Joy v. Crime Victims Treatment Center
Filing
28
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT & RECOMMENDATION for 24 Report and Recommendation. Having reviewed the record, the parties' submissions in connection with the Defendant's motion to dismiss, the R&R, the Objections, and the Response, the Court a grees with Judge Cave's thoughtful and well-reasoned analysis and conclusions in full and therefore ADOPTS THE R&R IN ITS ENTIRETY. For the reasons articulated in the R&R, CVTC's motion to dismiss the complaint is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows: (1) Plaintiff's Title VI Claim is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and with leave to amend to correct the deficiencies identified in pages 11-14 of the R&R; (2) Plaintiff's Title VII Claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE andw ithout leave to amend; (3) CVTC's motion to dismiss is DENIED as to Plaintiff's Section 1981 Claim; and (4) Plaintiff's NYSHRL and NYCHRL Claims are DISMISSED with prejudice and without leave to amend. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motion pending at Dkt. No. 12 and mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Margaret M. Garnett on 1/29/2025) (mml)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
1/29/2025
LYDIA JOY,
Plaintiff,
23-CV-11177 (MMG)
-against-
ORDER ADOPTING
REPORT &
RECOMMENDATION
CRIME VICTIMS TREATMENT CENTER
(CVTV),
Defendant.
MARGARET M. GARNETT, United States District Judge:
On December 2, 2024, the Honorable Sarah L. Cave issued a Report and
Recommendation (the “R&R”) recommending that the Court grant in part and deny in part
Defendant CVTC’s motion to dismiss the complaint. 1 Dkt. No. 24. Specifically, Judge Cave
0F
recommended that: (1) Plaintiff’s Title VI Claim be dismissed without prejudice and with leave
to amend to address identified deficiencies; (2) Plaintiff’s Title VII Claim be dismissed with
prejudice and without leave to amend; (3) CVTC’s motion to dismiss be denied as to the Section
1981 Claim; and (4) Plaintiff’s NYSHRL and NYCHRL Claims be dismissed with prejudice.
See R&R at 21.
A district court reviewing a report and recommendation addressing a dispositive motion
“may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the
magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also Bradley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 12-CV7300, 2015 WL 1069307, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2015) (same). Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)
and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), parties may submit objections to the magistrate
The R&R, which is appended to this Order for ease of reference, describes in detail the facts and
procedural history of this case.
1
1
judge’s report and recommendation. When a party submits timely and specific objections to a
report and recommendation, the court is required to make a de novo determination of those
portions of a report to which objection is made, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), by reviewing “the
Report, the record, applicable legal authorities, along with [the] objections and replies.”
Bandhan v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 234 F.Supp.2d 313, 316 (S.D.N.Y.2002). However, where a
party’s objections are “conclusory or general,” or where the party “simply reiterates its original
arguments,” the report should be reviewed only for clear error. Walker v. Vaughan, 216
F.Supp.2d 290, 292 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (quoting Barratt v. Joie, No. 96-CV-0324 (LTS) (THK),
2002 WL 335014, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2002)); accord Cartagena v. Connelly, 06-CV-2047
(LTS) (GWG), 2008 WL 2169659, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2008). Furthermore, the district
court “may adopt those portions of the ... report to which no ‘specific written objection’ is made,
as long as the factual and legal bases supporting the findings and conclusions set forth in those
sections are not clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” Eisenberg v. New England Motor Freight,
Inc., 564 F. Supp. 2d 224, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2)); see also
Alverio v. Colvin, No. 13-CV-4722, 2015 WL 1062411, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2015) (“When
the parties make no objections to the [r]eport [and recommendation], the [c]ourt may adopt [it] if
there is no clear error on the face of the record.” (internal references omitted)).
Defendant CVTC filed timely objections to the R&R. Dkt. No. 25 (the “Objections”).
CVTC objects to the R&R only insofar it recommends this Court not dismiss Plaintiff’s claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and expressly disclaimed objections to all other recommendations by
Judge Cave. See Objections at 1. On December 16, 2024, Plaintiff submitted a response to the
Objections. Dkt. No. 26 (the “Response”).
2
The Court has reviewed those aspects of the R&R that were not the subject of any
objection for clear error and finds none. See Braunstein v. Barber, No. 06-cv-5978, 2009 WL
1542707, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2009) (explaining that a “district court may adopt those
portions of a report and recommendation to which no objections have been made, as long as no
clear error is apparent from the face of the record.”). Moreover, the Court has reviewed de novo
those aspects of the R&R that were the subject of the Objections. Having reviewed the record,
the parties’ submissions in connection with the Defendant’s motion to dismiss, the R&R, the
Objections, and the Response, the Court agrees with Judge Cave’s thoughtful and well-reasoned
analysis and conclusions in full and therefore ADOPTS THE R&R IN ITS ENTIRETY.
For the reasons articulated in the R&R, CVTC’s motion to dismiss the complaint is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows: (1) Plaintiff’s Title VI Claim is DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE and with leave to amend to correct the deficiencies identified in pages
11-14 of the R&R; (2) Plaintiff’s Title VII Claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and
without leave to amend; (3) CVTC’s motion to dismiss is DENIED as to Plaintiff’s Section 1981
Claim; and (4) Plaintiff’s NYSHRL and NYCHRL Claims are DISMISSED with prejudice and
without leave to amend.
