United States of America v. The M/Y Amadea, a Motor Yacht Bearing International Maritime Organization No. 1012531, Including All Fixtures, Fittings, Manuals, Stocks, Stores, Inventories, and Each Lifeboat, Tender, and Other Appu

Filing 467

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW granting 445 Motion in Limine; denying as moot 71 Motion to Dismiss. For the foregoing reasons, the Government's Motion in Limine (ECF No. 445) and its Motion to Strike (ECF No. 97) are GRANTED. Claimants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 71) is DENIED AS MOOT. The Clerk of Court is respectfully requested to terminate ECF Nos. 71, 97, and 455. SO ORDERED.. (Signed by Judge Dale E. Ho on 3/10/2025) (ks)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.

23 Civ. 9304 (DEH)

The M/Y Amadea, a Motor Yacht Bearing
International Maritime Organization No.
1012531,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSION OF LAW

Defendant.

DALE E. HO, United States District Judge:
Before the Court is the Government’s Motion to Strike the Claim of Claimants Eduard
Khudainatov (“Khudainatov”) and Millemarin Investments Ltd. (“Millemarin” and collectively,
“Claimants”), for lack of standing. Mot. to Strike, ECF No. 97. In substance, the Government
asserts that Claimants lack a true ownership interest in the M/Y Amadea—a 348-foot luxury
superyacht subject to this forfeiture action—and therefore do not have standing to contest its
forfeiture.
The Court held an evidentiary in this matter over four days beginning on January 21, 2025,
to resolve apparent factual disputes between the parties regarding standing. Much of the record
was submitted directly to the Court through exhibits and deposition designations, which were also
submitted via video. As the Court explains in detail below, while the record in this case is
voluminous, it is ultimately not very complicated with respect to the issues that are material to the
Government’s motion.

Having carefully reviewed that record, the Court finds that the

preponderance of the evidence before it indicates that the incidents of ownership in the Amadea
other than title—possession, dominion and control, and a financial stake—were transferred to
Errigal Marine Ltd (“Errigal”) in September 2021, pursuant to a payment of €225 million in
1

connection with a Memorandum of Agreement (the “September 2021 MOA”). Moreover, the
Court finds that a preponderance of the evidence in the record indicates that after that point,
Claimants did not hold or exercise the incidents of ownership in the Amadea other than bare title.
That is a sufficient basis to conclude that Claimants are mere straw owners of the Amadea, who
hold title to it for another party and therefore, under Second Circuit precedent, lack standing to
contest forfeiture. And while it is unnecessary for the Court’s decision, the Court notes that the
preponderance of the evidence in the record indicates that after the September 2021 MOA, the
incidents of ownership in the Amadea other than title were held or exercised by members of the
family of Suleiman Kerimov, an individual who is subject to sanctions pursuant to a designation
by the Treasury Department under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C.
§ 1701 et. seq.
In sum, Claimants have failed to establish standing by a preponderance of the evidence,
which they acknowledge is their burden on this motion. But the record is tilted even more than
that, as Claimants have failed, on the record before the Court, to establish even a genuine issue of
material fact as to their standing. That is, leaving aside any genuine factual disputes or factual
issues on which the Court weighs the evidence, and considering the undisputed material facts
alone, Claimants have not adduced any competent evidence indicating that they exercised the
incidents of ownership with respect to the Amadea other than bare title after the September 2021
MOA. Under any legal standard, they lack standing to contest forfeiture. Accordingly, the
Government’s Motion to Strike is GRANTED.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1.

This is an action in rem to forfeit the M/Y Amadea, which the Government alleges

is beneficially owned by Suleiman Kerimov, a Russian national who has been designated by the
2

U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) as a Specially
Designated National (“SDN”) under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50
U.S.C. § 1701 et. seq. (“IEEPA”). See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5-6, ECF No. 37. Pursuant to Kerimov’s
designation as an SDN, U.S. persons (including U.S. financial institutions) are generally prohibited
from engaging in any dealings involving Kerimov’s property or in dealings that involve the
provision of funds, goods, or services to or for Kerimov’s benefit. See id.
2.

The Government alleges that Kerimov entered into an agreement to purchase the

Amadea in 2021 and that since then, he “or others acting on his behalf have spent more than a
million dollars to maintain and provision the Amadea, routing the money through U.S. financial
institutions”—transactions that the Government alleges “violated the sanctions imposed under
IEEPA and therefore constitute ‘specified unlawful activity’ as that term is defined in the federal
money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7).” Id. ¶ 7.
3.

On April 13, 2022, a seizure warrant issued for the Amadea. It was subsequently

seized in Fiji, and it is currently located in San Diego, California. See Am. Compl. ¶ 4.
4.

The Government filed this civil forfeiture case against the Amadea on October 23,

2023, ECF No. 1, and filed an Amended Complaint on February 16, 2024, ECF No. 37.
5.

Only one claim was filed: by Khudainatov and Millemarin. See Verified Claim of

Eduard Yurievich Khudainatov and Millemarin Investments Ltd. (“Claim”), ECF No. 9.
6.

The Initial Case Management Plan issued on January 17, 2024, setting a fact

discovery cutoff of June 24, 2024, and an expert discovery cutoff of August 8, 2024. See ECF No.
17.

3

7.

On February 9, 2024, the Government filed a Motion for Interlocutory Sale. See

ECF No. 32. After full briefing and oral argument, the Court denied the motion on June 11, 2024.
See Opinion and Order, ECF No. 121.
8.

On March 15, 2024, Claimants filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint.

See ECF No. 71. That motion has been fully briefed, see ECF Nos. 84 (Opposition) and 89 (Reply),
and remains pending.
9.

On May 17, 2024, the Government filed a motion to strike the Claim on the ground

that Claimants lack standing. See ECF No. 97.1 Claimants filed an Opposition on June 13, 2024,
ECF No. 123, and the Government filed a Reply on June 27, 2024, ECF No. 137. The
Government’s motion was initially styled as a motion for summary judgment, but in its Reply
brief, the Government noted that, should the Court deny summary judgment, it would request—
pursuant to Supplemental Rule G 2—an evidentiary hearing at which Claimants must establish their
standing by a preponderance of the evidence. See Mem. of L. Supp. P’s Mot. to Strike (“Reply”)
at 19, ECF No. 137 (citing Supplemental Rule G(8)(c)(ii)(B)). The parties subsequently submitted
several supplemental briefs. See ECF Nos. 147, 197, 216, 295, and 296.
10.

On May 24, 2024, the Court extended the fact discovery deadline by approximately

two months, to August 30, 2024. See Order, ECF No. 104.
11.

On July 26, 2024, the Court extended the fact discovery deadline a second time, for

an additional one-a-half months, to October 18, 2024. See Order, ECF No. 159 (granting in part
Claimants’ request to extend fact discovery through November 22, 2024).

1

Because Supplemental Rule G(8) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that any
government motion to strike a claim be decided prior to resolution of that claimant's motion to
dismiss, the Court deferred consideration of the Claimants’ Motion to Dismiss. See Supp. R.
G(8)(c)(ii).

2

All references to Rules are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
4

12.

On August 13, 2024, the Court set a tentative date of December 9, 2024, for an

evidentiary hearing on the Government’s motion to strike, if necessary. See Order, ECF No. 175.
13.

On September 19, 2024, the Court extended the fact discovery deadline a third time,

for an additional month, to November 15, 2024. See Order, ECF No. 255 (granting in part
Claimants’ request to extend discovery until January 15, 2025).
14.

On November 15, 2024, the Court extended the fact discovery deadline a fourth

time, this time solely for the purpose of completing certain depositions—those of Claimants and
an affiliated third-party witness—and gave the parties an additional five weeks, until December
20, 2024, to complete these depositions. See Mem. Order (“Nov. Order”) at 14, ECF No. 312
(granting in part Claimants’ request to extend discovery).
15.

In the same Order, the Court reserved decision on the Government’s Motion to

Strike. See id. at 4-5.
a. First, the Court noted that the gravamen of the Government’s motion is that
Claimants “are mere straw owners of the Amadea,” and “have not had dominion or
control over the Amadea or any financial stake in it” since a transaction in
September 2021 with Errigal Marine Limited (“Errigal”), a company nominally
owned by a non-party to the suit, Evgeny Kochman (“Kochman”). Mot. to Strike
at 1.
b. Claimants responded by arguing, inter alia, that “[n]o transfer of ownership [of the
Amadea] ever took place” and the transaction with Errigal was “ultimately
cancelled.” See Claimants’ Mem. of L. in Opp. To Pl.’s Mot. to Strike at 2, 4, ECF
No. 123. In making these assertions, Claimants relied heavily on the declaration of
Claimant Khudainatov himself. See Decl. of Claimant Eduard Khudainatov in
Supp. of Claimants’ Opp. To Pl.’s Mot. to Strike, ECF No. 126.
c. The Court concluded that, on the record before it, it could not resolve the
Government’s motion in a summary judgment posture. The Court explained that,
[T]he parties’ submissions contain numerous factual disputes—most
significantly, whether the Errigal transaction was in fact consummated,
which in turn depends in part on the credibility of Khudainatov’s declaration
denying that it was. In this context, the Court cannot adjudicate the
Government’s Motion to Strike in a summary judgment posture on the
papers.
5

Nov. Order at 4. In essence, the Court reasoned that if the September 2021 MOA
with Errigal had, in fact, effectuated a transfer of ownership of the Amadea to
Errigal, Claimants would have no standing for their claim. But given the declaration
of Mr. Khudainatov denying this, the Court could not award summary judgment to
the Government on the record before it at the time. See id.
16.

In the same Order, the Court formally ordered an evidentiary hearing under

Supplemental Rule G(8)(c)(ii)(B), adjourning it from the week of December 9, 2024, to the week
of January 21, 2025. See id. at 4-5.
17.

Throughout the discovery period, the Government repeatedly sought but was never

able to take Khudainatov’s deposition. The Court does not recount that long and tortured history,
which is set forth in some detail in the Court’s November 15 Mem. Order, ECF No. 312, and
January 8 Mem. Order, ECF No. 407. It is also recounted at some length in the Court’s Opinion
and Order on Claimant’s Motion for Reconsideration and on the Government’s Motion for
Sanctions, which is issued concurrently with this Opinion. For purposes of these Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, it is sufficient to note that: (1) the Court extended the fact discovery
period in this case four times—three times at the request of Claimants for purposes that included
Khudainatov’s deposition; and (2) Khudainatov did not appear for three noticed depositions and
did not file a motion for a protective order before the dates of those depositions:
a. He did not appear for a deposition noticed in July 2024 and did not file a motion
for a protective order beforehand;
b. After the Court extended the deadline for certain depositions to December 20, 2024
and ordered that Khudainatov’s deposition take place in a location where the
Government could conduct it, he did not appear again, citing a “medical
emergency” at 3:00 AM on the morning that the Government’s lawyers were
scheduled to travel to the agreed-upon location for the deposition;
c. After the Court granted the Government’s Motion to Compel, ECF No. 363 (under
seal), 3 and ordered that his deposition take place in New York during the week of
January 13, 2025, see Mem. Order, ECF No. 407, Claimants filed a motion for
3

The Government’s Motion to Compel is publicly available at ECF No. 364.
6

reconsideration the day before his noticed deposition date, and Khudainatov did not
appear.
18.

The Court held an evidentiary hearing over four days between January 21 and 27,

2025. The Court heard live testimony from five witnesses and received into evidence video
deposition designations from 15 additional witnesses. The parties collectively offered more than
500 exhibits, most of which were received into evidence without objection. Closing argument was
held on February 7, 2025.
19.

As explained below, the Court does not directly address objections to every exhibit

and every proffered line of deposition testimony. The Court addresses objections where it relies
on, or expressly declines to rely on, particular exhibits or testimony to which there is an objection.
With respect to any objections to exhibits or testimony that the Court deems immaterial or wholly
irrelevant to its decision, the objections are denied as moot.
FINDINGS OF FACT
A. Relevant Individuals and Entities
i.
20.

Claimants and Claimants’ Employees

Eduard Yurievich Khudainatov (“Khudainatov”)
a. Khudainatov is a Russian businessman who claims to have commissioned the
Amadea and to be the Amadea’s ultimate beneficial owner.
b. Khudainatov claims to have built and owned numerous superyachts from
approximately 2009 to 2021, including: (1) the 106-meter Amadea (ordered in
February 2012 and delivered in 2017); (2) the 136-meter Crescent (ordered in
March 2013 and delivered in May 2019); (3) the 140-meter Scheherazade (ordered
in December 2014 and launched in April 2020), among others. See GX-702-H at
9-11. He claims to have spent at least approximately €1.456 billion collectively on
various yachts between 2012 and 2014.
c. Despite being afforded ample opportunities to testify as to his ownership of the
Amadea, Khudainatov failed to attend his duly noticed depositions. He ultimately
submitted a declaration not subject to testing by cross examination during the
evidentiary hearing held in this case.
7

d. Claimants submit a hearsay declaration from Khudainatov, and they rely on it
throughout their Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. But, unlike
with other witnesses whose hearsay statements Claimants offered, Claimants did
not file a motion in limine seeking admission of Khudainatov’s hearsay declaration.
e. The Court excludes Khudainatov’s declaration from the record in considering the
Government’s Motion to Strike because it is hearsay. See FRE 802. Cf. ECF Nos.
312, 429; Hr’g Tr: 6:15-8:11. 4
f. As explained below, there is no competent evidence in the record tending to show
that Khudainatov had possession of, exercised dominion and control over, or held
a financial interest in the Amadea after a September 2021 transaction.
21.

Millemarin (“Millemarin”)
a. Claimant Millemarin is a corporate entity formed under the laws of the British
Virgin Islands on June 10, 2021, with Investment International Finance Ltd. (“IFF”)
as its only shareholder. GX-305; GX-406-F.
b. Claimants aver that Millemarin and IIF are both assets in a trust of which
Khudainatov is the direct beneficiary, but they do not cite to the record in stating
that proposition. See Claimants’ Amended Proposed Findings of Fact (“Claimants’
PFOF) ¶ 11, ECF No. 455-1.
c. The Amadea was Millemarin’s sole asset. See Millemarin 30(b)(6) Tr. 23:3-28:6.
d. From Millemarin’s formation until October 2024—after the Amadea was seized
and this litigation had begun—Olga Kroon (“Kroon”) was Millemarin’s sole
director. GX-406-E at 3; Millemarin 30(b)(6) Dep. Tr. 27:2-9; 33:25-34:6.

4

Even if the Court were to consider the Motion to Strike in a summary judgment (rather than a
fact-finding) posture, it would not consider Khudainatov’s declaration (or other hearsay
declarations from other witnesses who have not been made available for cross-examination). A
party “cannot rely on inadmissible hearsay in opposing a motion for summary judgment . . . absent
a showing that admissible evidence will be available at trial.” Abdel-Karim v. EgyptAir Airlines,
116 F. Supp. 3d 389, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (quoting Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp. v.
Esprit De Corp., 769 F.2d 919, 924 (2d Cir.1985)), aff’d sub nom. Abdel-Karim v. Egyptair
Holding Co., 649 F. App'x 5 (2d Cir. 2016). Khudainatov (as well as other witnesses described
below) was not deposed before the end of the fact discovery period (which was extended four
times and is closed). And Claimants have not made a showing that Khudainatov’s testimony will
ever be offered in an admissible form at trial. Accordingly, his testimony is properly excluded,
regardless of whether the Government’s motion is considered in a fact-finding or in a summary
judgment posture.
8

e. At the time of its Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) deposition, Millemarin
had a new director, Radovan Cvijetic, who had no personal knowledge relevant to
this case. Id. at 11:24-14:6; 14:20-15:24; 16:9:18. All knowledge he did have was
derived from briefing documents supplied by Claimants’ counsel. Id.
22.

Ekaterian Azarenko Parfireva (“Parfireva”)
a. Parfireva 5 works for Khudainatov’s “family office.” She has been employed there
as an “economist” since April 2007. Parfireva Tr. 14:6-16:12. Parfireva testified
that she oversaw matters relating to the Amadea and that she was responsible for
maintaining Amadea-related documents in Khudainatov’s family office, including
corporate documents, contracts, communications, and other relevant documents.
Id. at 16:16-26:25, 49:9-51:8, 53:19-55:15, 64:15-66:8.
b. As explained below, Parfireva’s deposition testimony was based on her review of
Khudainatov’s hearsay declaration and various documents rather than her own
firsthand knowledge of the events and transactions to which she testified.
ii.

23.

Claimants’ Counter-Parties in the September 2021 MOA, and Related
Individuals and Entities

Evgeniy Kochman (“Kochman”)
a. Kochman is a Russian businessman who was chairman of Imperial Yachts
(“Imperial”), the company that managed the Amadea on behalf of its owner and
employed the Amadea’s captain and crew.
b. According to its Certificate of Incorporation, Kochman was the sole owner and
ultimate beneficial owner of Errigal Marine Ltd (“Errigal”), a Cayman Island entity
formed on September 8, 2021. See GX-307.
c. The Court excluded Kochman’s declaration, CX-184, for two primary reasons: (1)
he was disclosed as a witness too late in the discovery process to make him
realistically available for deposition, and (2) he was not made available for crossexamination, rendering his declaration hearsay. See Hr’g Transcript, 6:15-7:9.

24.

Errigal Marine Ltd (“Errigal”)
a. Errigal is an entity formed under the laws of the Cayman Islands on September 8,
2021. GX-307. Kochman was Errigal’s UBO. See id. at 60.
b. As explained below, Errigal obtained all rights of ownership in the Amadea other
than title pursuant to a contract signed on September 14, 2021 (the “September
2021 MOA”). See GX-212.

5

The Government refers to her in its filings as “Azarenko,” which is apparently her maiden name.
9

25.

Imperial Yachts (“Imperial”)
a. Imperial was a company headquartered in Monaco. Wolf Tr. 21:21-22:24; Walsh
Tr. 18:13-19:3; Magee Tr. 57:4-58:4. Kochman was chairman of Imperial Yachts.
Wolf Tr. 69:21-70:3; Magee Tr. 58:5-18.
b. At all relevant times, Imperial Yachts managed the Amadea on behalf of the owner
and employed its captain and crew through its wholly controlled affiliate Ocean
Crew Limited. Walsh Tr. 19:16-20:9; Read Tr. 52:20-53:9.

26.

Victoria Pastukhova (“Pastukhova”)
a. Pastukhova purportedly worked for a company associated with Imperial Yachts and
purportedly became the “Client Coordinator” assigned to the Amadea until its
seizure in Fiji. Pastukhova claims to have helped coordinate charters of the Amadea
for Gulnara Kerimova. Claimants never made Pastukhova available for deposition,
and the Court excluded her declaration as hearsay. See Hr’g Tr. 6:15-25.

27.

Campbells Corporate Services Ltd. (“Campbells”)
Campbells is a corporate services firm in the Cayman Islands affiliated with a
Cayman law firm of the same name. Wolf Tr. 14:22-15:14, 33:10-34:24.
Campbells and its affiliates incorporated Cayman entities and then registered yachts
owned by them with the Cayman Islands Shipping Registry (“CISR”). Wolf Tr.
18:21-19:16. Campbells, its affiliate Campbells Nominees Ltd., and their
employees created Errigal, and two Campbells lawyers served as Errigal’s
directors. Wolf Tr. 68:19-69:8.

28.

John Wolf (“Wolf”)
a. Wolf was the head of corporate and a managing partner at Campbells from January
1997 until March 2023. Wolf Tr. 13:7-25. In his role at Campbells, Wolf oversaw
“the firm’s maritime practice,” including corporate work “with the major players in
the pleasure yacht or the maritime sphere.” Id. at 17:11-20:12. Wolf testified that
Campbells formed Errigal and that Kochman was Errigal’s UBO. Id. at 68:1669:20. He also served as one of Errigal’s two directors from its formation until
approximately March 2022. Id. at 93:23-25, 168:15-21.

29.

Damian Magee (“Magee”)
a. Damien Magee worked for Campbells from January 2017 to August 2023. Magee
Tr. 10:20-25. Magee was Errigal’s other director, serving in that capacity from
Errigal’s formation until approximately March 2022. Id. at 10:20-12:14; 13:6-14.
He testified that, after August 2021, he “d[idn’t] recall any transfer of ownership of
the Amadea.” Id. at 149:4-6.
10

iii.
30.

Suleiman Kerimov, Members of the Kerimov Family, and Employees

Suleiman Kerimov (“Kerimov”)
a. Kerimov is a Russian businessman who is subject to sanctions via his placement on
the OFAC’s list of SDNs. Pursuant to his designation as an SDN, U.S. persons
(including U.S. financial institutions) are generally prohibited from engaging in any
dealings involving Kerimov’s property, or that involve the provision of funds,
goods, or services to or for Kerimov’s benefit.
b. The Government alleges that Claimants hold title to the Amadea on Kerimov’s
behalf (i.e., to help the Kerimov family freely use the Amadea irrespective of the
financial and travel implications that come with Kerimov’s designation as an SDN),
but that the Kerimov family actually own the Amadea. The Kerimov family were
the sole users of the Amadea after the September 2021 MOA.

