Samuels v. Cornell Tech et al

Filing 27

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: The Court has considered all of the parties' arguments. To the extent not specifically addressed, those arguments are either moot or without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the defendants' motion to dismiss is granted and the complaint is dismissed without prejudice. The plaintiff "can amend his complaint to properly allege his standing to sue if he can do so truthfully." Samuels, 2024 WL 3742544, at *2. The time for the plaintiff to file an a mended complaint is March 24, 2025. If the plaintiff does not file an amended complaint by that date, this case will be closed. The Clerk is directed to close ECF Nos. 19 and 22. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge John G. Koeltl on 3/10/2025) ( Amended Pleadings due by 3/24/2025.) (ks)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
????????????????????????????????????
JUSTIN SAMUELS,
Plaintiff,

24-cv-1946 (JGK)

- against -

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER

CORNELL TECH, ET AL.,
Defendants.
????????????????????????????????????
JOHN G. KOELTL, District Judge:
The pro se plaintiff, Justin Samuels, brought this action
against Cornell Tech (“Cornell”) and the City University of New
York (“CUNY”), alleging that the defendants participated in
Break Through Tech programs that discriminated against the
plaintiff based on sex, sexual orientation, and gender identity,
in violation of Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d et seq. and §§ 2000e et seq.,
respectively, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20
U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq., the New York State Human Rights Law
(“NYSHRL”), N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290 et seq., and the New York City
Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”), N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8–101 et seq.
CUNY now moves to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rules
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Cornell contends that the plaintiff has failed to effect service
on Cornell but joins in full CUNY’s motion to dismiss. For the

1

reasons explained below, the defendants’ motion to dismiss is
granted and the complaint is dismissed without prejudice.
I.
Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are taken from
the plaintiff’s complaint (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1, and his brief
in opposition to CUNY’s motion to dismiss, ECF No. 23,1 and are
accepted as true for purposes of the present motion to dismiss.2
A.
Break Through Tech is an organization that “operates at the
intersection of academia and industry to create new pathways
into tech degrees and careers for women and non-binary
undergraduates from diverse backgrounds.” Compl., Ex. 3 at 1,
ECF No. 1-3; see also id., Ex. 1, ECF No. 1-1. “Break Through
Tech’s national office is located in New York City on the
Cornell Tech campus.” Id., Ex. 2 at 2, ECF No. 1-2. Break
Through Tech currently offers two programs: “a Computing Program
and an AI Program.” Id. “Both have affiliate sites located on
college and university campuses across the United States.” Id.
The “AI Program helps women and non-binary students gain
the skills they need to get jobs in

. . . data science, machine

learning, and artificial intelligence.” Id. at 3. “The AI

1

“A district court deciding a motion to dismiss may consider factual
allegations made by a pro se party in his papers opposing the motion.” Walker
v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 122 n.1 (2d Cir. 2013).
2 Unless otherwise noted, this Memorandum opinion and Order omits all internal
alterations, citations, footnotes, and quotation marks in quoted text.

2

Program is currently offered in New York, Boston, and Los
Angeles or virtually to students [located elsewhere].” Id. at 4.
The Computing Program “encourage[s] women and non-binary
students to enter the tech academic pipeline.” Id. at 5. The
Computing Program consists of “workshops for incoming [college]
students,” an abbreviated internship program, and other “career
readiness” and “community-building” opportunities. Id. at 5–6.
“The Computing Program is offered in New York City, Chicago, and
[the District of Columbia].” Id. at 6.
B.
The plaintiff, Justin Samuels, identifies as “a Black man
with a deep interest in technology.” Compl. 1. The plaintiff
alleges that Cornell and CUNY participated in and offered Break
Through Tech programs that excluded “straight and gay men” and
applied “racial preferences[]” in “admissions and employment.”
Id. at 2.
The plaintiff alleges that “upon reviewing the [Break
Through Tech] program’s website, [he] was dismayed to discover
that [he] [is] precluded from applying due to its discriminatory
policies. The program explicitly states that it is only open to
women, transgender individuals, and non-binary individuals,
effectively excluding straight and gay men from participation.”
Id. at 1. Based on these policies, the plaintiff contends that
CUNY and Cornell “blatantly discriminate against men, including
3

gay men like [him]self, . . . and the exclusion based solely on
sex has harmed [him] personally.” Pltf’s Opp. (“Opp.”) 1, ECF
No. 23. However, the plaintiff does not allege that he ever
applied to any program offered by Cornell or CUNY. See Compl. at
1–2. Nor does the plaintiff allege that he is a college student.
See Compl. at 1-2; Opp. at 1-3. Instead, the plaintiff states
merely that he was “particularly interested in the opportunities
offered by the [Break Through Tech] programs,” id. at 1, and
contends that it was “futile for [him] to apply because [he]
w[ould] be rejected solely due to [his] sex,” Opp. 1.
C.
On March 14, 2024, the plaintiff filed this action. ECF No.
1. CUNY now moves to dismiss the complaint for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and for failure to
state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. ECF No. 19. Cornell contends that the plaintiff
has failed to effect service on Cornell but joins in full CUNY’s
motion to dismiss the complaint. ECF No. 22.
II.
A.
To prevail against a motion to dismiss for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the
burden of proving the Court’s jurisdiction by a preponderance of
the evidence. Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d
4