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motion pending at Dkt. No.
12 and mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff.
Dated: January 29, 2025
New York, New York
SO ORDERED.
MARGARET M. GARNETT
United States District Judge
3
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
LYDIA V. JOY,
Plaintiff,
-v-
CIVIL ACTION NO. 23 Civ. 11177 (MMG) (SLC)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
CRIME VICTIMS TREATMENT CENTER,
Defendant.
SARAH L. CAVE, United States Magistrate Judge.
TO THE HONORABLE MARGARET M. GARNETT, United States District Judge:
I.INTRODUCTION
Pro se Plaintiff Lydia V. Joy asserts race and national origin discrimination and retaliation
claims against Defendant Crime Victims Treatment Center (“CVTC”), which she alleges wrongfully
terminated her from a professional development training program.
(ECF No. 1 (the
“Complaint”)). CVTC now moves to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim (ECF No. 12
(the “Motion”)), which Ms. Joy has opposed. (ECF No. 18 (the “Opposition”)). For the reasons
set forth below, we respectfully recommend that the Motion be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED
IN PART.
II.BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
The following facts are summarized from Ms. Joy’s Complaint and Opposition, the
allegations of which the Court accepts as true for purposes of the Motion. See N.J. Carpenters
Health Fund v. Royal Bank of Scotland Grp., PLC, 709 F.3d 109, 119 (2d Cir. 2013); Caraballo v.
Dep’t of Corrs. of City of N.Y., No. 22 Civ. 971 (JLR), 2022 WL 16555313, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31,
2022); see also Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 122 n.1 (2d Cir. 2013) (“A district court deciding
a motion to dismiss may consider factual allegations made by a pro se party in [her]
papers opposing the motion.”).1
1. The Parties
Ms. Joy, who is originally from Paraguay and whose primary language is Spanish, identifies
as Hispanic. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 2). In December 2021, she obtained a community health worker
certification from LaGuardia Community College, where she was valedictorian of her graduating
class. (Id. ¶ 3). Since March 2022, Ms. Joy has been employed at Lenox Health Greenwich Village
Emergency Department (the “ED”) as an Outreach Services Associate in the Infectious Diseases
Department. (Id. ¶ 4). In her position in the ED, where she “was employed [] during all relevant
times . . . to the present[,]” Ms. Joy worked as a health educator and counselor in the HIV
program. (Id.)
CVTC is “a recipient of federal and state funding” that provides training in rape crisis and
domestic violence advocacy. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 28).
2. The Training Program
At some point, one of Ms. Joy’s co-workers reported to the ED Director that she was
impressed with Ms. Joy’s work and recommended that she be added to a special team for sexual
assault survivors, known as the “SAFE Team.” (Id. ¶ 5). To join the SAFE Team, Ms. Joy needed
to complete “special training.” (Id. ¶ 7). A social worker in the ED referred Ms. Joy to CVTC’s
Rape Crisis and Domestic Violence Advocate Training and Certification (the “Training Program”),
1
Internal citations and quotation marks are omitted from case citations unless otherwise indicated.
2
which the social worker had completed herself “without incident.” (Id. ¶ 8). If she completed
the Training Program and joined the SAFE Team, Ms. Joy anticipated applying to the
National Advocate Credentialing Program (“NACP”) to become a bilingual sexual assault case
manager or bilingual counselor, higher paying positions that would involve counseling,
serving as a case manager for survivors, managing a clinical case load, developing plans with
survivors, assisting in legal matters, and making referrals. (Id. ¶ 6). Ms. Joy’s “employer”—i.e.,
the ED—approved her participation in the Training Program. (Id. ¶ 9).
Ms. Joy registered for the Training Program with the goal of becoming an Advocate
within one year. (Id. ¶ 10). She “complied with all the processes from the interview, disclosed
medical forms and information forms [to] CVTC, [and] signed up in their App,” among other
tasks. (Id. ¶ 11).
On September 26, 2022, Ms. Joy interviewed with CVTC’s Community
Programs Coordinator and one of its social workers. (Id. ¶ 15). The same day, CVTC sent
Ms. Joy an acceptance letter that listed the dates on which she was to attend a total of 40
hours of training. (Id. ¶ 16).
On September 29, 2022, Ms. Joy returned by email “the
procedures and legal documentation”
required
to
enter
the
Training
Program,
including medical records, a photograph, a copy of a photo identification, “Mount Sinai ED”
forms, and a HIPAA release. (Id. ¶ 17).
Ms. Joy then received a copy of CVTC’s manual
and training materials along with credentials and access to CVTC’s “app.” (Id. ¶ 18–19).
Ms. Joy believes that she had an agreement with CVTC to provide her with 40 hours of
advocate training. (Id. ¶ 28).
On October 6, 2022, Ms. Joy participated in her first session of the Training
Program, which ran for three hours, and the next day, was introduced to her CVTC mentor. (Id.
