Moreno v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration

Filing 14

DECISION AND ORDER: For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's request for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED; the Commissioner's request for Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED; and this case is DISMISSED. The Clerk is directed to enter final judgment in favor of the Commissioner and then close the file. (Signed by Magistrate Judge Gary R. Jones on 9/23/2024) (mml) Transmission to Orders and Judgments Clerk for processing.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
----------------------------------------------------MIGUEL M.,
Plaintiff,

DECISION AND ORDER
1:24-cv-01543-GRJ

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
----------------------------------------------------GARY R. JONES, United States Magistrate Judge:
In April of 2019, Plaintiff Miguel M. 1 applied for Disability Insurance
Benefits under the Social Security Act. The Commissioner of Social
Security denied the application. Plaintiff, represented by Konoski &
Partners, P.C., Bryan Matthew Konoski, Esq., of counsel, commenced this
action seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s denial of benefits
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405 (g) and 1383 (c)(3). The parties consented to the
jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge. (Docket No. 7).
This case was referred to the undersigned on September 10, 2024.
Presently pending are the parties’ requests for Judgment on the Pleadings
under Rule 12 (c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the following

Plaintiff’s name has been partially redacted in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 5.2 (c)(2)(B) and the recommendation of the Committee on Court
Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the United States.

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reasons, Plaintiff’s request is due to be denied, the Commissioner’s request
is due to be granted, and this case is dismissed.
I. BACKGROUND
A.

Administrative Proceedings

Plaintiff applied for benefits on April 10, 2019, alleging disability
beginning May 24, 2018. (T at 16). 2 Plaintiff’s application was denied
initially and on reconsideration. He requested a hearing before an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). A hearing was held on November 2,
2020, before ALJ Sharda Singh. (T at 36-65). Plaintiff appeared with an
attorney and testified. (T at 41-59). The ALJ also received testimony from
Jane Gerrish, a vocational expert. (T at 60-64).
On December 18, 2020, ALJ Sharda issued a decision denying the
application for benefits. (T at 13-35). On August 27, 2021, the Appeals
Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (T at 1-4).
Plaintiff commenced an action seeking judicial review in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York. On August 30,
2022, the Honorable Andrew E. Krause, United States Magistrate Judge,
approved a stipulation remanding the matter for further administrative
proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g). (T at 975).

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Citations to “T” refer to the administrative record transcript at Docket No. 8.
2

The Appeals Council entered a Remand Order on September 16, 2022. (T
at 967-71).
A further administrative hearing was held on January 30, 2023,
before ALJ Singh. (T at 944-66). Plaintiff appeared and testified. (T at 95058, 959-61). The ALJ also received testimony from Andrew Vaughn, a
vocational expert. (T at 958-59, 961-65).
B.

ALJ’s Decision

On March 31, 2023, the ALJ issued a second decision denying the
application for benefits. (T at 907-933).
The ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of
the Social Security Act through December 31, 2023. (T at 912). The ALJ
determined that Plaintiff engaged in substantial gainful activity after the
alleged onset date, specifically between July and August of 2019, but found
that there were continuous 12-month periods during which Plaintiff did not
engage in substantial gainful activity after the alleged onset date. (T at
913).
The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s cervical spine impairment, left
shoulder impairment, lumbar spine impairment, left knee impairment, right
knee meniscus tear (status post-surgery), asthma, major depressive

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disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder were severe impairments as
defined under the Social Security Act. (T at 913).
However, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed
impairments in 20 CFR Part 403, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (T at 913).
At step four of the sequential analysis the ALJ determined that
Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform
sedentary work, as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567 (a), with the following
limitations: he can sit for 30 to 45 minutes, having to stand for 1 to 2
minutes and then return to sitting; he can never climb ladders, ropes, or
scaffolds; can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, kneel,
crouch, and crawl; he is limited to occasional overhead reaching with the
left upper extremity; frequent reaching in all directions with the left upper
extremity; and frequent fine gross and hand manipulations bilaterally; must
avoid unprotected heights, hazards and concentrated exposure to fumes,
odors, dusts, and gases; and would need to use a cane for ambulation and
balance, holding the cane with his left hand (T at 915).
The ALJ also found Plaintiff restricted to simple, routine, repetitive
non-complex tasks, with no more than occasional contact with supervisors,
co-workers, and the public, in a low stress environment, defined as
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involving only occasional decision making, changes in work setting, and
judgment. (T at 915).
The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could not perform his past relevant
work as a bus driver, police officer, or teacher aide. (T at 921). However,
considering Plaintiff’s age (30 on the alleged onset date), education (at
least high school), work experience, and RFC, the ALJ determined that
there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that
Plaintiff can perform. (T at 921-22).
As such, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not been under a disability,
as defined under the Social Security Act, and was not entitled to benefits
for the period between May 24, 2018 (the alleged onset date) and March
31, 2023 (the date of the ALJ’s decision). (T at 924). On December 7,
2023, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, making the
ALJ’s second decision the Commissioner’s final decision. (T at 900-906).
C.