31.

Firuza Kerimova (“Firuza”)
a. Firuza is Kerimov’s wife. She is also an SDN, and she cruised the Mediterranean
on the Amadea in October 2021. See GX-410, 410-A, 410-B, and 410-C.
(describing guest preferences for the October 2021 trip); Read Tr. 156:19-24
(Captain Read’s testifying that he “deliver[ed] the boat to Sicily” in anticipation of
“people getting ready to go cruising”).

32.

Gulnara Kerimova (“Gulnara”)
a. Gulnara is Kerimov’s daughter. She is also an SDN, and she took three trips on the
Amadea between September 2021 and February 2022. Claimants say these trips
were charters of the Amadea rather than trips taken as an owner of the boat. Gulnara
was also involved in the Amadea’s planned renovation.
b. Claimants point to a purported “Charter Agreement,” CX-6; GX-216, through
which Gulnara agreed to charter the Amadea for a one-month trip through the
Caribbean in early 2021, as evidence that the Kerimov family did not own the
Amadea. Claimants’ PFOF ¶ 162-66. As explained below, the Court finds the
“Charter Agreement” has no probative value.
c. Claimants submit a declaration from Gulnara, which the Court excluded from
evidence. Claimants did not provide the Government Gulnara’s declaration until
two weeks before discovery was set to close in this case, which was not enough
time to arrange her deposition before the discovery cutoff given the logistical
challenges of deposing a Russian national. They did not notice Gulnara’s
deposition until after the Court extended discovery for the sole purpose of
completing other depositions, and they only did so in a foreign country where the
Government did not have permission to participate in her deposition. The Court,
11

therefore, granted the Government’s Motion for a Protective Order, ECF 340, with
respect to her and another witness (Alisa Gadzhieva), precluding her declaration
from being entered as evidence in this case. See Mem. Orders, ECF Nos. 361 and
429; Hr’g Tr. 6:15-8:11.
33.

Alisa Gadzhieva (“Gadzhieva”)
a. Gadzhieva is Kerimov’s niece. Gadzhieva made the two payments to Millemarin’s
parent company, IFF, as contemplated by the September 2021 MOA. See GX-412,
GX-431-A, GX-704-H at 2.
b. The parties disagree over whether Gadzhieva was sufficiently independently
wealthy as to have made these payments on her own, or if she could only have done
so on her uncle Kerimov’s behalf. Compare Claimants’ PFOF ¶ 124 (citing
Gadzhieva Declaration, CX-64, CX-66-cx-69), with Gov’t Proposed Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law (“Gov’t PFOF/COL”) ¶ 89, ECF No. 452. 6
c. Claimants submit a declaration from Gadzhieva, which the Court excluded from
evidence for the same reasons that it excluded Gulnara’s declaration. See Mem.
Orders, ECF Nos. 361 and 429; Hr’g Tr. 6:15-8:11.

34.

Dinar Khalikov
a. Dinar Khalikov is an AV and IT consultant for the Kerimov family. The Amadea’s
captain described Khalikov as the “owner’s rep[resenative]” with respect to the
Amadea, Walsh Tr. 127:11-14, though Khalikov himself disclaimed that
characterization, Khalikov Tr. 137:16-138:13.
b. Khalikov did not offer testimony about Millemarin, and he testified that he
“[n]ever” met Khudainatov. Khalikov Tr. 149:9-10. He testified “now I know that
Mr. Khudainatov had paid for [the Amadea] and them someone had just taken it
away from him,” id. at 142:12-14, but he did not state the basis for that purported
knowledge.
c. He also testified that, in 2020, he visited the Amadea with Kerimov in Abu Dhabi.
Id. at 157:20-159:23. He testified as to various problems that he perceived with the
Amadea, including that it was noisy and that parts of its interior look “horrible.”
Id. at 152:25-253:2. Khalikov also testified that he advised Kerimov not to buy the

6

Because it is unnecessary to the Court’s decision—which is based on the absence of any
competent evidence in the record that Claimants exercised the incidents of ownership with respect
to the Amadea other than bare title after the September 2021 MOA—the Court does not wade
through the evidence and conclusively resolve the factual question whether Gadzhieva was
sufficiently independently wealthy so as to make payments of €225 million. However, the Court
notes that the Government’s evidence raises grave doubts with regard to Gadzhieva’s ability to
purchase the Amadea herself—that is, without financial assistance from Kerimov.
12

Amadea and that Kerimov responded in substance, “do you think I’m stupid.” Id.
at 59:21-60:1.
d. To the extent Claimants rely on Khalikov’s statements as to what Kerimov said,
that testimony is excluded as hearsay. See Fed. R. Evid. 802. The Court also
declines to credit Khalikov’s testimony regarding the Amadea generally, which was
implausible given the amount of money and effort that the Kerimov family invested
in it, as described throughout this decision. His long-standing business relationship
with the Kerimov family also created an incentive to obfuscate the Kerimovs’
interest in the Amadea. See 4 Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 607.04[5] (2025)
(“Relationships between a party and a witness are always relevant to a showing of
bias, whether the relationship is based on ties of . . . business, friendship, enmity,
or fear.”). Finally, based on the Court’s observation of Khalikov’s testimony on
video, including his demeanor and his narrative and non-responsive answers to
questions, 7 the Court finds that Khalikov’s testimony lacks credibility. See Uddin
v. Garland, No. 20-3618, 2022 WL 14701072, at *2 (2d Cir. Oct. 26, 2022) 8
(holding that a trier of fact may base a credibility determination on the demeanor,
candor, or responsiveness of the applicant or witness).
35.

Adam von Poblitz (“Von Poblitz”)
a. Von Poblitz, an employee in Citibank’s Global Family Office, helped manage
Kerimov and his family’s financial affairs. Von Poblitz Tr. 16:2-15; 16:16-18:6.
He testified that he helped manage the Heritage Trust, a Kerimov family trust that
“provide[d] resources to the broader [Kerimov] family and charity,” id. at 17:5-25
- 18:1-6, and that was funded exclusively by Kerimov, see id. at 20:5-15.
b. The Government points to Von Poblitz’s testimony in arguing that (1) Gadzhieva’s
brother, Nariman Gadzhiev, headed the Kerimov family office, and (2) Gadzhieva
was not independently wealthy enough to “loan” Errigal the € 225 Million to buy
the Amadea as part of the September MOA—she got the money from Kerimov. See
Government’s PFOF/COL ¶¶ 28, 89.

36.

Allen Vine (“Vine”)
a. Vine is a Merrill Lynch investment analyst who served as an advisor to the Kerimov
family office from 2006 through late 2017 or early 2018. Vine Tr. 10:2-18. Vine
helped advise Kerimov’s Heritage Trust, and the Government points to his

7

See, e.g., Khalikov Tr. 79:25-86:3 (exemplifying Khalikov’s narrative testimony in an over-sixpages-long response to being asked, “what could make the vessel more charterable?”).
8

In all quotations from cases, the Court omits citations, alterations, emphases, internal quotation
marks, and ellipses, unless otherwise indicated.
13

testimony to help establish that Gadzhieva is Kerimov’s niece. Id. at 40:9-44:16;
64:2-14.
iv.
37.

Other Fact Witnesses

Timothy Bergen (“Agent Bergen”)
a. Agent Bergen is a special agent with the FBI responsible for conducting and
assisting in investigations into the activities of individuals and groups responsible
for money laundering, sanctions evasion, and other crimes associated with
organized crime. Decl. of Timothy Bergen ¶ 2.
b. Agent Bergen swore out the affidavit in support of a warrant to seize the Amadea,
and he submitted declaration testimony as to documents collected from the boat
after it was searched by FBI agents in Fiji and, later, in California. Id. at ¶¶ 11-12.
Agent Bergen also submitted testimony as to documents and other evidence
collected pursuant to grand jury subpoenas on individuals, entities, and financial
institutions associated with Errigal, Millemarin, and the Amadea. Id. at ¶¶ 16-18.
c. Claimants object to Agent Bergen’s declaration being entered into evidence “with
few exceptions.” See Claimants’ Objections to the Decl. of Timothy Bergen at 1.
Claimants do not object to the portion of Agent Bergen’s declaration that the Court
relies on in establishing the foundation of certain exhibits, see supra. The portions
of Agent Bergen’s declaration that are not objected to are therefore admitted into
the record without objection. The Court does not rely on other portions of his
declaration, objections to which are denied as moot.

38.

Todd McGee (“Agent McGee”)
a. Agent McGee is a special agent with the FBI who also conducts and assists in
investigations into the activities of individuals and groups responsible for money
laundering, sanctions evasion, and other crimes associated with organized crime.
McGee Decl. ¶ 2.
b. Agent McGee interviewed two of the Amadea’s crewmembers—Captain John
Walsh and Martin Messenger—at Los Angeles International Airport in April 2022
as the two men were attempting to travel enroute to Fiji to begin shifts on the
Amadea. Id. at 4. Agent Magee’s declaration identifies inconsistencies between
their responses to his questions and their deposition responses.
c. Claimants object to Agent McGee’s deposition testimony being entered into
evidence on the grounds that it is either hearsay or fails to comply with the rule
regarding impeachment by extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement.
14

However, because the Court does not rely on McGee’s testimony to resolve the
Government’s Motion to Strike, it need not decide whether his declaration should
be admitted. Claimants’ objections to it are therefore denied as moot.
39.

Francois Zuretti (“Zuretti”)
a. Zuretti is the founder and former manager of Zuretti Interior Design, “a design
office to provide interior design of motor yachts.” Zuretti Tr. 18:5-14. Zuretti’s
design firm was hired to provide the interior design on three yachts: the Amadea,
the Crescent, and the Scheherazade. Id. at 25:6-18, 27:16-21, 109:5-12.
b. Zuretti claims to have met Khudainatov “more than ten” times, id. at 43:14-22, and
“believe[s] even today” that Khudainatov owns the Amadea, id. at 149:13-19.
However, Zuretti provided no explanation as to why he holds this belief or why he
is qualified to opine on the Amadea’s ownership.

40.

Peter Read (“Captain Read”)
a. Captain Read was first employed in connection with the Amadea “towards the end
of the build process” and “came into the project as one of the two build captains”
in 2016. Read Tr. 27:16-19. When the Amadea launched, Captain Read became
one of “the two operational captains.” Id. at 27:22-23. Read remained a Captain
of the Amadea until in or about October 2021. Id. at 115:7-116:16.

41.

John Walsh (“Captain Walsh”)
a. Captain Walsh was hired to captain the Amadea in November 2021. Walsh Tr. 23:811, 92:14-18, 93:19-25.
b. Captain Walsh testified that, when he was hired, he understood the Amadea to be
owned by Millemarin because that is what was indicated on his employment
agreement. Id. at 19:14-20:18. He also testified that he did not know and did not
care who the Amadea’s owner was when he was hired, id. at 19:7-13, and that, as
of the date of his deposition, “To this day, I still don’t know who the owner of
Amadea is,” id. at 72:8-9.

42.

Martyn Messenger (“Messenger”)
a. Messenger was employed on the Amadea from December 2019 to April 2022 as its
Chief Security Officer. Messenger Tr. 14:12-24; 6:1-16.
b. Messenger testified that he was told by a different Amadea crew member that
Khudainatov owned the boat, id. at 17:2-11, but did not testify that he had his own
firsthand knowledge of that fact. Later, Messenger testified that he told U.S.
15

Customs and Border Patrol agents that Kerimov owned the Amadea. Id. at 83:110.
Ben Turner (“Turner”)

43.
a.

Turner testified in his capacity as captain of the Amore Vero and a former captain
of the Amadea. Turner Tr. 13:4-15; 37:8-38:6; 11:4-12:5; 47:9-48:18. Turner
testified regarding his experiences as a captain of a chartered vessel, stating that
charterers typically do not renovate or otherwise change the vessels they charter.
Id. at 29:17-25. He also testified that, when he was a captain of the Amadea, he did
not know who owned the vessel, id. at 59:15-60:1, and that “none of [the crew]
would truly know” whether a particular guest onboard was a charterer or owner, id.
at 70:9-15.
v.

44.

Expert Witnesses

Anders Aslund (“Dr. Aslund”)
a. Dr. Aslund was offered by the Government as an economic expert who specializes
in Russian economic matters. He received his doctorate from Oxford University
and describes himself as “a leading specialist on Eastern European economies,
especially Russia and Ukraine.” Decl. Testimony of Anders Aslund (“Anders
Decl.”) ¶¶ 1, 4. From 1991-94, he worked as one of the chief economic advisors to
Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s reform government. See id. ¶ 1. He has served
at numerous institutions, including the Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics
at the Stockholm School of Economics, the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian
Studies, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, the Brookings
Institution, the Peterson Institute for International Economics, the Atlantic Council,
the Russian and Eurasian Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, and the Carnegie Moscow Center's project on Post-Soviet Economies. See
id. ¶ 2. He has written sixteen books, edited another sixteen books, and has
published more than 1,400 articles, including in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy,
The New York Times, The Washington Post, Financial Times, and The Wall Street
Journal. See id. ¶¶ 2-3. He has spent his career studying Russia, including the
activities and wealth of Russian oligarchs. See ¶ 3. He testified live and via
declaration.
b. Specifically, Dr. Aslund opined on two disputed matters and reached the following
conclusions: (1) that it was unlikely Khudainatov had the financial means to
commission the Amadea (and, for that matter, the other super yachts Claimants’
state that he owns, which collectively are valued at $1.5 billion), because evidence
of his purported wealth during the relevant period—including valuations of his
holdings in the oil and gas industries—is “inflated and highly misleading,” id. ¶ 46;
and (2) that Gadzhieva’s purported loan to of €225 million to Errigal—a recentlyformed shell company with no assets—did not make economic sense, id. ¶ 93.
16

c. Claimants filed a Daubert motion to exclude to Dr. Aslund’s testimony. In it,
Claimants do not challenge his qualifications as to Russian and Eastern European
economies generally, but instead focus on two arguments:
i. First Claimants object to Dr. Aslund’s methodology, arguing that his
testimony was simply a “regurgitation of news articles” and thus “is not an
expert opinion at all.” Claimants’ Corrected Mot. to Exclude Expert
Opinion of Anders Aslund at 2, ECF No. 385. But there is no authority for
the proposition that a qualified expert cannot rely on secondary sources such
as news articles, and courts routinely admit expert testimony based on such
sources. Cf. Coca v. City of Dodge City, No. 22-1274, 2023 WL 8545263,
at *7 (D. Kan. Dec. 11, 2023). Claimants’ objections to Dr. Aslund’s
reliance on secondary sources concern the weight, not the admissibility, of
his testimony.
ii. Next, Claimants’ dispute Dr. Anders’ qualifications to opine on issues of
“corporate valuation” with respect to oil and gas fields specifically. ECF
No. at 15. Dr. Anders credibly testified as to his education with respect to
auditing, and his experience on the board of Ukrainian State Railroads, a
company with 250,000 employees, where he was a member of the audit
committee. See Hr'g Tr. 285:20-25. This is more than enough to satisfy
Daubert's requirements for establishing an expert's qualifications. See
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Northrop Grumman Corp., No. 12 Civ. 3040,
2014 WL 464769, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2014) (“In the Second Circuit,
courts have construed the inquiry into an expert's qualifications with an
eye towards the 'liberal thrust' of the Federal Rules and their general
relaxation of traditional barriers to opinion testimony.”). In light of his
education and experience with corporate auditing generally, any objection
to Dr. Aslund's experience with respect to oil and gas field valuation
specifically goes to the weight of his testimony, not the admissibility of it.
d. The Court therefore DENIES Claimants’ motion as to Dr. Aslund’s two opinions
described above. Furthermore, the Court finds Dr. Aslund’s testimony to be
credible and persuasive. However, as explained below, his testimony concerns
issues (Khudainatov’s supposed wealth and Gadzhieva’s purported loan) that are
ultimately unnecessary to resolve in deciding the Government’s motion. That is,
while Dr. Aslund’s testimony supports the Court’s conclusions, it is inessential to
the Court’s decision.

17

45.

Richard Connolly (“Dr. Connolly”)
a. Dr. Connolly was offered by Claimants as an expert on the Russian economy to
rebut the Government’s economic expert’s testimony. He received his doctorate
from the Centre for Russian and East European Studies (CREES) at the University
of Birmingham and has served as director of the research institute there. See
Connolly Decl. ¶¶ 1, 3. He describes himself as “an expert on the Russian
economy.” Id. ¶ 1. He was a Visiting Professor of Public Policy at the Russian
Presidential Academy for the National Economy and Public Administration
(RANEPA) in Moscow for five years (2013- 2018). See id. ¶ 4. As a consultant,
his clients have included the U.K. Ministry of Defence, the U.S. Department of
Defense, the U.S. National Intelligence Council. See id. ¶ 6. He has held roles with
the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London, the Centre for a New
American Security (CNAS) in Washington, D.C., and at the NATO Defence
College in Rome. Id. ¶ 8. He has written more than 100 academic articles, book
chapters, policy reports and briefs, as well as book titled, Russia's Response to
Sanctions. See id. ¶ 9. He testified live and via declaration.
b. Dr. Connolly offered testimony responding to Dr. Aslund’s opinion that
Khudainatov lacked the wealth to commission the Amadea and other superyachts.
His primary point was that, given Khudainatov’s status in his “professional
network,” which includes “Russian politicians and industry leaders as supporters,”
“it is highly likely that Mr. Khudainatov would have enjoyed the sort of access to
income flows afforded to very few people in Russia.” Id. ¶ 91. He opined that,
because Khudainatov had “the trust of some of Russia's wealthiest and most
powerful individuals and organisations,” he had an “unusual degree of access to
large volumes of capital.” Id. ¶ 90. He also criticized Dr. Aslund for ignoring or
understating “Khudainatov's other business activities that are likely to have added
to his publicly observable income streams.” Id. ¶ 93.
c. Dr. Connolly also sought to explain Gadzhieva’s €225 million “loan” to Errigal,
which she paid directly to Millemarin in connection with the September 2021
MOA. Dr. Connolly admitted that the “loan at issue may not be rational from a
‘home economics’ standpoint,” but hypothesized that “[t]here are a variety of
motivations that Ms. Gadzhieva may have acted upon.” Id. ¶ 104. Dr. Connolly
offered no concrete explanation as to why Gadzhieva may have made a loan he
characterized as “difficult to explain,” Hr’g Tr. 235:13-14, and agreed is facially
“irrational,” id. at 229:1-4.

46.

Sean Meagher (“Captain Meagher”)
a. Captain Meagher was offered by the Government as an expert on yachting. He has
38 years as a professional captain, including “over 150 weeks of charter on vessels
18

ranging from 65 feet to 357 feet in length.” Meagher Decl. ¶ 8. He attended the
Naval honors school Tabor Academy and the Massachusetts Maritime Academy.
See id. ¶ 1. Among other things, he is a managing partner of Marinus Vectors,
which provides “technical, operational, tactical, and strategic solutions to unique
challenges within the maritime sector, particularly in the superyacht industry and
maritime critical infrastructure.” Id. ¶ 2. He testified live and via declaration.
b. Captain Meagher testified on various topics including changes made to the Amadea
crew’s uniforms and renovations made and planned for the Amadea at the direction
of members of the Kerimov family, and which he opined went “far beyond what
would be expected from a mere charter guest.” Id. ¶ 48, see also id. ¶¶ 54-55, 6771, 81-83, 87-88.
c. Claimants move to exclude Captain Meagher’s testimony. Their principal
argument is that he “lacks the requisite expert experience to opine on the M/Y
Amadea and practices aboard the Amadea” because he has not regularly skippered
boats of similar size and value and with a similar management structure. Claimants’
Mot. in Lim. to Exclude Expert Test. and Report of Sean P. Meagher (“Mot. to
Exclude Meagher Test.”) at 1, ECF No. 376. But Captain Meagher testified that,
in addition to his other experience, he has served as a relief captain on the Bravo
Eugenia, a 109-meter vessel that, during his service was chartered once for
approximately one week. See Hr’g Tr. 164:10-18. Claimants’ argument that the
bulk of Captain Meagher’s experience was on comparatively smaller vessels goes
more to the weight that should be afforded his testimony, rather than suggesting
that he is altogether unqualified. The Court finds that Captain Meagher’s extensive
experience generally and on the Bravo Eugenia specifically are sufficient to
establish his qualifications under Daubert. See Travelers Indem. Co., 2014 WL
464769, at *2.
d. Claimants also raise a number of objections to various aspects of Captain
Meagher’s testimony. The Court rejects these objections, as follows:
i. Claimants argue that Captain Meagher’s testimony that certain changes
made to the Amadea at the direction of Gulnara Kerimova are the type likely
to be made by an owner of a vessel (rather than a mere charterer) reflect his
personal, not expert, opinion. See Mot. to Exclude Meagher Test. at 14-15.
This objection is specious; Captain Meagher’s opinion in this regard is
based on his experience captaining 150 weeks’ worth of charters. See
Meagher Decl. ¶ 8.
ii. Claimants also raise objections to any testimony about whether the Amadea
could legally be chartered (something that Captain Meagher did not opine
19

about); Captain Meagher’s testimony as to witness credibility (which
Captain Meagher also did not opine about except in response to deposition
questions posed by Claimants); and his testimony about ownership of the
Amadea (which the Court does not rely on). These objections are therefore
DENIED as moot.
47.