¶¶ 20–21). Following an additional eight hours of training on October 8, 2022, Ms. Joy
3
corresponded with
her mentor, who informed her that “[o]ne of the most critical parts of the training was ‘role
plays’” that practiced introductions to survivors to form “an emotional connection[.]” (Id. ¶
21). Ms. Joy “completed all her role plays in English and had good feedback[.]” (Id. ¶¶ 21–22).
Ms. Joy participated in further training and role play sessions on October 9 and 12, 2022. (Id.
¶¶ 22, 23, 25). During the role play session on October 12, 2022, CVTC’s Clinical Director
commented to Ms. Joy, “I can only imagine how difficult it is for you because your
primary language is Spanish[,]” and “[t]his is difficult for you because of the lack of emotional
connection with the survivor due to the language barrier.” (Id. ¶¶ 25–26). Another trainee
who is white performed the same role play as Ms. Joy and received positive feedback, while Ms.
Joy did not. (Id. ¶¶ 29, 33). Ms. Joy viewed Ms. Karp’s comments as racist microaggressions.
(Id. ¶¶ 25–26). Based on the Clinical Director’s comments, Ms. Joy believes that “CVTC only
accepts survivors whose primary language is English into the program[.]” (Id. ¶ 27).
On October 13, 2022, Ms. Joy participated in another role play session, following which
she was told “not to return for the last 16 hours of training” and her profile was removed from
the CVTC App without explanation. (Id. ¶¶ 32, 41–42, 45). Ms. Joy believes that she was
dismissed “because her first language is not English.” (Id. ¶ 31). Ms. Joy reported her dismissal
from the Training Program to her supervisor in the ED, who commented that “her employer
paid for the hours and the fact that she was dismissed from the training ‘did not look good’
in her record.” (Id. ¶ 34). The ED, concerned that Ms. Joy would no longer qualify for the SAFE
Team position, planned to open an investigation and request information from CVTC. (Id.)
On October 15, 2022, Ms. Joy inquired of CVTC’s Operations Director and Head of Human
Resources the reason for her dismissal from the Training Program. (Id. ¶ 45). Later the same
4
day, she received a response from CVTC’s Community Programs Coordinator that discussed the
importance of background checks for all CVTC volunteers and stated that:
[d]uring our initial phone call, I asked whether you were taking the CVTC training
in your capacity as an [ED] employee or if you had planned to become a CVTC
advocate. You answered that you had hoped to become a CVTC advocate.
Previous [ED] staff who enrolled in our training did so in their capacity as hospital
staff and community partners, with no plans to go on call as CVTC advocates.
Because you stated you were taking the training of your own volition, you were
held to the same standard as every volunteer candidate that goes through our
program. Based on our concerns, we determined that it would not be appropriate
for you to complete training this year and become an advocate with CVTC. I’m
happy to have a conversation with you next week to go further into how we came
to this decision.
I understand this news is difficult to hear, but we have been clear since Day 1—as
well as in your advocate interview—not everyone who is invited will complete
training or become a CVTC advocate.
(Id. ¶ 46 (the “Oct. 15 Email”)). Ms. Joy asserts that, contrary to the Oct. 15 Email, she told CVTC
that she was participating in the Training Program “for the opportunity the certification would
provide to be part of the [SAFE Team] at [the] ED.” (Id. ¶ 47). Ms. Joy alleges that CVTC’s
explanation for her dismissal “is pretextual and that the true reason for being terminated from
the [T]raining [Program] was based on race and national origin discrimination.” (Id.) Ms. Joy
responded to the Oct. 15 Email with additional questions regarding her dismissal, but did not
receive a response from CVTC, which she believes “constitutes an adverse inference that her
dismissal . . . was based on her race and national origin[.]” (Id. ¶¶ 48–49, 52). Later in October,
she received from CVTC a box of “gifts” including water bottles and phone accessories, which she
sent back, believing them to be “some sort of bribery to not speak up about her unlawful
termination from the [T]raining [P]rogram[.]” (Id. ¶¶ 50–51).
As a result of her dismissal from the Training Program, Ms. Joy was “prevented [] from
pursuing a more senior position with better benefits” in the ED and “was mortified and scared
5
that her employer [the ED] might terminate her[.]” (Id. ¶¶ 35–37; see id. ¶ 41). After her
dismissal, Ms. Joy sought medical attention and counseling. (Id. at 14).
B. Procedural Background
On December 9, 2022, Ms. Joy filed a complaint with the New York State Division of
Human Rights (“NYSHR”) and the United States Equal Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). (ECF
No. 1 ¶ 53). During discovery in these administrative proceedings, CVTC disclosed that of the
63 people who participated in the Training Program, 55 are of United States origin and eight from
other national origins, although none are Hispanic. (Id. ¶ 55). On September 26, 2023, Ms. Joy
received from the EEOC a notice of right to sue letter (the “EEOC Notice”). (Id. ¶ 57).
On December 23, 2023, Ms. Joy filed the Complaint, in which she asserts claims under the
following laws: (i) Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. (the “Title VI
Claim”); (ii) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (the “Title VII Claim”);
(iii) 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (the “Section 1981 Claim”); (iv) the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y.
Exec. L. § 290 et seq. (the “NYSHRL Claim”); and (v) the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.C.