Procedural History

Plaintiff commenced this action, by and through his counsel, by filing
a Complaint on February 29, 2024. (Docket No. 1). On July 9, 2024,
Plaintiff filed a brief requesting judgment on the pleadings. (Docket No. 11).
The Commissioner interposed a brief requesting judgment on the pleadings

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on September 6, 2024. (Docket No. 12). On September 18, 2024, Plaintiff
submitted a reply brief in further support of his request. (Docket No. 13).
II. APPLICABLE LAW
A.

Standard of Review

“It is not the function of a reviewing court to decide de novo whether a
claimant was disabled.” Melville v. Apfel, 198 F.3d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 1999).
The court’s review is limited to “determin[ing] whether there is substantial
evidence supporting the Commissioner's decision and whether the
Commissioner applied the correct legal standard.” Poupore v. Astrue, 566
F.3d 303, 305 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
The reviewing court defers to the Commissioner's factual findings,
which are considered conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. See
42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “Substantial evidence” is “more than a mere scintilla”
and “means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Lamay v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec.,
562 F.3d 503, 507 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)).
“In determining whether the agency's findings are supported by
substantial evidence, the reviewing court is required to examine the entire
record, including contradictory evidence and evidence from which
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conflicting inferences can be drawn.” Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145,
151 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotations omitted).
“When there are gaps in the administrative record or the ALJ has
applied an improper legal standard,” or when the ALJ’s rationale is unclear,
remand “for further development of the evidence” or for an explanation of
the ALJ’s reasoning is warranted. Pratts v. Chater, 94 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir.
1996).
B.

Five-Step Sequential Evaluation Process

Under the Social Security Act, a claimant is disabled if he or she
lacks the ability “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of
any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last
for a continuous period of not less than 12 months ....” 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(1)(A).
A claimant’s eligibility for disability benefits is evaluated pursuant to a
five-step sequential analysis:
1. The Commissioner considers whether the claimant is
currently engaged in substantial gainful activity.
2. If not, the Commissioner considers whether the claimant has
a “severe impairment” which limits his or her mental or physical
ability to do basic work activities.

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3. If the claimant has a “severe impairment,” the Commissioner
must ask whether, based solely on medical evidence, claimant
has an impairment listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. If the
claimant has one of these enumerated impairments, the
Commissioner will automatically consider him disabled, without
considering vocational factors such as age, education, and
work experience.
4. If the impairment is not “listed” in the regulations, the
Commissioner then asks whether, despite the claimant's severe
impairment, he or she has residual functional capacity to
perform his or her past work.
5. If the claimant is unable to perform his or her past work, the
Commissioner then determines whether there is other work
which the claimant could perform.
See Rolon v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 994 F. Supp. 2d 496, 503
(S.D.N.Y. 2014); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v),
416.920(a)(4)(i)–(v).
The claimant bears the burden of proof as to the first four steps; the
burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. See Green-Younger v.
Barnhart, 335 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2003). At step five, the Commissioner
determines whether claimant can perform work that exists in significant
numbers in the national economy. See Butts v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 101,
103 (2d Cir. 2005); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c)(2).

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III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff raises one main argument in support of his request for
reversal of the ALJ’s decision. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ committed
legal error by failing to adequately explain her conclusion that Plaintiff
retained the RFC to perform simple tasks independently.
A claimant’s RFC is his or her “maximum remaining ability to do
sustained work activities in an ordinary work setting on a continuing basis.”
Melville, 198 F.3d at 52 (quoting SSR 96-8p). When making an RFC
determination, an ALJ must consider medical opinions regarding the
claimant’s functioning and make a determination based on an assessment
of the record as a whole. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.9527(d)(2)
(“Although we consider opinions from medical sources on issues such as
...your residual functional capacity...the final responsibility for deciding
these issues is reserved to the Commissioner.”).
Here, as noted above, the ALJ determined, inter alia, that Plaintiff
retained the RFC to perform simple, routine, repetitive non-complex tasks,
with no more than occasional contact with supervisors, co-workers, and the
public, in a low stress environment, defined as involving only occasional
decision making, changes in work setting, and judgment. (T at 915).