Michael Hitch (“Captain Hitch”)
a. Captain Hitch is Claimants’ rebuttal expert offered to refute Captain Meagher’s
testimony. Captain Hitch skippers the M/Y Nord, a 142-meter-long vessel, and has
over forty years of seafaring experience, including on yachts greater than 80 meters
long. Rebuttal Decl. of Michael A. Hitch, ¶1-2.
b. The Court entertained Claimants’ initial request for Captain Hitch to testify via
remote means (provided requisite legal authorizations for the Government to
participate, and appropriate safeguards to ensure reliability, were in place), but
Claimants ultimately withdrew their request. See Hr’g Tr. 9:14-22. Captain Hitch’s
testimony was instead offered by declaration; he did not appear live at the
evidentiary hearing.
c. The Government objected to Captain Hitch’s declaration being entered as evidence,
arguing that it is hearsay. The Government also argued that Captain Hitch’s report
should not be entered into evidence because it contains four paragraphs added after
he was deposed.
d. The Court ultimately allowed Captain Hitch’s report and affidavit to be admitted as
evidence except for the four new paragraphs. Hr’g Tr. 69:10-22. Given that
Captain Hitch did not appear, the Court ordered that “his report and affidavit [would
serve] as his direct and his deposition designations [would serve] as the cross.” Id.
at 69:18-22.
e. In his declaration, Captain Hitch opined, based on his review of various documents,
that “Gulnara Kerimova was a guest of the Amadea in late 2021 – early 2022
pursuant to a charter agreement, [and] it does not appear that Ms. Kerimova ever
purchased the Amadea, and there is no support for the conclusion that her father,
Mr. Suleiman Kerimov, ever became the ultimate beneficial owner of the vessel.”
Id. ¶ 34. Captain Hitch did not explain the basis for his conclusion in this regard
other than to say that it is based on “a careful and thorough review” of certain
documents listed by Bates number in an appendix to his declaration. Id. ¶ 33.
f. Captain Hitch also opined that the changes made to the Amadea at the direction of
Gulnara Kerimova “were minimal,” and “were typical accommodations for an
ultra-high net worth individual who intended to charter a vessel long-term.” Id. ¶
36. He further opined that these changes were “all consistent” with Claimants’
20

“theory of the case” that Gulnara Kerimova merely chartered (and did not own) the
Amadea, and that the Amadea was never sold. Id. ¶ 35.
g. Captain Hitch’s testimony that the changes made to the Amadea were “typical,”
however, was undermined by his acknowledgement that in his experience, he has
never seen charter guests making the sorts of changes to a vessel ordered by
members of the Kerimov family to the Amadea, including: changing the entire
purpose of a room; replacing toilets and bidets; removing built-in bars; removing a
jacuzzi; re-doing a deck in a different type of wood; removing refrigerators from
guest cabins; changing the yacht’s inlaid metal finishes; re-wiring electrical
sockets; or (more generally) making changes so large that an interior designer
would fly to the yacht to present renderings. Hitch Tr. 13:13-16:1. The Court
therefore declines to credit his testimony that the changes made or contemplated to
the Amadea were “minimal.”
Ewan McKendrick (“Professor McKendrick”)

48.

a. Professor McKendrick is a lawyer and professor based in the United Kingdom
whom the Government commissioned as an expert and who wrote a report opining
on the legal significance of the September 2021 MOA. The Government ultimately
chose not to rely on his opinion or call him as a witness at the evidentiary hearing.
b. Claimants point to Professor McKendrick’s testimony to substantiate their claim
that the transaction between Millemarin and Errigal never closed. McKendrick Tr.
63:10-14. Professor McKendrick testified that “[a] completion of sale would be the
point at which legal title, i.e. property, passes from seller to buyer,” and that he
“ha[d]n’t seen anything that suggests title was passed from seller to buyer under
th[e] agreement because clause (18) was not implemented.” Id. at 17:1-3; 38:2225.
II.

The Errigal Transaction
A.
49.

Evidence of Claimants’ Ownership of the Amadea Before September 2021
Relying largely on declarations that the Court excluded as hearsay, Claimants aver

that “Mr. Khudainatov commissioned, built, and continues to own, not only the Amadea, but also
the Crescent and the Scheherazade.” “Claimants’ PFOF” ¶¶ 72-83 (citing, inter alia, Khudainatov
Khudainatov’s and Kochman’s excluded declarations, the deposition testimony of Khudainatov
employee Parfireva (which itself was largely based on her review of Khudainatov’s declaration),
21

and various exhibits). As explained below, resolving this issue is ultimately unnecessary to the
Court’s decision, which turns on: (1) the transfer of ownership rights in the Amadea other than title
under the September 2021 MOA, and (2) the absence of competent evidence that Claimants
exercised any of those rights in ownership afterwards. But the Court finds, in light of the broader
record in this case, that it cannot credit Claimants’ assertions regarding the commissioning of the
Amadea:
a. The Government presented significant evidence tending to show that Claimants’
assertion that Khudainatov commissioned the Amadea is implausible. See “Gov’t
PFOF/COL”), ¶¶ 145-58 (citing, inter alia, expert testimony of Dr. Aslund
opining that Khudainatov lacked the necessary wealth to acquire the Amadea and
other superyachts, inconsistencies in Claimants’ account of his ownership of
these vessels, and various exhibits); Aslund Decl. ¶ 57 (opining that, in light of
evidence regarding Khudainatov’s wealth, “it is implausible that he would [have]
be[en] able to purchase the Amadea” for approximately €213 million between
2012 and 2017). In particular, Dr. Aslund’s expert testimony, which the Court
credits, painstakingly reviews the public record concerning Khudainatov’s wealth
during the relevant period, and he persuasively opines that that record does not
indicate that Khudainatov in fact had the financial resources to commission the
Amadea (and, for that matter, the other superyachts Claimants assert he
commissioned and/or owned during the same period).
b. Dr. Connolly’s rebuttal testimony on this question did not undermine Dr. Aslund’s
conclusions. As noted, the primary point of Dr. Connolly’s testimony was his
assertion that Khudainatov had “the trust of some of Russia's wealthiest and most
powerful individuals and organisations,” and therefore would have access to
“large volumes of capital” and “other business activities that are likely to have
added to his publicly observable income streams.” Connolly Decl. ¶¶ 90, 93. But
Dr. Connolly does not concretely state what those sources of capital or nonpublicly observable income streams may have been. The Court therefore cannot
credit Dr. Connolly’s testimony in this regard, which is purely speculative. Cf.
Boucher v. U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp., 73 F.3d 18, 21 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[E]xpert
testimony should be excluded if it is speculative or conjectural”).
50.

On June 10, 2021, Claimant Millemarin was incorporated under the laws of the

British Virgin Islands. GX-406-C; GX-406-D at 2-3; CX-408, CX-410. A little over one month
later, or around July 20, 2021, Millemarin signed a “Memorandum of Agreement,” with Nereo—
another entity that Claimants aver is owned by Khudainatov, see Claimants’ PFOF ¶ 27—which
22

provided that Nereo as “seller” would transfer the Amadea to Millemarin as “buyer.” See GX-209.
The agreement stated that its “completion date” was August 16, 2021. GX-209 at 2.
51.

On or around August 16, 2021, Captain Read sailed the Amadea to international

waters and signed documents to effectuate its sale from Nereo to Millemarin. See Read Tr. 110:15114:3; GX-219 (Bill of Sale signed by Captain Read); Magee Tr. 110:11-113:3 (stating that, upon
receipt of the certificate of registry from the Cayman Island Shipping Registry representative,
Millemarin became the registered legal owner of the Amadea as of August 16, 2021).
B.
52.

The Terms of the September 2021 MOA with Errigal
On September 8, 2021, Errigal was incorporated under the laws of the Cayman

Islands. GX-304. At this time, John Wolf and Damien Magee of the Campbells law firm were the
only people acting as Errigal’s directors; they continued in that role until March 13, 2022. See
GX-307 at 63. According to Claimants, Kochman was Errigal’s ultimate beneficial owner. See
GX-701 at 11. 9
53.

On or around September 14, 2021, Millemarin and Errigal signed a “Memorandum

of Agreement.” See GX-212 (the “September 2021 MOA”). Olga Kroon signed on behalf of
Millemarin, and Damian Magee signed on behalf of Errigal. Id. at 8.
54.

As discussed below, while the parties disagree as to the purpose of the September

2021 MOA, there is no dispute that, on its face, it provided that Millemarin “agree[s] to sell,” and
that Errigal “agrees to buy,” the Amadea. GX-212 at 4, cl.14; id. at 5, cl. 24.

9

Claimants object to this exhibit, their own Amended Responses to the Government’s Special
Interrogatories, subject to admission of highlighted portions of their responses. See Gov’t Ex. List,
COURT-X-2. The Court admits the exhibit in its entirety and overrules the objection as moot.
The Court also so rules with respect to Claimants’ other discovery responses: Claimants’ Second
Amended Responses to the Government’s Interrogatories (GX-702) and Claimants’ Responses to
the Government’s Requests for Admission (GX-704).
23

55.

Specifically, on its face, the September 2021 MOA provides:
a. that the “NAME OF SELLER” is “Millemarin,” and that the “NAME OF BUYER”
is “Errigal,” id. at 1, cls. 2-3;
i. that the “SALES PRICE” is €225 million, id. at 2, cl. 6;
ii. that the “PAYMENT SCHEDULE” consists of a “non-refundable” payment
of €45 million, with the remaining balance of €180 million to be paid by
November 1, 2021, id. at 2, cl. 7;
iii. that “The SELLER agrees not to enter into any other agreement for the sale
of the VESSEL,” id. at 4, cl. 14;
b. with respect to usage and control of the Amadea, that
i. “SELLER undertakes not to use the VESSEL after the Sea Trial and/or the
Condition Survey,” id. at 4, cl. 22; and
ii. “The BUYER has conducted sea trial of the VESSEL on 11 September 2021
and has accepted the VESSEL,” id. at 3, cl. 13(b)
iii. “The BUYER may use the VESSEL after first payment and becomes fully
responsible for all Running cost (operational, technical and crew costs),” id.
at 3, cl. 13(b).
iv. “The Buyer may start using the yacht and/or start any works on board after
[the initial] payment,” id. at 2, cl. 7
c. with respect to financial responsibilities, including
i. “RUNNING COSTS,” the MOA provides that “All running costs for the
VESSEL including berthing fees and crew’s wages shall be for the
BUYER’S account until Completion of the Sale,” id. at 4, cl. 19;
ii. “RISK,” the MOA provides that “The risk of loss, damage, or destruction
of the VESSEL shall be borne by the BUYER until the Completion of the
Sale,” id. at 4, cl. 22.
d. that “time being of the essence,” the “COMPLETION DATE” is “1 November 2021
upon receipt of payment in full or such earlier date as may be agreed” id. at 3, cl.
12, and
i. Under the heading “COMPLETION OF SALE,” the MOA provides that
“on delivery of the VESSEL and in exchange for payment of the Sales Price,
the SELLER shall provide the documentation set out in Annex One,” id. at
4, cl. 18;
24

ii. Annex One, in turn, describes various documents including a Legal Bill of
Sale, see id. at 10-11.
e. under the heading “CANCELLATION,” that “BUYER shall return the VESSEL”
“[i]n the event of this Agreement being terminated under any of the terms and
conditions of Clauses (25) or (26),” id. at 5, cl. 28, which in turn are titled “SEA
TRIAL” (cl. 25), and CONDITION SURVEY (cl. 26);
f. that the written agreement was “the entire Agreement between SELLER and
BUYER,” and there were “no other duties, obligations, liabilities or warranties
implied or otherwise,” GX-212 at 6, cl. 35;
C.
56.

Payments in Connection with the September 2021 MOA
There is no dispute that two transfers, totaling €225 million, were made in

connection with the September 2021 MOA. See, e.g., Claimants’ Rule 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 11-13,
ECF No. 124.
57.

In a letter dated September 15, 2021, Millemarin told Errigal that payments under

the September 2021 MOA “should be made to the account of Invest International Finance, Ltd,”
CX-247-A at 1, which was Millemarin’s parent company.
58.

IIF received two transfers, totaling €225 million, in connection with the September

2021 MOA. While the record is somewhat unclear as to the precise date of the first payment, there
is no dispute that the second payment was received on or about October 27, 2021. See Hr’g Tr.
440:14-24; Claimants’ PFOF ¶ 118 (first payment of €45 million on October 6, 2021, second
payment of €180 million on or about October 27, 2021) (citing, inter alia, CX-453, CX-458);
Gov’t PFOF/COL ¶¶ 85-86 (first payment of €45 million by September 15, 2021, second payment
of €180 million on or about October 27, 2021) (citing GX-704 at 2 (Claimants’ response to Request
for Admission); GX-431 (Kochman email); GX-431-A (bank transfer confirmation)).
59.

There is no dispute that these two payments were made from accounts in the name

of Alisa Gadzhieva, the niece of Suleiman Kerimov, and not from accounts in the name of Errigal
or Kochman. See Hr’g Tr. 440:25-441:15; GX-412 at 1, GX-431-A at 1, GX-704 at 2. This
25

undisputed fact directly contradicts Claimants’ interrogatory responses stating that the September
2021 MOA “was not a transaction involving any third party and specifically not Kerimov.” GX701 at 19.
60.

Claimants assert that Gadzhieva’s payments to IIF represented a “loan” from

Gadzhieva to Kochman (rather than a payment to purchase the Amadea directly). Claimants’
PFOF ¶ 120. But there is no dispute that Gadzhieva did not send the funds to Kochman or to his
company, Errigal, but rather to Millemarin (or more precisely, to its parent company, IIF). See
Claimants’ PFOF ¶¶ 120-29. Claimants have produced the supposed loan agreement in discovery,
as well as two letters from Errigal to Gadzhieva referencing the loan agreement. See GX-412 at 1
(stating in part “GRANTING A CREDIT/LOAN TO A NON-RESIDENT LOAN AGREEMENT
15.09.2021”); GX-412-A (September 15, 2021 Errigal letter re: loan); GX-412-B (loan
agreement); GX-430 (October 21, 2021 Errigal letter regarding the loan); GX-431-A at 1 (stating
in part “GRANTING A CREDIT/LOAN TO A NON-RESIDENT”).
61.

As explained infra, resolving whether or not the Gadzhieva payments constituted a

loan to Errigal (rather than a payment to Millemarin to buy the Amadea) is ultimately unnecessary
to the Court’s decision. But the Court notes that it does not credit these documents or Claimants’
representations as to a “loan” for several reasons.
a. First, the purported “loan”—an unsecured transaction of €225 million to Errigal, a
shell company that lacked any assets and had only been incorporated the week
beforehand—makes no sense, and Claimants’ proffered explanation is so irrational
as to be implausible. There is nothing in the record to explain why Gadzhieza
would make such a loan. Specifically:
i. The loan charged only 3.5 percent annual interest with a 10-year term, see
GX-412-B at 2, was unsecured, and Errigal had no assets and therefore no
means of repaying the loan. See Magee Tr. 22:6-11 (testimony of Errigal
director: “Q. If Errigal had no assets, could Errigal have paid back two
hundred twenty-five million Euros plus interest? . . . A. I do not know how
Errigal could have repaid this loan”). Indeed, the €225 million “loan”
amount was not even paid to Errigal itself, but rather to a different entity—
26

IIF. See GX-412-A (Errigal letters instructing that Gadzhieva pay funds
under the loan to IIF); GX-430.
ii. Claimant’s expert, Dr. Connolly, did not dispute that the loan was, on its
face, irrational from a purely economic perspective. He agreed that the loan
“does seem difficult to explain.” Hr’g Tr. 235:13-14; see also id. 231:1925 (agreeing that the interest rate was “very, very low”); id. at 234:7-17
(admitting that Gadzhieva could have gotten a better return with far less risk
by investing in the public securities markets); id. at 229:1-230:5 (admitting
that the loan would “seem irrational” to “mere mortals . . . someone like you
and me”); id. at 236:2-4 (admitting that he could not say how Errigal could
have possibly repaid the loan).
iii. Dr. Connolly testified, however, that it “may be that there are other
motivations driving the extension of this loan,” Id. at 229:11-12, because
“the Russian economy especially in the elite is one characterized by high
levels of informality” where “doing favors or helping other parts of that elite
is something [one must] engage in to get by.” Id. at 229:14-15; 230:6-10.
Based on this testimony, Claimants contend that “Dr. Connolly . . . provided
a plausible explanation for the Alisia Gadzhieva loan . . . , namely that
within the society of ultra-high net worth individuals in Russia, it may have
been to her perceived advantage to assist Kochman in a transaction,” and
that, according to Dr. Connolly, “the relatively low interest rate set forth in
the loan agreement . . . indicated Ms. Gadzhieva considered the loan to have
relatively low risk.” Claimants’ PFOF ¶ 215.
iv. Dr. Connolly was, however, not aware of anything specific that could have
caused Gadzhieva to extend the admittedly “irrational” loan to Errigal. Hr’g
Tr. 230:14-22. There is nothing in the record suggesting any specific
motive for the purported loan. His testimony that any such motive “may”
exist is pure speculation, and the Court therefore declines to credit it. Cf.
Boucher, 73 F.3d at 21 (“[E]xpert testimony should be excluded if it is
speculative or conjectural.”). To the extent Dr. Connolly offered testimony
about Ms. Gadzhieva’ perception of risk, such testimony also lacks
foundation and is purely speculative, and the Court declines to credit it.
b. Second, the Court finds that it is more likely than not that the signatures of Errigal’s
director, Damian Magee, on the loan agreement and two associated Errigal letters,
were forged and that these documents are fraudulent.
i. The loan agreement and the two letters were each purportedly signed on
Errigal’s behalf by Magee, see GX-412-B, GX-412-A, GX-430, but he had
no recollection of them. Magee testified that he had no recollection of
having signed—or even seen—the loan agreement. See Magee Tr. 20:7-12.
Magee also testified that he did not recall signing the two letters directing
27

Gadzhieva to make the payments under the loan agreement. See Magee Tr.
26:15-27:22.
ii. Magee’s lack of recollection of these documents is notable for several
reasons. Although Magee testified that he signed many documents over the
years, he also testified that he “very rarely, if ever” was asked to sign
agreements involving such large sums. Magee Tr. 22:22-23:10. 10 Magee
also testified that approving a loan from a member of a sanctioned
individual’s family could expose him to personal liability under Cayman
law. See Magee Tr. 55:3-56:21.
iii. Claimants do not address Magee’s testimony in this regard in their Findings
of Fact, and the Court finds that Claimant’s position—stated with
substantial hesitation at closing argument—that Magee signed documents
taking out a €225 million loan and then simply forgot that he did so, see
Hr’g Tr. 455:11-457:4, is implausible.
iv. Magee noted other discrepancies about the loan agreement as well, such as
his signature not appearing the way he would expect, the lack of corporate
records of due diligence for the loan, the fact that as a director of Errigal he
would have known if Errigal had incurred €225 million in debt, and that a
four-page loan agreement was unusually short for such a large financial
commitment. See Magee Tr. 22:12-26:11, 33:18-25.
v. Wolf, Magee’s supervising partner and co-director of Errigal, likewise
testified that he had not seen or heard of any loan to Errigal. See Wolf Tr.
89:9-15. Moreover, Wolf would have been “absolutely” surprised if Magee
had signed such documents because for Errigal to borrow money, there
would need to be resolutions of the board of directors and neither he nor
Magee—Errigal’s directors—had prepared any such resolutions. See Wolf
Tr. 93:12-95:17 (testifying that it is “inconceivable” that Magee would have
signed such a loan agreement without bringing it to Wolf’s attention).
vi. Finally, Roger Jackson, Campbells’ Head of Information Technology,
testified that the corporation retained both employee emails and client
documents—such as loan agreements and letters—from 2021 on. See
Jackson Tr. 19:9-16; 31:1-33:18. Jackson searched Campbells’ IT systems
using a broad range of keywords and did not find either the loan agreement
or letters (see, e.g., GX-412-B, GX-412-A, GX-430); nor did he find
documents similar to them (such as earlier drafts), or any “emails or other
correspondence that discuss[ed]” the letters or loan agreements. See id.
10

Claimants’ objections to the testimony of Wolf and Magee regarding the loan documents as
“speculative” are overruled. Their testimony in this regard is based on personal experience and
does not constitute inappropriate speculation. For example, Magee’s testimony that he “rarely”
signed documents involving similar amounts of money is a statement of fact about his experience,
not “speculation.”
28

17:15-34:22; GX-807 (search terms used by Jackson to search for the
Errigal loan agreement and letters).
c. In light of the absence of any explanation for the purported €225 million
Gadzhieva-Errigal “loan,” Magee and Wolf’s complete lack of recollection of the
loan documents (which the Court finds implausible given the size of the loan), the
discrepancies Magee identified with his signature, and Jackson’s inability to find
any record of the agreement or the letters associated with it on Campbells’ IT
systems, the Court finds that it is more likely than not that Magee’s signature on
these documents was forged and that the purported loan documents are fraudulent.
D.
62.