Admin. Code § 8-502 (the “NYCHRL Claim”). (ECF No. 1 at 2).
On April 15, 2024, CVTC filed the Motion. (ECF Nos. 12–14). On May 13, 2024, Ms. Joy
filed the Opposition, and on May 20, 2024, CVTC filed a reply. (ECF Nos. 18; 20). On October 24,
2024, the Honorable Margaret M. Garnett referred the Motion to the undersigned for this Report
and Recommendation. (ECF No. 21).
6
III.DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standards
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain “factual
allegations sufficient ‘to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’” ATSI Commc’ns, Inc.
v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)). The complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Starr v. Sony BMG Music Ent., 592 F.3d 314, 321 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “In applying this standard,
a court accepts as true all well-pled factual allegations but does not credit ‘mere conclusory
statements’ or ‘[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action.’” Gottesfeld v.
Anderson, No. 18 Civ. 10836 (PGG), 2020 WL 1082590, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2020) (quoting
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). The Court shall not give “effect to legal conclusions couched as factual
allegations.” Port Dock & Stone Corp. v. Oldcastle Ne., Inc., 507 F.3d 117, 121 (2d Cir. 2007).
“Where a court can infer no more than the mere possibility of misconduct from the factual
averments – in other words, where the well-pled allegations of a complaint have not ‘nudged
[plaintiff's] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible’ – dismissal is appropriate.”
Gottesfeld, 2020 WL 1082590, at *4 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “In considering a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a district court may consider the
facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint as exhibits, and documents
incorporated by reference in the complaint.” DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C., 622 F.3d 104, 111
7
(2d Cir. 2010).
“Where a document is not incorporated by reference, the court may
never[the]less consider it where the complaint ‘relies heavily upon its terms and effect,’ thereby
rendering the document ‘integral’ to the complaint.’” Id. (quoting Mangiafico v. Blumenthal,
471 F.3d 391, 398 (2d Cir. 2006)). For a document to be integral to the complaint, “the plaintiff
must have (1) ‘actual notice’ of the extraneous information and (2) ‘relied upon th[e]
document[ ] in framing the complaint.’” DeLuca v. AccessIT Grp., Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 54, 60
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Chambers, 282 F.3d at 153).
In deciding a motion to dismiss a pro se complaint, “the submissions of a pro se litigant
must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.”
Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam); see Aris v.
N.Y. Guard, No. 22 Civ. 5019 (JLR), 2023 WL 5003581, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2023) (noting
that submissions from pro se litigants are generally “held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”). Despite that consideration, “a pro se plaintiff must
still plead enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Gottesfeld, 2020
WL 1082590, at *5.
While the Court has an obligation “to draw the most favorable
inferences” from a complaint, it “cannot invent factual allegations that [the plaintiff] has
not pled.”
Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010). The Court also “need not
accept allegations that are ‘contradicted by other matters asserted or relied upon or
incorporated by reference by a plaintiff in drafting the complaint.’” Tsinberg v. City of New
York, No. 20 Civ. 749 (PAE), 2021 WL 1146942, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2021) (quoting Fisk v.
Letterman, 401 F. Supp. 2d 362, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)).
8
B. Application
In the Complaint, Ms. Joy asserts five race and national origin discrimination and
retaliation claims: the Title VI Claim, the Title VII Claim, the Section 1981 Claim, the NYSHRL
Claim, and the NYCHRL Claim. (ECF No. 1 at 2). In her Opposition, Ms. Joy concedes that her
NYSHRL and NYCHRL Claims should be dismissed, and, accordingly, the Court recommends
dismissal of both claims with prejudice. (ECF No. 18 at 1).
The Court turns to analyzing whether Ms. Joy has adequately pled claims under Title VI,
Title VII, and Section 1981.
1. Title VI Claim
In support of her Title VI Claim, Ms. Joy alleges that CVTC, which receives federal funding,
discriminated and retaliated against her by dismissing her from the Training Program based on
her race and national origin. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 1, 31–32, 47). To support an inference that her
dismissal was discriminatory, Ms. Joy relies on allegations that (i) CVTC staff stated that the role
play sessions were “difficult for” Ms. Joy as a Spanish-speaker, and (ii) none of CVTC’s trainees
were of Hispanic origin. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 25–26, 55–56). In the Motion, as explained in further
depth below, CVTC argues that the Complaint does not allege facts supportive of relief under
Title VI.
a. Legal Standard
“Title VI prohibits intentional discrimination based on race[, color, or national origin] in
any program that receives federal funding.” DT v. Somers Cent. Sch. Dist., 348 F. App’x 697, 699
(2d Cir. 2009). It provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
9
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. To plead a Title VI claim, a plaintiff must allege that the
defendant received federal funding, that the defendant “discriminated against [her] on the
basis of [race or national origin], that the discrimination was intentional, and that the
discrimination was a substantial or motivating factor for the defendant’s actions[.]” Tolbert v.
Queens Coll., 242 F.3d 58, 69 (2d Cir. 2001). A “naked allegation” that a plaintiff was treated
differently from individuals outside of the protected class is “too conclusory” to survive a
motion to dismiss. Kajoshaj v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 543 F. App’x 11, 14 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing
Albert v. Carovano, 851 F.2d 561, 572 (2d Cir. 1988)).
