World Association of Icehockey Players Unions North America Division et al v. National Hockey League et al

Filing 232

OPINION AND ORDER re: 190 MOTION for Preliminary Injunction . filed by World Association of Icehockey Players Unions USA Corporation, World Association of Icehockey Players Unions North America Division, Isaiah DiLaura, Tanner Gould, 135 MOTION to Dismiss Pursuant to FRCP 12(b (6). filed by 8515182 Canada Inc., 8487693 Canada Inc., 7759983 Canada Inc., 1091956 Alta Ltd., 211 SSHC Canada ULC, Medicine Hat Tiger Hockey Club Ltd., Winterhawks Sport s Group LLC, Moose Jaw Tier 1 Hockey, Inc., CSH International, Inc, The Owen Sound Attack Inc., Bulldog Hockey Inc., Guelph Storm Ltd., Canadian Hockey League, London Knights Hockey Inc., Rebels Sports Ltd., Les Olympiques de Gatine au Inc., Le Club de Hockey Junior Armada Inc., Les Sagueneens Junior Majeur de Chicoutimi, Niagara IceDogs Hockey Club Inc., Vancouver Junior Hockey Limited Partnership, Brett Sports & Entertainment, Inc., Club Hockey Les Remparts de Queb ec Inc., Les Tigres de Victoriaville (1991) Inc., Western Hockey League, Brandt Group of Companies, Horsepower Sports and Entertainment Group Inc., Soo Greyhounds Inc., Generals Hockey, Inc., Kelowna Rockets Hockey Enterprises Ltd., P eterborough Petes Limited, North Bay Battalion Hockey Club Ltd., IMS Hockey, Corp, JAW Hockey Enterprises LP, Barrie Colts Junior Hockey Ltd., Lethbridge Hurricanes Hockey Club Ltd, Hockey Junior Baie-Comeau, Club de Hockey Shawinigan I nc., Club de Hockey Drummond Inc., Calgary Sports and Entertainment Corporation, West Coast Hockey LLP, Wenatchee Wild LLC, Moncton Wildcats Hockey Club Limited, Prince Albert Raiders Hockey Club Inc., Top Shelf Entertainment, Inc., H alifax Mooseheads Hockey Club Inc., Quebec Maritimes Junior Hockey League, Kingston Frontenac Hockey Ltd., Saint John Major Junior Hockey Club Limited, Edmonton Major Junior Hockey Corporation, GSL Group, Thunderbird Hockey Enterprises, L LC, OEG Inc., Ottawa 67's Limited Partnership, Priestner Sports Corporation, Saskatoon Blades Hockey Club Ltd., Kitchener Rangers Jr. A Hockey Club, Swift Current Bronco Hockey Club Inc., EDGEPRo Sports & Entertainment Ltd., Jaco bson & Greiner Group of Companies, Windsor Spitfires, Inc., Cape Breton Major Junior Hockey Club ULC, Sudbury Wolves Hockey Club Ltd., Saginaw Hockey Club, L.L.C, Dan MacKenzie, Ontario Major Junior Hockey League, Kamloops Blazers Hocke y Club, Inc., Cape Breton Major Junior Hockey Club Limited Partnership, Les Huskies de Rouyn-Noranda Inc., Les Foreurs de Val-d'Or (2012) Inc., Le Club de Hockey L'Oceanic de Rimouski Inc., Mississauga Steelheads Hockey Club Inc., 230 LETTER MOTION to Compel Ontario Hockey League; Quebec Maritimes Junior Hockey League; Western Hockey League; Canadian Hockey League to Produce dates for 30b6 depositions addressed to Judge Margaret M. Garnett from J. Wyatt Fore dated 11/1 filed by Tanner Gould, Isaiah DiLaura, World Association of Icehockey Players Unions North America Division, World Association of Icehockey Players Unions USA Corporation, 132 MOTION to Dismiss Pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(2) . filed by 8515182 Canada Inc., 8487693 Canada Inc., 7759983 Canada Inc., 1091956 Alta Ltd., 211 SSHC Canada ULC, Medicine Hat Tiger Hockey Club Ltd., Winterhawks Sports Group LLC, Moose Jaw Tier 1 Hockey, Inc., CSH International, I nc, The Owen Sound Attack Inc., Bulldog Hockey Inc., Guelph Storm Ltd., Canadian Hockey League, London Knights Hockey Inc., Rebels Sports Ltd., Les Olympiques de Gatineau Inc., Le Club de Hockey Junior Armada Inc., Les Sagueneens Ju nior Majeur de Chicoutimi, Niagara IceDogs Hockey Club Inc., Vancouver Junior Hockey Limited Partnership, Brett Sports & Entertainment, Inc., Club Hockey Les Remparts de Quebec Inc., Les Tigres de Victoriaville (1991) Inc., Western Hockey League, Brandt Group of Companies, Horsepower Sports and Entertainment Group Inc., Soo Greyhounds Inc., Generals Hockey, Inc., Kelowna Rockets Hockey Enterprises Ltd., Peterborough Petes Limited, North Bay Battalion Hockey Club Ltd., IMS Hockey, Corp, JAW Hockey Enterprises LP, Barrie Colts Junior Hockey Ltd., Lethbridge Hurricanes Hockey Club Ltd, Hockey Junior Baie-Comeau, Club de Hockey Shawinigan Inc., Club de Hockey Drummond Inc., Calgary Sports and Entertainm ent Corporation, West Coast Hockey LLP, Wenatchee Wild LLC, Moncton Wildcats Hockey Club Limited, Prince Albert Raiders Hockey Club Inc., Halifax Mooseheads Hockey Club Inc., Top Shelf Entertainment, Inc., Quebec Maritimes Junior Hockey League, Kingston Frontenac Hockey Ltd., Saint John Major Junior Hockey Club Limited, Edmonton Major Junior Hockey Corporation, GSL Group, Thunderbird Hockey Enterprises, LLC, OEG Inc., Ottawa 67's Limited Partnership, Priestner Sports Corporation, Kitchener Rangers Jr. A Hockey Club, Saskatoon Blades Hockey Club Ltd., Swift Current Bronco Hockey Club Inc., EDGEPRo Sports & Entertainment Ltd., Jacobson & Greiner Group of Companies, Windsor Spitfires, Inc., Cape Breton Major Junior Hockey Club ULC, Sudbury Wolves Hockey Club Ltd., Saginaw Hockey Club, L.L.C, Dan MacKenzie, Ontario Major Junior Hockey League, Kamloops Blazers Hockey Club, Inc., Cape Breton Major Junior Hockey Club Limited Partner ship, Les Huskies de Rouyn-Noranda Inc., Les Foreurs de Val-d'Or (2012) Inc., Le Club de Hockey L'Oceanic de Rimouski Inc., Mississauga Steelheads Hockey Club Inc.. The Court does not have personal jurisdiction over the CHL Defenda nts under New York's long-arm statute because, among other reasons, the named Plaintiffs-who are not from New York and did not play hockey in New York-did not experience injury in New York for the purposes of Section 302(a)(3), and the claims of the named Plaintiffs do not "arise from" the CHL Defendants' transaction of business in New York for the purposes of Section 302(a)(1). The same is true for the WAIPU Plaintiffs, who have not even attempted to identify a member who s atisfies these requirements. Additionally, the Court does not have personal jurisdiction under the Clayton Act because Plaintiffs have not satisfied the Act's venue prong: They have not shown that the CHL Defendants "transact[] business&q uot; in this District. Because the Court dismisses without prejudice all claims asserted against the CHL Defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction, the Court's scheduling order regarding the preliminary injunction hearing, see Dkt. No. 68, is moot, and the preliminary injunction hearing that was previously scheduled for January 27, 2025, is CANCELLED. By separate order, the Court will schedule a conference for the remaining parties in this action. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate Dkt. No. 132, and to terminate Dkt. Nos. 135, 190, and 230 as moot. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Margaret M. Garnett on 11/26/2024) (kv)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
11/26/2024

WORLD ASSOCIATION OF ICEHOCKEY
PLAYERS UNIONS NORTH AMERICA
DIVISION et al.,
Plaintiffs,

24-CV-01066 (MMG)

-against-

OPINION & ORDER

NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE et al.,
Defendants.

MARGARET M. GARNETT, United States District Judge:
This case concerns purported violations of antitrust law by so-called “major junior”
hockey leagues and clubs that operate primarily in Canada and a handful of U.S. states. The
alleged antitrust violations arise out of purported agreements among the leagues and clubs to,
among other things, allocate exclusive geographic territories within North America for young
hockey players, refrain from recruiting players outside of each league’s designated territories,
conduct an involuntary draft that restricts players’ access to other clubs and leagues, and
otherwise control and restrict the market for the hockey talent of young players. Plaintiffs are
two individual hockey players from outside of New York who played major junior hockey in
Washington, Oregon, and Canada, as well as two associations whose members include
unidentified current and prospective major junior hockey players.
Pending before the Court is a motion by the CHL Defendants to dismiss the First
Amended Complaint under Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the
reasons explained below, Plaintiffs have failed to show personal jurisdiction in this Court over

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the CHL Defendants, which primarily operate in Canada or in states other than New York. As
such, the CHL Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiffs World Association of Icehockey Players Unions North America Division and
World Association of Icehockey Players Unions USA Corporation (collectively, the “WAIPU
Plaintiffs”), on behalf of their members, and Plaintiffs Tanner Gould and Isaiah DiLaura, on
behalf of themselves and a class of others similarly situated (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), brought
an action against (1) the National Hockey League (“NHL”), and (2) the Canadian Hockey
League (“CHL”); three leagues (the “Major Junior Leagues”) within the CHL (consisting of the
Western Hockey League (“WHL”), the Ontario Major Junior Hockey League (“OHL”), and the
Québec Major Junior Hockey League (also known as the Québec Maritimes Junior Hockey
League) (“QMJHL”)); the 60 member clubs within the three Major Junior Leagues (the “Major
Junior Clubs”); 1 and CHL President Dan MacKenzie (collectively, the “CHL Defendants”) for
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violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act.

