “to invoke its powers or affect its decisions.”
See id. (internal quotations omitted). Rather, the Joint Status Letter serves merely
to apprise the Court of the status of this matter. It is wholly unlike a pleading or
motion, which calls for the Court to exercise judicial power.
To the extent that the Court determines that the Joint Status Letter is a
judicial document, the Court must also “balance competing considerations” against
any presumption of access afforded the Joint Status Letter, such as “the privacy
interests of those resisting disclosure.” See Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 120 (internal
quotations omitted); accord Bernstein, 814 F.3d at 143. This balancing act supports
sealing of the Joint Status Letter because the value of public disclosure is outweighed
by the privacy interests at stake. Cf. Bernstein, 814 F.3d at 143. Indeed, as set forth
above, to the extent that the Joint Status Letter should even be treated as a judicial
document to which a presumption of access applies, such a presumption is entitled to
little weight. Moreover, the portions of the Joint Status Letter sought to be sealed
include information derived from Defendant’s confidential financial documents, in
which Defendant unquestionably has a strong privacy interest. (See, e.g., Dkt. 44 at
¶ 1(a)).
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