Title VI claims “are subject to the burden-shifting framework” established in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Johnson v. N.Y. Univ., No. 17 Civ. 6184 (VEC)
(GWG), 2018 WL 3966703, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2018), adopted by, 2018 WL 4908108
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2018); see Lopez v. Webster Cent. Sch. Dist., 682 F. Supp. 2d 274, 279
(W.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Courts have applied the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
analysis to cases arising under Title VI.”); accord Koumantaros v. City Univ. of N.Y., No. 03
Civ. 10170 (GEL), 2007 WL 840115, at *7 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2007). The first step of that
framework requires a plaintiff to “successfully assert[ ] a prima facie case of [ ] discrimination
against” the defendant. Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 123
(2d Cir. 2004). If a plaintiff states a prima facie case, “defendants [then] have the burden of
showing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for their actions.” Id. If the defendant does so,
the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove “by a preponderance of the evidence that the
legitimate reasons offered by the defendant
10
were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.” Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
b. Analysis
CVTC raises three arguments in support of the Title VI Claim’s dismissal: that (1) Ms. Joy’s
allegations regarding its receipt of federal funds are conclusory and therefore deficient; (2) Ms.
Joy “fails to allege how Title VI applies to CVTC or her claims”; and (3) Ms. Joy “makes no
allegations that CVTC receives federal funds aimed primarily at providing employment.” (ECF No.
13 at 13–14). Ms. Joy opposes these arguments to differing degrees. (See ECF No. 18 at 4–10).
The Court addresses them in turn.
i.
Federal Funding
CVTC first asserts that the Complaint “alleges only in conclusory fashion that [it] receives
federal funds” and that these “mere conclusory statements” are insufficient to support Ms. Joy’s
Title VI Claim. (ECF No. 13 at 13). Ms. Joy disputes that her allegations regarding federal funding
are conclusory and adds that she “does not have to prove her factual allegation[s]” at the
pleading stage. (See ECF No. 18 at 6).
Although Ms. Joy is correct that she need not prove her claims at this stage of the
proceedings, the Court disagrees that her allegations regarding federal funding are adequate.
Receipt of federal funds is a required element of every Title VI claim, see, e.g., Tolbert, 242 F.3d
at 69, and merely alleging, without additional information, that an entity receives such funds
therefore amounts to no more than a “[t]hreadbare recital[] of [an] element[] of a cause of
action.” Gottesfeld, 2020 WL 1082590, at *4. To satisfy the federal funding element, Ms. Joy
must provide additional allegations regarding the federal funding CVTC receives, such as its
11
specific source, or the “nexus between the use of [the] funds and the alleged discriminatory
practice[.]” See Bloomberg v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 410 F. Supp. 3d 608, 625–26 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)
(finding allegation that “the DOE was and is a recipient of federal funding” insufficient without
further allegations regarding the “nexus between the . . . federal funds and the alleged
discriminatory practice”); Assoko v. City of New York, No. 06 Civ. 11414 (RJH), 2009 WL
1108745, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2009) (finding allegation that entity received funding
from U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development sufficient to satisfy federal funding
element).
ii.
Application of Title VI to CVTC
CVTC next argues that only entities that (1) “receive[] federal funding as a whole” or
(2) receive federal funding and are “principally engaged in providing health care (or one of the
other services enumerated in 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a(3)(A)(ii))”—namely, education, housing, social
services, or parks and recreation—may be held liable under Title VI, and that the Complaint fails
to allege facts to support the law’s application under either standard. (See ECF No. 13 at 12)
(quoting Do No Harm v. Pfizer Inc., 646 F. Supp. 3d 490, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2022); 42 U.S.C. § 2000d4a(3)(A)(ii)). In the Opposition, Ms. Joy highlights the Complaint’s allegation that CVTC is an
organization “that trains people to be rape crisis and domestic violence advocates” (ECF No. 18
at 5 (quoting ECF No. 1 ¶ 1)), and offers novel allegations that CVTC is a “not-for-profit
organization committed to helping people heal from violent crime” that provides “a wide range
of therapeutic services free of charge to anyone impacted by violence.” (Id.)
Taken together, Ms. Joy’s allegations are sufficient to give rise to a plausible inference
that CVTC is “principally engaged” in the provision of social services and is therefore subject to
Title VI. See Runnion ex rel. Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater Chicago and Nw. Ind., 786 F.3d 510,
12
528 (7th Cir. 2015) (stating that, in context of Rehabilitation Act claim, “merely alleging that the
[entity] received federal funds and [was] engaged in [covered] activities . . . would have
been sufficient for pleading purposes”); Doe v. Salvation Army in U.S., 685 F.3d 564, 571 (6th
Cir. 2012) (“The phrase “principally engaged” has been interpreted in other statutory contexts
as referring to the primary activities of a business, excluding only incidental activities.”).
Accordingly, Ms. Joy has plausibly alleged that Title VI is applicable to CVTC.
iii.
Employment Practices Theory
Finally, CVTC argues that, to the extent Title VI applies and Ms. Joy is complaining about
employment practices, it is not Ms. Joy’s employer and that, even if it were, the claim would fail.