The Major Junior Clubs within the WHL include: Goldrush Sports Corp.; Calgary Flames Limited
Partnership; Edmonton Major Junior Hockey Corporation; EHT, Inc.; Kamloops Blazers Hockey Club,
Inc.; Kelowna Rockets Hockey Enterprises Ltd.; Shoot the Puck Foundation Inc.; Lethbridge Hurricanes
Hockey Club; Medicine Hat Tigers Hockey Club Ltd.; Moose Jaw Warriors Tier 1 Hockey Inc.;
Winterhawks Hockey LLC; Prince Albert Raiders Hockey Club Ltd.; EDGEPRo Sports & Entertainment
Ltd.; Rebels Sports Ltd.; Queen City Sports & Entertainment Group Ltd.; Saskatoon Blades Hockey Club
Ltd., Thunderbird Hockey Enterprises, LLC; Hat Trick, Inc.; Swift Current Bronco Hockey Club Inc.;
Top Shelf Entertainment, Inc.; Vancouver Junior Hockey Limited Partnership; and Westcoast Hockey
LLP (named in the First Amended Complaint as West Coast Hockey LLP). The clubs within the OHL
include: Windsor Spitfires, Inc.; London Knights Hockey, Inc.; Barrie Colts Junior Hockey Ltd.; Bulldog
Hockey Inc.; JAW Hockey Enterprises LP; Guelph Storm Hockey Club Ltd.; Kingston Frontenacs
Hockey Club Ltd.; Mississauga Steelheads Hockey Club Inc.; Niagara IceDogs Hockey Club Inc.; North
Bay Battalion Hockey Club Ltd.; Generals Hockey, Inc.; Ottawa 67’s Limited Partnership; Owen Sound
Attack Inc.; Peterborough Petes Ltd.; IMS Hockey Corp, Saginaw Hockey Club L.L.C.; 211 SSHC
Canada ULC; Soo Greyhounds Inc.; Kitchener Rangers Jr. A. Hockey Club; and Sudbury Wolves Hockey
Club Ltd. And the clubs within the QMJHL include: Le Titan Acadie Bathurst (2013) Inc./The Acadie
Bathurst Titan (2013) Inc.; Hockey Junior Baie-Comeau Inc.; Le Club de Hockey Drummond Inc.; Cape
Breton Major Junior Hockey Club Limited; Les Olympiques de Gatineau Inc.; Halifax Mooseheads
Hockey Club Inc.; Club de Hockey Les Remparts de Québec (named in the First Amended Complaint as

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On June 21, 2024, the CHL Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) and a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6). 2 With respect to the motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2), the parties have
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engaged in jurisdictional discovery.
I.

Alleged Conspiracy Among the CHL Defendants
The WAIPU Plaintiffs are “labor organizations that represent the interests of current and

prospective North American major junior hockey players.” First Amended Complaint, Dkt. No.
149 (“FAC”) ¶ 33. They allege that they have members who are currently major junior hockey
players in the WHL, OHL, and QMJHL, including American and non-American members, as
well as “hockey players from the United States and Canada who face the imminent prospect of
being involuntarily drafted into one of the Major Junior Leagues.” Id. The WAIPU Plaintiffs
have not identified any of their members.
Gould is a Canadian citizen who was born and raised in Calgary, Canada. Id. ¶ 34. He
was drafted at age 15 by the Tri-City Americans (a hockey team in the WHL located in
Kennewick, Washington) and subsequently traded to the Prince Albert Raiders (another WHL
team located in Saskatchewan, Canada). Id. DiLaura is an American citizen who was born and
raised in Lakeville, Minnesota. Id. ¶ 35. He was first recruited at age 13 by scouts for certain

Club de Hockey Les Remparts de Québec (2014) Inc.); Le Club de Hockey Junior Armada Inc.; Moncton
Wildcats Hockey Club Limited; Le Club de Hockey L’Océanic de Rimouski Inc.; Les Huskies de RouynNoranda Inc.; 8515182 Canada Inc.; Les Tigres de Victoriaville (1991) Inc.; Saint John Major Junior
Hockey Club Limited; Club de Hockey Shawinigan Inc.; Les Foreurs de Val-d’Or (2012) Inc.; Les
Saguenéens Junior Mageur de Chicoutimi; and 7759983 Canada Inc. Club de Hockey-(Le Phoenix de
Sherbrooke) (named in the First Amended Complaint as 7759983 Canada Inc.).
Plaintiffs amended the Complaint on July 17, 2024. See Dkt. No. 149. The First Amended Complaint
did not substantively alter the allegations. The CHL Defendants subsequently filed a letter on July 19,
2024, affirming their intent to rely on their previously filed motions to dismiss. See Dkt. No. 151.

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The NHL has also filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). This
Opinion does not address the NHL’s motion; it resolves only the CHL Defendants’ motions.

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WHL clubs, was drafted at age 15 by and signed with the Prince George Cougars (a WHL team
located in British Columbia, Canada), and was subsequently traded to the Portland Winterhawks
(a WHL team in Portland, Oregon) and then to the Swift Current Broncos (a WHL team in
Saskatchewan, Canada). Id. 3
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The CHL is an incorporated, not-for-profit organization that is organized under the laws
of Canada and has a principal place of business in Canada. Id. ¶ 37. Plaintiffs allege that
“[d]espite the ‘L’ in its name, the CHL is not a sports league;” they allege it “exists solely for the
benefit of the Major Junior Leagues and to facilitate their collusive conduct.” Id. ¶ 109. The
Major Junior Leagues are members of the CHL but are also separate entities that operate
independently from the CHL and from one another. Id. ¶¶ 4, 110. They comprise 60 member
Major Junior Clubs; nine of the clubs are located in Washington, Oregon, Michigan, or
Pennsylvania, and the remaining 51 clubs are located in Canada. Id. ¶¶ 40–61, 63–82, 84–101,
108. “The Major Junior Leagues are the primary pathway for prospects to reach hockey’s top
professional ranks in the NHL,” and “[m]ore than half of all current NHL players are former
Major Junior Players.” Id. ¶ 112. Plaintiffs allege that within the CHL, the Major Junior
Leagues and the Major Junior Clubs each include “horizontal competitors” that would ordinarily
“have to compete against each other for Players’ services across the entirety of North America
by, among other things, offering competitive compensation . . . [and] a humane environment.”
Id. ¶ 20. Instead, Plaintiffs allege that the CHL Defendants have agreed to unlawfully restrain
competition in several ways.

Gould and DiLaura are not asserting claims against their former clubs but are asserting claims against
every other Defendant. Id. ¶¶ 34–35.

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First, Plaintiffs allege that the CHL, the Major Junior Leagues, and the Major Junior
Clubs (collectively, the “Major Junior Defendants”) agreed to geographically allocate the North
American market, dividing up U.S. states and Canadian provinces into three territories for each
Major Junior League. Plaintiffs allege that each of the Major Junior Leagues are “capable of
producing hockey games, and a full schedule of games and playoffs, without entering into any
agreement with either of the two other Major Junior Leagues.” Id. ¶ 4. In spite of this, Plaintiffs
allege that they “have agreed to allocate the geographic territories in which each of the Major
Junior Leagues, and the Major Junior Clubs that participate in those Leagues, recruit and source
[p]layers. To this end, the Major Junior Leagues have allocated exclusive, non-overlapping
territories among themselves—including New York and every other state—with each League
having the exclusive right to recruit and source Players from within their allocated exclusive
territories.” Id. ¶ 7. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that the OHL clubs are restricted from
recruiting and drafting players from outside a set of states that includes New York. 4 Id. ¶ 62.
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Also under the agreement, players from the exclusive states and provinces of one Major Junior
League “cannot be recruited by, be drafted by, or otherwise play for” any club in the other two
Major Junior Leagues absent permission from that Major Junior League and the CHL. Id. ¶ 124.
Thus, for instance, the WHL and QMJHL allegedly could not recruit players from New York
because the OHL has the exclusive right to recruit players from New York. Id. ¶ 122. Plaintiffs

Plaintiffs allege that with respect to the United States, the WHL clubs are restricted from recruiting
players outside of Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Minnesota, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah,
Washington, and Wyoming; that the OHL clubs are restricted from recruiting players outside of Alabama,
Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan,
Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin; and that the QMJHL clubs are restricted from
recruiting players outside of Maine, Massachusetts, Vermont, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, and
Connecticut. Id. ¶¶ 39, 62, 83.

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allege that this market allocation agreement “is memorialized in the rules, directives, and
regulations of the CHL and the three Major Junior Leagues.” Id. ¶ 119.
Second, Plaintiffs allege that the Major Junior Defendants have agreed “to conduct
involuntary drafts within their exclusive territories, to draft Players at the same age [i.e., players
who will reach age 16 during their first major junior hockey season], and to respect the rights of
drafting Clubs across all three Leagues.” Id. ¶ 8. They allege that the Major Junior Clubs use
the annual drafts held by their respective Major Junior Leagues to fill their rosters, and that the
drafts are “conducted in accordance with the Leagues’ market allocation scheme.” Id. ¶ 129.
They allege that no labor union has ever represented the Major Junior Players, and no collective
bargaining agreement (“CBA”) has authorized these entry drafts, and as such, the drafts are
“ongoing per se violations of the antitrust laws.” Id. ¶ 131.
Third, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have agreed to restrict the freedom of movement
of players in the CHL (“Major Junior Players” or “Players”). Specifically, they allege that the
Major Junior Defendants prohibit Players via contractual provisions in their respective Standard
Player Agreements (“SPAs”) “from providing their hockey services to any club other than the
Major Junior Club that drafted the Player until he reaches the age of 20 (with a Club option to
extend their contract for one ‘overage’ year).” Id. ¶ 10. They further allege that pursuant to the
rules of the Major Junior Leagues, each Major Junior Club maintains a “protected” list—which
can include both signed and unsigned Players—and clubs “routinely demand payment [of as
much as $500,000] from any club (either within or outside of major junior hockey) that is
interested in securing a release for a Player included on the Club’s protected list.” Id. ¶ 11; see
also id. ¶¶ 138–39, 150. As a result, Plaintiffs allege the “Major Junior Defendants have set up a
de facto reserve system” for Players who are drafted for their entire major junior careers in which

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even Players who have been terminated by a club during the time period of the SPA are still
obligated to play hockey exclusively for that club. Id. ¶¶ 12, 141.
Fourth, they allege that “Major Junior Clubs are insulated from competition for Players
through their territorial allocations, their involuntary drafts, and their rules and contractual
provisions that bind Players to their Clubs for a term of five years,” id. ¶ 13; this lack of
competition, in turn, “empowers the Major Junior Clubs to exploit Players,” including via
agreements “to artificially suppress Player compensation through the standardized terms and
payment schedules set forth in the Major Junior Leagues’ rules and SPAs,” and to “prevent
Major Junior Players from receiving any compensation in connection with Defendants’
commercial exploitation of Players’ names, images, and/or likenesses (“NIL”) in merchandise
and other products,” by including “non-negotiable provisions in each Player’s SPA that assign all
rights to commercially exploit his [NIL] entirely to Major Junior Defendants.” Id. ¶¶ 14, 16. As
illustrative examples, Plaintiffs allege that Player compensation in the WHL is fixed at $250.00
per month, in the OHL is fixed at $470.00 per month, and in the QMJHL is “similarly fixed at
non-competitive levels,” and that by comparison, the average salary in the American Hockey
League (“AHL”) and East Coast Hockey League (“ECHL”) is more than $5,000 per month and
$2,800 per month, respectively. Id. ¶¶ 156–57. Plaintiffs allege that “all Major Junior Players
are required to sign SPAs that include these anticompetitive provisions,” that “League
commissioners review each signed SPA to ensure that the terms are consistent with the Major
Junior Defendants’ [alleged] illegal agreement,” and that “significant fines are imposed on any
Major Junior Clubs that deviate from these terms.” Id. ¶ 18; see also id. ¶ 154 (“League fines
assessed on clubs have exceeded $200,000.”). According to Plaintiffs, “Defendants’ cartel

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artificially suppresses and standardizes compensation by denying Players their freedom of
choice, freedom of movement, and freedom to play for the Club of their choice.” Id. ¶ 21.
II.