Addenda to the September 2021 MOA
There is no dispute that “the Completion Meeting contemplated in Annex One of

the September 2021 MOA appears not to have occurred.” Gov’t PFOF/COL ¶ 102.
63.

There are no fully executed versions of the documents described in Annex One in

the record.
64.

Wolf—the Campbells lawyer who served as one of Errigal’s directors—testified

with respect to the September 2021 MOA that “we were asked to execute [this agreement and] we
did, but then it never seemed to close which is in itself unusual.” Wolf Tr. 87:18-20; see also id.
at 92:4-7.
65.

The only communications in the record bearing directly on why the Annex One

documents were not signed are a November 19, 2021, email chain from Julia Stewart of Imperial
Yachts to Mikhail Avsiannikov, an employee of the Khudainatov family office. In it, Stewart
states:
Evgeniy met with the Principal yesterday. It has been decided to leave Milemarin as the
registered owner until 1 May 2022. In reality, we will aim to do the re-registration in March
– April when the yacht will be a long way from Europe.
GX-436 at 3. 11 Avsiannikov replied that:

11

“Evgeniy” appears to be a reference to Evgeniy Kochman. The email does not specify who the
referenced “Principal” is.
29

The director of Milemarin Olga Kroon is much concerned about the obligation of
Milemarin to transfer the ownership title once the final payment is made under the MOA
of 14 September 2021. The final payment has already been made.
Id. at 2-3.
i. The November 2021 Addendum
66.

In response, Stewart suggested that the parties sign an “Addendum Two” to the

September 2021 MOA. Id. at 2.
67.

On November 30, 2021, Stewart sent Avsiannikov an email attaching a signed

“Addendum Two” to the September 2021 MOA (the “November 2021 Addendum”). See GX-437
(cover email); GX-437-A (signed attachment). Pursuant to Addendum Two, “the Completion Date
is postponed until May 1, 2022.” GX-437-A.
68.

On its face, the November 2021 Addendum reiterated that Errigal retained all

financial responsibilities associated with the Amadea:
a. Errigal “shall pay all insurance costs” for the Amadea;
b. Errigal “will be responsible for costs of rectifying any loss or damage, including
but not limited to total loss of the yacht”;
c. Errigal “shall pay all and any costs associated with or incurred by the Yacht or by
[Millemarin] in connection with the yacht from 14 September 2021 until the
Completion Date”;
d. Errigal “is fully responsible for and shall pay all costs of the Yacht’s or
[Millemarin’s] compliance with all applicable rules and requirements of Flag and
Class”;
e. Errigal “shall pay all operational costs from 14 September 2021 such as crew
salaries, insurance, technical, and operational maintenance, fuel and consumables,
mooring and any Port fees, food and alcohol, and any other costs incurred by the
Yacht”;
f. Errigal “shall indemnify [Millemarin] for any loss or damage of the Yacht,
including but not limited to total loss of the Yacht, until the Completion Date”; and
g. “[i]n the event of a dispute, Errigal will cover all the costs of [Millemarin] or any
other party related to [Millemarin] associated with the dispute.”
30

Id. at 1.
ii. The March 2022 Addendum
69.

On March 7, 2022, Millemarin, its parent company IIF, and Errigal signed a

document styled as an “amendment” to the September 2021 MOA. See GX-217 (the “March 2022
Addendum”). Millemarin’s director, Olga Kroon, signed for Millemarin and IIF; Errigal’s
director, John Wolf, signed for Errigal. GX-217 at 3-4.
70.

The recitals to the March 2022 Addendum reiterate that “the Company

[Millemarin] and the Purchaser [Errigal] entered into the Memorandum of Agreement upon which
the Company agreed to sell the vessel — pleasure yacht named Amadea,” and that “[t]he sale price
under the Memorandum of Agreement was paid by the Purchaser to the account of the Seller in
two tranches: the first tranche amounting to EUR 45 mln was paid on 17 September 2021, and the
second tranche amounting to EUR180 mln was paid on 27 October 2021.” Id. at 2
71.

Under the terms of the agreement, Errigal agreed to purchase Millemarin’s shares

for €225 million, but the two prior payments totaling €225 million that had already been paid in
connection with the September 2021 MOA “shall be set off” against the purchase price. GX-217
at 2 (Clauses 1 and 2). Thus, in exchange for the September and October 2021 payments from
Gadzhieva for the Amadea, IIF would transfer the shares of Millemarin to Errigal without any
additional payments being required.
72.

On its face, the March 2022 Addendum—which was styled as an “Amendment” to

the September 2021 MOA, see GX-217 at 1—did not purport to replace or cancel the September
2021 MOA. See also Wolf Tr. 80:22-23 (Errigal Director who signed the March 2022 Addendum
on behalf of Errigal—testifying that “it was perfectly obvious to me on the face of this that [the

31

September] MOA still stood.”). There is nothing in the March 2022 Addendum that purports to
address the September 2021 MOA’s conveyance of the incidents of ownership over the Amadea.
73.

The March MOA provided that “the closing of this agreement will take place on or

before 15 March 2022.” GX-217 at 3 (Clause 5). IIF signed a share transfer certificate dated
March 10 transferring its shares in Millemarin to Errigal, see GX-218, but there is no version in
the record countersigned by Errigal.
E.
74.

Claimants’ Proffered Evidence that the September 2021 MOA Was Not a
Sales Agreement
Notwithstanding the face of the September 2021 MOA, which states that it is a sales

agreement, Claimants contend that it represented a “Temporary Use Agreement” between
Khudainatov (Millemarin) and Kochman (Errigal), to “grant temporary use of the Amadea to
[Errigal and] Kochman, including the ability to charter the vessel and market it for sale in search
of a buyer.” Claimants’ PFOF ¶ 108. According to Claimants, the purpose of this “Temporary
Use Agreement” was to effectuate a prior “Cooperation Agreement” to enlist Kochman to sell the
Amadea. See id.
75.

The Court cannot credit Claimants’ assertions of a preexisting Cooperation

Agreement. The purported Cooperation Agreement itself, CX-242, which has been offered by
Claimants, is excluded as untimely disclosed and for lack of foundation. 12
12

As an initial matter, the document Claimants provided the Court is in Russian; they did not
provide the Court with a translation of it (but the Government did). Claimants’ Exhibit List,
COURT-X-1, indicates that the Government objects to CX-242 on the bases that: (1) it was not
timely disclosed, and (2) it lacks a proper foundation. Claimants respond by pointing the Court to
their Opposition to the Government’s Motion in Limine dated Jan. 27. 2025, ECF No. 447, and
Parfireva’s deposition testimony. As to the Opposition brief, it does not directly reference CX242. Moreover, as discussed infra, the Court grants the Government’s Motion in Limine to exclude
various documents as untimely disclosed and not properly authenticated as business records. As
for Parfireva’s deposition testimony, Claimants do not cite particular pages of Parfireva’s
deposition transcript that properly authenticate it, for example, by establishing that it was “kept in
32

76.

But even assuming that such a preexisting Cooperation Agreement existed, the

Court cannot credit the contention that the September 2021 MOA represents a “Temporary Use
Agreement” rather than a sales agreement for several reasons. First, there is no competent
documentary evidence in the record supporting Claimants’ contention that the September 2021
MOA was for mere “temporary use” of the Amadea as opposed to a sale:
a. Claimants’ contentions as to a temporary use agreement contradict the face of the
September 2021 MOA itself, which repeatedly and without exception uses the
language of a “sale” of the Amadea. See, e.g., GX-212 at 1, cl. 2-3 (referring to
Millemarin and Errigal as “Seller” and “Buyer,” respectively); id. at 2, cl. 6
(referring the “sales price”); id. at 4, cl. 14 (Millemarin “agrees to sell” the
Amadea). By contrast, there is nothing in its language suggesting that it was
intended as an agreement for temporary use, such as any limitation on the
timeframe of the supposed temporary use, provisions for the return of the Amadea
after that term has run, provisions regarding the assessment of the vessel’s condition
on return, or any provisions describing how and when the €225 million “sales price”
should be returned. 13
b. Claimants’ contentions regarding a temporary use agreement also contradict every
relevant external document properly in the record, which all refer to the September
2021 MOA as a sales agreement. See, e.g., GX-437-A (November 2021
Addendum); GX-217 (the March 2022 Addendum); GX-412 at 3-6 (email thread
between Julia Stewart of Imperial Yachts, Evgeniy Kochman of Imperial
Yachts/Errigal, and Parfireva of the Khudaintatov family office referring to the
the course of a regularly conducted business activity and also that it was the regular practice of
that business activity to make the [record].” United States v. Komasa, 767 F.3d 151, 156 (2d Cir.
2014) (cleaned up). It is not the Court’s responsibility to sift through her entire deposition
transcript to identify where the foundation for the document was purportedly established. In any
event, the Court has searched through Parfireva’s transcript, and she testified that she had no
involvement in the drafting of the purported Cooperation Agreement and claims to have seen it
only after it was signed. See Parfireva Tr. 213:7-15. Accordingly, the Court sustains the
Government’s objections and excludes CX-242.
13

At closing argument, Claimants pointed to the fact that the first payment was refundable as
circumstantial evidence that the September 2021 MOA contemplated a temporary use agreement.
See Hr’g Tr. 460:24-465:4. But the fact that a deposit is non-refundable says nothing about
whether an agreement is for temporary use. Claimants also relied on Errigal Director Wolf’s
testimony that a provision permitting use of a yacht immediately after putting down a deposit is
“unusual,” see Wolf Tr. 84-85, but the fact that the transaction was unusual does not imply that the
MOA was, contrary to its plain terms, intended merely for “temporary use” of the Amadea. Finally,
to the extent that Claimants rely on Parfireva’s testimony regarding the deposit, the Court has
addressed that point infra.
33

“buyer” and “seller,” as well as an “SPA,” an abbreviation for “sales purchase
agreement”); GX-409, 409-A (Stewart email attaching draft September 2021 MOA
as “Sale Contract A v3 clean.docx); GX-481 & 481-A (Stewart email attaching draft
September 2021 MOA as “Amadea sale contract v 4.pdf”); 14 GX-495 at 1 (Stewart
email to Parfireva attaching draft September 2021 MOA with subject line “Amadea
sale” and discussing “Purchase of Amadea”). There is no suggestion in any of these
documents of a temporary use agreement. There are no external documents in the
record referring to the September 2021 MOA as a cooperation agreement or
temporary use agreement.
77.

Second, there is no competent testimony in the record describing the September

2021 MOA as having been intended to effectuate a purported cooperation agreement between
Khudainatov and Kochman. The only testimony offered by Claimants in this regard is from
Parfireva, an employee of the Khudainatov family office. See Parfireva Tr. 63:11-14; 85:2186:23. 15 The Court cannot accord any weight to her testimony in this regard for several reasons.
a. First, Parfireva lacks personal knowledge as to the intentions of the parties with
respect to the September 2021 MOA, 16 and is therefore not competent to testify
regarding it. See Fed. R. Evid. 602 (“A witness may testify to a matter only if

14

Claimants purport to object to these exhibits on foundation, authenticity, and hearsay grounds.
Those objections are overruled, as the exhibits are authenticated in Agent Bergen’s declaration.
See Bergen Decl. ¶16 (authenticating and laying the foundation for various documents). Claimants
do not object to this portion of Special Agent Bergen’s testimony, other than to “reserve” their right
to object to the exhibits referenced therein. Having reviewed the declaration, the Court finds that
it lays an adequate foundation for these documents and authenticates them properly.
15

Claimants have also submitted the declarations of Khudainatov and Kochman to support the
notion of a cooperation agreement. As noted, supra, the Court has excluded these declarations
from its consideration of this motion.
16

Parfireva never spoke with Khudainatov or Kochman about their intentions in entering the
MOA. See Parfireva Tr. 188:4-9. She did not testify that she was involved in the drafting or
negotiation of the purported cooperation agreement or the September 2021 MOA. See id. 213:715 (testifying she first saw the cooperation agreement after it was already signed). Rather, she
represented that her testimony was based on the fact that she received the two agreements at
roughly the same time and that she understood their terms to “coincide.” See id. 88:24-89:13
(stating, when asked “how” she knew that the September 2021 MOA “was intended to effectuate
the Cooperation Agreement,” that it was “[b]ecause we received the [September 2021 MOA] right
after the Coop Agreement, or Cooperation Agreement was generated, and the terms and conditions
of the MYBA Agreement coincided with what was included in the Cooperation Agreement.”).
34

evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal
knowledge of the matter.”). 17
b. Second, her testimony is this regard is belied by her own contemporaneous
correspondence regarding the September 2021 MOA with Imperial Yachts,
including Kochman and Stewart, which did not reference a cooperation agreement
and described the September 2021 MOA as what it indicates it is on its face: an
agreement for sale. See, e.g., GX-412; GX-495.
78.

Third, there is no circumstantial evidence in the record supporting the notion that

the MOA was intended for temporary use to effectuate a sale of the Amadea, such as testimony or
documents showing that, consistent with the asserted purpose of a purported temporary use
agreement, any effort was made after September 2021 to market or sell the Amadea.
F.
79.

Claimants’ Proffered Evidence that the September 2021 MOA Was Canceled
Claimants aver that the September 2021 MOA was canceled. See Claimants’ PFOF

¶ 150. The Court rejects that contention for several reasons.
80.

First, there are no documents in record reflecting cancellation of the September

2021 MOA.
a. The face of the September 2021 MOA provides for cancellation in relation to
dissatisfaction with the Sea Trial and the Condition Survey. See GX-212 at 5, cl.
28 (cancellation clause, citing cl. 25 and 26). There is nothing in the record
suggesting cancellation in connection with these clauses of the MOA.
b. The September 2021 MOA itself is memorialized and accompanied by supporting
documentation such as email correspondence, but there is no documentary evidence
in record suggesting that the MOA was canceled.

17

Parfireva’s lack of personal knowledge on this subject is fatal not only in a fact-finding posture.
That is, even if the Court were to consider this motion in a summary judgment posture, it would
decline to consider her testimony on this subject due to her lack of personal knowledge. See Miller
Marine Servs., Inc. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 197 F. App'x 62, 64 (2d Cir. 2006) (affirming
district court’s decision not to consider affidavit on summary judgment where it was based only
on affiant’s “belief and conclusion,” rather than on personal knowledge); Rule 56(e) (explaining
that affidavits opposing summary judgment must be “made on personal knowledge, set[ting] forth
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and ... show[ing] affirmatively that the affiant is
competent to testify to the matters stated therein”).
35

81.

Second, there is no direct oral testimony from a witness with personal knowledge

in the record indicating that the MOA was canceled. The only testimony offered by Claimants on
this point is from Khudainatov Family Office employee Parfireva, but her testimony was not based
on personal knowledge:
a. Parfireva acknowledged that Khudainatov did not tell her that the MOA “had been
canceled,” and she never had “any conversation with him whatsoever about the
termination of the Agreement.” Parfireva Tr. 199:17-200:8. Because she lacked
personal knowledge as to whether the MOA was canceled, she was not competent
to testify on that subject. See Fed. R. Evid. 602.
b. Parfireva testified that she inferred that it had been canceled based on two factors:
(1) “that there was no other document that confirmed that the deal or the transaction
was consummated,” and (2) that, in April 2022, a “Management Agreement was
signed between Millemarin and Imperial Yachts.” Id. at 199:4-16. This testimony
is not based on personal knowledge. And the Court also rejects it for the following
additional reasons:
i. As for the absence of closing documents, the terms of the MOA do not state
that transfer of the incidents of ownership other than title depend on closing.
Rather, under the terms of the MOA, transfer of possession, dominion and
control, and financial interest in the Amadea turn on other conditions such
as payment. There is no dispute these conditions were fulfilled. There can
therefore be no dispute that the incidents of ownership other than title
passed from Millemarin to Errigal. There is nothing under the terms of the
MOA itself suggesting that the failure to sign the closing documents affects
the transfer of ownership rights in the Amadea other than title.
ii. As for the April Management Agreement, while it is dated April 4, 2022, it
was not fully signed until May 10, 2022, see CX-482 at 20—nearly a month
after the Amadea’s seizure. It therefore cannot constitute evidence of who
was financially responsible for the Amadea at the time it was seized. There
is no evidence in the record that any payments were ever made under the
Agreement. And the Management Agreement is contrary to all other
evidence in the record as to who actually bore the financial responsibilities
for the Amadea during the relevant period. The Management Agreement
states that Millemarin would be responsible for paying Imperial Yachts for
the expenses of running the Amadea starting in August 2021, see id. at 21—
but that is directly contrary to the terms of the September 2021 MOA, which
provided that Errigal would be responsible for those costs after that date.
As explained infra, all the relevant evidence in record indicates that, after
that date, Millemarin bore no financial responsibility for the Amadea.

36

82.

There is no indirect evidence of cancellation, such as a return of control of the

Amadea to Millemarin, or a return by Millemarin of any of the €225 million. See Parfireva Tr.
113:16-21 (acknowledging that the funds were not returned). 18
G.
83.