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Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to adequately explain how she
reached the conclusion that he could perform simple tasks independently,
given contrary evidence in the record.
In support of this argument, Plaintiff points to a consultative
psychological evaluation performed by Dr. Ruth Grant in January of 2020.
Dr. Grant diagnosed major depressive disorder and posttraumatic stress
disorder. (T at 531). She opined that Plaintiff could follow and understand
simple directions and instructions, but “may have moderate difficulty doing
simple tasks independently ….” (T at 531). Dr. Grant also believed Plaintiff
might have “significant difficulty” in other areas of mental functioning,
including maintaining attention and concentration, sustaining a schedule,
and performing complex tasks. (T at 531).
The ALJ found Dr. Grant’s opinion “partially persuasive.” (T at 919).
The ALJ agreed that Plaintiff was “affected by moderate deficits in multiple
areas of mental function including social abilities, concentration/cognitive
abilities, and overall adaptive [functioning],” but found Dr. Grant’s use of the
term “significant” to describe certain limitations vague and concluded that
the overall record supported a finding of only moderate mental deficits. (T
at 919).

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Plaintiff says that the ALJ appeared to accept the portion of Dr.
Grant’s opinion in which she assessed moderate impairment in his ability to
perform simple tasks independently, but then failed to explicitly explain how
she reconciled that finding with the conclusion that Plaintiff retained the
RFC to perform simple tasks independently. Plaintiff contends that this
amounted to legal error requiring remand.
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred by failing to explain how she
reconciled the RFC findings with her conclusion at step three of the
sequential evaluation that Plaintiff had moderate impairment in his ability to
understand, remember, or apply information. (T at 914).
The Court finds Plaintiff’s arguments unavailing. Here’s why. Even if
Plaintiff’s ability to perform tasks independently is moderately impaired, an
ALJ can appropriately account for moderate mental impairments through
an RFC containing non-exertional limitations like those found by the ALJ
here. See Duffy v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 17CV3560GHWRWL, 2018
WL 4376414, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2018), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 1:17-CV-3560-GHW, 2018 WL 4373997 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13,
2018)(“Mild or moderate limitations in concentration do not necessarily
establish that a claimant is disabled, particularly where the ALJ limits the
scope of work to unskilled, repetitive work.”)(collecting cases); see also
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Campos v. Saul, No. 18CV9809 (DF), 2020 WL 1285113, at *23 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 18, 2020); Stonick v. Saul, No. 3:19-CV-01334 (TOF), 2020 WL
6129339, at *13 (D. Conn. Oct. 19, 2020).
Moreover, the ALJ’s overall conclusion that Plaintiff retained the RFC
to meet the mental demands of a significantly reduced range of work is
adequately articulated in her decision and well-supported by the record.
In January of 2020, Dr. Warren Leib, a non-examining State Agency
review physician, opined that Plaintiff was not significantly limited in his
ability to remember locations and work-like procedures, understand and
remember very short and simple instructions, carry out very short and
simple instructions, sustain an ordinary routine without special supervision,
and make simple work-related decisions (T at 80-81). Dr. Leib concluded
that Plaintiff could perform “simple work” (T at 75). In April of 2020, Dr. L.
Haus, another State Agency Review physician, agreed with these findings
(T at 92-93, 98-99).
The ALJ considered these assessments persuasive, finding that they
were “consistent with the treatment record and supported by objective
findings” (T at 921). The ALJ referenced the treatment record, accurately
noting that mental status examinations did not evidence behavioral or

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cognitive deficits other than “constricted affect/anxious or mildly depressed
mood.” (T at 919, 1222, 1224, 1226, 1228, 1230).
For these reasons, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s RFC
determination, which limited Plaintiff to a reduced range of unskilled work in
a low-stress environment, is consistent with applicable law and is
supported by substantial evidence. The denial of benefits must therefore
be sustained. See, e.g., Zabala v. Astrue, 595 F.3d 402, 410 (2d Cir.
2010)(“None of the clinicians who examined [claimant] indicated that she
had anything more than moderate limitations in her work-related
functioning, and most reported less severe limitations. Although there was
some conflicting medical evidence, the ALJ’s determination that Petitioner
could perform her previous unskilled work was well supported.”); McIntyre
v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 146, 150-51 (2d Cir. 2014)(finding that ALJ
appropriately accounted for moderate work-related psychiatric limitations
by limiting the claimant to unskilled, low stress work involving limited
contract with others); see also Platt v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 588 F. Supp.
3d 412, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2022)(collecting cases); Martinez v. Comm'r of Soc.
Sec., No. 13-CIV-159-KMK-JCM, 2016 WL 6885181, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
5, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 6884905
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2016)(“[S]uch limitations in concentration, dealing with
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stress, and socialization have been found to be consistent with an RFC for
unskilled work.”); Lee W. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:20-CV-008-DB,
2021 WL 1600294 at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2021) (“[U]nskilled work, by
definition, already accounts for limitations in mental functioning, including
limitations interacting with others and learning new tasks.”).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s request for Judgment on the
Pleadings is DENIED; the Commissioner’s request for Judgment on the
Pleadings is GRANTED; and this case is DISMISSED. The Clerk is
directed to enter final judgment in favor of the Commissioner and then
close the file.

s/ Gary R. Jones

Dated: September 23, 2024

GARY R. JONES
United States Magistrate Judge

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