Alleged Conduct by the NHL
Plaintiffs allege that the NHL is a co-conspirator that joined and facilitated the CHL

Defendants’ conspiracy. They allege that through a written agreement with the Major Junior
Defendants (the “NHL-CHL Agreement”), the NHL provides funding to the Major Junior
Leagues, with annual funding expressly contingent on Major Junior Defendants maintaining
many of the rules and policies that Plaintiffs allege comprise the anticompetitive agreements,
including that each Major Junior League must have its own exclusive territory, that the Major
Junior Defendants must have various rules and practices that serve to bind Players to a particular
club for their entire major junior careers, and more. Id. ¶¶ 22–23, 196–98. Plaintiffs also allege
that the NHL agreed that its clubs would pay up to $175,000 to the relevant Major Junior Club
for each Major Junior Player selected in the NHL draft, and it agreed that Major Junior Players
under the age of 20 who are drafted by an NHL club but do not make the club’s opening day
roster will be assigned or returned back to the Major Junior League. Id. ¶¶ 200–04.
They further allege that the NHL and its clubs largely own and control the constituent
clubs of non-defendants AHL and ECHL, which are developmental hockey leagues that pay their
players “substantially more than Major Junior Players;” they allege that the AHL and ECHL
(which, unlike the Major Junior Defendants, do not have players under age 18) “have agreed not

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to [recruit] Major Junior Players, even further reducing competition for those Players’ services.”
Id. ¶¶ 25, 219, 246–48. 5 6
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III.

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Claims
Plaintiffs Gould and DiLaura, the individual plaintiffs, seek to represent a putative class

of “[a]ll Major Junior Players who play or played major junior hockey for a Major Junior Club at
any time between February 14, 2020 and the date of judgment in this matter.” Id. ¶ 233.
On behalf of themselves and the putative class, Gould and DiLaura claim that the conduct
of both the CHL Defendants in allegedly conspiring to allocate geographic markets, conduct
involuntary Player drafts, impose a de facto reserve system upon Players, and artificially depress
and fix the compensation and benefits for players, as well as the conduct of the NHL in allegedly
making its annual funding contingent on the CHL Defendants maintaining many of the rules and
practices alleged and preventing AHL and ECHL clubs from competing to sign 18- and 19-yearold players that are subject to the NHL-CHL Agreement, violates Section 1 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. 7 Id. ¶¶ 242–63. They seek (1) an injunction enjoining Defendants
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and their co-conspirators from:
(i) enforcing their agreement to allocate geographic markets to source, recruit, and
draft talent; (ii) enforcing the terms of the SPAs and League rules that create a de
facto reserve system and/or standardize the compensation (including for agreeing
to assign their NIL rights) that Major Junior Players receive; (iii) otherwise
restricting Major Junior Players’ ability to negotiate with multiple Major Junior

Plaintiffs listed in the First Amended Complaint various NHL clubs and AHL and ECHL entities alleged
to be unnamed co-conspirators. Id. ¶¶ 102–04.

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A different representative plaintiff brought in Canada a class proceeding under the Canadian
Competition Act against the NHL, CHL, Major Junior Leagues, AHL, ECHL, and Hockey Canada; the
action was dismissed by the Canadian court. See Mohr v. National Hockey League, 2021 FC 488, aff’d
2022 FCA 145; application for leave to appeal dismissed, SCC File No. 40426.

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The Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits “[e]very contract, combination . . . or conspiracy . . . in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations[.]” 15 U.S.C. § 1.

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Clubs or clubs in other leagues; and (iv) enforcing the provisions of the NHL-CHL
agreement that cement and codify the core aspects of this anticompetitive scheme.
Id. ¶ 31.
They further seek: (2) an injunction against Defendants boycotting or otherwise
retaliating against Major Junior Players; (3) treble damages for the difference between the
compensation paid to Major Junior Players and the compensation they would have received in an
unrestrained market; and (4) treble damages and/or disgorgement of profits and restitution for the
amount that Defendants have been unjustly enriched through the exploitation of Major Junior
Players’ NIL. Id.
The WAIPU Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief against only the Major Junior Defendants
for conducting involuntary drafts that allocate Players and restrict competition on their
compensation and benefits. Id. ¶¶ 265–76. They seek an order from the Court declaring that “all
involuntary drafts conducted by the Major Junior Defendants constitute per se violations of the
antitrust laws,” that all rights claimed by a Major Junior Club based on an involuntary draft are
unenforceable, and that Major Junior Leagues and Clubs may not foreclose other Major Junior
Leagues and Clubs from negotiating terms of employment with a drafted and unsigned Player.
Id. ¶ 276. They also seek to enjoin the Major Junior Defendants from conducting future
involuntary entry drafts and from enforcing rights obtained by participating in such drafts. Id.
¶¶ 277–80.
The parties are currently briefing Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction against the
Major Junior Defendants in advance of the Major Junior Defendants’ 2025 entry drafts. See Dkt.
No. 190.

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LEGAL STANDARDS UNDER RULE 12(B)(2)
“[T]he plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the court has jurisdiction over the
defendant” on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
DiStefano v. Carozzi N. Am., Inc., 286 F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal references omitted).
The showing plaintiffs must make “‘varies depending on the procedural posture of the
litigation.’” Dorchester Fin. Sec., Inc. v. Banco BRJ, S.A., 722 F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 2013)
(quoting Ball v. Metallurgie Hoboken-Overpelt, S.A., 902 F.2d 194, 197 (2d Cir. 1990)).
Before jurisdictional discovery, a plaintiff may defeat a motion under Rule 12(b)(2) “by
pleading in good faith legally sufficient allegations of jurisdiction.” Ball, 902 F.2d at 197
(internal reference omitted). After jurisdictional discovery, the plaintiff’s prima facie showing
“must include an averment of facts that, if credited by the trier, would suffice to establish
jurisdiction over the defendant.” Id. “At that point, the prima facie showing must be factually
supported.” Id. Where, as here, jurisdictional discovery has been conducted and affidavits have
been submitted but the court has not held a “full-blown evidentiary hearing,” the court construes
the pleadings and affidavits in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and resolves all doubts in
the plaintiff’s favor. Dorchester Fin. Sec., Inc., 722 F.3d at 85 (internal references omitted); see
also Astor Chocolate Corp. v. Elite Gold Ltd., 510 F. Supp. 3d 108, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (“[T]he
court applies a ‘standard . . . akin to that on a motion for summary judgment,’ construing the
‘pleadings documents, and other evidentiary materials . . . in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff and all doubts are resolved in its favor.’” (quoting Melnick v. Adelson-Melnick, 346 F.
Supp. 2d 499, 503 (S.D.N.Y. 2004))). Given the time provided for jurisdictional discovery, “the
Court will limit its jurisdictional analysis to the facts presented and must assume that the
Plaintiffs have provided all the evidence they possess to support their jurisdictional claims.”

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Jacobs v. Felix Bloch Erben Verlag fur Buhne Film und Funk KG, 160 F. Supp. 2d 722, 731
(S.D.N.Y. 2001).
Plaintiffs must make jurisdictional allegations with “factual specificity”—they “cannot
establish jurisdiction through conclusory assertions alone.” Berdeaux v. OneCoin Ltd., 561 F.
Supp. 3d 379, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (internal references omitted). Additionally, “[w]hen
personal jurisdiction is predicated on specific jurisdiction, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie
case of jurisdiction as to each claim.” Id. at 396.
The Rule 56 standard guides the court as to the documents it may consider outside the
pleadings; the court may only consider admissible evidence. Astor Chocolate Corp., 510 F.
Supp. 3d at 121.
DISCUSSION
The CHL Defendants argue that they are not subject to personal jurisdiction in this
District. They argue, inter alia, that the CHL Defendants primarily operate in Canada, that no
hockey games within or across the Major Junior Leagues are played in New York, that no Major
Junior Players are trained in New York, that the Major Junior Defendants do not have physical
locations in New York and do not sell tickets to hockey events in New York, and that their
broadcasting arrangements focus largely on Canadian audiences. See Dkt. No. 133 at 2–6. To
the extent they have any conduct that touches upon New York, they assert that contact is
incidental and insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction under any theory proffered by
Plaintiffs.
For their part, Plaintiffs argue that the CHL Defendants have sufficient connection to
New York state or to this District through, for example, their recruiting and scouting activities,
the availability of their internet-based merchandise to New York customers, and their

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connections to and relationships with the NHL, which is headquartered in New York City.
However, the lack of evidence that the claims and injuries of these plaintiffs have any connection
to the CHL Defendants’ contacts with the forum, even assuming those contacts are otherwise
sufficient, is fatal to the Plaintiffs’ jurisdictional arguments, under any proffered theory. For the
reasons further explained below, the Court GRANTS the CHL Defendants’ motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction.
I.

