Cover- Coleman v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

Filing 21

DECISION AND ORDER: For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff is GRANTED Judgment on the Pleadings, and this matter is REMANDED for further administrative proceedings consistent with this Decision and Order. The Clerk is directed to enter final judgment in favor of Plaintiff and then close the file. (Signed by Magistrate Judge Gary R. Jones on 8/30/2024) (mml) Transmission to Orders and Judgments Clerk for processing.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
----------------------------------------------------RAQUEL C-C.,
Plaintiff,

DECISION AND ORDER
1:24-CV-00695-GRJ

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
----------------------------------------------------GARY R. JONES, United States Magistrate Judge:
In January of 2021, Plaintiff Raquel C-C. 1 applied for Disability
Insurance Benefits under the Social Security Act. The Commissioner of
Social Security denied the application. Plaintiff, represented by Konoski &
Partners, P.C., Bryan Matthew Konoski, Esq., of counsel, commenced this
action seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s denial of benefits
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405 (g) and 1383 (c)(3). The parties consented to the
jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge. (Docket No. 10).
This case was referred to the undersigned on July 31, 2024.
Presently pending are the parties’ requests for Judgment on the Pleadings
under Rule 12 (c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the following

Plaintiff’s name has been partially redacted in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 5.2 (c)(2)(B) and the recommendation of the Committee on Court
Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the United States.
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reasons, Plaintiff is granted judgment on the pleadings and this matter is
remanded for further administrative proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
A.

Administrative Proceedings

Plaintiff applied for benefits on January 4, 2021, alleging disability
beginning December 30, 2016. (T at 224-29). 2 Plaintiff’s application was
denied initially and on reconsideration. She requested a hearing before an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).
A hearing was held on September 21, 2022, before ALJ Sharda
Singh. (T at 32-58). Plaintiff appeared with an attorney and testified. (T at
37-54). The ALJ also received testimony from Peter Manzi, a vocational
expert. (T at 54-57). During the hearing, Plaintiff amended her alleged
onset date to October 24, 2019. (T at 36).
B.

ALJ’s Decision

On December 21, 2022, the ALJ issued a decision denying the
application for benefits. (T at 12-31). The ALJ found that Plaintiff had not
engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 24, 2019 (the
amended alleged onset date) and met the insured status requirements of

2

Citations to “T” refer to the administrative record transcript at Docket No. 16.
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the Social Security Act through December 31, 2021 (the date last insured).
(T at 17-18).
The ALJ concluded that, as of the date last insured, Plaintiff’s
fibromyalgia, chronic pain syndrome, chronic fatigue syndrome,
degenerative joint disease of the knees and shoulders, and obesity were
severe impairments as defined under the Act. (T at 18).
However, the ALJ found that, as of the date last insured, Plaintiff did
not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or
medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 403,
Subpart P, Appendix 1. (T at 21).
At step four of the sequential analysis the ALJ determined that, as of
the date last insured, Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) to perform light work, as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567 (b), with the
following limitations: she could never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds;
could occasionally climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch,
and crawl; could occasionally reach overhead with the right upper
extremity; and must avoid hazards such as moving machinery. (T at 22).
The ALJ concluded that, as of the date last insured, Plaintiff could
perform her past relevant work as a teacher aide as that occupation is
generally performed. (T at 25).
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As such, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not been under a disability,
as defined under the Social Security Act, and was not entitled to benefits
for the period between October 24, 2019 (the amended alleged onset date)
and December 31, 2021 (the date last insured). (T at 26).
On December 4, 2023, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request
for review, making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision. (T
at 1-6).
C.

Procedural History

Plaintiff commenced this action, by and through her counsel, by filing
a Complaint on January 31, 2024. (Docket No. 1). On May 15, 2024,
Plaintiff filed a brief in support of a request for judgment on the pleadings.
(Docket No. 17). The Commissioner interposed a brief in support of a
request for judgment on the pleadings on August 15, 2024. (Docket No.
19).
II. APPLICABLE LAW
A.

Standard of Review

“It is not the function of a reviewing court to decide de novo whether a
claimant was disabled.” Melville v. Apfel, 198 F.3d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 1999).
The court’s review is limited to “determin[ing] whether there is substantial
evidence supporting the Commissioner's decision and whether the
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Commissioner applied the correct legal standard.” Poupore v. Astrue, 566
F.3d 303, 305 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
The reviewing court defers to the Commissioner's factual findings,
which are considered conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. See
42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “Substantial evidence” is “more than a mere scintilla”
and “means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Lamay v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec.,
562 F.3d 503, 507 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)).
“In determining whether the agency's findings are supported by
substantial evidence, the reviewing court is required to examine the entire
record, including contradictory evidence and evidence from which
conflicting inferences can be drawn.” Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145,
151 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotations omitted).
“When there are gaps in the administrative record or the ALJ has
applied an improper legal standard,” or when the ALJ’s rationale is unclear,
remand “for further development of the evidence” or for an explanation of
the ALJ’s reasoning is warranted. Pratts v. Chater, 94 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir.
1996).