Claimants’ Proffered Witness Testimony on Claimants’ Ownership
Generally
Claimants state that “each and every witness testified consistently that they either

believed Mr. Khudainatov and/or Millemarin was and still is the owner of the Amadea, or stated
that they were not sure who owned the Amadea.” Claimants’ PFOF ¶ 11. In making this broad
proclamation, Claimants do not cite any testimony in particular. As explained supra, in reviewing
the record, the Court finds that the various generalized testimony proffered by Claimants on this
point is not admissible and/or does not address whether Claimants held the incidents of ownership
of the Amadea after the September 2021 MOA, other than title. Specifically:
a. Lürssen. Lürssen, the shipbuilder, testified as to his interactions with Khudainatov
around the time that the Amadea was built. See Claimants’ PFOF ¶¶ 34-36 (citing
deposition designations). But he also testified that he was unaware of the
transaction represented in the September 2021 MOA and that he had never heard
of Millemarin or Errigal. Lürssen Tr. 37:8-17. Even crediting his testimony
regarding his belief about who owned the Amadea a decade ago, Lürssen says
nothing about who possessed, exercised dominion and control over, or had a

18

Parfireva attempted to explain the failure to return the funds by stating that “[a]s far as I know
the lawyers of Mr. Evgeniy Kochman stated that any action related to the Amadea that has
indefinite status after it was seized in Fiji can result in violation of any Sanctions rules or
regulations. In other words, any actions regarding this event, until the status of the boat is clarified,
were not advisable.” Parfireva Tr. 113:22-114:9 (emphasis added). That testimony is excluded
because it lacks foundation and constitutes hearsay under FRE 802. Even if the Court were to
permit the testimony, however, the Court would find that it is not credible, because it is
contradicted by Claimants’ assertion that they entered into a management agreement with Imperial
Yachts (of which Kochman was chair) in May 2022, after the Amadea had been seized. Claimants’
contention that Kochman entered into a management agreement regarding a seized vessel belies
Parfireva’s testimony that he was unwilling to take any actions related to the Amadea at that time
due to fear of sanctions—including accepting the return of €225 million that he purportedly used
to pay for it.
37

financial stake in the Amadea during the relevant time period, i.e., after the
September 2021 MOA.
b. Zuretti. The interior designer Zuretti testified: “I even believe even today
[Khudainatov is] still the owner [of the Amadea]. I'm sorry to say that. But I don't
know that.” Zuretti Tr. 44:5-10. The Government objects that this statement lacks
foundation. That objection is sustained, as Zuretti offered no explanation as to the
basis for his “belie[f]” as to the current ownership of the Amadea, and even
admitted, “I don’t know that.” Id.
c. Read. Captain Read testified that, in 2017, he understood Khudainatov to be the
owner of the Amadea. Read Tr. 83:6-84:2. Read also testified that he did not know
about the transfer of the Amadea from Nereo to Millemarin. Read Tr. 112:9-19.
Even crediting his testimony about his understanding in 2017—the basis of which
is not explained—that testimony ultimately says nothing about who possessed,
exercised dominion and control over, or had a financial stake in the Amadea during
the relevant time period, i.e., after the September 2021 MOA.
d. Walsh. Captain Walsh testified that, at the time he served on the Amadea in fall
2021, he had an “understanding” that the “shipowner” was Millemarin Investments
Limited, as indicated on his employment agreement. Walsh Tr. 19:14-20:18. That
testimony was based on a review of his “Seafarer’s Employment Agreement,”
which does not appear to have been offered as an exhibit, and which Claimants do
not cite in their Proposed Findings of Fact. Walsh ultimately testified “To this day,
I still don’t know who the owner of Amadea is.” Walsh Tr. 72:8-9.
e. Messenger. Security Officer Messenger testified that he was told by the other head
of security, Scott Fairey that the owner was “Eduard Khudainatov.” (Messenger Tr.
17:2-11). The Government objects to this testimony as hearsay. The Court sustains
the objection. Messenger also acknowledged that, in an interview with U.S.
Customs and Border Patrol, he stated that Kerimov was the owner of the Amadea.
Id. at 83:1-10.
f. Parfireva. The specifics of Khudainatov family office employee Parfireva’s
testimony as to ownership of the Amadea are largely addressed above. The Court
further notes, though, that her testimony in this regard is largely based on: (1) her
review and restatement of facts in Khudanatov’s declaration, see Parfireva Tr.
129:9—which the Court has deemed inadmissible and which cannot be entered into
the record through the backdoor testimony of another witness simply restating its
contents—and (2) Parfireva’s interpretation of the September 2021 MOA, see id.
187:24-188:9—which the Court can and has interpreted itself, concluding that it
unambiguously describes a sale of the Amadea. 19

19

Cf. New Windsor Volunteer Ambulance Corps, Inc. v. Meyers, 442 F.3d 101, 111 (2d Cir. 2006)
(“To the extent that the determination of ownership turns on the interpretation of provisions of a
38

g. Khalikov. Kerimov family employee (or contractor) Khalikov offered testimony
that no member of Kerimov family wanted to purchase the Amadea. While he
stated that he “know[s] that” Khudainatov “paid for” the Amadea, Khalikov Tr.
142:12-14, he did not state the basis for that purported knowledge and also testified
that he never met Khudainatov, see id. at 149:9-10. He is not competent to offer
testimony on that fact. Moreover, as noted above, the Court found his testimony
not credible. But even crediting his testimony in this regard, it says nothing about
whether Khudainatov possessed, exercised dominion and control over, or had a
financial stake in the Amadea during the relevant time period, i.e., after the
September 2021 MOA.
h. Cvijetic. Millemarin Director and 30(b)(6) witness Cvijetic testified that the
September 2021 MOA was for temporary use, not a sale of the Amadea. See
Millemarin 30(b)(6) Tr. 59:9:11. But he only began serving as director in late 2024,
long after the Amadea had been seized and this litigation had commenced. He
admitted during his deposition that he had no personal knowledge relevant to this
case, acknowledging that what he did know was largely the product reviewing
briefing documents that he received from Claimants’ litigation counsel. See
Millemarin 30(b)(6) Tr. 11:24-14:6; 14:20-15:24; 16:9:18.
III.

Indicia of Ownership after the September 2021 MOA
A.
84.

Title after the September 2021 MOA
Claimants have held legal title to the Amadea at all relevant periods of this

litigation, including after the September 2021 MOA. The Government does not dispute this. See
Hr’g Tr. at 359:5-8 (Government statement that pursuant to the September 2021 MOA, “all right
of ownership, except bare title, passed from Millemain to Errigal upon payment of 22 million
euros”); id. at 360:8 (Government argument that the September 2021 MOA transferred all “right
and responsibilities and ownership” of the Amadea from Millemarin to Errigal “[a]side from bare
title”).

contract, the existence and terms of the contract are questions of fact, but the effect of those terms
on ownership is strictly a question of law if the provisions are unambiguous . . . .”).
39

B.

Possession after the September 2021 MOA
i. Physical Presence on and Usage of the Amadea

85.

There is no dispute that Khudainatov was never physically present on the Amadea

after the September 2021 MOA. See Hr’g Tr. 461:5-9 (Claimants responding “no” to the Court
asking if there was “any evidence that Mr. Khudainatov used the Amadea himself, set foot on it
after the September 2021 MOA”).
86.

There is no dispute that Khudaintov did not personally use the Amadea after the

September 2021 MOA was signed.

Cf. id. at 460:24-25; 461:1-9. (Claimants stating that

Khudainatov did not use the Amadea himself after the September 2021 MOA and instead
“exercised his ownership rights to give other people the permission to use the property”).
87.

The only record evidence regarding use of the Amadea after the September 2021

MOA shows that the Kerimov family were the boat’s sole users. The Court does not detail this
evidence at length, but notes that it is unequivocal. The Kerimov family took three international
trips on the Amadea between September 2021 and February 2022:
a. In September 2021, Captain Read skippered an overnight trip on the Amadea to
Nice, France. Read Tr. 117:2; 119:17. Captain Read testified that, during this
period “some women,” all with the last surname “Kerimov,” were the passengers
on this trip. Id. at 118:21-25; 119:8-11.
b. In October 2021, Captain Read delivered the Amadea to Sicily in anticipation of
“guests coming on and people getting ready to go cruising.” Id. 156:19-24. All of
the record evidence demonstrates that the people to whom Captain Read referred
were members of the Kerimov family. See, e.g., GX-410, GX-410-A, GX-410-B,
GX-410-C.
c. From mid-January to early February 2022, the Kerimov family cruised on board
the Amadea in the Caribbean. All of the evidence in the record—guest lists and
cabin allocations—shows members of the Kerimov family were aboard the Amadea
when it was in St. Kitts and St. Barts. See GX-606; GX-607.
88.

Claimants attempt to explain the Kerimov family’s exclusive use of the Amadea by

characterizing their cruises as charters rather than owners’ voyages. They point to a purported
40

contract between Gulnara Kerimova and either Millemarin or Imperial Yachts—a so-called
“charter agreement”—as proof that Kerimova simply sought to use the Amadea temporarily on a
month-long excursion in the Caribbean in early 2022. See CX-6; GX-216. The Court does not
credit this argument. Claimants proffer a purported contract between Gulnara Kerimova and either
Millemarin or Imperial Yachts. CX-6; see also GX-216.
a. This contract states that Kerimova agreed to pay € 5,000,000 to cruise the Amadea
in the Caribbean in early 2022. But no witness with personal knowledge has
testified about this purported charter agreement. There is no evidence of any such
payment being made.
b. Notably, the Amadea’s captain at the time of the alleged charters, Captain Walsh,
testified that he had no knowledge of any charter agreement with the Kerimov
family, Walsh Tr. 159:25-160:2, which is significant because Imperial Yachts’
standards book states that “[f]or every charter Captain needs to read carefully the
signed Agreement.” GX-600 at 9. 20
c. While there is proof that the Kerimov family cruised the Caribbean as planned,
there is no proof that they paid to charter the Amadea or were otherwise subject
to treatment concomitant with their being charterers rather than owners.
ii. Personal Property Onboard the Amadea
89.

Claimants concede that the Amadea did not contain any Khudainatov family

personal effects—such as family photos or clothing items—at the time it was seized. Hr’g Tr.
372:21-25; 373:1-6.
90.

There is no other evidence that Khudainatov’s personal possessions were on board

the Amadea at the time of seizure. During closing argument, counsel for Claimants pointed to
evidence—such as vendor invoices, see CX-399, 399A, 340, 341—purporting to show that
Khudainatov had “paid for all of the furnishings, etc. that were on board the Amadea, [such as] the

20

Claimants object to this document on hearsay grounds. But the Imperial Yachts Standards Book
was properly authenticated by Captain Walsh. See Walsh Dep. Tr. 160. It is, therefore, admitted
into evidence.
41

furnitures, the drapes, [and] the dishes.” Hr’g Tr. 470:3-10; see also id. at 471:21-24 (Claimants’
argument that “Mr. Khudainatov paid for all the furnishing, the carpet, the drapes, everything that
was being put into the Amadea while it was being built”). But while that evidence may support
the notion that Khudainatov paid for the items aboard the Amadea when it was built and outfitted
in 2015, it does not establish that those items still belonged to Khudanatov after the September
2021 MOA and at the time the Amadea was seized in April 2022. Claimants conceded that if the
September 2021 MOA was in fact a sales agreement, then Khudainatov no longer owned the
furniture, carpet, drapes, and other fixtures aboard the Amadea. See Hr’g Tr. 472:14-20. In other
words, Claimants’ assertion that Khudainatov owned these items at the time of seizure was
premised entirely on their contention that the September 2021 MOA did not effectuate a sale of
the Amadea to Errigal. As explained above, the Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence
that it did; indeed, there can be no genuine dispute of fact on that point.
iii. The Purported “Presence” of Claimants’ Counsel Onboard the Amadea
91.

The parties do not dispute that Claimants hired local counsel to contest the

Amadea’s seizure in Fiji.
a. Claimants submit various documents from Fijian litigation contesting seizure to
support the fact that Khudainatov retained local counsel. See CX-755-58. The
Government objects to the documents as hearsay. Specifically with respect to a
letter from Fijian counsel to the Fijian court contesting seizure, Claimants state they
are not offering that letter for the truth of any statement asserted therein but rather
to demonstrate that Khudainatov has constantly asserted ownership of the Amadea,
including at seizure. The Fiji litigation documents are admitted for the limited
purpose of establishing that Claimants contemporaneously retained local counsel
to contest the Amadea’s seizure; they are nonetheless inadmissible for the truth any
matter asserted therein (i.e., to substantiate Claimants’ assertion that they owned
the Amadea at the time of seizure).
b. Claimants also cite testimony from Parfireva to support the claim that local counsel
was quickly retained and immediately contested seizure. See Hr’g Tr. 495:13-23.
Parfireva’s testimony indicates that, when the Amadea was seized, a search for legal
counsel to assist with the seizure “was conducted on behalf of Eduard
Khudainatov.” Parfireva Tr. 113:1-15.
42

92.

The Court rejects Claimants’ characterization of this evidence as demonstrating that

that, “at the time of seizure, Mr. Khudainatov was effectively on” the Amadea through the presence
of counsel in Fiji who contested the seizure. Id. 497:22-23. During closing argument, Claimants
argued that “Mr. Khudainatov was in possession of the Amadea at the time that it was seized
because he had hired Fijian counsel who was there starting April 12, which is the date the boat
arrived in Fiji.” Id. 497:18-23. Claimants stated that Khudainatov was “physically there by way
of counsel on April 12th when the boat was seized,” id. 498:3-4, and that Fijian counsel was
“onboard” the Amadea when it was seized, id. 498:18. See also id. 492:13-16 (Claimants stating
“Mr. Khudainatov immediately hired counsel who was physically present, if I know, at the time
that it was attempted to be seized by US authorities in Fiji”). The Court rejects these statements
as mischaracterizations of the record: The statements of Claimants’ U.S.-based counsel are not
evidence, and there is no evidence in the record that Claimants’ Fijian counsel was ever aboard the
Amadea, let alone at the time it was seized.
C. Dominion and Control after the September 2021 MOA
i. Changes to the Amadea
93.

After the September 2021 MOA was consummated, plans were made to

substantially renovate the Amadea. Imperial Yachts commissioned Zuretti to make the Amadea
“less rigid, classical and conventional.” GX-408-A. The scope of the project was such that Zuretti
charged €1,000,000 in design fees and estimated that the Amadea would need to be docked for
seven months for work to be completed. GX-420-A. Some of the changes planned to be made to
the Amadea were relatively minor, such as removing decorative fixtures (e.g., drapes and ceiling

43

rosettes) and replacing carpets. GX-426. 21 Other changes were more drastic; the Amadea’s bar
was to be removed, one of its dining rooms was to be turned into a gymnasium, its jacuzzi was to
be removed, and its audio video/information technology system was to be overhauled. GX-427C. 22
94.

The parties’ respective experts disagreed as to whether the changes made to the

Amadea could be made only by an owner (as the Government’s expert Captain Meagher testified),
or could be made by an ultra-high net worth charterer (as Claimants’ expert Captain Hitch
testified). Ultimately, the Court credits the testimony of Captain Meagher in this regard. It does
not credit Captain Hitch’s characterization of these renovations and changes to the Amadea as
“typical,” because it is contradicted by his own testimony acknowledging that, in his decades of
experience he had never seen changes along these lines directing by a charterer of a vessel. See,
e.g., Hitch Tr. 101:21-23 (Hitch answering “no” after being asked “[h]ave you ever had, seen, a
charter guest order a refit that would take seven months”). Ultimately, however, the Court notes
that this finding is immaterial to its decision because, as explained below, all of the evidence of
dominion and control of the Amadea after the September 2021 MOA points away from the
Claimants.
95.

There is no evidence in the record that Claimants directed, approved, or otherwise

were involved in any of the changes made or planned with respect to the Amadea after the
September 2021 MOA. See Hr’g Tr. 463:6-10 (Claimants confirming that Khudainatov was not

21

The Government’s exhibit list indicates a “Potential Objection Pending,” COURT-X-2, but
Claimants do not appear to have lodged any such objection to this exhibit.
22

Claimants object to this document on foundation, authentication, and hearsay grounds. The
Government responds to this objection by noting that the exhibit was testified to by Agent Bergen.
The objection is overruled, as Claimants do not object to the portion of Agent Bergen’s declaration
authenticating CX-427-C.
44

involved in any of the specific changes to the Amadea after the September 2021 MOA). There is
no evidence that Claimants’ input was solicited in the design process for the renovations, that
Claimants met with the designers, or that Claimants had final approval over the planned
renovations.
96.

To the extent there is any evidence in the record indicating at whose direction these

changes were made, all of it indicates that the Amadea was being renovated for the Kerimov
family’s benefit and to the Kerimov family’s specifications. Cf. Claimants’ PFOF ¶ 176
(acknowledging evidence that “[a] few of the changes that were requested by Gulnara [Kerimov],
Firuza [Kerimov], and/or Khalikov were actually implemented before the [Kerimov family’s]
January/February 2022 Caribbean charter”).
D. Financial Interest in the Amadea after the September 2021 MOA
i. Responsibility for the Amadea’s Costs
97.

Under the terms of the September 2021 MOA, Claimants were immediately no

longer responsible for the Amadea’s running costs upon entry into the agreement—even before
receiving the final payment pursuant to the agreement. See GX-212 (“All running costs for the
vessel including berthing fees and crew’s wages shall be for the Buyer’s account until Completion
of the Sale.”).
98.

There is no dispute that Claimants did not actually bear any of the Amadea’s costs

after the September 2021 MOA. See Hr’g Tr. 491:22-25; 492:1-16 (Claimants responding “no” to
the Court asking if Claimants bore any of the Amadea’s costs after the September 2021 MOA).
There is no evidence indicating that Claimants actually paid for any of the Amadea’s running costs
after that date. See Millemarin 30(b)(6) Deposition Tr. 86:1-3 (Claimants’ 30(b)(6) witness stating

45

he was “not sure” and did not know in response to being asked if “Millemarin ever pa[id] any
expense related to the Amadea”).
99.

During closing argument, Claimants’ counsel conceded that Errigal bore all of the

Amadea’s financial costs between the September 2021 MOA and seizure in April 2022, “aside
from the insurance coverage.” Hr’g Tr. 494:2-7. But those insurance costs were paid before the
September 2021 MOA.

Claimants offer a “Confirmation of Coverage” as evidence that

Millemarin paid for the insurance policy that indemnified the Amadea at the time of its seizure.
See CX402-A. The document shows that Millemarin is listed as the owner of the Amadea on a
policy in effect between August 16, 2021, and August 15, 2022. Id. The document is dated before
the September 2021 MOA was signed, and Claimants offer no evidence that they made any
insurance payments after the September 2021 MOA was consummated.
100.

Claimants also point to a purported 2022 Management Agreement between

Millemarin and Imperial Yachts as evidence that Millemarin continued to have financial
obligations with respect to the Amadea. See CX-482. As noted above, the Court does not consider
the agreement because it was not signed until after the Amadea was seized. But even if the Court
did consider it, the Court would afford it no weight. The terms of the supposed management
agreement—which purport to place financial obligations on Millemarin for the costs of managing
the Amadea as of August 21, 2021—are contradicted by the September 2021 MOA, which
transferred all financial obligations associated with the Amadea from Millemarin to Errigal. And
there is no evidence in the record that any payments were made in connection with the purported
management agreement.

46

ii. Financial Benefit from the Amadea after the September 2021 MOA
101.

Claimants did not receive any continuing financial benefits from the Amadea after

the September 2021 MOA. After receiving €225 million for the Amadea pursuant to the September
2021 MOA, there is no evidence Claimants received any additional funds or proceeds related to
the vessel, such as profits derived from the purported charters of the vessel.
102.

Claimants offer a document purporting to show that Gulnara Kerimova attempted

to make a payment to Imperial Yachts, ostensibly as payment for a charter of the Amadea. See
CX-54 (Russian version); CX-55 (English version).

Even assuming these documents are

admissible, 23 Claimants acknowledge that this payment was not ultimately made. See Hr’g Tr.
482:10-14 (Claimants acknowledging that the bank refused to “conduct the transaction [due to]
compliance issues”). Moreover, even if any such payment were made, Claimants have not
submitted any evidence establishing that Claimants would have received the proceeds.
103.

Claimants also submit various documents such as balance sheets from the

Khudainatov family office purporting to demonstrate Khudainatov’s continued financial interest
in the Amadea after the September 2021 MOA. The Government objects to those documents as
untimely produced and the Court sustains those objections.
a. Claimants’ balance sheets purport to show that they considered the Amadea a
financial liability for Millemarin even after the September 2021 MOA was
consummated. See CX-674 through CX-677. These documents were produced
after discovery closed. The Government moved in limine to exclude these and other
similar documents as untimely produced. See ECF No. 445.
b. Claimants state that they were unable to produce these documents because
Millemarin’s former director, Olga Kroon, held exclusive possession of the
documents and refused to provide them to Millemarin’s new director. See
Claimants’ Jan. 31, 2024 Letter, ECF No. 447. Claimants’ explanation for why
23

The Government objects to these documents based on foundation, authenticity, and relevance.
See COURT-X-1. As explained here, the Court finds that these documents are irrelevant but
assumes for purposes of this Opinion that they are admissible.
47

Millemarin’s balance sheets were untimely produced does not bear scrutiny. 24 The
Government’s motion in limine is granted; accordingly, the balance sheets and other
documents subject to the Government’s motion (i.e., CX-674 through CX-677, and
CX-716), are excluded. 25

24

Claimants state that Millemarin’s former director, Olga Kroon, had “exclusive possession” of
the documents and that “she was unwilling to voluntarily cooperate with counsel’s request for the
disclosure of documents on the basis of a concern that doing so could violate E.U. sanctions law—
specifically because Mr. Khudainatov had been sanctioned by the European Union.” Claimants’
Jan. 31, 2025 Letter at 1-2, ECF No. 447. Claimants state that Ms. Kroon, as a Swiss citizen, was
“unable to take any action to benefit Khudainatov,” which they say includes the turning over of
documents. Id. at 2. But sanctions were imposed against Khudainatov in June 2022, Hr’g Tr.
354:7-9, and Kroon continued to serve as Millemarin’s director for more than two more years,
until October 2024; she only resigned after Millemarin’s 30(b)(6) deposition was noticed.
Moreover, one of the documents on which Claimants seek to rely was prepared by Kroon for
Millemarin in April 2024, two years after the EU sanctions were imposed, see id. at 507:16-22.
Claimants offer no plausible explanation why, after EU sanctions were imposed on Khudainatov,
Kroon would continue to serve as Millemarin’s sole director and to prepare documents on its
behalf, but would not turn those documents over to Khudainatov or Millemarin itself. At closing
argument, Claimants’ counsel averred that, after EU sanctions were imposed against Khudainatov,
Kroon “would engage in the b[are] minimum obligations that she would have to do as Millemarin
during that time, but did not want to act on behalf of Mr. Khudainatov who was sanctioned by
getting voluntarily involved in this litigation.” Id. at 511:1-5. But counsel did not cite anything in
the record to support the assertion that Kroon was willing to do some tasks but not others for
Millemarin; counsel’s assertion in this regard is not itself evidence. Finally, the Court notes that
various other documents proffered as exhibits by Claimants include documents signed and
submitted by Kroon in April 2022, before the imposition of EU sanctions on Khudainatov. See
CX-755-58 (documents from Fijian litigation in April 2022). But Claimants do not explain why,
if the balance sheets were in her possession and in fact support Khudainatov’s claim of ownership
of the Amadea, Kroon did not offer these documents at that time.
25

Beyond the issue of late disclosure of the documents in question, the Government also seeks to
exclude these documents on another basis, arguing that they are not admissible as business records
under FRE 803(6) and 902(11)-12. See Gov’t Mot. in Lim., ECF No. 445. Claimants purport to
authenticate these documents as business records with certifications—untimely produced less than
one week before the evidentiary hearing was held—that list virtually every document produced by
Claimants in this litigation by Bates number, then purports to authenticate all of them in a
conclusory manner. See id. (referencing purported certifications offered as CX-769, CX-770, and
CX-771). Even leaving aside that the purported certifications were untimely disclosed, see FRE
902(11)-(12), the certifications do not lay a proper foundation for bulk admission of these
documents as business records. There is no adequate explanation, for example, on a category-bycategory basis, of “how the record[s] came into existence in the course of a regularly conducted
activity of the entity.” In re Lyman Good Dietary Supplements Litig., No. 17 Civ. 8047, 2020 WL
3414927, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2020) (citing FRE 803(6)). Accordingly, for these reasons as
well, the Court grants ECF No. 445 and excludes the documents subject to it.
48

c. Even if the Court were to consider these balance sheets, they do not constitute
evidence that Claimants actually retained a financial stake in the Amadea. Even
crediting them, they are purely internal documents; they do not constitute evidence
of any kind of enforceable legal liability in connection with the Amadea.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. Legal Standards
A.
1.