Legal Principles Concerning Personal Jurisdiction
In order for a federal court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, three

requirements must be met.
“First, the plaintiff’s service of process upon the defendant must have been procedurally
proper.” Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50, 59 (2d Cir. 2012).
The CHL Defendants do not challenge proper service of process.
“Second, there must be a statutory basis for personal jurisdiction that renders such service
of process effective.” Id. Under Rule 4(k)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
Serving a summons or filing a waiver of service establishes personal jurisdiction
over a defendant . . . who is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general
jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A). Here, Plaintiffs rely on (1) New York’s long-arm statute, C.P.L.R.
§ 302(a), in accordance with Rule 4(k)(1)(A), and (2) the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22.
“Third, the exercise of personal jurisdiction must comport with constitutional due process
principles.” Licci ex rel. Licci, 673 F.3d at 60. This due process analysis includes two
components: the “minimum contacts” inquiry, which requires considering “whether the
defendant has sufficient contacts with the forum state to justify the court’s exercise of personal
jurisdiction,” and the “reasonableness” inquiry, which requires considering “whether the
assertion of personal jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial
13

justice—that is, whether it is reasonable to exercise personal jurisdiction under the circumstances
of the particular case.” Id. (internal references omitted).
Because the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not shown a statutory basis for personal
jurisdiction, it need not and does not consider the third requirement.
II.

Plaintiffs Have Not Established Jurisdiction Under New York’s Long-Arm Statute
New York law provides for general and specific jurisdiction over non-domiciliary

defendants. See Royalty Network v. Dishant.com, LLC, 638 F. Supp. 2d 410, 417 (S.D.N.Y.
2009). Plaintiffs do not contend that the CHL Defendants’ contacts with New York are
sufficient to essentially render them “at home” in New York such that this Court has general
jurisdiction over them. See Sonera Holding B.V. v. Cukurova Holding A.S., 750 F.3d 221, 225
(2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam). And indeed, jurisdictional discovery shows that neither the CHL,
nor any Major Junior Leagues or Major Junior Clubs, are located in New York or train or play
games in New York. See Decl. of Lauren Willard Zehmer, Dkt. No. 134, Exs. 1–4, 6–65.
Instead, Plaintiffs argue that two different provisions of New York’s “long-arm statute,”
C.P.L.R. § 302(a), provide for specific jurisdiction over the CHL Defendants. The statute
provides, in relevant part:
As to a cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a
court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary . . . who in
person or through an agent:
1. transacts any business within the state . . .; or . . .
3. commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property
within the state . . . if he
(i) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent
course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or
consumed or services rendered, in the state, or
(ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the
state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international
commerce[.]
14

C.P.L.R. §§ 302(a)(1), (3).
Plaintiffs contend that C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(3) (“Section 302(a)(3)”) applies to the CHL
Defendants because their antitrust violations outside of New York caused injury in New York,
including to players who were based in New York or played on hockey teams in New York. See
Dkt. No. 179 (hereinafter, “Pls.’ 12(b)(2) Opp.”) at 23. They point to evidence that since 2021,
Major Junior Clubs in the OHL have drafted 44 players from New York, and since 2020, they
have signed seven players from New York. See id. at 11 n.41, n.42. However, even if these
asserted injuries were sufficient to establish jurisdiction, the requirements of Section 302(a)(3)
are nonetheless unsatisfied because Plaintiffs have not shown that the CHL Defendants caused
injury in New York to the named Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs further contend that C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(1) (“Section 302(a)(1)”) provides a basis
for personal jurisdiction because the CHL Defendants transact business in New York in several
ways, including by scouting New York teams, advertising and streaming games on New Yorktargeted online platforms, and marketing merchandise online to within the United States
(including New York). See id. at 27. Again, even if these activities were sufficient to amount to
“transacting business” within the meaning of Section 302(a)(1), Plaintiffs still would not be able
to rely on Section 302(a)(1) because Plaintiffs have not shown that their claims arise from any
such New York transactions or conduct of business.
A. Section 302(a)(3): Tortious Acts Outside of New York
Jurisdiction pursuant to Section 302(a)(3) requires “tortious activity out of state . . .
causing injury in New York,” Royalty Network Inc., 638 F. Supp. 2d at 423, and it must also
satisfy either Section 302(a)(3)(i) or (ii).
Plaintiffs argue that the CHL Defendants’ alleged violations of antitrust law constitute
tortious conduct committed outside New York that has caused injury within New York.
15

Plaintiffs’ allegations of antitrust violations validly allege tortious activity conducted outside of
New York for jurisdictional purposes. See Yellow Page Sol., Inc. v. Bell Atl. Yellow Pages Co.,
No. 00-cv-05663, 2001 WL 1468168, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2001). For purposes of this
motion, the CHL Defendants do not contest that this element has been met.
However, the parties disagree on whether the CHL Defendants’ alleged tortious acts
caused injury in New York. Plaintiffs argue that the CHL Defendants have caused injury in New
York—where New York players have been drafted by the OHL and have signed contracts—by
depriving New York resident players of the ability to negotiate the terms of their contracts in a
competitive market, be compensated at competitive levels, and freely transfer between Major
Junior Clubs or to clubs outside of major junior hockey, which consequences the Plaintiffs claim
flow from the market allocation agreement. See Pls.’ 12(b)(2) Opp. at 23. They have also
caused injury in New York by the market allocation agreement itself, which allegedly denies all
New York-based players the opportunity to compete for roster spots in WHL and QMJHL clubs.
See id.
The core issue here is the situs of the claimed injury. “‘[C]ourts determining whether
there is injury in New York must generally apply a situs-of-injury test, which asks them to locate
the original event which caused the injury.’” Yellow Page Sol., Inc., 2001 WL 1468168, at *9
(quoting Bank Brussels Lambert v. Fiddler Gonzalez & Rodriguez, 171 F.3d 779, 791 (2d Cir.
1999)). “‘The original event occurs where the first effect of the tort that ultimately produced the
final economic injury is located.’” Doe v. Del. State Police, 939 F. Supp. 2d 313, 327 (S.D.N.Y.
2013) (quoting Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc. v. Am. Buddha, 609 F.3d 30, 39–40 (2d Cir. 2010)).
Courts disregard both the location of the “initial tort” and the “resultant economic hardships” and
felt consequences, and they focus instead on the location of the “first effect of the tort.” In re

16

Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., No. 06-MD-01738, 05-cv-00453 (BMC) (JO), 2012 WL 12355046, at
*7 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2012) (internal references omitted) (emphasis in original).
For instance, the Second Circuit has held that defendants who terminated the employment
of a plaintiff at a meeting in New Jersey were subject to jurisdiction in New York under Section
302(a)(3) because the plaintiff worked in New York, and the “original event” was the plaintiff’s
“experience of being removed from his job,” which happened in New York. DiStefano, 286 F.3d
at 85. This could be distinguished from making the decision to terminate and the termination
itself, which the court held constituted the “tortious act without the state.” Id. In contrast, where
defendants fired a plaintiff who worked in New Jersey but resided in New York and thus felt the
ultimate economic consequences of the firing in New York, the Second Circuit held that the
defendants were not subject to jurisdiction in New York under Section 302(a)(3). Mareno v.
Rowe, 910 F.2d 1043, 1046 (2d Cir. 1990). Thus, the “first effect” in both cases was the place
where the plaintiff first experienced the termination.
To the extent that Plaintiffs rely on the fact that the alleged injuries were experienced by
some players from New York, the mere fact that a player was from New York or previously
played on a hockey team in New York is insufficient under the law to show injury in New York.
See, e.g., Yellow Page Sol., Inc., 2001 WL 1468168, at *9 (collecting cases) (the mere residence
of plaintiff in a state is insufficient to show injury in that state).
So, the Court must consider whether the “first effect” of either of the two types of alleged
antitrust injury occurred in New York. Turning first to the alleged injuries that occurred after
New York players were drafted by the OHL or signed with OHL clubs, such as the inability to
competitively negotiate the terms of their contract, be compensated at competitive levels, or
freely transfer between clubs, the Court agrees with the CHL Defendants that those injuries

17

occurred outside of New York. See Dkt. No. 208 (“CHL 12(b)(2) Reply”) at 3–4. Considering
that none of the Major Junior Defendants are located in New York, none of the clubs train or
play in New York, and there is no evidence that any Player SPAs have been negotiated or signed
in New York, Plaintiffs have made no showing (nor do they argue besides merely stating so in a
short, conclusory paragraph) as to how any of those injuries occurred within New York. See
Pls.’ 12(b)(2) Opp. at 23. Although Plaintiffs point to scouting and recruiting activities that may
have taken place in New York for players who ultimately were drafted and then signed by an
OHL club, the CHL Defendants persuasively argue that “any alleged injuries to current CHL
players necessarily occurred outside of New York” because the injuries were “suffered outside of
the state.” CHL 12(b)(2) Reply at 3 (emphasis in original). Thus, considering that the draft took
place outside New York, and players did not enter into contracts in New York, play for teams
located in New York, or even play any major junior games in New York, any injury flowing
from being drafted into an OHL team occurred outside of New York. See id. at 4–6.
The second type of claimed injury—regarding New York players barred from competing
for roster spots in the WHL or QMJHL—presents a thornier problem. Prospective market
entrants may in some circumstances suffer antitrust injury where they were thwarted from
entering the market due to antitrust violations. See generally Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit
Co., 166 F. 261, 264 (2d Cir. 1908) (“[I]t is as unlawful to prevent a person from engaging in
business as it is to drive a person out of business.” (internal references omitted)); In re Aluminum
Warehousing Antitrust Litig., 833 F.3d 151, 158 (2d Cir. 2016) (courts have recognized antitrust
claims of market participants other than competitors and consumers, including potential new
market entrants); Fine v. Barry & Enright Prods., 731 F.2d 1394, 1396–97 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 881 (plaintiff alleged unlawful agreements between game show producers and