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B.

Five-Step Sequential Evaluation Process

Under the Social Security Act, a claimant is disabled if he or she
lacks the ability “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of
any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last
for a continuous period of not less than 12 months ....” 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(1)(A).
A claimant’s eligibility for disability benefits is evaluated pursuant to a
five-step sequential analysis:
1. The Commissioner considers whether the claimant is
currently engaged in substantial gainful activity.
2. If not, the Commissioner considers whether the claimant has
a “severe impairment” which limits his or her mental or physical
ability to do basic work activities.
3. If the claimant has a “severe impairment,” the Commissioner
must ask whether, based solely on medical evidence, claimant
has an impairment listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. If the
claimant has one of these enumerated impairments, the
Commissioner will automatically consider him disabled, without
considering vocational factors such as age, education, and
work experience.
4. If the impairment is not “listed” in the regulations, the
Commissioner then asks whether, despite the claimant's severe
impairment, he or she has residual functional capacity to
perform his or her past work.

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5. If the claimant is unable to perform his or her past work, the
Commissioner then determines whether there is other work
which the claimant could perform.
See Rolon v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 994 F. Supp. 2d 496, 503
(S.D.N.Y. 2014); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v),
416.920(a)(4)(i)–(v).
The claimant bears the burden of proof as to the first four steps; the
burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. See Green-Younger v.
Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2003). At step five, the Commissioner
determines whether claimant can perform work that exists in significant
numbers in the national economy. See Butts v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 101,
103 (2d Cir. 2005); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c)(2).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff raises two main arguments in support of her request for
reversal of the ALJ’s decision. First, she argues that the ALJ failed to
adequately address the impact of her mental impairments on her RFC and
ability to perform her past relevant work. Second, Plaintiff argues that the
ALJ’s RFC determination does not reflect the extent of her physical
limitations. The Court will address both arguments in turn.

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A.

Mental Impairments

The Commissioner uses a “special technique” to evaluate the severity
of mental impairments at step two of the sequential analysis. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520a(a). The ALJ rates the degree of functional limitation resulting
from the claimant’s mental impairment(s) to determine whether the
impairment(s) is/are “severe.” See id. at § 404.1520a(d)(1).
To perform this analysis, the ALJ considers the degree of limitation in
four (4) broad functional areas – understanding, remembering, or applying
information; interacting with others; concentrating, persisting, or
maintaining pace; and adapting or managing oneself. If the limitation in
these domains is no more than “mild,” and if the evidence does not
otherwise indicate more than a mild limitation in the claimant’s activity to
perform basic work activities, then the mental impairment(s) will be
considered non-severe. See id.
In the present case, the ALJ recognized Plaintiff’s ADHD, major
depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, obsessive compulsive
disorder, and PTSD as medically determinable impairments, but concluded
that they did not cause more than minimal limitation in Plaintiff’s ability to
perform basic mental work activities and were, thus, non-severe
impairments. (T at 19).
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As to the four functional areas, the ALJ assessed mild limitation with
respect to Plaintiff’s ability to understand, remember, or apply information;
mild impairment as to interacting with others; mild limitation in
concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and mild impairment in
adapting or managing herself. (T at 20).
Plaintiff does not challenge these conclusions but argues that the ALJ
erred by failing to explain why the RFC does not incorporate any limitation
with respect to her ability to meet the mental demands of basic work
activity.
Although the ALJ discussed Plaintiff’s mental limitations when
determining her RFC (T at 24-25), remand is required because the ALJ did
not address Plaintiff’s mental limitations with the vocational expert when
assessing whether Plaintiff could meet the mental demands of her past
relevant work.
At step four of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ concluded that, as
of the date last insured, Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform her past
relevant work as a teacher aide. (T at 25). This conclusion was based on
interrogatory responses provided by the vocational expert. (T at 25-26).
The vocational expert opined that a claimant with the limitations set
forth in the RFC could perform Plaintiff’s past relevant work as that
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occupation is generally performed in the national economy, albeit not as
Plaintiff actually performed it. (T at 358).
Notably, however, the vocational expert was not asked whether a
claimant with the limitations set forth in the RFC and mild impairment in all
four domains of mental functioning could perform the past relevant work. 3
This was a material omission because Plaintiff’s past relevant work
as a teacher aide is classified as semi-skilled work. (T at 55).
Courts in this Circuit have consistently recognized that semiskilled
work “may be inconsistent with mild limitations in mental functioning.”
Lorraine K. v. Kijakazi, No. 20-CV-1469L, 2022 WL 1115456, at *3
(W.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2022)(citations omitted); see also Novas v. Kijakazi, No.
22CV1020MKVBCM, 2023 WL 2614362, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2023),
report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Novas v. Comm'r of Soc.
Sec., No. 22-CV-1020 (MKV), 2023 WL 2613550 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2023);
Garcia v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 21-CV-01230 (SDA), 2022 WL
4234555, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2022), amended in part, No. 21-CV01230 (SDA), 2022 WL 17103621 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2022).

