Xue v. Columbia University in the City of New York
Filing
35
ORDER granting 34 Letter Motion to Stay. APPLICATION GRANTED. a "strong showing" that Plaintiff's claims are "unmeritorious," "the breadth of discovery and the burden of responding to it, and the risk of unfair preju dice to the party opposing the stay," Alapaha View Ltd. v. Prodigy Network, LLC, 20-CV-7572, 2021 WL 1893316, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2021), I find that Defendants have met their burden to show good cause why discovery should be stayed. Accordingly, discovery is hereby STAYED pending my decision on the motion to dismiss. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the open motion at Doc. 34. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Vernon S. Broderick on 9/23/2024) (sgz)
9/23/2024
September 12, 2024
VIA ECF
Having considered the relevant factors, including whether Defendants have made
a “strong showing” that Plaintiff’s claims are “unmeritorious,” “the breadth of
discovery and the burden of responding to it,” and “the risk of unfair prejudice to
the party opposing the stay,” Alapaha View Ltd. v. Prodigy Network, LLC, 20CV-7572, 2021 WL 1893316, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2021), I find that
Defendants have met their burden to show good cause why discovery should be
stayed. Accordingly, discovery is hereby STAYED pending my decision on the
motion to dismiss. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the
open motion at Doc. 34. SO ORDERED.
Hon. Vernon S. Broderick
United States District Court, Southern District of New York
Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse
40 Foley Square, Room 415
New York, NY 10007
Re:
Qishen Xue v. Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York, et al.
Civil Action No. 1:23-CV-7502 (VSB)
Dear Judge Broderick:
We represent Defendants The Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York
(“Columbia”), Lee Bollinger, Linda Amrou, and Madeleine Zelin (collectively “Individual
Defendants”) in this matter. Pursuant to the Court’s August 29, 2024 Order (Docket No. 31), we
submit this letter motion for a stay of discovery pending the Court’s ruling on Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, In Part.
Pursuant to Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures, a court has discretion to
stay discovery for “good cause shown.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). Although a stay of discovery
pending the outcome of a motion to dismiss is not automatic, courts routinely conclude that a stay
is warranted where, as here, defendant has demonstrated that the claims lack merit, the discovery
will be burdensome, and the stay would not prejudice the plaintiff. See Alapaha View Ltd. v.
Prodigy Network, LLC, No. 20 CV 7572 (VSB), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89789 *3-4 (S.D.N.Y.
May 10, 2021); Am. Fed'n of Musicians & Emplrs' Pension Fund v. Atl. Recording Corp., No. 15
CV 6267(GHW), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66201, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2016) (staying discovery
pending resolution of defendants’ partial motion to dismiss); Thomas v. New York City Dep't of
Educ., No. 09 CV 5167 (SLT), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95798, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2010)
(granting stay of discovery and noting that “even if defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted only
in part, such a ruling will narrow and clarify the scope of the issues in this litigation”).
First, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s negligence claim against all Defendants
and Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) claim against the Individual Defendants is likely to
succeed on the merits. Plaintiff, a former Columbia graduate student and recipient of the
scholarship for displaced students, alleges that Defendants were negligent because a press release
regarding the scholarship recipients described Plaintiff as a “political prisoner.” Plaintiff further
alleges that thereafter they developed bipolar disorder and were unable to complete their academic
program. As set forth in Defendants’ motion to dismiss, there is no claim under New York law
for “negligence of paperwork”, and, in any event, Plaintiff cannot establish that any of the
Defendants had a duty to them or that the harm alleged was reasonably foreseeable. Similarly, the
claims under the ADA against the Individual Defendants fail as a matter of law because it is well
established that Title III of the ADA does not permit individual employees to be held liable for
actions taken in the course of their employment, especially when, as in this case, the employer
entity is subject to suit. In their opposition to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff did not provide any
substantive response to the legal arguments for dismissal, much less articulate any legitimate basis
to deny the motion. If the Court grants Defendants’ motion in its entirety, the “negligence of
paperwork” claim will be eliminated, and the Individual Defendants will no longer be parties to
the case.