(ECF No. 13 at 14). In support of this argument, CVTC invokes Section 2000d-3 of Title VI, which
provides that nothing in it “shall be construed to authorize action under [Title VI] by any
department or agency with respect to any employment practice of any employer . . . except
where a primary objective of the Federal financial assistance [the employer receives] is to provide
employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3. Although Section 2000d-3 refers only to agency action, the
Second Circuit has held that the statute also applies to private actions. See Ass’n Against Discr.
in Empl., Inc. v. City of Bridgeport, 647 F.2d 256, 276 (2d Cir. 1981); Johnson v. Cnty. of Nassau,
411 F. Supp. 2d 171, 175 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). Accordingly, “[f]or a claimant to recover under Title VI
against an employer for discriminatory employment practices, a threshold requirement is that
the employer be the recipient of federal funds aimed primarily at providing employment.” Ass’n
Against Discr. in Empl., Inc., 647 F.2d at 276. As CVTC observes, the Complaint fails to allege any
connection between the federal funding it supposedly receives and its employment practices,
“as opposed to any of the other purposes for which [CVTC] uses federal funding[.]” Miller-Sethi
13
v. City Univ. of N.Y., No. 21 Civ. 8591 (JPO), 2023 WL 419277, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26,
2023)(dismissing Title VI claim for failure to allege nexus between federal funds and
employment). Accordingly, to the extent Ms. Joy seeks relief based on her dismissal from the
Training Program on the basis that her dismissal amounted to an unlawful employment
practice, the Complaint fails to state any viable claim under Title VI. See Sherman v. Yonkers
Pub. Sch., No. 21 Civ. 7317 (CS), 2023 WL 137775, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2023) (dismissing Title
VI claim where “Plaintiff ha[d] not alleged, even in conclusory fashion (which in any event
would not suffice), that the federal funds received by [the defendant] were primarily intended
to provide employment”).
* * *
Consistent with the above, although the Complaint allows for an inference that Title VI
applies to CVTC, it does not contain sufficient factual allegations regarding CVTC’s receipt of
federal funding or suggest that CVTC may be held liable under Title VI based on its employment
practices. Because the deficiencies in Ms. Joy’s allegations may be fixable through amendments
to the Complaint, however, we respectfully recommend that the Motion be GRANTED as to the
Title VI Claim but that the claim be dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend. See
Verdi v. City of New York, 306 F. Supp. 3d 532, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (dismissing Title VI claim
without prejudice and with leave to amend where complaint lacked sufficient allegations
regarding defendant’s receipt of federal funding).
2. Title VII Claim
Ms. Joy’s Title VII Claim is premised on her assertion that CVTC was her employer and
engaged in discrimination and retaliation based on her race and national origin, i.e., dismissing
her from the Training Program because her primary language is Spanish. (See generally ECF
14
No. 1). CVTC argues that it was not Ms. Joy’s employer and is not covered by Title VII. (ECF No. 13
at 9–11). The Court agrees that Ms. Joy has not stated, and cannot state, a claim under Title VII.
a. Legal Standard
Section 2000e-2(a) of Title VII provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to . . . discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment
because of such individual’s race, color, . . . or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, . . . or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Title VII defines an employee as “an individual employed by an employer[,]”
an “elliptical statutory definition” that the Second Circuit has explained has as “‘a prerequisite . . .
that the individual have been hired in the first instance.’” York v. Ass’n of Bar of City of N.Y., 286
F.3d 122, 125 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1997)). In
addition, “the question [] whether someone is or is not an employee under Title VII usually turns
on whether he or she has received direct or indirect remuneration from the alleged employer.”
Pietras v. Bd. of Fire Comm’rs of Farmingville Fire Dist., 180 F.3d 468, 473 (2d Cir. 1999). If the
purported employee does not obtain any financial benefit from the purported employer, “no
‘plausible’ employment relationship of any sort can be said to exist” because compensation from
the employer to the employee “is an essential condition to the existence of an employeremployee relationship.” O’Connor, 126 F.3d at 115–16. The following factors are indicative of a
“financial benefit” for Title VII purposes: “salary or other wages; employee benefits, such as
health insurance; vacation; sick pay; or the promise of any of the foregoing.” York, 286 F.3d at
15
126. “[B]enefits must meet a minimum level of significance, or substantiality, in order to find an
employment relationship in the absence of more traditional compensation.” Id. Benefits may
satisfy the “remuneration test” if they are in the form of “(1) a retirement pension, (2) life
insurance, (3) death benefits, (4) disability insurance, and (5) some medical benefits.” Pietras,
180 F.3d at 471.
b. Analysis
Ms. Joy fails to state a plausible Title VII Claim for two reasons. First, she alleges
throughout the Complaint that the ED—not CVTC—was her employer. For example, she alleges
that she “was employed” as an “Outreach Services Associate for the Infectious Diseases
Department” of the ED “during all relevant times[.]” (ECF No. 1 ¶ 4). She also alleges that “her
employer recommended and approved her for” the Training Program “run by . . . CVTC”—an
allegation that only makes sense if the ED, not CVTC, is her “employer.” (Id. ¶ 1). Similarly, she
alleges that her “employer approved” her participation in the Training Program that CVTC runs.