During the administrative hearing, the ALJ asked whether a hypothetical claimant
limited to unskilled work, with limitation in her ability to interact with others and adapt to
changes, could perform Plaintiff’s past relevant work; the vocational expert testified that
such a claimant could not perform the work. (T at 57).
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As such, “when posing hypotheticals to the VE, the ALJ should
inquire about even ‘mild’ limitations on mental functioning ….” Novas, 2023
WL 2614362, at *12; see also Rousey v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 285 F.
Supp. 3d 723, 742 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)(ALJ erred by failing to ask VE to
“assume non-severe mental impairments including mild limitations in
concentration, persistence or pace,” because plaintiff's “non-severe anxiety
and memory impairments may have affected the vocational expert's
conclusion that [she] could do her past skilled and semi-skilled sedentary
work”); Coulter v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 673 F. Supp. 3d 365, 375-80
(S.D.N.Y. 2023)(collecting cases)
“Remand for an adequate consideration of non-severe mental
impairments is especially appropriate where the ALJ has found that Plaintiff
could perform semi-skilled or skilled work.” Ayaz M. v. Kijakazi, No. 3:22CV-1603 (KAD), 2024 WL 449575, at *3 (D. Conn. Feb. 5, 2024); see also
Lewis v. Berryhill, No. 3:18-CV-00209 (JAM), 2018 WL 6040264, at *3 (D.
Conn. Nov. 19, 2018).
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds a remand for adequate
consideration of the impact of Plaintiff’s non-severe mental impairments on
her ability to perform her past relevant work is required.

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B.

RFC

A claimant’s “residual functional capacity” (“RFC”) is his or her
“maximum remaining ability to do sustained work activities in an ordinary
work setting on a continuing basis.” Melville, 198 F.3d at 52 (quoting SSR
96-8p).
When assessing a claimant’s RFC, an ALJ must consider medical
opinions regarding the claimant’s functioning and make a determination
based on an assessment of the record as a whole. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1527(d)(2), 416.9527(d)(2) (“Although we consider opinions from
medical sources on issues such as ...your residual functional capacity...the
final responsibility for deciding these issues is reserved to the
Commissioner.”).
As noted above, the ALJ determined that, as of the date last insured,
Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform light work, as defined in 20 CFR
404.1567 (b), with the following limitations: she could never climb ladders,
ropes, or scaffolds; could occasionally climb ramps and stairs, balance,
stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; could occasionally reach overhead with the
right upper extremity; and must avoid hazards such as moving machinery.
(T at 22).

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Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to explain why the RFC
determination does not include (a) a limitation with respect to overhead
reaching bilaterally and/or (b) any restriction in her ability to manipulate
objects with her bilateral upper extremities.
The Court finds that this aspect of the ALJ’s decision must also be
revisited on remand.
In October of 2021, Dr. J. Sharif-Najafi, a non-examining State
Agency review physician, opined, inter alia, that Plaintiff was limited to
occasional overhead reaching bilaterally. (T at 67).
In September of 2021, Dr. Michael Healy performed a consultative
examination. Dr. Healy assessed mild to moderate limitation with respect
to Plaintiff’s ability to reach, grasp, and hold objects with either upper
extremity. (T at 436).
The ALJ found the opinions of Dr. Sharif-Najafi and Dr. Healy
“generally persuasive.” (T at 24).
However, the RFC developed by the ALJ does not include any
limitation with respect to Plaintiff’s ability to reach overhead with her left
upper extremity and does not incorporate any limitation in her ability to
manipulate objects. (T at 22).