Overview
There are two separate questions as to the applicable legal standards here.

a. The first question concerns the factors that are relevant to the standing inquiry in a
civil forfeiture case.
(i).

The Court agrees with Claimants that, in at least most cases, a claimant need
not demonstrate ultimate beneficial ownership of the res to establish standing,
but rather only an interest in it. Standing is a threshold inquiry distinct from
the merits. See United States v. $557557557,933.89, More or Less, in U.S.
Funds, 287 F.3d 66, 78 (2d Cir. 2002) (“$557,933.89, More or Less”) (“[T]to
establish standing the claimant need not prove the full merits of [his]
underlying claim.”) (cleaned up).

(ii).

In an ordinary case, an interest that can establish standing may include “actual
possession, dominion, control, title, or [a] financial stake.” United States v.
Contents of Acct. Nos. 208-06070 & 208-06068-1-2 (“Contents of Accts.”),
847 F. Supp. 329, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (citing, inter alia, Mercado v. U.S.
Customs Serv., 873 F.2d 641, 644 (2d Cir. 1989)).

(iii).

Where, however, the government makes a prima facie showing that a claimant
is merely a straw owner of the res (i.e., one who “hold[s] title to it for
somebody else,” United States v. Cambio Exacto, S.A., 166 F.3d 522, 527 (2d
Cir. 1999)), title alone is not enough to establish standing. Instead, a claimant
must establish it possesses some of the other indicia of ownership (e.g.,
possession, dominion/control, or a financial stake). As explained infra, this
is essentially the same standard that Claimants urge the Court to adopt,
although Claimants deny that the Government has made a prima facie
showing of straw ownership.

b. The second question is the evidentiary standard: whether a motion to strike a claim
considered at an evidentiary hearing under Supplemental Rule G(8) should be
resolved on a summary judgment standard—such that the motion can be defeated
upon a showing that there is a genuine dispute of material fact—or in a fact-finding
posture—in which a court may weigh evidence, make credibility determinations,
and ultimately resolve factual disputes based on a preponderance of the evidence.
49

(i).

There is no directly controlling authority from the Second Circuit on this
question. But the Court ultimately concludes, based on guidance from the
Circuit and district court decisions within it, that when considering a motion
to strike at an evidentiary hearing under Supplemental Rule G, a court may
engage in fact-finding and resolve factual disputes based on a preponderance
of the evidence standard.

(ii).

As explained below, however, the Court concludes that resolution of this
question is ultimately immaterial to the Court’s decision in this particular
case, because on the record before the Court, the undisputed material facts
alone compel the conclusion that Claimants lack standing. That is, even
without engaging in any weighing of the evidence properly in record, and
considering only the material facts that are not genuinely disputed, the Court
concludes that Claimants lack standing.

B.

Standing
i.

2.

Standing to Contest Forfeiture

The Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture

Actions were promulgated in 1966. Supplemental Rule G, which addresses forfeiture actions in
rem, was added in 2006 “to bring together the central procedures that govern civil forfeiture
actions.” Advisory Committee Notes to Supplemental Rule G. Supplemental Rule G(5) provides
that any “person who asserts an interest” in the res that is the subject of a forfeiture action may
“contest the forfeiture by filing a claim in the court where the action is pending.” Supp. R.
G(5)(a)(i).
3.

“Standing is a prerequisite to challenging the forfeiture.” United States v. Vazquez-

Alvarez, 760 F.3d 193, 197 (2d Cir. 2014). “Without standing, [a claimant] is simply a stranger to
the litigation.” Id. at 198. “[I]f the claimant lacks standing, the court lacks jurisdiction to consider
his challenge of the forfeiture.” United States v. One 1982 Porsche 928, Three-Door, License Plate
1986/NJ Temp./534807 (“One 1982 Porsche”), 732 F. Supp. 447, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).

50

4.

As the Second Circuit has explained, Supplemental Rule G provides that a claimant

contesting forfeiture must establish “claim standing.” United States v. Technodyne LLC, 753 F.3d
368, 379-80 (2d Cir. 2014) (“The Advisory Committee Note accompanying that Rule indicates
that ‘standing’ in this context refers to ‘claim standing.’”) (citing Supplemental Rule G(8)(c)
Advisory Committee Note). “While the meaning of ‘claim standing’ is somewhat obscure on its
face, it appears that the drafters intended to denote a claimant’s “standing to contest forfeiture.”
Id. at 380 (citing Supplemental Rule G(8)(a) Advisory Committee Note). “In general, ‘[i]n order
to contest a governmental forfeiture action, claimants must have both standing under the statute or
statutes governing their claims and standing under Article III of the Constitution as required for
any action brought in federal court.’” Id. (quoting Cambio Exacto, 166 F.3d at 526). 26
5.

Constitutional or Article III standing exists only where a litigant has “suffered an

injury in fact” that is “fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action” and “likely . . . [to be]
redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)
(internal quotation marks omitted). The “ultimate focus” of the Article III standing question is
“injury to the party seeking standing.” Cambio Exacto, 166 F.3d at 527. “To demonstrate standing
under Article III, therefore, a litigant must allege a ‘distinct and palpable injury to himself,’ that is
the direct result of the ‘putatively illegal conduct of the adverse party,’ and ‘likely to be redressed
by the requested relief.’” Id. (internal citations omitted).

26

In the context of forfeiture actions, statutory standing (as distinct from Article III standing)
concerns compliance with the procedural requirements for asserting a claim on the res. See
Technodyne LLC, 753 F.3d at 380 (“Litigants have statutory standing to oppose forfeiture in a civil
in rem proceeding commenced by the government if they ‘claim[] an interest in the seized
property[,] . . . asserting [that] interest in the property in the manner set forth in the Supplemental
Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims.’”) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(4)(A)).
51

6.

To establish Article III standing in a forfeiture action—i.e., that forfeiture will cause

the claimant a distinct palpable injury—the claimant “must demonstrate a possessory or ownership
interest in the [res], which may be proven by actual possession, dominion, control, title, or financial
stake.” Contents of Accts., 847 F. Supp. at 333 (citing, inter alia, Mercado, 873 F.2d at 644).
Claimants adopted this position during closing argument, initially describing the relevant inquiry
as involving “five” factors but, after failing to articulate a difference between “dominion” and
“control,” ultimately conceding that four factors were relevant to standing: possession, dominion
and control, title, and a financial stake. See Hr’g Tr. 379:1-23, 380:2-16. Based on case law in the
Second Circuit, the Court agrees that, generally speaking, the four factors of (1) actual possession,
(2) dominion and control, (3) title, and (4) a financial stake are relevant to a claimant’s standing in
a forfeiture action. See Contents of Accts., 847 F. Supp. at 333; One 1982 Porsche, 732 F. Supp.
at 451.
7.

A claimant must “establish standing by a preponderance of the evidence.” Vazquez-

Alvarez, 760 F.3d at 197 (citing Supplemental Rule G(8)(c)(ii)(B)). See also United States v. Four
Hundred Seventeen Thousand, One Hundred Forty-Three Dollars & Forty-Eight Cents
($417,143.48), No. 13 Civ. 5567, 2015 WL 5178121, at *5 (“The claimant bears the burden of
establishing standing by a preponderance of the evidence.”), aff’d 682 F. App’x 17 (2d Cir. 2017).
“The burden of proof in making a demonstration of standing rests with the claimants.” United
States v. All Right, Title & Int. in Prop., Appurtenances, & Improvements Known as 479 Tamarind
Drive, Hallendale, Fla., No. 98 Civ. 2279, 2011 WL 1045095, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2011)
(citing Mercado, 873 F.2d at 644). Claimants agreed at closing argument that they bear the burden
of establishing standing by a preponderance of the evidence. See Hr’g Tr. 373:14-16.

52

8.

The Second Circuit, however, has repeatedly made clear that “[t]he function of

standing in a forfeiture action is therefore truly threshold only,” and that “to establish standing ‘the
claimant need not prove the full merits of [his] underlying claim.’” $557,933.89, More or Less,
287 F.3d at 78-79 (quoting Torres v. $36,256.80 U.S. Currency, 25 F.3d 1154, 1158 (2d Cir. 1994));
cf. Cambio Exacto, 166 F.3d at 528 (stating that, in assessing standing, a court “need not decide
the extent to which [claimants] ‘own’ the [res]”).
ii.
9.

Standing and Straw Ownership

The Second Circuit has held that those who are mere “‘straw’ owners”—for

example, those “who do indeed ‘own’ the property, but hold title to it for somebody else”—lack
standing. Cambio Exacto, 166 F.3d at 527. “Such owners do not themselves suffer an injury when
the property is taken.” Id. See also United States v. $829,422.42, 561 F. App’x 100, 100 (2d Cir.
2014) (“In order to have standing to challenge the forfeiture of property, one must be more than a
mere ‘straw owner.’”).
10.

Because assertions of straw ownership go to a claimant’s standing—which is a

“threshold” rather than a “merits” issue, see $557,933.89, More or Less, 287 F.3d at 78—courts
may consider assertions of straw ownership on a motion to strike a claim. Accordingly, the Second
Circuit has affirmed a government’s motion for summary judgment for lack of standing where the
claimant has bare legal title to a property but is merely a straw owner. See United States v. Premises
& Real Prop. with Bldgs., Appurtenance & Improvements at 500 Delaware St., Tonawanda, N.Y.,
113 F.3d 310, 312 (2d Cir. 1997) (“500 Delaware St.”) (“It is abundantly clear that the district
court did not err in holding that the father was a mere straw owner and lacked standing to assert a
claim as innocent owner.”).

53

11.

Courts must be mindful of the possibility of straw ownership because, as the Circuit

has recognized, there is a “substantial danger of false claims in forfeiture proceedings.” Mercado,
873 F.2d at 646. “Bare legal title can be insufficient to demonstrate standing in a civil forfeiture
action, because appearances may be manipulated and deceptive and it may be an attempt to
disguise interests in property by not placing title in their own names.” United States v. Any And
All Funds on Deposit in Acct. No. 12671905, Held in the Name of Landlocked Shipping Co. at
Wells Fargo Brokerage Servs., LLC, & All Int. & Other Proceeds Traceable Thereto, No. 9 Civ.
3481, 2010 WL 3185688, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2010) (cleaned up).
12.

The Government can show that a claimant is a straw owner with evidence that,

despite holding legal title to the res, the claimant lacks other indicia of ownership—such as actual
possession, dominion and control, or a financial stake (such as responsibility for mortgage,
property tax, insurance payments, and utility bills). See 500 Delaware St., 113 F.3d at 312 (noting
that, while the claimant held title, a party other than the claimant “continued in possession and
management of the property. He received all rental payments and was responsible for leasing when
vacancies occurred. He made mortgage, property tax, and insurance payments, paid utility bills,
and maintained the property and made repairs”). See also In re 650 Fifth Ave. & Related Props.,
830 F.3d 66, 92 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding that individuals were not bona fide owners given the “lack
of evidence that [they] ever exercised any control over [the corporation], participated in any of its
decisions, or received any income therefrom”). 27

27

The Court does not mean to suggest that the definition of a straw owner is limited to a holder
of bare title who lack other indicia of ownership. For example, the Second Circuit has stated that
one who has only physical possession of the res but lacks the other indicia of ownership may
also be a straw owner who lacks standing to contest forfeiture. See Mercado, 873 F.2d at 645
(explaining that mere “possession, as in the instant case, is not enough. There must be some
indication that the claimant is in fact a possessor, not a simple, perhaps unknowing custodian.”).
54

13.

Thus, “[w]hile ownership may be proven by actual possession, dominion, control,

title and financial stake,” in some circumstances “‘[t]he possession of bare legal title to the res
may be insufficient,’ absent other evidence of control or dominion over the property.” One 1982
Porsche 928, 732 F. Supp. at 451 (quoting United States v. One 1945 Douglas, (Appeal 1), 604
F.2d 27, 28-29 (8th Cir. 1979);); United States v. One 1945 Douglas, (Appeal 2), 647 F.2d 864,
866 (8th Cir. 1981)). “A search for standing in civil forfeiture cases looks beyond the formal title
to determine whether the record owner is the ‘real’ owner or merely a ‘strawman’ set up either to
conceal illegal dealings or to avoid forfeiture.” Id.; see also United States v. One Red 2003
Hummer H2 VIN: 5GRGN23U93H118675, 234 F. Supp. 3d 415, 419 (W.D.N.Y. 2017) (“One Red
2003 Hummer H2”) (“[T]he possession of bare legal title to the res may be insufficient [to establish
standing], absent other evidence of control or dominion over the property”) (quotation marks
omitted). “There must be some indicia of reliability or substance to claims of ownership in order
to reduce the likelihood of a false or frivolous claim.” $829,422.42, 561 Fed. App’x at 100 (2d
Cir. 2014).
14.

“[N]umerous cases hold that once the government makes a prima facie showing

that a third-party claimant is a ‘straw,’ the claimant must present evidence of dominion and control
or other indicia of true ownership.” United States v. Ida, 14 F. Supp. 2d 454, 459-60 (S.D.N.Y.
1998) (quotation marks omitted). The government’s showing of straw ownership may be defeated
with evidence that the claimant has an actual interest in the res—such as evidence that the claimant
used the property, paid the costs associated with it, allowed others to use it only with her
permission, and mingled other possessions with it. See, e.g., One Red 2003 Hummer H2, 234 F.
Supp. 3d at 419 (cited in Claimants’ Amended Proposed Conclusions of Law (“Claimants’ PCOL”)
¶ 44, ECF No. 455-1) (finding claimant was not a mere straw owner and had standing where

55

discovery showed “he purchased the Vehicle; he held title to the Vehicle; he insured the Vehicle;
he maintained the Vehicle; he held the keys to the Vehicle; he drove the Vehicle 75% of the time;
he allowed others to drive the Vehicle only with his permission; and his possessions were recovered
from the Vehicle”).
15.

At closing argument, Claimants urged the Court to adopt the same sort of burden-

shifting framework, where, upon a prima facie showing of straw ownership, a claimant bears the
burden of establishing other indicia of ownership by a preponderance of the evidence. See Hr’g
Tr. 434:12-17 (“[O]nce the government makes a prima facie showing that a third-party claimant is
a straw, the claimant must present evidence of dominion and control or other indicia of true
ownership. So that's the legal support in why I was suggesting that there's a shifting of burden that
happens.”).
C.
16.

Procedure on a Motion to Strike Under Supplemental Rule G(8)
Supplemental Rule G(8) governs motions in forfeiture cases, and Rule G(8)(c)

addresses motions to strike a claim or answer. It provides that “the government may . . . move to
strike [a] claim on the ground that the ‘claimant lacks standing.’” Vazquez-Alvarez, 760 F.3d at
197 (quoting Supplemental Rule G(8)(c)(i)(B)).
17.

Rule G(8)(c)(ii)(B) states that such a motion “may be presented as a motion for

judgment on the pleadings or as a motion to determine after a hearing or by summary judgment
whether the claimant can carry the burden of establishing standing by a preponderance of the
evidence.” See also Vazquez-Alvarez, 760 F.3d at 197 (upon a motion to strike, “[t]he claimant
must then establish standing by a preponderance of the evidence”) (citing Supplemental Rule
G(8)(c)(ii)(B)); Four Hundred Seventeen Thousand, One Hundred Forty-Three Dollars & FortyEight Cents ($417,143.48), 2015 WL 5178121, at *5 (same).

56

18.

Rule G(8)(c) plainly states that a motion to strike a claim can be presented and

adjudicated in one of three procedures: “on the pleadings,” “by summary judgment,” or “after a
hearing.” The 2006 Advisory Committee Notes to Supplemental Rule G(8) explain as follows:
Paragraph (c)(ii) further identifies three procedures for addressing claim standing. If a
claim fails on its face to show facts that support claim standing, the claim can be dismissed
by judgment on the pleadings. If the claim shows facts that would support claim standing,
those facts can be tested by a motion for summary judgment. If material facts are
disputed, precluding a grant of summary judgment, the court may hold an
evidentiary hearing. The evidentiary hearing is held by the court without a jury. The
claimant has the burden to establish claim standing at a hearing; procedure on a
government summary judgment motion reflects this allocation of the burden.
Advisory Committee Notes to Supplemental Rule G(8)(c)(ii) (emphasis added).
19.

The Second Circuit has not expressly articulated what evidentiary standard is

appropriate on motion to strike considered via an evidentiary hearing under Supplemental Rule
G(8). But as the Advisory Committee Notes explain, a court “may hold an evidentiary hearing”
“[i]f material facts are disputed, precluding a grant of summary judgment.” Advisory Committee
Notes to Supplemental Rule G(8)(c)(ii). This suggests that, where there is a dispute of material
fact that renders summary judgment inappropriate, the purpose of an evidentiary hearing is to
resolve those disputes via fact-finding “by the court without a jury.” Id. Indeed, if fact-finding
were not appropriate at an evidentiary hearing under Rule G(8), it would make little sense to
specify that a jury—which typically serves as fact-finder—is unnecessary in this context. In
making fact-finding determinations, the Court applies a preponderance of the evidence standard.
Cf. Vazquez-Alvarez, 760 F.3d at 197 (citing Supplemental Rule G(8)(c)(ii)(B)) (stating that
claimant must “establish standing by a preponderance of the evidence”).
20.

Claimants argue that “[w]here the Court conducts an evidentiary hearing on the

government’s motion to strike a claim for lack of standing, the government’s motion is still
ultimately analyzed under the summary judgment standard.” Claimants’ PCOL¶ 21. To the extent
57

Claimants argue that, when the government requests an evidentiary hearing, a motion to strike
must be adjudicated under the Rule 56 summary judgment standard—that is, a standard where the
government must “show[] that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law” to prevail—the Court rejects that argument for several
reasons.
a. First, Claimants’ argument is contrary to Supplemental Rule G(8). As noted, the Rule
provides for three alternative procedures for a motion to strike: on the pleadings, via
summary judgment, or via an evidentiary hearing “[i]f material facts are disputed,
precluding a grant of summary judgment.” Advisory Committee Notes to
Supplemental Rule G(8)(c)(ii) (emphasis added). If a court has already determined that
summary judgment is inappropriate because material facts are genuinely disputed,
holding an evidentiary hearing applying the same “genuine dispute of material fact
standard” would serve no purpose. It is axiomatic that “[s]ummary judgment should
be denied if . . . a rational factfinder could resolve all material factual issues in favor of
[the non-moving] party.” Soto v. Gaudett, 862 F.3d 148, 157 (2d Cir. 2017). Claimants’
position appears to be that, to defeat a motion to strike, they need only submit some
evidence such that “there are sufficient facts that [they] could put before a jury
[whereby] a jury could find in [their] favor.” Hr’g Tr. 378:20-22. But that would render
an evidentiary hearing under Supplemental Rule G(8) merely duplicative of summary
judgment practice.
b. Second, at closing argument, Claimants acknowledged that their burden at the
evidentiary hearing is to establish standing by a preponderance of the evidence. See
Hr’g Tr. 389:13-14 (“We have the burden to prove our ownership – facially colorable
interest by a preponderance of evidence.”). Cf. Vazquez-Alvarez, 760 F.3d at 197 (“The
claimant must . . . establish standing by a preponderance of the evidence.”) (citing
Supplemental Rule G(8)(c)(ii)(B)). The notion that showing a mere genuine dispute of
material fact is sufficient to defeat the Government’s motion is inconsistent with that
concession.
21.