Cir. 2000). In considering such a motion, the Court generally
must accept as true the material factual allegations in the
complaint. See J.S. ex rel. N.S. v. Attica Cent. Schs., 386 F.3d
107, 110 (2d Cir. 2004). However, the Court does not draw all
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Id. Indeed,
where jurisdictional facts are disputed, the Court has the power
and the obligation to consider matters outside the pleadings to
determine whether jurisdiction exists. See Kamen v. Am. Tel. &
Tel. Co., 791 F.2d 1006, 1011 (2d Cir. 1986). In so doing, the
Court is guided by the decisional law that has developed under
Rule 56. See id.
B.
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim, the Court must accept the allegations in the
complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the
plaintiff’s favor. McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d
184, 191 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court’s function on a motion to
dismiss is “not to weigh the evidence that might be presented at
a trial but merely to determine whether the complaint itself is
legally sufficient.” Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1067 (2d
Cir. 1985).
To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff’s complaint
must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
5

544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). While the Court should construe the factual allegations
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, “the tenet that a
court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a
complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id.
When presented with a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), the Court may consider documents that are referenced
in the complaint, documents that the plaintiff relied on in
bringing suit and that are either in the plaintiff’s possession
or that the plaintiff knew of when bringing suit, or matters of
which judicial notice may be taken. See Chambers v. Time Warner,
Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2002).
The Court must construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris
v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to
raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v.
Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474–75 (2d Cir. 2006)
(emphasis in original). However, a pro se litigant is not exempt
“from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and
substantive law.” Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir.
1983).

6

III.
At the threshold, the defendants argue that the plaintiff
lacks Article III standing to assert any of the claims alleged
in the complaint. CUNY Mem. 1, ECF No. 20; Cornell Ltr. 1, ECF
No. 22; CUNY Rep. 1, ECF No. 24.
Article III of the United States Constitution “confines the
federal judicial power to the resolution of ‘Cases’ and
‘Controversies.’” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423
(2021). For there to be an Article III case or controversy, the
plaintiff must have standing. Id. The “irreducible
constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements:” (1)
injury in fact, (2) causation, and (3) redressability. Lujan v.
Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). “The plaintiff,
as party invoking federal jurisdiction, bears the burden of
establishing these elements,” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S.
330, 338 (2016). At the pleadings stage, “the complaint’s
factual allegations of standing must be plausible and
nonconclusory.” Lugo v. City of Troy, 114 F.4th 80, 87 (2d Cir.
2024).
“Ordinarily, to establish standing to challenge an
allegedly discriminatory program, a plaintiff must apply to that
program.” Do No Harm v. Pfizer Inc., 126 F.4th 109, 118 (2d Cir.
2025). “But a plaintiff need not go through the motions of
formally applying when that would be a futile gesture.” Id. “In
7

such circumstances, a plaintiff need only demonstrate that they
are able and ready to apply, but a discriminatory policy
prevents them from doing so on equal footing.” Id.
In this case, the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate
Article III standing to sue CUNY and Cornell. The plaintiff has
not alleged that he was able and ready to apply to the programs
offered by CUNY and Cornell in partnership with Break Through
Tech. Rather, the plaintiff’s assertions “suggest[] an abstract,
generalized grievance, not an actual desire to” apply to the
programs offered by CUNY and Cornell. See Carney v. Adams, 592
U.S. 53, 63 (2020); Samuels v. New York City, No. 23-cv-10045,
2024 WL 3742544, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2024). Such “words of
general intent” are insufficient to demonstrate standing. See
Carney, 592 U.S. at 64.
Moreover, “[a]pplicants who fail to meet the basic
eligibility requirements . . . cannot demonstrate that they
suffered a particularized personal injury . . . .” Houser v.
Pritzker, 28 F. Supp 3d. 222, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). The programs
offered by CUNY and Cornell in partnership with Break Through
Tech are available only to college students. Compl., Exs. 1–3.
However, the plaintiff does not allege that he was a college
student when this action was brought, much less that he was a
college student at CUNY or Cornell. Indeed, the plaintiff stated
that he lived in Portugal when he filed this action. ECF No. 1.
8

Then, three months later, the plaintiff indicated that he
resides in Alabama. ECF No. 6. Accordingly, the plaintiff lacks
Article III standing to sue the defendants. See Do No Harm, 126
F.4th at 118. Therefore, the plaintiff’s claims against CUNY and
Cornell are dismissed without prejudice for lack of standing.
IV.
Because the complaint must be dismissed for lack of Article
III standing, it is unnecessary to reach the defendants’ other
arguments for dismissal.
CONCLUSION
The Court has considered all of the parties’ arguments. To
the extent not specifically addressed, those arguments are
either moot or without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the
defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted and the complaint is
dismissed without prejudice.
The plaintiff “can amend his complaint to properly allege
his standing to sue if he can do so truthfully.” Samuels, 2024
WL 3742544, at *2. The time for the plaintiff to file an amended
complaint is March 24, 2025. If the plaintiff does not file an
amended complaint by that date, this case will be closed.

9