18

television networks limiting the number of game show appearances by non-celebrity guests; the
Court found the Clayton Act “grants standing to prospective entrants to a business as well as to
existing industry members”).
Plaintiffs adequately allege that players in New York were unable to qualify for clubs
outside the OHL; in other words, New York players were pre-restricted from entering the market
for WHL and QMJHL clubs as a result of the alleged market allocation agreement. See, e.g.,
Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379, 398–403 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (football player
seeking to play in the NFL and challenging under the Sherman Act a rule limiting player
eligibility experienced an antitrust injury because the alleged group boycott excluded him from
the market for NFL player services), rev’d on other grounds, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004); Singh
v. Am. Racing-Tioga Downs Inc., No. 21-cv-00947 (LEK/ML), 2021 WL 6125432, at *7
(N.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2021) (owners of racing horses who sued defendants for an alleged group
boycott excluding them from entering competitions had plausibly alleged injury from
defendants’ alleged conspiracy to exclude plaintiffs). Although CHL Defendants argue that this
type of injury is too speculative, if the injury is cognizable under the antitrust laws, then the
Plaintiffs have a much stronger argument that the situs of this type of injury would be New York.
This would not be a situation in which a New York resident is attempting to carry home his
injury merely because he is a resident of New York. Rather, a hypothetical New York player
who otherwise would be competing freely for roster spots in any Major Junior League or Club
likely felt the first effects of the tort—the alleged exclusion from competing for clubs outside the
OHL—in New York because the CHL Defendants allegedly determined this restriction based on
the players’ location in New York, where the player would also likely be scouted playing for his
current club or team. C.f. In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 2012 WL 12355046, at *8 (finding

19

personal jurisdiction in New York for a conspiracy to inflate prices that occurred in China
because the plaintiffs did not feel the effects of the conspiracy until they purchased the product at
a supra-competitive price in New York; the economic injury was not “an attenuated result of the
injury,” but was rather the “first and primary” injury).
However, the Court need not conclusively determine this issue because there is no such
plaintiff in this case. Indeed, none of the named Plaintiffs could plausibly establish that they
suffered either type of injury in New York, regardless of the Court’s situs-of-injury analysis, as
neither of the individual Plaintiffs were from or played on hockey teams in New York, and the
WAIPU Plaintiffs have not identified any of their members beyond general and conclusory
statements. See Berdeaux, 561 F. Supp. 3d at 397. Because none of the named Plaintiffs allege
any injury in New York, there can be no personal jurisdiction under Section 302(a)(3).
The Court must assess personal jurisdiction over the CHL Defendants based only on the
claims of the named Plaintiffs, “notwithstanding the fact that [the] [n]amed Plaintiffs purport to
represent individuals domiciled across the United States, including in New York.” Id. “[T]he
unnamed class members, who may or may not ever become parties to this action, are irrelevant
to the question of specific jurisdiction.” Id. Rather, courts—including courts in this Circuit—
have long looked only to the claims of named plaintiffs in assessing personal jurisdiction. See
id.; Beach v. Citigroup Alt. Inv. LLC, No. 12-cv-07717 (PKC), 2014 WL 904650, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2014) (“Contacts with unnamed class members may not be used as a
jurisdictional basis, especially before a class has been certified.”); Selman v. Harvard Med. Sch.,
494 F. Supp. 603, 613 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (citing Mintz v. Mathers Fund, Inc., 463 F.2d 495
(7th Cir. 1972)); DeCoursey v. Murad, LLC, 673 F. Supp. 3d 194, 208 (N.D.N.Y. 2023);
Chernus v. Logitech, Inc., No. 17-673 (FLW), 2018 WL 1981481, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 27, 2018)

20

(collecting cases); NEWBERG & RUBENSTEIN ON CLASS ACTIONS (6th ed.) § 6.30 (“[A] court
must have personal jurisdiction to adjudicate the putative class representative’s individual[]
claims against the defendant just as in any individual case.”); see also Suarez v. Cal. Nat. Living,
Inc., No. 17-cv-09847 (VB), 2019 WL 1046662, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2019); Lyngaas v.
Curaden AG, 992 F.3d 412, 433 (6th Cir. 2021) (“Long-standing precedent shows that [in class
actions,] . . . the personal-jurisdiction analysis has focused on the defendant, the forum, and the
named plaintiff, who is the putative class representative.” (emphasis in original)).
For instance, in Berdeaux, in which the plaintiffs brought claims of fraud against
defendants concerning an alleged cryptocurrency scheme, the court held that there was no
personal jurisdiction over the moving defendants under Section 302(a)(3) because, even
accepting arguendo the plaintiffs’ argument that they were injured where they resided, the
named plaintiffs resided in Montana and Tennessee, not in New York. Berdeaux, 561 F. Supp.
3d at 406. Although they sought to assert claims on behalf of “all investors and entities who
transferred investment money to the [defendants],” the court held that for the purposes of
determining jurisdiction over the moving defendants, only the claims of the named plaintiffs
could be considered, not those of unnamed putative class plaintiffs. Id. (emphasis in original).
Here, Gould is a citizen of Canada who was born and raised in Canada, and who played
for Major Junior Clubs in Washington state and in Canada. FAC ¶ 34. DiLaura is an American
citizen who was born and raised in Minnesota and played for Major Junior Clubs in Canada and
in Oregon. Id. ¶ 35. Although the individual Plaintiffs may seek to represent a class of all Major
Junior Players who played for a Major Junior Club during a specified time period, for purposes
of determining whether this Court has specific personal jurisdiction over the CHL Defendants,
the Court may only consider the claims brought by the named Plaintiffs. See, e.g., Berdeaux,

21

561 F. Supp. 3d at 406. Gould and DiLaura—who are not from New York and did not play on
New York-based hockey teams—do not argue that they have experienced any injury in New
York, and they may not rely on the injury experienced by absent putative class members who
may or may not ever become parties to this action to assert personal jurisdiction. See id.
Moreover, the WAIPU Plaintiffs—who are not bringing a class action—have declined to
identify any of their members, including any who may have suffered injuries in New York. (Nor
have they even specifically alleged that they have any members who were injured in New York.)
Because Plaintiffs have not adequately established that the CHL Defendants’ alleged
antitrust violations caused them injury in New York, the Court need not address whether
Plaintiffs have established the remaining elements of Section 302(a)(3).
B. Section 302(a)(1): Transaction of Business in New York
The jurisdictional inquiry under Section 302(a)(1) is twofold: “[U]nder the first prong
the defendant must have conducted sufficient activities to have transacted business in the state,
and under the second prong, the claims must arise from the transactions.” Am. Girl, LLC v.
Zembrka, 118 F.4th 271, 276–77 (2d Cir. 2024) (internal references omitted).
The transaction of business involves “purposeful activity—some act by which the
defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Id. at 277 (internal references
omitted). “New York decisions[,] . . . at least in their rhetoric, tend to conflate the long-arm
statutory and constitutional analyses by focusing on the constitutional standard: whether the
defendant’s conduct constitutes purposeful availment of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Best Van Lines,
Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d 239, 247 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal marks and references omitted). The
business in question does not need to be commercial in nature. See id. at 247 n.10. Moreover,
22

“Section 302 is a single act statute and proof of one transaction in New York is sufficient to
invoke jurisdiction,” Am. Girl, LLC, 118 F.4th at 276 (internal references omitted), although
jurisdiction cannot be based on conduct that is “extraneous or coincidental.” Spetner v. Palestine
Inv. Bank, 70 F.4th 632, 640 (2d Cir. 2023).
The second prong is satisfied where “there exists an articulable nexus or a substantial
relationship between transactions occurring within the state and the cause of action sued upon.”
Spetner, 70 F.4th at 643 (internal references omitted); see also Paterno v. Laser Spine Inst., 24
N.Y.3d 370, 379 (2014) (“There must be a substantial relationship between the transaction and
the claim asserted.” (internal references omitted)). This is satisfied where “‘at least one element
of the claim arises from defendant’s New York contacts.’” Spetner, 70 F.4th at 643 (internal
marks omitted) (quoting Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, 20 N.Y.3d 327, 341 (2012)). While
this inquiry is “relatively permissive,” id., “‘the nexus is insufficient where the relationship
between the claim and transaction is too attenuated or merely coincidental.’” Bayshore Cap.
Advisors, LLC v. Creative Wealth Media Fin. Corp., 667 F. Supp. 3d 83, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 2023)
(internal marks omitted) (quoting D&R Glob. Selections, S.L. v. Bodega Olegario Falcon
Pineiro, 29 N.Y.3d 292, 299 (2017)). Essentially, there must be a “relatedness between the
transaction and the legal claim such that the latter is not completely unmoored from the former.”
Licci ex rel. Licci, 732 F.3d at 168–69 (internal references omitted).
Plaintiffs argue that at least some of the CHL Defendants have engaged in a relevant
course of business in New York: The OHL and its constituent clubs have scouted, recruited,
drafted, and signed New York players. See Pls.’ 12(b)(2) Opp. at 27; see also Decl. of Judith A.
Zahid, Dkt. No. 180 ¶ 5 (between 2020 and 2024, the OHL recruited 89 players in some regard
who played for a New York-based club or were from a New York hometown); id., Ex. 13 at 1–3

23

(the OHL has scouted players from New York-based teams) 8; Pls.’ 12(b)(2) Opp. at 11 n.41,
7F

n.42. They also argue that the CHL broadcasts hockey games in the United States and has
offered an app in the United States through which fans can watch CHL games, and that some
Major Junior Clubs have advertised on New York-targeted radio and other media platforms. See
Pls.’ 12(b)(2) Opp. at 11; Decl. of Zahid, Dkt. No. 180, Exs. 33–38 (concerning an app and
packages for CHL TV); id., Exs. 39–40 (concerning online advertising and streaming of OHL
hockey games). They further argue that the CHL has a licensing agreement with EA Sports
through which Major Junior Players and CHL teams appear in an EA Sports NHL video game,
see Decl. of Zahid, Dkt. No. 180, Ex. 43, and they argue in their opposition brief (but do not
allege or show) that the video game generates revenue in the United States (including in New
York). See Pls.’ 12(b)(2) Opp. at 14. Moreover, they argue that some CHL Defendants have
offered on the Internet and for sale into the United States the merchandise (such as hats) of
Major Junior Clubs (but do not argue or show that any of this merchandise includes any Player’s
NIL). See id. at 14, 27; Decl. of Zahid, Dkt. No. 180, Exs. 44–45; FAC ¶ 193.
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that Major Junior Clubs have offered their players to be drafted
and signed by New York-based NHL teams pursuant to an anticompetitive agreement between
the NHL and CHL. See Pls.’ 12(b)(2) Opp. at 28. Plaintiffs submitted exhibits to support that in
2024, two New York-based NHL teams each drafted one Major Junior Player from the QMJHL
and from the OHL, and pursuant to the NHL-CHL Agreement, draft picks that were not chosen
for the NHL team’s roster were returned to their Major Junior Clubs. See Decl. of Zahid, Dkt.
No. 180, Exs. 52–53, 59–62.