(Id. ¶ 9; see also id. ¶ 36 (alleging that Ms. Joy was “scared that her employer might terminate
her because she was dismissed from a training program”); ¶ 41 (alleging that Ms. Joy “suffered
scrutiny in her work (current employer) for having been dismissed” from the Training Program)).
Because these specific allegations in the Complaint contradict Ms. Joy’s conclusory assertions
that CVTC was her “employer” for Title VII purposes, the Court need not accept them. See
Tsinberg, 2021 WL 1146942, at *4 (“The Court need not accept allegations that are contradicted
by other matters asserted . . . by a plaintiff in drafting the complaint.”).
Second, Ms. Joy’s allegations fail to satisfy the “remuneration test” set forth above. See
York, 286 F.3d at 126. The only “benefits” Ms. Joy describes are those she hoped the ED would
16
provide her if she completed the Training Program and became part of the SAFE Team. (See,
e.g., ECF No. 1 ¶ 1 (alleging that, due to dismissal from the Training Program, Ms. Joy was
“prevent[ed] from applying for a better position that came with higher compensation and
benefits”); id. ¶ 35 (same)). At most, Ms. Joy’s allegations give rise to the inference that,
while she was in the Training Program, she hoped to become a volunteer advocate for CVTC;
any incidental benefits she received as a trainee were far from “the sort of substantial benefits”
required to demonstrate status as an employee under Title VII. See York, 286 F.3d at 126
(explaining that plaintiff who received “merely incidental” benefits of clerical support and
networking as part of her volunteer position did not allege employer-employee relationship for
Title VII purposes).2
Given Ms. Joy’s concessions that the ED—not CVTC—was her employer, she has not,
and cannot, state a plausible Title VII claim against CVTC.
Accordingly, we respectfully
recommend that the Title VII Claim be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and without leave to
amend.
3. Section 1981 Claim
Ms. Joy contends that she had an “agreement” with CVTC, which “guaranteed” to provide
her with 40 hours of domestic violence advocacy training. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 28, 59). Without
conceding any other elements of a Section 1981 Claim, CVTC argues that Ms. Joy has failed to
allege the existence of any contract of which CVTC deprived her based on her race or national
origin. (ECF No. 13 at 15).
2
Given these two fundamental defects in Ms. Joy’s Title VII Claim, the Court need not analyze CVTC’s
alternative argument that the Training Program is not covered by Title VII (ECF No. 13 at 11), because
whether Ms. Joy’s participation in the Training Program was “part of the job” is a fact-intensive question
inappropriate for the pleading stage. See La Grande v. DeCrescente Distrib. Co., 370 F. App’x 206, 211 (2d
Cir. 2010) (reversing dismissal of Title VII claim based on allegation that employer prevented Black plaintiff
from participating in training that he alleged was “part of the job” and white employees were permitted
to attend, noting that “[t]raining is a benefit of employment that receives protection under Title VII”).
17
a. Legal Standard
Section 1981 provides that:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be
subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and extractions of
every kind, and to no other.
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). “[T]he term ‘make and enforce contracts’ includes the making, performance,
modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms,
and conditions of the contractual relationship.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b). “The rights protected by
[Section 1981] are protected against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination[.]” Id. at
§ 1981(c). “Section 1981 does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender[,] [ ] religion,
national origin, or age[.]” Anderson v. Conboy, 156 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 1998); see Saint Francis
Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987) (holding that § 1981 does not prohibit alleged
discrimination as to religious expression); Williams v. Victoria’s Secret, No. 15 Civ. 4715 (PGG)
(JLC), 2017 WL 1162908, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2017) (dismissing § 1981 claim based on alleged
age discrimination).
To plead a Section 1981 claim, “a plaintiff must allege facts in support of the following
elements: (1) the plaintiff is a member of a racial minority; (2) an intent to discriminate the basis
of race by the defendant; and (3) the discrimination concerned one or more of the activities
enumerated in the statute (i.e., make and enforce contracts, sue and be sued, give evidence,
etc.).” Mian v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., 7 F.3d 1085, 1087 (2d Cir. 1993).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a [Section 1981] plaintiff must specifically allege the
‘circumstances giving rise to a plausible inference of racially discriminatory intent.’” Bentley, Jr.
18
v. Mobil Gas Station, 599 F. App’x 395, 396 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 35 F.3d
709, 713 (2d Cir.1994)). “Direct evidence of discriminatory intent is not required to satisfy the
second element of a section 1981 claim, as a plaintiff may instead rely on circumstantial
evidence that supports an inference of discrimination.” Oparaji v. ABN AMRO Mortg. Grp., Inc.,
No. 19 Civ. 1650 (MKB), 2020 WL 9816011, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2020) (citing Lizardo v.
Denny’s, Inc., 270 F.3d 94, 104 (2d Cir. 2001)).