Second, dismissal of the negligence claim will substantially narrow the scope of discovery
and reduce the cost and time associated with completing discovery. The discovery required for
the negligence claim is completely distinct from that required for the ADA claim. The negligence
claim will require discovery regarding the use of certain language in publicity materials, the
communications regarding such materials, and the actions taken with respect to the use of such
language and the alleged harm resulting therefrom. Since Plaintiff alleges that their mental health
disability resulted from Defendants’ alleged “negligence of paperwork”, discovery will be
necessary into Plaintiff’s health prior to the alleged “negligence of paperwork” in 2020, requiring
Defendants to subpoena medical records from various health care providers, many of whom are
likely outside New York, for the years prior to Plaintiff’s arrival at Columbia in August 2020. In
contrast, the ADA claim is based on the alleged failure to accommodate Plaintiff’s disability, with
which Plaintiff does not purport to have been diagnosed until February 2021. The discovery with
respect to Plaintiff’s alleged emotional distress damages resulting from the way they were treated
after becoming disabled could be limited to medical records relating to the period beginning in
August 2020. If a stay is not granted, the parties will be required to spend unnecessary time and
financial resources on discovery that likely will not serve any purpose. See Spencer Trask
Software & Info. Servs., LLC v. RPost Int'l Ltd., 206 F.R.D. 367, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(“[P]roceeding with discovery while the motion to dismiss is pending would unnecessarily drain
the parties' resources.”). This is particularly significant with respect to Defendant Amrou, who is
no longer employed by Columbia and currently resides in California, making her participation in
discovery that much more burdensome. Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Amrou took or
failed to take any actions with respect to Plaintiff after they became disabled, so the dismissal of
the “negligence of paperwork” cause of action will eliminate the need for any discovery from
Defendant Amrou.
Finally, a stay of discovery would not prejudice the Pro Se Plaintiff. Courts have routinely
held that staying discovery pending the outcome of a dispositive motion is not prejudicial. See
O'Sullivan v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. 17 CV 8709 (LTS)(GWG), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70418
at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2018) (granting stay holding that “the passage of a reasonable amount of
time, without any other form of attendant prejudice, cannot itself constitute prejudice sufficient to
defeat a motion to stay discovery. Otherwise, stays of discovery would never be granted given that
some delay is inherent in any stay.”); Am. Fed'n of Musicians & Emplrs' Pension Fund v. Atl.
Recording Corp., No. 15 CV 6267(GHW), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66201, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8,
2016). There is no particular time sensitivity associated with Plaintiff’s claims. Additionally, the
requested stay will result in relatively minimal delay as neither party sought an extension of time
in connection with the motion, and the motion was fully briefed and submitted on July 29, 2024.
See HAHA Global, Inc. v. Barclays, No. 19 CV 04749 (VEC)(SDA), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
29637, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. February 20, 2020) (granting stay and finding that “staying discovery
would not unfairly prejudice Plaintiff as the motions to dismiss already have been filed”).
Accordingly, Defendants respectfully request that the Court stay discovery until
Defendants’ motion to dismiss is decided.
Respectfully submitted,
Susan D. Friedfel
914-872-8027
Susan.Friedfel@jacksonlewis.com
JACKSON LEWIS P.C.
cc:
Encl.
Qishen Xue, Pro Se Plaintiff (via email and U.S. Mail with encl.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
X
QISHEN XUE,
Plaintiff,
-againstTHE TRUSTEES OF COLUMBIA
UNIVERSITY IN THE CITY OF NEW
YORK, COLUMBIA GLOBAL CENTERS,
LEE BOLLINGER, MADELEINE ZELIN,
AND LINDA AMROU,
Case No. 1:23-CV-7502
Defendants.
X
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the Defendants’ Letter Motion for
a Stay of Discovery, was filed via ECF and served via UPS, on September 12, 2024 upon Plaintiff
Pro Se at the address set forth below:
Qishen Xue
1931 71st Street, Floor 2
Brooklyn, New York 11204
____________________
Susan D. Friedfel
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