The cases cited by Claimants are of limited value in answering this question. The

Second Circuit cases cited by Claimants predate the adoption of Supplemental Rule G in 2006 and
do not purport to set forth the standard for establishing standing at an evidentiary hearing under
the Rule. Moreover, the cited cases arose in different procedural postures, and the quotes
Claimants cite from them do not purport to describe the appropriate standards for an evidentiary
hearing.
58

a. For example, in Torres (cited at Claimants’ PCOL ¶ 30), the Second Circuit stated, “[a]t
this preliminary juncture . . . the claimant need not prove the full merits of her
underlying claim. All that needs to be shown is a ‘facially colorable interest in the
proceedings sufficient to satisfy the case-or-controversy requirement and prudential
considerations defining and limiting the role of the court.” 25 F.3d at 1158. Torres,
however, was decided in 1994—twelve years before the adoption of Supplemental Rule
G—and involved a motion for summary judgment. See id. at 1155. In accordance with
the summary judgment standard, the Court reversed the district court’s grant of
summary judgment because the claimant had “submit[ted] documentary evidence” that
“raised a triable issue of fact whether under New York law, she is the beneficial owner
of a constructive trust” holding the disputed res. Id. at 1157. Torres did not purport to
state the standard for assessing standing at an evidentiary hearing held by a court
because genuine disputes of material fact precluded summary judgment.
b. Claimants quote Cambio Exacto, 166 F.3d at 527, for the proposition that all that is
needed for standing is “[a]n allegation of ownership and some evidence of ownership.”
Claimants’ PFOF ¶ 5. But Cambio Exacto was decided on summary judgment, and in
accordance with that standard held that “summary judgment was improper” because
the claimants submitted evidence that they “had a financial stake in the [forfeited]
funds.” Cambio Exacto, 166 F.3d at 528. The case does not purport to state the
standard at an evidentiary hearing under Supplemental Rule G(8), which is
unsurprising given that it was decided in 1999.
c. $557,933.89, More or Less, 287 F.3d at 78 (quoting Torres, 25 F.3d at 1158) (cited at
Claimants’ PFOF ¶ 5), was decided in 2002 and also predates the adoption of
Supplemental Rule G. It too was decided in a different procedural posture which
involved a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Second Circuit confronted the
government’s argument—raised for the first time during oral argument on appeal—
that, because a jury found that the claimant was not the “innocent owner” of the res in
question, the claimant lacked standing altogether to contest the forfeiture. See id. at
77. But as the Circuit noted, “in this case the district court [had already] held that
Article III standing was satisfied by the mere fact that ‘Mercado had custody of the
money orders at the time of their seizure.’” Id. at 79 n.10 (quoting United States v.
$557,933.89, More or Less in U.S. Funds, No. 95-CV-3978, 1998 WL 817651, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1998)). 28 The district court made that determination in the context
of the government’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (i.e., not on the basis of any
28

Notably, the Circuit observed that “the district court's holding on this point is questionable.” 287
F.3d at 79 n.10. But the Circuit ultimately held that the government’s request to revisit that
determination “post-verdict, based either on the evidence presented at trial or on the facts found
by the jury,” “would result in unnecessary and unproductive tail-chasing.” Id. at 78. As the Circuit
explained, “the determination of a claimant's standing [i]s the threshold question” that, in turn
determines “whether the claimant may properly invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts to
determine the merits of the underlying dispute, and it therefore logically precedes, not follows,
that determination. Consequently, to establish standing the claimant need not prove the full merits
of [his] underlying claim.” Id.
59

evidentiary submissions), see 1998 WL 817651, at *2. In holding that the claimant had
adequately demonstrated standing for purposes of surviving a motion for judgment on
the pleadings, $557,933.89, More or Less says nothing about what would be necessary
for a claimant to carry its burden of establishing standing at an evidentiary hearing.
d. The out-of-Circuit cases cited by Claimants, see Claimants’ PCOL ¶¶ 22-23, are not
binding on this Court and are similarly inapposite. 29
22.

Finally, to the extent that Claimants argue that a jury must decide the issues raised

on the Government’s motion to strike, see Claimants’ PCOL ¶ 27, that contention is belied by the
Advisory Committee Notes, which plainly state that in this context “[t]he evidentiary hearing is

29

For example, Claimants cite the First Circuit’s decision in United States v. $ 8,440,190.00 in
U.S. Currency, 719 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2013) for the proposition that, even “[w]here the Court
conducts an evidentiary hearing on the government’s motion to strike a claim for lack of standing,
the government’s motion is still ultimately analyzed under the summary judgment standard.”
Claimants’ PCOL ¶¶ 21-22. But, contrary to Claimants’ suggestions, that case did not involve an
actual evidentiary hearing. In that case, the government styled its motion to strike as a summary
judgment motion, and the district court subsequently decided to hold an evidentiary hearing—but
the First Circuit noted that, while the district court’s proceeding was originally “billed as an
evidentiary hearing, neither side ended up offering factual evidence or testimony.” $8,440,190.00
in U.S. Currency, 719 F.3d at 54. In reversing, the First Circuit noted that, “[w]hile the district
court called the parties in for an evidentiary hearing, no evidence was in fact taken at the hearing.”
Id. at 60. Given the absence of any actual evidence received at the hearing, the Circuit treated the
government’s motion to strike as the government originally styled it—i.e., as a motion for
summary judgment. See id. The case does not appear to stand for the broad proposition that, when
a court conducts a hearing under Supplemental Rule G(8) at which it actually receives evidence,
it must apply a summary judgment standard.
The Eighth Circuit’s decision in United States v. One Lincoln Navigator 1998, 328 F.3d
1011 (8th Cir. 2003), which was decided before the 2006 adoption of Supplemental Rule G, is
similarly inapposite. There, the district court held an evidentiary hearing on the claimants’ petition
for immediate release of the subject property on grounds of substantial hardship under 18 U.S.C.
§ 983(f)(1) & (3), and it subsequently denied the hardship petition based on adverse credibility
rulings against the claimants. See id. at 1012. The government then moved for summary judgment,
which the district court granted based in part on its prior adverse credibility determinations at the
hardship hearing. See id. The Eighth Circuit held that decision was erroneous because there was
no dispute that the one of the claimants had a financial interest in the res and the other held title to
it, the latter of which “establishes a prima facie case of ownership [in Arkansas]” under state law.
Id. at 1013. The Eighth Circuit held that “[i]n these circumstances,” the claimants had satisfied
the requirements of Article III standing, and that the credibility issues on which the district had
ruled went to the merits of the case. See id.
60

held by the court without a jury.” Advisory Committee Notes to Supplemental Rule G(8)(c)(ii)
(emphasis added). 30
D.

The Requisite Showing to Establish Standing at an Evidentiary Hearing
23.

As noted, there is no binding authority from the Second Circuit as to precisely what

a claimant must show to establish standing at an evidentiary hearing on a motion to strike under
Supplemental Rule G.
24.

In the absence of direct binding authority as to the requisite showing for

establishing standing at an evidentiary hearing on a motion to strike, the Court returns to the
following basic principles:
•

A claimant must have standing to contest forfeiture, see Vazquez-Alvarez, 760 F.3d
at 197;

•

“The function of standing in a forfeiture action is . . . truly threshold only . . .”
$557,933.89 More or Less, 287 F.3d at 78. Thus, to establish standing, a claimant
“need not prove the full merits of [his] underlying claim.’” Id. (quoting Torres, 25
F.3d at 1158);

•

Standing requires only that a claimant have an interest in the res, such that they
would suffer a “distinct and palpable injury” from forfeiture, Cambio Exacto, 166
F.3d at 527;

•

A court may grant a motion to strike where the claimant is a straw owner—for
example, where the claimant has bare legal title to the res, but lacks the other
hallmarks of ownership such as possession, dominion, control, or a financial stake,
because “[s]uch owners do not themselves suffer an injury when the property is
taken,” id.; see also 500 Delaware St., 113 F.3d at 312;

•

In adjudicating the motion, “[i]f material facts are disputed, precluding a grant of
summary judgment, the court may hold an evidentiary hearing” to resolve such
factual disputes, Advisory Committee Notes to Supplemental Rule G(8)(c)(ii); and

30

The Government also argues that this case sounds in admiralty and is triable to the Court on the
merits and cites this as another reason why any concerns about taking standing issues away from
a jury are misplaced. Claimants dispute this. The Court does not resolve this question; it is
unnecessary to its resolution of the motion.
61

•

25.

On a motion to strike, a claimant “must . . . establish standing by a preponderance
of the evidence,” Vazquez-Alvarez, 760 F.3d at 197 (citing Supplemental Rule
G(8)(c)(ii)(B));
The Court harmonizes these principles as follows: generally speaking, on a motion

to strike based on a lack of standing, a claimant need not establish ultimate beneficial ownership,
as such a requirement would inappropriately merge the “threshold” question of standing and the
ultimate merits determination. See $557,933.89, More or Less, 287 F.3d at 78. In an ordinary
case, to establish standing, a claimant need only show some indicia of ownership such “actual
possession, dominion, control, title, or [a] financial stake.” Contents of Accts., 847 F. Supp. at 333;
One 1982 Porsche 928, 732 F. Supp. at 451.
26.

Where the government makes a prima facie showing of straw ownership, however,

the claimant must establish an interest in the property that goes beyond mere title—such as
possession, dominion and control, or a financial stake. See 500 Delaware St., 113 F.3d at 312; Ida,
14 F. Supp. 2d at 459-60; One 1982 Porsche 928, 732 F. Supp. at 451. This requirement
appropriately balances the Circuit’s twin guidance that a straw owner lacks standing, but that a
claimant need not prove ultimate beneficial ownership to satisfy the merely threshold standing
inquiry.
27.

Where disputed factual issues preclude a grant of summary judgment, the motion

may be considered in the context of an evidentiary hearing, at which the court may resolve such
factual disputes. See Advisory Committee Notes to Supplemental Rule G(8)(c)(ii).
28.

In so holding above, the Court does not attempt to set forth precisely what showing

would be necessary to establish standing at an evidentiary hearing in every case. But in this
context—i.e., where the government makes a prima facie showing of straw ownership—a claimant
has the burden of establishing an interest in the property beyond mere title—such as possession,

62

dominion and control, or a financial interest—by a preponderance of the evidence. See VazquezAlvarez, 760 F.3d at 197.
29.

While the Court’s reasoning differs from that of Claimants, its conclusion as to the

requisite showing for standing at this stage of the proceedings in this particular case is ultimately
not meaningfully different from the standard that Claimants proposed. At closing argument,
Claimants argued that, to establish standing, a claimant must show, by a preponderance of the
evidence, at least one or more indicia of ownership: possession, dominion/control, title, and
financial stake. See Hr’g Tr. 383:16-384:1 (Claimants’ counsel acknowledging that “if we could
not show any of those things we would not have standing,” and further acknowledging that
Claimants must do so “[b]y a preponderance of the evidence”). Claimants further offered that, if
the government makes a prima facie showing of straw ownership by proving a claimant had
possession of bare title and nothing else, a claimant can defeat a motion to strike and establish
standing by showing one of the other indicia of ownership by a preponderance of the evidence.
See id. 396:4-6 (Claimants counsel stating, “[e]ven if the government makes a prima facie showing
of straw ownership, then the burden shifts to claimants to show that we actually had more than
bare legal title.”). Claimants describe this legal standard as grounded in the summary judgment
standard, but regardless of how they describe it, the legal standard that they urge—that they must
establish an interest in the res by a preponderance of the evidence—is essentially the same one
adopted by the Court. 31

31

To the extent that Claimants contend that fact-finding is inappropriate in this context, that is
ultimately irrelevant to the Court’s decision in this case, because as explained below, the record is
devoid of any evidence that could establish even a genuine dispute of fact as to any of indicia of
ownership by Claimants other than title—i.e., possession, control/dominion, or a financial stake—
after the September 2021 MOA.
63

II. Application
30.

The Government initially presented its motion primarily as a Motion for Summary

Judgment, but in the alternative requested an evidentiary hearing in the event that factual disputes
preclude summary judgment, see Reply Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. to Strike at 19, ECF No.
137. The Court ruled that Khudainatov’s declaration denying that the September 2021 MOA
effectuated a transfer of ownership of the Amadea created a genuine dispute of fact as to whether
Claimants had standing, see Nov. Order at 4, and in accordance with Rule G(8), set this case for
an evidentiary hearing before the Court without a jury, see ECF No. 312 at 14. As explained below,
however, based on the record now before the Court—from which Khudainatov’s declaration is
excluded as hearsay, see supra—the Court concludes that:
•

The Government has made a prima facie showing that Claimants are mere straw
owners of the Amadea. Pursuant to the September 2021 MOA, they hold legal title
to the Amadea but none of the other incidents of ownership in it such as possession,
dominion and control, or a financial stake.

•

Claimants have failed to establish that, after the September 2021 MOA, they held
or exercised any of the incidents of ownership in the Amadea beyond bare title.

As explained below, the preponderance of the evidence supports these conclusions. And as
explained further, the Court reaches the same conclusions based solely on the undisputed material
facts in the record.
A.
31.

The Government Has Made a Prima Facie Showing of Straw Ownership
The Court concludes that the Government has made a prima facie case of straw

ownership, i.e., that Claimants “hold title to [the res] for somebody else.” Cambio Exacto, 166
F.3d at 527. Claimants, to the extent they had any ownership interests in the Amadea, transferred
such interests other than bare legal title to Errigal through the September 2021 MOA. Indeed,
there is not even a genuine dispute of fact that they did so:

64

a. Under the plain terms of the MOA, in exchange for €225 million, all of the incidents
of ownership in the Amadea other than title passed from Millemarin to Errigal,
including possession; the ability to use it and start any works on it; and all financial
responsibilities, including the running costs and all risk associated with loss,
damage, or destruction of the Amadea.
b. There is no dispute that the €225 million transfer contemplated by the September
2021 MOA took place.
c. Thus, under the plain terms of the MOA, after payments were rendered on the
September 2021 MOA, Claimants had no interest in the Amadea other than title.
d. This is sufficient to make a prima facie showing of straw ownership. See 500
Delaware St., 113 F.3d at 312; One 1982 Porsche 928, 732 F. Supp. at 451.
32.

Although unnecessary to the Court’s determination that the Government has made

a prima facie showing of straw ownership, the undisputed fact that Kerimov’s niece, Gadzhieva,
was the source of funds for the September 2021 MOA further supports the Court’s conclusion that
the Government has made a prima facie showing straw ownership. That Errigal itself did not “pay”
for the transaction is suspicious. Moreover, the preponderance of the evidence weighs against
Claimants’ assertion that Gadzhieva “loaned” €225 million to Errigal, a newly incorporated shell
company with no assets and no means of repaying a loan, because the notion of such a loan makes
no sense on its face and there is no explanation for it in the record, and the documents purporting
to substantiate the purported loan appear to have been forged. Accordingly, the Court’s finding
that Gadzhieva paid the €225 million purchase price for the Amadea supports (although is
unnecessary to) the Court’s conclusion that Khudainatov retained title so as to serve as a straw
owner for Kerimov and/or members of the Kerimov family.
33.

As noted, the Court rejects Claimants contention that the September 2021 MOA

was not a sales agreement but a “temporary use” agreement. There is no admissible documentary
evidence in the record supporting that characterization, which is contradicted by the plain terms of
the MOA. Claimants’ characterization is also contradicted by every external admissible document
65

in the record. The only evidence in record on this point is the testimony of Khudainatov family
office employee Parfireva, to which the Court can accord no weight due to her lack of personal
knowledge about the issue. Thus, it is not merely that the preponderance of the evidence indicates
that the September 2021 MOA was a sales agreement rather than a “temporary use agreement”:
There can be no genuine dispute of fact that it was a sales agreement. See Miller Marine Servs.,
Inc. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co., 197 F. App'x 62, 64 (2d Cir. 2006) (affirming district court’s
decision not to consider affidavit on summary judgment where it was based only on affiant’s
“belief and conclusion,” rather than on personal knowledge); Rule 56(c)(4) (explaining that
affidavits opposing summary judgment must be “made on personal knowledge, set out facts that
would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on
the matters stated”).
34.

At closing argument, Claimants denied that the September 2021 MOA and the

accompanying payments were sufficient to establish a prima facie case for straw ownership. But
when asked at closing argument what the standard for such a showing would be, and how the
Government’s showing fell short, Claimants could provide no coherent answer. See Hr’g Tr.
392:15-396:14.

The Court rejects Claimants’ hodge-podge arguments contesting the

Government’s prima facie showing of straw ownership, as follows:
a. Claimants initially pointed to the fact that the Government offered no witness
testimony as to straw ownership. Hr’g Tr. 393:10-16. But Claimants cite no
authority for the proposition that witness testimony is necessary to support a prima
facie showing of straw ownership. Here, there is documentary evidence (i.e., the
September 2021 MOA) and an undisputed €225 million payment, which together
provide clear and unequivocal evidence that Claimants transferred the incidents of
ownership of the Amadea other than bare title.
b. Claimants then noted that “everyone here agrees that September [2021] MOA does
not transfer title to the Amadea.” Hr’g Tr. 394:24-25. But holding bare title without
the other incidents of ownership is perhaps the quintessential definition of straw
ownership—and the basis for the Government’s prima facie showing here. See
66

Cambio Exacto, 166 F.3d at 527 (explaining that a straw owner is one who
“‘own[s]’ the property, but hold[s] title to it for somebody else”). Claimants’
position that title alone is enough to establish standing is foreclosed by Second
Circuit precedent holding that a straw owner who holds title and nothing else lacks
standing to contest forfeiture. See 500 Delaware St., 113 F.3d at 312.
c. Claimants also pointed to “evidence showing that Mr. Khudainatov commissioned
and built the Amadea.” Hr’g Tr. 396:11-12. Indeed, in their Proposed Findings of
Fact, they make much out of the “evidence of [Khudainatov’s] original ownership
of the Amadea, from construction through delivery, repeated use of the property,
and the granting of permission to another to use the property in specified ways.”
Claimants’ PFOF ¶ 8.
(i).

As noted, the Court does not credit Claimants’ assertions about
Khudainatov commissioning the Amadea, which are dubious in light of
the Government’s expert testimony regarding Khudainatov’s wealth
during the relevant period.

(ii).

In any event, this issue is ultimately unnecessary to the Court’s decision.
That is, even if the Court were to reject Dr. Aslund’s testimony, and
instead credited Claimants’ evidence that Khudainatov commissioned the
Amadea and owned it for some period of time prior to 2021, that would
not change the Court’s decision. The fact that a claimant previously
owned the res at some point in the past does not disprove that the claimant
is a mere straw owner now, at least under the facts of this case. Cf. 500
Delaware St., 113 F.3d at 312 (affirming district court’s determination that
claimant, who originally owned property and transferred it to his son, but
then had bare title transferred back to him, was a straw owner). Indeed,
during closing argument, Claimants ultimately agreed that, for purposes
of standing in this case, it “does not matter” whether Khudainatov
originally commissioned the Amadea, because if he in fact sold it in 2021,
then he lacks standing. See Hr’g Tr. 447:23-448:10 (conceding that a sale
of the Amadea would deprive Claimants of standing, but still arguing that,
as a legal matter, title is enough to maintain standing).

(iii).

The question before the Court then, is not whether Claimants had any
indicia of ownership in the Amadea at any point in time. Rather, it is
whether, in face of evidence that the Amadea was sold pursuant to the
September 2021 MOA, they can establish that they exercised any
incidents of ownership other than title after that date. As explained
throughout this Opinion, they cannot establish even a genuine dispute of
fact that they did.

67

d. At one point, Claimants argued that the Government needs to show “illegal
activity” of some sort in order to make a prima facie showing of straw ownership.
Hr’g Tr. 524:9-11 (“The only way the government gets to argue straw ownership is
if there’s, first, a finding that there was illegal conduct.”). Claimants offer no
support for that proposition, and the Second Circuit has not held that illegal activity
is a prerequisite to a finding of straw ownership. Rather, the Circuit has simply
defined a straw owner as one who “hold[s] title to [the property] for somebody
else.” Cambio Exacto, 166 F.3d at 527; see also $829,422.42, 561 F. App’x at 100.
As Claimants acknowledged, whether the Amadea was in fact involved in illegal
activity is a merits question, see Hr’g Tr. 377:23-378:6, which is not a part of the
threshold standing inquiry. Finally, even if some evidence of illegality were a
threshold requirement, there is some such evidence here: namely, the forgery of the
documents purporting to show that Gadzhieva’s payment of €225 million for the
Amadea was a loan.
e. Ultimately, Claimants can do no more than to note that this case features facts that
are different from past cases where a straw ownership was found—e.g., where the
true owner “transfer[s title to] the property after an indictment, clearly to try to
avoid forfeiture. That is sort of your standard arrangement with a straw owner.”
Hr’g Tr. 392:22-23. But that is a distinction without a difference. If someone who
receives bare title and no other incidents of ownership can be a straw owner, it
follows that the reverse can be true as well—i.e., that someone who transfers all of
the incidents of ownership except title can be a straw owner, as the Court finds is
the case here.
35.