“An inference of discrimination may be drawn where ‘similarly situated’ patrons who are
not members of the relevant protected class are treated differently than the plaintiffs who
allege discrimination under section 1981.” Oparaji, 2020 WL 9816011, at *14 (citing Lizardo,
270 F.3d at 101). A plaintiff complaining of alleged disparate treatment, however, “must show
she was similarly situated in all material respects to the individuals with whom she seeks to
compare herself.” Johnson v. Andy Frain Servs., Inc., 638 F. App’x 68, 70 (2d Cir. 2016).
“A plaintiff’s naked allegation that the defendant acted based on the plaintiff’s race and
color is too conclusory to survive a motion to dismiss.” Bentley, Jr., 599 F. App’x at 396 (citing
Albert v. Carovano, 851 F.2d 561, 572 (2d Cir. 1988)). “Finally, ‘a complaint that identifies other
possible motives, combined with a lack of specific factual support of racial animus, contradicts a
claim of racial discrimination.’” Akyar v. TD Bank US Holding Co., No. 18 Civ. 379 (VSB), 2018 WL
4356734, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2018) (quoting Hicks v. IBM, 44 F. Supp. 2d 593, 598 (S.D.N.Y.
1999)).
19
b. Analysis
CVTC argues that it provided the Training Program to Ms. Joy “for free” and was paid by
the ED for her to participate, so Ms. Joy has failed to allege the existence of a contractual
relationship. (ECF No. 13 at 15).
Section 1981 “offers relief when racial discrimination blocks the creation of a contractual
relationship, as well as when racial discrimination impairs an existing contractual relationship, so
long as the plaintiff has or would have rights under the existing or proposed contractual
relationship.” Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 476 (2006). A Section 1981
plaintiff “must identify injuries flowing from a racially motivated breach of their own contractual
relationship, not of someone else’s.” Id. at 480. Construing the Complaint as favorably as
possible, the Court finds that Ms. Joy has alleged—barely—the existence of a contractual
agreement with CVTC under this standard. She lists the steps she took to register for, prepare
for, and participate in the Training Program, and that CVTC sent her an “acceptance letter” with
the training hours and dates. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 10, 11, 16, 17, 27, 28). And she alleges that CVTC
dismissed her from the Training Program for, apparently, not speaking English well enough, thus
preventing her from completing the Program’s objective—certification as a domestic violence
advocate. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 25–26, 30–31). A reasonable reading of Ms. Joy’s allegations is that CVTC
prevented her from completing the Training Program based on her race—Hispanic—which is
sufficient to plead a Section 1981 claim for purposes of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and
12(b)(6). See Mahmud v. Nassau Cnty. Med. Ctr., 191 F. Supp. 2d 286, 300 (E.D.N.Y. 2000)
(denying motion to dismiss Section 1981 claim based on denial of hospital privileges based on
race), reconsideration denied, 496 F. Supp. 2d 266, 274 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
20
The Second Circuit has recognized the existence of an implied contract for Section 1981
purposes where a student who enrolls at an educational institution and “complies with the
terms prescribed by the university and completes the required courses[,]” such that the
institution “must award him a degree.” Papelino v. Albany Coll. of Pharm. of Union Univ., 633
F.3d 81, 93 (2d Cir. 2011). In such a case, “a racially motivated dismissal thus runs afoul of §
1981.” Evans v. Columbia Univ. of the City of N.Y., No. 14 Civ. 2658 (NSR), 2015 WL 1730097, at
*6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2015) (denying motion to dismiss Section 1981 claim based on alleged
racially motivated termination from university). A similar rationale applies to CVTC’s alleged
racially motivated dismissal of Ms. Joy from the Training Program, which plausibly alleges a
Section 1981 Claim. Furthermore, CVTC cites no authority for its suggestion that Ms. Joy, as
opposed to the ED, had to pay herself for the Training Program for a contract to exist for
Section 1981 purposes. (See ECF No. 13 at 15). Accordingly, we respectfully recommend that
the Motion be DENIED as to the Section 1981 Claim.
IV.CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we respectfully recommend that the Motion be
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows:
1. The Title VI Claim should be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and with leave to
amend.
2. The Title VII Claim should be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and without leave to
amend.
3. The Motion should be DENIED as to the Section 1981 Claim.
4. The NYSHRL and NYCHRL Claims should be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
21
Dated:
New York, New York
December 2, 2024
_________________________
SARAH L. CAVE
United States Magistrate Judge
22
Case 1:23-cv-11177-MMG-SLC
Document 24
Filed 12/02/24
Page 23 of 23
*
*
*
NOTICE OF PROCEDURE FOR FILING OBJECTIONS TO THIS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The parties shall have fourteen (14) days (including weekends and holidays) from service
of this Report and Recommendation to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)
and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d) (adding
three additional days when service is made under Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C), (D) or (F)). A party
may respond to another party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a
copy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Such objections, and any response to objections, shall be filed with
the Clerk of the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d), 72(b). Any requests for
an extension of time for filing objections must be addressed to Judge Garnett.
FAILURE TO OBJECT WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL RESULT IN A WAIVER OF
OBJECTIONS AND WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ.
P. 6(a), (d), 72(b); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). If Ms. Joy does not have access to cases
cited in this Report and Recommendation that are reported on Westlaw, she may request copies
from CVTC’s counsel. See Local Civ. R. 7.2.
23
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