8

The unsealed version of this exhibit (and of various other documents) can be found at Dkt. No. 220.

24

The CHL Defendants argue that recruiting and scouting activities in New York for
positions outside New York do not constitute transacting business within the meaning of Section
302(a)(1). CHL 12(b)(2) Reply at 8–10. They further argue that none of the named Plaintiffs’
claims “arise from” the conduct alleged. Id. at 8, 12–13.
For the reasons below, Plaintiffs have not satisfied Section 302(a)(1).
1. Transaction of Business Prong
The CHL Defendants argue that recruiting and scouting activities conducted by OHL
Defendants in New York do not constitute the transaction of business in New York. The Court
finds that Plaintiffs have not made a sufficient showing as to scouting activities in New York.
Moreover, for the reasons explained further below, even if such activities were sufficient for
“transacting business,” Plaintiffs’ claims do not arise from this conduct.
In assessing whether recruiting constituted the transaction of business, the Second Circuit
in Suber v. VVP Services, LLP assessed circumstances in which plaintiff, an attorney in New
York City, was approached by a New York-based recruitment agency with the opportunity to
work as an attorney for the defendant (an esports venture) in California. No. 21-2649, 2023 WL
115631, at *1–2 (2d Cir. Jan. 10, 2023) (summary order), cert. denied 144 S. Ct. 346. Plaintiff
went to work for defendant in California (though she initially worked in New York remotely for
around a month), and she ultimately brought several claims against defendant concerning her
employment. Id. The Second Circuit found that the recruitment of plaintiff in New York did not
constitute a business transaction under Section 302(a)(1); “[r]ecruiting [plaintiff] was not a New
York transaction because the Defendants did not invoke the benefits or protections of the laws of
New York by contacting [plaintiff] in New York, inviting her to interview in California, and
hiring her to work in California.” Id. at *3.

25

The court cited in contrast to Fischbarg v. Doucet, 9 N.Y.3d 375 (2007), in which the
New York Court of Appeals found jurisdiction under Section 302(a)(1) where defendants
(California residents) had substantial and continuing contacts in New York with plaintiff, a New
York attorney they had solicited in New York to represent them in Oregon. See Suber, 2023 WL
115631, at *3. The Second Circuit in Suber emphasized that the defendants in Fischbarg had
phoned the plaintiff “‘at least twice per week’ for ‘approximately nine months’ alongside dozens
of emails, faxes, and other communications.” Id. (quoting Fischbarg, 9 N.Y.3d at 378)
(emphasis in original). In Fischbarg, the court noted that a defendant transacts business in New
York when, “on his or her own initiative . . . [the defendant] projects himself or herself into this
state to engage in a sustained and substantial transaction of business.” 9 N.Y.3d at 382 (internal
marks and references omitted); see also Paterno, 24 N.Y.3d at 377 (transaction of business under
Section 302(a)(1) can be found where the defendant “seeks out and initiates contact with New
York, solicits business in New York, and establishes a continuing relationship”).
As between Suber and Fischbarg, the nature of the CHL Defendants’ business is much
more closely related to the scouting and recruiting activity in Suber. As developmental hockey
leagues, the Major Junior Leagues and their clubs might have an interest in finding and recruiting
promising hockey players that goes beyond merely hiring the employees necessary to produce
their product (major junior hockey games for which tickets, broadcast rights, and merchandise
can be sold), compared to Suber, where the defendant was in the business of an “esports venture”
and engaged in recruiting only to find an employee. But Suber counsels that courts must look to
the nature of recruiting and scouting to assess whether a defendant transacted business in New
York, and here the evidence and allegations suggest even fewer deliberate contacts with New
York than was true in Suber.

26

Plaintiffs have not shown any substantial or continuing scouting and recruiting activities
in New York. They have not made any specific factual averment that any scouting activities by
the CHL Defendants or their agents in New York actually involved contact with players, as
opposed to involving merely involving observing players and gathering information about which
players to recruit. Indeed, many of the exhibits Plaintiffs cite to show scouting activities in New
York indicate that scouts observed players to identify and rank them. See, e.g., Decl. of Zahid,
Dkt. No. 180, Ex. 13 at 2, 5 (indicating that an OHL scout “identifies and reports on junior
players who reside in New York” and other Eastern states and watches them play “wherever
their team is playing and regardless of where the team is based,” but does not “conduct outreach
to prospective players or their families about playing in the OHL or related recruiting
activities”); id., Ex. 15 at 1 (explaining that the purpose of the OHL Central Scouting Bureau is
to “identify, rate and rank players”); id., Ex. 17 at 4 (indicating that a scout who focuses on
Eastern U.S. states (including New York) for the London Knights—a team within the OHL—
evaluates and develops an opinion about players, which he reports to management). 9 Nor have
8F

Plaintiffs shown that any negotiation of player contracts occurred in New York, that any
contracts were signed in New York, that any drafts were conducted by the CHL Defendants in
New York, or that the CHL Defendants otherwise maintained continuing relationships in New
York in connection with recruiting, as in Fischbarg. Overall, Plaintiffs have not met their

While Plaintiffs argue that clubs reach out to meet players and their families after club scouts report
back their findings, they point only to an allegation in the First Amended Complaint in which the family
of Gould—who was born and raised in Canada, not New York—allegedly received various calls from
scouts and general managers. See Pls.’ 12(b)(2) Opp. at 9 n.33; FAC ¶ 34. They also point to some
evidence that Brodie Barrick, the OHL Director of Player Recruitment & Player Support Services, met
once with the coaching staff of the Buffalo Jr. Sabres (a New York minor league team) and spoke “a
handful of times” over the phone from Ontario with “the team.” See Decl. of Zahid, Dkt. No. 180, Ex. 13
at 6. But while Barrick has spoken to top potential prospects for the OHL, none of the prospective
players with whom he has spoken since starting in his role were from New York. See id. at 5.
9

27

burden to show that the CHL Defendants invoked the benefits or protections of the laws of New
York through scouting and recruiting in New York. See Suber, 2023 WL 115631, at *3.
Plaintiffs point to an inapposite case, Lutz v. Rakuten, Inc., in which the court assessed
Pennsylvania’s long-arm statute—which provides for jurisdiction “based on the most minimum
contact with the Commonwealth allowed under the Constitution of the United States”—and not
New York’s long-arm statute. 376 F. Supp. 3d 455, 463 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (internal references
omitted). The court found personal jurisdiction over defendants—entities in Japan that operate a
baseball team—where they engaged in extensive contract negotiations with plaintiff via text and
email while plaintiff (a baseball player) was in Pennsylvania, plaintiff signed the contract in
Pennsylvania, and defendants wire transferred his salary to his bank account in Pennsylvania and
paid for his medical insurance for physical therapy and rehabilitation (most of which occurred in
Pennsylvania). Id. at 462, 465. These are not the circumstances at play in this case. To the
extent Plaintiffs argue that Lutz shows that the analysis for personal jurisdiction is different in
sports cases, see Pls.’ 12(b)(2) Opp. at 28 n.95, Plaintiffs provide no basis for this argument; Lutz
involved entirely different jurisdictional facts and a different long-arm statute.
Overall, Plaintiffs’ allegations and evidence concerning the solicitation and recruiting of
players in New York do not show the transaction of business in New York sufficient to satisfy
Section 302(a)(1).
2. “Arise From” Prong
Moreover, even if the identified activities of the CHL Defendants were sufficient to
constitute “transacting business” for purposes of Section 302(a)(1), none of the named Plaintiffs’
claims arise from the transactions Plaintiffs point to in New York.
With respect to the arguments regarding recruiting and scouting in New York and
releasing players to the NHL pursuant to the allegedly unlawful NHL-CHL Agreement,
28

Plaintiffs’ arguments suffer the same flaw as did their arguments under Section 302(a)(3): The
named Plaintiffs’ claims do not arise out of the CHL Defendants’ transaction of business in New
York. As explained, courts only look to the claims of named plaintiffs, not absent putative class
members, in this analysis. See, e.g., Beach, 2014 WL 904650, at *6; Selman, 494 F. Supp. at 613
n.6.
For instance, in In re Dental Supplies Antitrust Litigation, dental practices and dentists
sued distributors of dental supplies and equipment for allegedly entering an agreement not to
compete involving price-fixing, anti-poaching, and group boycotts, through which they blocked
new competitors from entering the market. No. 16-cv-00696 (BMC) (GRB), 2017 WL 4217115,
at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2017). In assessing whether the court had personal jurisdiction over
moving defendants under Section 302(a)(1), the court held that even if, arguendo, it were to
consider sales of defendants’ products by another entity in New York as the transaction of
business by defendants, plaintiffs’ conspiracy allegations did not arise from those sales because
the moving defendants did not make any sales to any named plaintiff in New York. Id. at *6.
Similarly, in In re SSA Bonds Antitrust Litigation, plaintiffs alleged that defendants
conspired to fix the price of various bonds in the secondary market. 420 F. Supp. 3d 219, 226
(S.D.N.Y. 2019). In determining whether the court had personal jurisdiction under Section
302(a)(1) over various individual defendants—who allegedly promoted, artificially priced, and
traded bonds with class members in the United States and New York—the court held that
plaintiffs could not “rely on bare allegations that Defendants transacted with unnamed absent
class members to establish jurisdiction.” Id. at 233. Rather, they would need to show that
individual defendants transacted with named plaintiffs. Id.

29

Plaintiffs’ brief fails to address or explain how the claims of the named Plaintiffs, as
opposed to unnamed putative class members or unidentified association members, can be said to
properly arise from any identified activity in New York. Here, as explained, neither of the
individual Plaintiffs are from New York or played hockey in New York, and the WAIPU
Plaintiffs have not identified any of their members who are from or played in New York. There
are no allegations and there is no evidence that any of the named Plaintiffs were scouted or
recruited in New York or released to New York-based NHL teams pursuant to the NHL-CHL
Agreement. Thus, the named Plaintiffs’ claims do not arise from the CHL Defendants’
transaction of business in New York, even if they could establish that the conduct of the CHL
Defendants was sufficient.
Finally, with respect to the CHL Defendants’ marketing of merchandise, advertising, and
streaming online to within the United States, including advertising by certain CHL Defendants
on New York-targeted platforms, Plaintiffs have not articulated any “substantial relationship” or
“articulable nexus” between those transactions and Plaintiffs’ claims of violations of antitrust
law. 10 See, e.g., World Skating Federation v. International Skating Union, 357 F. Supp. 2d 661,
9F

662–66 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (defendant’s contracts with major television networks in New York
were unrelated to plaintiff’s claims that the defendant used its market power to coerce skaters
and judges not to compete in plaintiff’s figure staking events); Conrad v. Latido Mitu Holdings,
LLC, No. 21-cv-03596 (PKC), 2021 WL 5909656, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2021) (defendants’
online sales through their website of unrelated merchandise into New York did not confer
jurisdiction under Section 302(a)(1) because those transactions were unrelated to plaintiffs’

Nor have Plaintiffs articulated more specifically any such substantial relationship or articulable nexus
between the transactions and the named Plaintiffs’ claims.