Claimants make much of this Court’s previous statement, in declining to award

summary judgment to the Government, that “the parties’ submissions contain numerous factual
disputes—most significantly, whether the Errigal transaction was in fact consummated.”
Claimants’ PFOF ¶ 7 (quoting Nov. Order 4). They then point to the fact that the closing
documents for the September 2021 MOA were never signed, see Claimants’ PFOF ¶ 64 (citing
Wolf testimony that September 2021 MOA did not close); id. ¶ 66 (citing Magee testimony that
ownership of the Amadea was not transferred); id. ¶ 69 (citing McKendrick testimony that legal
title to the Amadea did not pass), and then argue that this is enough to defeat the Motion to Strike.
This argument, however, reads too much significance into the Court’s use of the word
“consummated,” which was a reference to whether the MOA’s terms regarding the transfer of the
68

incidents of ownership of the Amadea had in fact been effectuated. Under Second Circuit
precedent, the fundamental issue on this motion is whether the Claimants have sufficient indicia
of ownership so as to have standing to contest forfeiture of the Amadea. See 500 Delaware St.,
113 F.3d at 312. And under the terms of the MOA, all of the incidents of ownership of the Amadea
were transferred from Millemarin to Errigal upon full payment of its €225 million purchase price.
The only effect of signing the closing documents would have been to transfer title as well. The
testimony of various witnesses—Wolf, Magee, McKendrick, and Parfireva—that there was no
transfer of ownership of the Amadea because the September 2021 MOA closing documents were
never signed—is premised on the notion that ownership is established by mere title. But as
explained supra, in this context, title alone is insufficient. Claimants’ position in this regard—that
they remained owners of the Amadea because they retained mere title to it—is foreclosed by the
uniformity of case-law holding that a straw owner who holds bare title and no other ownership
interest lacks standing to contest forfeiture.
36.

Finally, Claimants’ assertion that the September 2021 MOA was canceled finds no

support in the record. There is no evidence of any of the events that, on the face of the agreement,
would trigger cancellation.

There is no documentary evidence supporting the notion of

cancellation, or indirect evidence of cancellation such as a return of any portion of the €225 million
purchase price to Millemarin. The only testimony regarding cancellation is from Parfireva, whose
testimony in this regard was not based on personal knowledge, but from inferences based on
documents that, themselves, do not provide evidence that the MOA was cancelled. Her testimony
and these documents are not sufficient to establish even a genuine dispute of material fact as to
cancellation of the MOA. See Miller Marine Servs., 197 F. App’x at 64 (affirming exclusion of
affidavit on summary judgment not based on personal knowledge); Rule 56(e).

69

37.

In sum, the Government has made a prima facie showing of straw ownership, and

has done so not just by a preponderance of the evidence. On the record before the Court, there is
no genuine dispute of fact that the September 2021 MOA effectuated a transfer of all ownership
interests in the Amadea, other than title, to Errigal. The fact that Millemarin held only bare title to
the Amadea at that point is not subject to a genuine dispute. And bare title alone is insufficient to
establish standing to challenge forfeiture.
B.
38.

Claimants Have Failed to Rebut the Government’s Prima Facie Showing of
Straw Ownership
In light of the Government’s prima facie showing of straw ownership, the burden

shifts to Claimants to establish some incident of ownership other than bare title. See Ida, 14 F.
Supp. 2d at 459-60; Hr’g Tr. 434:12-17 (counsel for Claimants conceding that once the
Government makes a prima facie show of straw ownership, “that there's a shifting of burden” in
which a “claimant must present evidence of dominion and control or other indicia of true
ownership”). As explained below, the Court concludes that Claimants have not established any
indicia of ownership after the September 2021 MOA other than title—such as possession,
dominion and control, or a financial stake—by a preponderance of the evidence. Indeed, there is
not even a genuine dispute of material fact that Claimants lacked any indicia of ownership in the
Amadea other than title after the September 2021 MOA.
39.

Before turning to a discussion of the various indicia other than title, the Court notes

that their definitions can be both self-referential and overlapping. See, e.g., United States v. U.S.
Currency Amounting to the Sum of Thirty Thousand Eight Hundred Dollars, 555 F. Supp. 280, 283
(E.D.N.Y. 1983) (explaining that, to establish standing, “the claimant must demonstrate a
possessory interest in the res with its attendant characteristics of dominion and control”);
Possession, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) (defining “possession” as, inter alia, “having
70

control over a thing with the intent to have and to exercise such control” (emphasis added)); id.
(“A person who, although not in actual possession, knowingly has both the power and the intention
at a given time to exercise dominion or control over a thing . . . is then in constructive possession
over it.” (emphasis added)); Dominion, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) (defining
“dominion” as “perfect control in right of ownership” and stating that “[t]he word implies both
title and possession and appears to require a complete retention of control over disposition”
(emphasis added)).
40.

The Court does not and need not set out its own precise definitions for each

indicator of ownership beyond title. As explained below, regardless of how precisely one might
define these terms, Claimants have not demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence—or even
the existence of a genuine dispute of fact—that they held anything beyond the Amadea’s title at
the time of seizure.
i.
41.

Possession

The term “possession,” though somewhat “ambiguous,” generally “means more

than mere custody” and includes “a right or interest of proprietorship . . . .” Mercado, 873 F.2d at
644-45. “‘Possession’ requires a knowledge of presence and an intent to control.” Id. at 645.
42.

In cases where a claimant says that he owned a seized res, the court must find some

“indication that the claimant is in fact a possessor, not a simple . . . custodian,” and there must be
“some indicia of reliability or substance to reduce the likelihood of a false or frivolous claim.” Id.;
cf. 500 Delaware St., 113 F.3d at 312 (holding that claimant who held title was a straw owner
where a party other than the claimant, inter alia, “continued in possession . . . of the property”).

71

43.

As noted supra, all of the direct evidence in the record about possession of the

Amadea after the September 2021 MOA indicates that Claimants did not possess it during the
relevant period.
a. It is undisputed that Khudainatov did not step foot on the Amadea after the
September 2021 MOA or sail the vessel after the September 2021 MOA.
Compare with One Red 2003 Hummer H2, 234 F. Supp.3d at 419 (claimant had
standing where, inter alia, he held keys to the seized vehicle and drove it 75%
of the time).
b. All of the evidence in the record indicates that the only people who used the
Amadea after the September 2021 MOA were members of the Kerimov family.
They alone cruised aboard the boat and decided where the Amadea would
travel, including to Fiji, where it was ultimately seized.
c. Claimants argue that the Kerimov family’s use of the Amadea was in their
capacity as charterers, not as owners. As noted above, the Court rejects this
argument and finds that it is not supported by a preponderance of the evidence.
d. Ultimately, the Court’s finding that members of the Kerimov family were the
only people who used the Amadea after the September 2021 MOA supports the
Court’s decision, but is unnecessary for it. Even leaving aside that finding, there
can be no genuine dispute of fact that the Claimants did not use the Amadea
after September 2021.
44.

Claimants point to various circumstantial forms of evidence that they possessed the

yacht. But their reliance on those forms of evidence is unavailing:
a. Claimants say that Khudainatov’s possessions were onboard the Amadea at the
time of seizure. Cf. One Red 2003 Hummer H2, 234 F. Supp. 3d at 420
(claimant had standing where, inter alia, he kept his possessions inside seized
vehicle). But Claimants’ representation in this regard was not based on
evidence of the presence of Khudainatov’s personal effects onboard the
Amadea, as there were none. Rather, it was based on evidence that Khudainatov
had paid for furnishings onboard. As noted, the preponderance of the evidence
indicates that he lacked the means to pay for the Amadea at the time it was
commissioned. In any event, the notion that these items belonged to
Khudainatov at the time of seizure is based on the premise that the September
2021 MOA did not effectuate a sale of the Amadea. The preponderance of the
evidence indicates that it did; indeed, there can be no genuine dispute of fact
that point.

72

b. Claimants stated at closing argument that their Fijian counsel was “on” the
Amadea at the time it was seized. The Court rejects that contention for two
reasons.

45.

(i).

First, as noted, this assertion is based on misrepresentation of facts in
the record. There is no record evidence whatsoever that local Fijian
counsel was ever physically present on the Amadea, let alone present on
the boat when it was seized. Rather, the evidence suggests that
Claimants retained counsel in Fiji around the time the Amadea was
seized and that local counsel contemporaneously opposed seizure.
These facts do not prove that Claimants “possessed” the Amadea when
it was seized.

(ii).

Second, the Court rejects Claimants’ argument that, when counsel
contests seizure soon after seizure is initiated, the mere fact of
contestation is evidence of standing. See Hr’g Tr. 501:18-23. Claimants
cite no legal authority to support this proposition. The implication of
Claimants’ argument is that standing to contest forfeiture can be based
on a claimant’s expeditious hiring of a lawyer—which is obviously not
the law. See, e.g., U.S. v. All Funds on Deposit on or Before November
8, 1994 in Citibank Acct. No. 42773634, 955 F. Supp. 23, 27 (E.D.N.Y.
1997) (“[A] bare assertion of ownership of the res, without more, is
inadequate to prove an ownership interest sufficient to establish
standing.”).

In sum, Claimants have not established under any standard that they “possessed”

the Amadea at any point in time after the September 2021 MOA up until when it was seized in Fiji
in April 2022. The preponderance of the evidence indicates that they did not possess the Amadea
at any point after the September 2021 MOA; instead, it shows that only members of the Kerimov
family did. Ultimately, there is not even a genuine dispute of fact that Claimants did not possess
the Amadea during the relevant period, as there is no competent evidence in the record suggesting
that they did.
ii.
46.

Dominion & Control

Commonly accepted definitions of “control” suggest that it means, essentially, the

“[p]ower . . . to manage, direct, superintend, restrict, regulate, govern, administer, or oversee” the
rem. Control, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990). Claimants acknowledged that “control” and
73

“dominion” are often used in concert and that they are “not certain if there’s a difference with the
meaning between those two [words] for this case.” Hr’g Tr. 379:5-379:25, 380:1. Accordingly,
the Court considers these terms together.
47.

There is no evidence Claimants exercised dominion and/or control over the Amadea

after the September 2021 MOA. At the time of its seizure, the Amadea was set to undergo
substantial renovations, changes that would require the boat to be docked for 7 months while its
interior was overhauled. There is no evidence suggesting that Claimants directed the renovations,
would oversee the design plans’ implementation, or had even been consulted about the changes set
to be made.
48.

The only evidence in the record about who directed these changes to the Amadea

is that it was members of the Kerimov family. See 500 Delaware St., 113 F.3d at 312 (claimant
who held title was a straw owner where another party, inter alia, “maintained the property and
made repairs”); One Red 2003 Hummer H2, 234 F. Supp. 3d 415, 419 (W.D.N.Y. 2017) (claimant
was not a straw owner of seized vehicle where he, inter alia, “maintained” it).
49.

Claimants respond by asserting Khudainatov was “kept informed of and approved

certain events,” which they suggest demonstrates that Claimants had dominion and control over
the vessel. Claimants’ PFOF ¶ 132. Claimants’ argument fails for two reasons.
a. First, there is no evidence in the record that Claimants were actually “kept
informed of and approved” the changes that were made and planned to be made
to the Amadea. The only evidence offered in this regard consists of declarations
from witnesses whose testimony the Court excluded. See Hr’g Tr. 6-9.
b. Second, even if Claimants were “kept informed of” such changes, their
knowledge of the planned renovations is not the same as “approving of” those
changes or otherwise exercising power over the renovation process. Claimants
cite no authority for the proposition that receiving information about a res is
evidence of dominion and/or control over it.

74

50.

The preponderance of the evidence, including Captain Meagher’s testimony,

suggests that these changes to the Amadea were substantial, and that they were made by the
Kerimovs as owners rather than as charterers, which further supports the Court’s conclusions as to
standing. But this particular issue is ultimately immaterial. That is, even excluding Captain
Meagher’s testimony that these renovations could only have been made by an owner, and crediting
Captain Hitch’s testimony that they could have been made by a charterer, there is still no competent
evidence in the record that Claimants exercised dominion and control over the Amadea with
respect to these changes to the Amadea. The only evidence in the record about who directed these
changes is that they were directed by members of the Kerimov family.
51.

Accordingly, Claimants have not established under any standard that they exercised

dominion and/or control over the Amadea at any point in time after the September 2021 MOA up
until when it was seized in Fiji in April 2022. The preponderance of the evidence indicates that
they did not exercise dominion and/or control over the Amadea at any point after the September
2021 MOA, and that only members of the Kerimov family did. Indeed, there is not even a genuine
dispute of fact on this point because there is no competent evidence in the record indicating that
Claimants exercised dominion and/or control over the Amadea during the relevant period.
iii.
52.

Financial Stake

There is no definition of the term “financial interest” in case-law or in dictionaries

that is particularly helpful here. See, e.g., Financial interest, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990)
(defining “financial interest” as “interest equated with money or its equivalent”). Accordingly, the
Court uses a common-sense definition of the term and considers any evidence in the record about
legal responsibility for the Amadea’s costs, actual payment of such costs, or financial benefits
derived from the Amadea.

75

53.

There is no dispute that Kerimov’s niece Gadzhieva paid €225 million in

connection with the September 2021 MOA. As noted, the plain terms of the agreement transferred
all costs and risk of loss associated with the Amadea to Errigal.
54.

There is no evidence that, after September 2021, Claimants paid for the Amadea’s

upkeep, crew, docking and undocking, fueling, or other costs associated with maintaining a
superyacht. Claimants have presented no admissible evidence—not a single receipt, invoice, or
other evidence of expenditure—showing any payments made by Millemarin or Khudainatov in
connection with the Amadea after the September 2021 MOA.
55.

Claimants point to three pieces of evidence to support the notion that they had a

continued financial stake in the Amadea after September 2021. None are availing:
a. The one expense that Claimants point to involves the Amadea’s insurance
coverage, which extended beyond the September 2021 MOA. See CX-402-A. But
those costs were all paid before Millemarin and Errigal contracted with each other,
thus the payment does not prove anything about whether Claimants actually
continued to bear any financial responsibility for the Amadea after September
2021. Cf. 500 Delaware St., 113 F.3d at 312 (finding title-holding claimant a straw
owner when another person, inter alia, “made mortgage, property tax, and
insurance payments, paid utility bills”).
b. Claimants point to a purported 2022 management agreement with Imperial Yachts
as evidence that they continued to bear financial responsibility for the Amadea,
but the Court does not consider the agreement because it was not signed until after
the Amadea was seized. It therefore cannot be evidence of Claimants’ contention
that the September 2021 MOA—and its transfer of financial obligations from
Millemarin to Errigal—was no longer in effect.
c. Claimants point to the fact that the Amadea is listed as a liability on Millemarin’s
internal balance sheets as purported evidence of their continued financial stake in
the boat, but as noted supra, those documents were untimely disclosed and thus
are not admitted as evidence. In any event, it is unclear how numbers purporting
to show a liability on an internal spreadsheet held by Millemarin’s former
director—which Claimants say that they themselves lacked access to until only
recently, and do not represent any kind of legally enforceable obligation—
constitute evidence of a financial interest.

76

56.

Similarly, Claimants present no evidence showing that they obtained any financial

benefit from the Amadea after receiving the €225 million sales proceeds pursuant to the September
2021 MOA. Claimants aver that Gulnara Kerimova attempted to pay for at least one trip taken
aboard the Amadea, which ostensibly proves that the boat was being chartered and had not been
sold. That payment was never made; nor is there evidence that Claimants (as opposed to Imperial
Yachts) would have received payment for the purported charter. In fact, there is no competent
evidence in the record that Claimants ever received a single euro from any of the so-called charters
of the Amadea. Cf. 500 Delaware St., 113 F.3d at 312 (claimant who held title was straw owner
where a party other than the claimant, inter alia, “received all rental payments” from property).
57.

Finally, it is uncontested that Claimants never returned the €225 million Millemarin

received pursuant to the September 2021 MOA. Claimants say Millemarin is now liable to Errigal
to return funds paid as part of the September 2021 MOA since their deal “fell apart following
Russia’s military action in Ukraine.” Claimants’ PCOL ¶ 38(h). But, beyond a line in Millemarin’s
excluded balance sheets listing the Amadea’s value as a liability, there is no evidence Millemarin
is actually indebted to Errigal.
58.

Claimants have not established under any standard that they had a financial interest

in the Amadea at any point in time after the September 2021 MOA. Indeed, there is not even a
genuine dispute of fact on this point because there is no competent evidence in the record that
Claimants were liable for any costs of, actually made any payments in connection with, or derived
any financial benefit from the Amadea during the relevant period.
C.
59.

Claimants’ Other Arguments Regarding Ownership of the Amadea Fail
Claimants raise several additional arguments regarding ownership of the Amadea.

For example, Claimants repeat a mantra that numerous witnesses testified that Khudainatov owned

77

the Amadea. See Claimants’ PFOF ¶ 11. The Court concludes that these witnesses’ testimony
does not create a genuine dispute of fact as to the relevant indicia of ownership of the Amadea
after September 2021.
a. To the extent that these witnesses testified as to who legally owned the vessel,
the Court cannot rely on such testimony; not even an expert witness can testify
to a legal conclusion. See United States v. Duncan, 42 F.3d 97, 101 (2d Cir.
1994) (“[T]his Court requires the exclusion of testimony which states a legal
conclusion.”).
b. As explained above, to the extent that these witnesses sought to testify to facts
that are relevant to the indicia of ownership, such testimony: (1) did not address
the relevant time period (i.e., after the September 2021 MOA); (2) was not
based on personal knowledge of the witness and/or was based purely on
hearsay; and/or (3) addressed the issue of legal title rather than other incidents
of ownership—such as possession, dominion/control, or a financial stake—
which, in the context of this case, is not sufficient to establish standing.
60.

In their post-hearing Proposed Findings of Fact, Claimants raise a new argument:

that the Government’s allegation of straw ownership is itself a basis for establishing Claimants’
standing. They state that “the threshold for standing is so low that other Circuits have noted that
the government’s allegations [of straw ownership] combined with an assertion of ownership, even
without any additional evidence, can themselves be sufficient for standing.” Claimants’ PFOF ¶
6. Claimants elaborated at closing argument that “the government's assertion that Mr. Khudainatov
is a straw owner, combined with []our verified claim, are sufficient for standing.” Hr’g Tr. 397:1922. In essence, Claimants contend that, where the government alleges that a claimant posed as a
straw owner, such an allegation shows that the claimant has some sort of interest in the property
sufficient to confer standing. The Court declines to credit this argument, which was not raised in
Claimants’ pre-hearing Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, see ECF No. 426, and
has no support in Second Circuit case-law. More to the point, Claimants’ argument turns the law
on straw ownership on its head, by trying to make what courts have consistently found to be a
basis to deny standing into a reason for finding it. See, e.g., Cambio Exacto, 166 F.3d at 527
78

(stating straw owners “do not themselves suffer an injury when the property is taken”);
$829,422.42, 561 F. App’x at 100 (“In order to have standing to challenge the forfeiture of property,
one must be more than a mere ‘straw owner.’”).
D. Summary
61.

In sum, Claimants have not established under any standard that they had an interest

in the Amadea other than bare title at any point in time after the September 2021 MOA. The
preponderance of the evidence indicates that they did not. But, even leaving aside disputed factual
issues, there is no dispute of material fact as to standing because:
a. There can be no genuine dispute that, to the extent Claimants had any ownership
interest in the Amadea, the September 2021 MOA transferred away the incidents
of ownership in the Amadea other than title, because:
(i).

All of the documents in the record about the September 2021 MOA—
including the MOA itself, the addenda to it, and contemporaneous
documents referencing it—confirm that it was for a sale of the Amadea;

(ii).

There is no dispute that €225 million was paid in connection with the
September 2021 MOA;

(iii).

The terms of the MOA are unambiguous that all of the incidents of
ownership in the Amadea other than title were then transferred away; and

(iv).

There is no competent evidence in the record indicating that the
September 2021 MOA was canceled or was meant to provide for the mere
temporary use, rather than the sale, of the Amadea;

b. There can be no genuine dispute that, after the September 2021 MOA, Claimants
did not hold or exercise the incidents of ownership in the Amadea other than title;
(i).

there is no competent evidence in the record that Claimants held or
exercised any of the incidents of ownership in the Amadea other than title
after September 2021; and

(ii).

all of the competent evidence regarding the incidents of ownership other
than title after September 2021 points to parties other than Claimants.

There is therefore not even a genuine dispute of material fact that Claimants are mere straw owners
who lack standing to contest forfeiture of the Amadea.
79

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Government’s Motion in Limine (ECF No. 445) and its
Motion to Strike (ECF No. 97) are GRANTED. Claimants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 71) is
DENIED AS MOOT.
The Clerk of Court is respectfully requested to terminate ECF Nos. 71, 97, and 455.
SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 10, 2025
New York, New York
DALE E. HO
United States District Judge

80