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Accordingly, the Court concludes that the ALJ erred by failing to
provide a sufficient explanation as to how she resolved the conflicts
between the RFC determination and the assessments of two physicians
that she found “generally persuasive.”
“[T]he crucial factors in any determination must be set forth with
sufficient specificity to enable [the reviewing court] to decide whether the
determination is supported by substantial evidence.” Ferraris v. Heckler,
728 F.2d 582, 587 (2d Cir. 1984). Remand is required where the ALJ failed
to provide an “adequate ‘roadmap’ for his reasoning.” Almodovar v.
Berryhill, No. 17-CV-8902 (BCM), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48612, at *18
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2019).
Here, although the ALJ referenced Plaintiff’s history of right shoulder
surgery in a summary of her medical history (T at 23), the ALJ provided no
explanation as to why she found Plaintiff restricted to occasional overhead
with her right upper extremity, but (apparently) concluded that she had no
limitation as to overhead reaching with her left upper extremity, even
though both Dr. Healy and Dr. Sharif-Najafi assessed limitation with respect
to overhead reaching bilaterally.

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The Commissioner points to the opinion of Dr. R. Mohanty, another
non-examining State Agency review physician, who did not assess any
limitation with respect to overhead reaching. (T at 85-92).
However, the ALJ gave Dr. Mohanty’s opinion the same “generally
persuasive” designation assigned to the assessments of Dr. Healy and Dr.
Sharif-Najafi. (T at 24).
Moreover, other than a conclusory reference to Plaintiff’s
“conservative” treatment history and “generally normal findings,” the ALJ
did not explain how she reconciled the competing medical opinions and
concluded that no medical professional appears to have reached, i.e., that
Plaintiff was limited to occasional overhead reaching with her right upper
extremity but could perform unlimited overhead reaching with her left.
The ALJ also failed to adequately explain the absence of
manipulative limitations in the RFC determination. As noted above, Dr.
Healy opined that Plaintiff had mild to moderate limitation in her ability to
grasp and hold objects. (T at 436). Both Dr. Sharif-Najafi and Dr. Mohanty
assessed no limitations as to handling or holding. (T at 67, 87).
It is possible the ALJ found the State Agency review physicians’
assessments more persuasive as to this issue, but the ALJ described all
three opinions as “generally persuasive” and did not provide a sufficient
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explanation as to how she reconciled their conflicting conclusions regarding
whether and to what extent Plaintiff’s ability to manipulate objects was
limited.
This is a material omission because (a) Dr. Healy examined Plaintiff,
while the State Agency review physicians did not; (b) Plaintiff reported that
she had difficulty holding items without dropping them and problems with
grabbing objects due to weakness, stiffness, and tremors in her hands (T at
22, 278-79, 283, 482); and (c) the description of Plaintiff’s past relevant
work as a teacher aide shows that the job duties include distributing
teaching materials to students, operating learning aides (e.g., film and slide
projectors), typing instructional materials, and reproducing materials using
duplicative equipment, all of which involve grasping and holding objects.
See DOT 249.367-074.4
Although a court may sometimes overlook the lack of a robust
explanation if it is possible to “glean the rationale of the ALJ’s decision,”
Cichocki v. Astrue, 534 Fed. Appx. 71, 76 (2d Cir. 2013), this should be
done sparingly and only where the “the record contains robust support for

The Social Security Administration has taken administrative notice of the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles (“DOT”), which is published by the Department of Labor and
provides detailed descriptions of the requirements for a variety of jobs. See 20 CFR §
416.966 (d)(1).
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the finding that [the claimant} is not disabled” and it is clear the ALJ
considered all the relevant evidence. Barrere v. Saul, 857 F. Appx. 22, 24
(2d Cir. 2021). That is not the case here.
A remand is required for proper consideration of Plaintiff’s ability to
reach overhead bilaterally, as well as her ability to grasp and hold objects.
C.

Remand
“Sentence four of Section 405 (g) provides district courts with the

authority to affirm, reverse, or modify a decision of the Commissioner ‘with
or without remanding the case for a rehearing.’” Butts v. Barnhart, 388 F.3d
377, 385 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g)).
Remand for further administrative proceedings is the appropriate
remedy “[w]here there are gaps in the administrative record or the ALJ has
applied an improper legal standard.” Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 82-83
(2d Cir. 1999); see also Rhone v. Colvin, No. 13-CV-5766 (CM)(RLE), 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180514, at *28 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2014).
For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds a remand for
further administrative proceedings to be the appropriate remedy.

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IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff is GRANTED Judgment on the
Pleadings, and this matter is REMANDED for further administrative
proceedings consistent with this Decision and Order. The Clerk is directed
to enter final judgment in favor of Plaintiff and then close the file.

s/ Gary R. Jones

Dated: August 30, 2024

GARY R. JONES
United States Magistrate Judge

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