10

30

claims that defendants displayed on their website plaintiffs’ copyrighted photos without
authorization). Tangential or attenuated connections between the conduct of a defendant in the
relevant forum and a plaintiff’s claims will not suffice for jurisdiction. See Cutting Edge
Enterprises, Inc. v. National Association of Attorneys General, 481 F. Supp. 2d 241, 243–48
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding that the New York negotiation of a multi-state tobacco settlement,
which resulted in the publication of directories of compliant tobacco manufacturers in states that
entered the settlement agreement, was too attenuated from the claim of a non-New York plaintiff
that he had been excluded from those directories in violation of the Sherman Act; although the
settlement agreement had been negotiated and executed in New York, the claim of a horizontal
group boycott by defendants which did not take place in New York did not arise out of those
transactions in a sufficiently direct way to support jurisdiction).
Here, while some of the players who were subject to the alleged unlawful agreements
may play in some of the hockey games that are advertised online or may appear in video games
that are sold online (including to New York residents), those transactions are far too distant from
Plaintiffs’ antitrust claims. There may, of course, be some tenuous connection between some of
the alleged anticompetitive agreements and some of the transactions. For example, it could be
said that because of the Major Junior Leagues’ alleged agreement to allocate North American
territories, a Major Junior Club was able to scout a player with limited competition, which then
allowed the club to draft the player, which then allowed the relevant Major Junior League or
Major Junior Club to negotiate the player’s contract in an uncompetitive market, which then
allowed the Major Junior League or Major Junior Club to insist upon terms in the player’s SPA
allowing the club, league, and/or CHL to gain control over the player’s NIL, which then allowed
the CHL to negotiate with entities that sought to use the player’s NIL, which then allowed the

31

CHL to license the player’s NIL to EA Sports, which then allowed EA Sports to develop a video
game that included the player’s NIL, which then allowed the video game to be marketed and sold
to users, which then allowed users in the United States (including, perhaps, in New York) to
purchase the game. But any such connection is far removed and does not amount to a
sufficiently “substantial relationship” or “articulable nexus” for the purposes of specific
jurisdiction under Section 302(a)(1). 11 See Cutting Edge Enter., Inc., 481 F. Supp. 2d at 247–48;
10F

see also Suber, 2023 WL 115631, at *4 (plaintiff’s allegations that defendants defrauded
investors in New York “have nothing whatsoever to do with” her claims arising from her
employment, which center on promises made prior to her employment). 12
11F

For all of the reasons stated above, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not established that
there is specific personal jurisdiction over the CHL Defendants under New York’s long-arm
statute. 13
12F

For the same reasons, the fact that some of the CHL Defendants may advertise or stream hockey games
online, including on New York-targeted platforms, is far too tenuous a connection, and the fact that some
clubs may make available online for sale merchandise that does not bear the NIL of any player is even
more tenuous of a connection.

11

Plaintiffs referred in their brief to the fact that OHL clubs paid fees to minor league New York-based
teams pursuant to release agreements to secure the release of Major Junior Players, see Pls.’ Br. at 11, but
they did not advance these facts in support of their Section 302(a)(1) arguments or make any arguments
whatsoever as to how these fee payments constitute the transaction of business under Section 302(a)(1).
In any case, Plaintiffs’ antitrust claims do not arise out of such transactions. Although there may be some
thin connection between the fee payments and the relevant antitrust claims because without such release
payments, Major Junior Clubs in the OHL might not be able to secure some New York-based players, and
thus might not fully be able to exploit the New York market to which OHL clubs allegedly have an
exclusive right under a wholly separate geographic allocation agreement with entirely different entities,
such a connection is far too tenuous to support jurisdiction. See Cutting Edge Enter., Inc., 481 F. Supp.
2d at 247–48. Nor is there any connection between the payments and the named Plaintiffs’ claims.
12

The CHL Defendants also argue that even if Plaintiffs had established personal jurisdiction over some
of the CHL Defendants, Plaintiffs could not invoke conspiracy jurisdiction for the purposes of satisfying
either the New York long-arm statute or due process over the other CHL Defendants because conspiracy
jurisdiction only applies where a co-conspirator committed a tort within New York, among other reasons.
CHL 12(b)(2) Reply at 14–16. The Court need not reach this issue because it finds that Plaintiffs have
not shown specific jurisdiction as to any of the CHL Defendants.

13

32

III.

Plaintiffs Have Not Established Jurisdiction Under the Clayton Act
In addition to their arguments under New York’s long-arm statute, Plaintiffs further

contend that the Clayton Act provides a statutory hook for personal jurisdiction over the CHL
Defendants.
“‘Although plaintiffs allege violations of the Sherman Act, the private right of action to
pursue antitrust claims is provided by the Clayton Act[.]’” In re SSA Bonds Antitrust Litig., 420
F. Supp. 3d at 229 (quoting In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 2012 WL 12355046, at *5). The
Clayton Act provides, in relevant part:
Any suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws against a corporation may
be brought not only in the judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in
any district wherein it may be found or transacts business; and all process in such
cases may be served in the district of which it is an inhabitant, or wherever it may
be found.
15 U.S.C. § 22.
The Second Circuit, interpreting the phrase “in such cases,” held that the Clayton Act’s
service of process provision only applies when the Clayton Act’s particular venue provision is
satisfied. See Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 428 F.3d 408, 423–27 (2d Cir. 2005). In
other words, the Clayton Act’s service of process provision only applies when the defendants
reside, are found, or transact business in the district where the action is brought (here, the
Southern District of New York). See id. at 427. Plaintiffs do not argue that the CHL Defendants
reside or are found within the Southern District of New York; rather, they argue that the CHL
Defendants “transact business” in this District. See Pls.’ 12(b)(2) Opp. at 35–39.
“The Supreme Court has construed the phrase ‘transacts business,’ as used in the venue
provision of Clayton Act Section 12, to refer to ‘the practical, everyday business or commercial
concept of doing business or carrying on business of any substantial character.’” Daniel, 428
F.3d at 428 (quoting United States v. Scophony Corp., 333 U.S. 795, 807 (1948)). Transaction of
33

business of a “substantial character” requires that there be “some amount of business continuity
and certainly more than a few isolated and peripheral contacts with the particular judicial
district.” Dennis v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 343 F. Supp. 3d 122, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (internal
references omitted). “[T]he propriety of venue turns on the nature of the corporate defendant’s
business.” Daniel, 428 F.3d at 429.
Plaintiffs have not shown that the CHL Defendants “transact business” in this District.
They make three overarching arguments in service of this unsuccessful effort:
First, Plaintiffs argue that venue under the Clayton Act lies in this District because the
alleged market allocation agreement dictates whether or not the Major Junior Leagues recruit in
this District. See Pls.’ 12(b)(2) Opp. at 36–37. But Plaintiffs do not explain how this agreement
constitutes the transaction of business in this District.
Plaintiffs point to In re Blue Cross Blue Shield Antitrust Litigation (“BCBS”), a case from
the Northern District of Alabama, in support of their argument, but that case involved entirely
different circumstances. 225 F. Supp. 3d 1269 (N.D. Ala. 2016). In BCBS, similar to this case,
the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had agreed to allocate geographic service areas for the
provision of Blue Cross Blue Shield insurance plans, to boycott all health care providers who
resided outside of their allocated geographic service areas, and to fix prices. Id. at 1278. But in
that case, the court found that the moving defendants “transacted business” in the district only
after detailing the particular “substantial business” conducted by each defendant: namely, that
the defendants had received hundreds of thousands of dollars in insurance premiums from
subscribers in the Northern District of Alabama and/or had providers within their provider
network within the district. Id. at 1291, 1296–97. Plaintiffs here do not make any similar
allegations about the CHL Defendants’ transaction of business in this District, such as receiving

34

substantial or regular payments from this District, or maintaining clubs or facilities in this
District.
Plaintiffs point to one line in BCBS in which, in discussing one of the numerous
defendants’ transaction of business, the court wrote, “In addition, Moving Defendants have
transacted business in this district by entering into an agreement with another insurance company
who maintains a provider network within this district . . . to provide access to medical services
for insured parties.” Id. at 1298. But entering into a geographic allocation agreement alone did
not satisfy the Clayton Act’s venue requirement, and the court had already detailed each
defendant’s extensive transaction of business in the district. Indeed, with respect to two of the
defendants—who had also allegedly engaged in the market allocation scheme—the court
ultimately found that the defendants conducted substantial business in the district because they
collected tens of thousands of dollars from members in the district, settled claims from providers
in the district, and more. Id. at 1298. But the court noted that those defendants “presented a
closer question as they have historically maintained less than ten subscribers in this district,”
making clear that the existence and operation of the market allocation scheme alone was not
sufficient to satisfy the Clayton Act’s transaction of business clause. Id.
Overall, the Court finds that the geographic market allocation alone, or the fact that it
allegedly dictates which clubs can recruit in this District, does not constitute the carrying on of
business of any substantial character under the Clayton Act.
Second, Plaintiffs argue that the CHL Defendants enforced the market allocation
agreement across Canada and the United States, including in this District. See Pls.’ 12(b)(2)
Opp. at 37. They point to the fact that the CHL Defendants have penalties in place for Major

