Prophete v. New York Metropolitan Hospital et al

Filing 26

ORDER: For the foregoing reasons, this action is dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate all pending motions and to close this case. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Ronnie Abrams on 1/28/2025) (tg)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
ALIN CHRISTOPHER PROPHETE,
Plaintiff,
23-CV-11117 (RA)

v.

ORDER

NEW YORK CITY HEALTH AND
HOSPITALS, et al.,
Defendants.
RONNIE ABRAMS, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, brings this action against Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. For the reasons set forth below, the Court
dismisses this action without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
BACKGROUND
On December 21, 2023, Plaintiff filed the complaint in this action. See Dkt. 1. On January
18, 2024, the Court issued a Valentin Order requiring identification of the John Doe and Jane Doe
defendants referred to in the Complaint (the “Doe Defendants”) and requiring Plaintiff to file an
Amended Complaint with the real names of the Doe Defendants “[w]ithin thirty days of receiving
this information.” Dkt. 7. Defendant New York City Health and Hospitals represented that it
provided Plaintiff with the names of the Doe Defendants on March 28, 2024, see Dkt. 23, and thus
Plaintiff should have filed his Amended Complaint by April 29, 2024. Plaintiff failed to do so.
On June 17, 2024, Magistrate Judge Stein, to whom the Court referred this case, directed
Plaintiff to file an Amended Complaint containing the real names of the Doe Defendants by July
8, 2024. See Dkt. 24. Plaintiff again failed to do so. On October 4, Judge Stein ordered Plaintiff
to file an Amended Complaint containing the real names of the Doe Defendants by October 17,

2024, and warned Plaintiff that failure to comply with the Order would result in a recommendation
to this Court that the case be dismissed for want of prosecution. See Dkt. 25. Plaintiff has not
responded.
LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a district court may
dismiss an action if “the plaintiff fails to prosecute or otherwise comply with [the] rules or a court
order.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). “A district court considering a Rule 41(b) dismissal must weigh five
factors: ‘(1) the duration of the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the court order, (2) whether
plaintiff was on notice that failure to comply would result in dismissal, (3) whether the defendants
are likely to be prejudiced by further delay in the proceedings, (4) a balancing of the court’s interest
in managing its docket with the plaintiff’s interest in receiving a fair chance to be heard, and (5)
whether the judge has adequately considered a sanction less drastic than dismissal.’” Baptiste v.
Sommers, 768 F.3d 212, 216 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (quoting Lucas v. Miles, 84 F.3d 532, 535
(2d Cir. 1996)). “No single factor is generally dispositive.” Id.
Because a Rule 41(b) dismissal is “the harshest of sanctions,” it must “‘be proceeded by
particular procedural prerequisites,’ including ‘notice of the sanctionable conduct, the standard by
which it will be assessed, and an opportunity to be heard.’” Id. at 217 (quoting Mitchell v. Lyons
Prof’l Servs., Inc., 708 F.3d 463, 467 (2d Cir. 2013)). Furthermore, “a pro se litigant’s claim
should be dismissed for failure to prosecute ‘only when the circumstances are sufficiently
extreme.’” Id. (quoting LeSane v. Hall’s Sec. Analyst, Inc., 239 F.3d 206, 209 (2d Cir. 2001)).
DISCUSSION
Several of the above factors weigh in favor of dismissing this action under Rule 41(b).
First, the duration of Plaintiff’s non-compliance is significant: Plaintiff has not communicated with
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the Court since April 5, 2024, see Dkt. 22, and more than three months have passed since his
response to Judge Stein’s October 4, 2024 order was due. See, e.g., Singelton v. City of New York,
No. 14-CV-9355 (DLC), 2015 WL 9581781, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2015) (dismissing an action
under Rule 41(b) where “[t]he plaintiff has not meaningfully communicated with the defendants
for over two months” and had not communicated with the court in over two months); Portorreal
v. City of New York, 306 F.R.D. 150, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (dismissing an action for failure to
prosecute where the plaintiff had “repeatedly ignored orders setting deadlines and requiring status
letters” and her response to a court order was “almost two months overdue”); Toliver v. Okvist,
No. 10 Civ. 5354, 2014 WL 2535111, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 2014) (R. & R.) (recommending the
dismissal of a case under Rule 41(b), where the plaintiff’s response to a court order was five weeks
overdue), adopted, 2015 WL 8543103 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2015). Second, Plaintiff was on notice
that his failure to comply would result in dismissal: the Court’s October 4, 2024 order explicitly
warned Plaintiff that this action would be dismissed if he failed to respond. See Mitchell, 708 F.3d
at 468 (holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing an action where its
“detailed scheduling order clearly stated that future noncompliance and tardiness would be met
with dismissal”). Third, Plaintiff has been given an opportunity to be heard; indeed, Plaintiff was
required only to file an Amended Complaint containing the real names of the Doe Defendants to
avoid dismissal. Fourth, this case has been pending for thirteen months, and the Court has an
obligation “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. In light of these considerations, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s
non-compliance warrants dismissal.
On balance, however, and in light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court concludes that a
“less drastic” sanction than dismissal with prejudice is appropriate in this case. Baptiste, 768 F.3d
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at 216. Any prejudice to Defendants has been minor: this case is at an early stage, and based on
the record, it does not appear that Defendants have had any substantive involvement in the case.
See LeSane, 239 F.3d at 210 (“[T]here is no evidence in the record that plaintiff’s delay . . . caused
any particular, or especially burdensome, prejudice to defendants beyond the delay itself.”).
Moreover, this action has not substantially burdened the Court’s docket: the Court has not decided
any substantive motions, held any hearings, presided over any discovery, or scheduled trial. Under
these circumstances, the Court finds that dismissal without prejudice is a less harsh, and more
appropriate, sanction for Plaintiff’s failure to communicate with the Court or to comply with the
Court’s orders. See, e.g., Ortega v. Mutt, No. 14-CV-9703 (JGK), 2017 WL 1133429, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2017) (finding that, where any prejudice to the defendant was minor, “the
lesser sanction of dismissal without prejudice (rather than with prejudice) is appropriate in order
to strike the appropriate balance between the right to due process and the need to clear the docket
and avoid prejudice to defendant by retaining open lawsuits with no activity” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); see also 2 Moore’s Federal Practice § 19.101 (“The alternative sanctions that the
court should consider include . . . dismissal without prejudice . . . .”).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this action is dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate all pending
motions and to close this case.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:

January 28, 2025
New York, New York
Hon. Ronnie Abrams
United States District Judge
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