35

Junior Clubs that breach the market allocation agreement, and they argue that this ensures that
any player from this District would only be drafted by the OHL. Id.
Plaintiffs cite Myers v. American Dental Association, in which plaintiff, a dentist
practicing in the Virgin Islands, challenged a rule by the American Dental Association (the
“ADA”) (and that was subsequently implemented by a constituent association in the Virgin
Islands (“VIDA”)) requiring dentists who announce an area of specialization to limit his or her
practice to that area. 695 F.2d 716, 718 (3d Cir. 1982). VIDA was a constituent organization of
the ADA that paid dues, adopted the code promulgated by the ADA, and was prohibited from
adopting rules inconsistent with the ADA’s code. Id. at 719. The plaintiff’s affidavits showed
that officers of the ADA came to the Virgin Islands to attend VIDA’s business meeting and to
ensure that it adopted the ADA’s newly promulgated code. Id. at 730. The affidavits also
showed that for eight years, an ADA trustee participated in VIDA’s annual meetings to ensure
VIDA did not take any actions inconsistent with ADA policy. Id. The court held that “when a
national professional organization . . . polices the qualifications of members residing in a judicial
district, or sets standards which it attempts to enforce[,] . . . the organization’s activities should
provide a basis for venue in the district in which they occur” under the “transacts business”
clause of the Clayton Act. Id. at 726. It held that the ADA’s “direct, continual supervision” of
VIDA in the Virgin Islands to ensure enforcement was sufficient for venue. Id. at 730.
In this case, Plaintiffs point to evidence of rules in place to effectuate the CHL
Defendants’ alleged conspiracies, as well as the threat of monetary penalties in place for
breaking those rules, as set out, inter alia, on the WHL’s website and in an OHL Manager’s
Manual. See Decl. of Zahid, Dkt. No. 180, Exs. 6, 10; see also id., Ex. 14. But unlike in Myers,
other than pointing to rules and mechanisms for enforcement, Plaintiffs point to no conduct—and

36

no conduct in this District whatsoever—by the CHL Defendants that shows that they actually
attempted to supervise or otherwise enforce those rules. Merely having rules and potential
penalties in place alone is insufficient to show the transaction of business in this District.
Also unlike in Myers, in which a constituent organization was located in the Virgin
Islands, none of the Major Junior Leagues or Major Junior Clubs are located in this District, and
Plaintiffs have not otherwise shown that any policing or supervision regarding the enforcement
of rules occurred in this District. Overall, they have provided no support as to how the rules and
any enforcement of those rules concern the Southern District of New York. See Ass’n of Am.
Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. v. Am. Bd. of Med. Specialties, No. 13-2609 (PGS) (LHG), 2014
WL 1334260, at *5–6 (D.N.J. Apr. 2, 2014) (argument that defendant organization enforced
qualifications on New Jersey physicians by maintaining a website asking patients to determine
whether their physician complied was insufficient; unlike in Myers, the website did not rise to
the level of “policing,” plaintiff did not show that the organization engaged in “direct, continual
supervision” of its member boards in New Jersey, none of the member boards had their principal
place of business in New Jersey, and the organization did not conduct any regular meetings in
New Jersey).
Third, Plaintiffs argue that the CHL Defendants’ recruiting efforts constitute the
transaction of business. They argue that the OHL Defendants, acting in accordance with the
geographic market allocation agreement, recruited and scouted players across the United States
and Canada, including in this District. See Pls.’ 12(b)(2) Opp. at 37–38. But Plaintiffs have not
averred facts showing such recruitment efforts of any substantial character in this District.

37

Plaintiffs only allege in a conclusory fashion in the First Amended Complaint that the
OHL has recruited and sourced players from this District, see, e.g., FAC ¶¶ 106, 125, which is
plainly insufficient. See Ball, 902 F.2d at 197.
Outside the pleadings, Plaintiffs’ proffered evidence shows additional connection to New
York, but it does not specifically show activities in this District. For instance, Plaintiffs present
evidence that the OHL has a scouting staff member assigned to New York (among other states),
and that between 2020 and 2024, the OHL scouted or recruited in some way 89 players who
played for a New York-based club or were from a New York hometown. 14 See Decl. of Zahid,
13F

Dkt. No. 180 ¶ 5; id. Ex. 15; id. Ex. 13 at 2. They have shown that some Major Junior Clubs in
the OHL also have scouts for New York and other states. See id., Ex. 17 at 4 (the London
Knights have a scout based in the Eastern United States, which includes New York in the
coverage area); Decl. of Zehmer, Dkt. No. 134, Ex. 39 ¶ 11 (the Oshawa Generals has “one parttime volunteer scout located in New York”). 15 They additionally point to evidence that at least
14F

one OHL scout has traveled to showcases, including in Buffalo, New York, to observe players,
see Decl. of Zahid, Dkt. No. 180, Ex. 13 at 4; Decl. of Zehmer, Dkt. No. 134, Ex. 3 ¶ 17, and the
OHL Director of Player Recruitment and Player Support Services has “had introductory calls and
meetings with a handful of elite hockey teams in the United States,” see Decl. of Zahid, Dkt. No.

The CHL Defendants have not countered this showing with affidavits or other evidence, but have stated
in their brief that the record “reflects merely that those [89] players were identified as potentially eligible
to play in the CHL.” CHL 12(b)(2) Reply at 11 n.3. Even accepting Plaintiffs’ affidavit as true, the
Court’s analysis does not change.

14

Plaintiffs also cite a document (an online article) that they argue shows that the Sarnia Sting, an OHL
team, has a regional scout for New York, but the article merely states that in January 2022, the team
welcomed an individual to their scouting department who is a native of Brooklyn, New York. See Decl.
of Zahid, Dkt. No. 180, Ex. 18; see also Pls.’ 12(b)(2) Opp. at 9 n.28.

15

38

180, Ex. 13 at 6. 16 Without any connection to the Southern District of New York, however, this
15F

evidence does not show the transaction of business in this District.
Plaintiffs provide some general evidence that an OHL scout travels to watch players
where their teams play, and has scouted New York-based teams, including Westchester Express
(a team in this District). See id. Ex. 13 at 2–3. 17 This is plainly insufficient to show the
16F

transaction of business of any “substantial character.” Plaintiffs do not show that any scout has
ever even traveled to this District or how many times a scout has observed a team located in this
District. Their showing is bare and fails to show any contact by a CHL Defendant with this
District. In other words, Plaintiffs provide no support that there is “some amount of business
continuity,” or indeed anything “more than a few isolated and peripheral contacts” with the
Southern District of New York. See Dennis, 343 F. Supp. 3d at 199.
This case is similar to Dennis, in which the court found that plaintiffs did not satisfy the
Clayton Act’s venue prong where plaintiff merely alleged that a defendant corporation, which
was headquartered in Australia, recruited students from the Southern District of New York for its
New York office because there were “no allegations in the amended complaint as to the
regularity of such recruitment.” 343 F. Supp. 3d at 200. The court stated that “[w]ithout more,”
it could not conclude that the recruiting efforts “evidence the ‘practical, everyday business or
commercial concept of doing business or carrying on business of any substantial character.’” Id.
(quoting Daniel, 428 F.3d at 430).

As explained above, supra Section II(B)(1), Plaintiffs have not shown that any of these scouting efforts
involved any contact with players or anything more than observing players and gathering information.

16

Plaintiffs also argued that an OHL scout has watched the NY Saints (a team in this District), but does
not indicate where in any of the affidavits or exhibits this appears. See Pls.’ 12(b)(2) Opp. at 8. Even
assuming this is true, it does not change the Court’s analysis.
17

39

Here, too, Plaintiffs have not made an averment of facts as to the regularity of any
recruiting activities in this District (or indeed, even that any recruiting activities ever occurred in
this District), and the Court is unable to conclude that the CHL Defendants transacted business of
any “substantial character” in this District.
Because the Court finds, for all of the reasons explained above, that it does not have
personal jurisdiction over the CHL Defendants, it need not decide the CHL Defendants’ motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
IV.

Plaintiffs Have Not Established Jurisdiction as to Dan MacKenzie
While the Court has already extensively explained why it does not have personal

jurisdiction over any of the CHL Defendants, including MacKenzie, the Court emphasizes that
Plaintiffs have not come close to establishing personal jurisdiction over MacKenzie, who resides
and works in Canada. See Decl. of Zehmer, Dkt. No. 134, Ex. 5. The allegations and
jurisdictional facts asserted with respect to MacKenzie are paper thin. Concerning jurisdiction,
Plaintiffs allege in the First Amended Complaint only that MacKenzie is the President of the
CHL, and they allege:
MacKenzie . . . has continuous and systemic business contacts with this district,
including with respect to the licensing and selling of merchandise and products,
including television events, and his participation in the illegal anticompetitive
scheme described herein, which has caused and is causing antitrust injury to Major
Junior Players.
FAC ¶ 38.
These conclusory allegations are wholly insufficient to show personal jurisdiction in this
Court. Moreover, in their brief, Plaintiffs note that MacKenzie executed the NHL-CHL
Agreement, see Pls.’ 12(b)(2) Opp. at 16 n.75, but the affidavit they cite shows that MacKenzie
never traveled to New York as part of the negotiation, execution, or implementation of the
agreement, and in fact, the NHL deputy commissioner traveled to Canada to negotiate the
40

agreement. See Decl. of Zehmer, Ex. 1 ¶ 22. These facts do not establish personal jurisdiction in
New York, nor do Plaintiffs appear to argue that they do.
In short, for all the reasons explained above—including throughout this Opinion—this
Court does not have personal jurisdiction over MacKenzie.
CONCLUSION
The Court does not have personal jurisdiction over the CHL Defendants under New
York’s long-arm statute because, among other reasons, the named Plaintiffs—who are not from
New York and did not play hockey in New York—did not experience injury in New York for the
purposes of Section 302(a)(3), and the claims of the named Plaintiffs do not “arise from” the
CHL Defendants’ transaction of business in New York for the purposes of Section 302(a)(1).
The same is true for the WAIPU Plaintiffs, who have not even attempted to identify a member
who satisfies these requirements. Additionally, the Court does not have personal jurisdiction
under the Clayton Act because Plaintiffs have not satisfied the Act’s venue prong: They have
not shown that the CHL Defendants “transact[] business” in this District.
Because the Court dismisses without prejudice all claims asserted against the CHL
Defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction, the Court’s scheduling order regarding the
preliminary injunction hearing, see Dkt. No. 68, is moot, and the preliminary injunction hearing
that was previously scheduled for January 27, 2025, is CANCELLED. By separate order, the
Court will schedule a conference for the remaining parties in this action. The Clerk of Court is
directed to terminate Dkt. No. 132, and to terminate Dkt. Nos. 135, 190, and 230 as moot.
Dated: November 26, 2024
New York, New York

SO ORDERED.
_______________________
MARGARET M. GARNETT
United States District Judge

41