Whitehead v. The Walt Disney Company et al

Filing 74

ORDER denying 56 Letter Motion to Stay ; denying 61 Letter Motion for Discovery; denying 62 Letter Motion to Stay. Plaintiff's motions to stay the proceedings in this action, Dkt. Nos. 56, 61, and 62, are hereby DENIED. The Court cert ifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate Dkt. Nos. 56, 61, and 62. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Margaret M. Garnett on 1/28/2025) (tg)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
1/28/2025

DAVID LOUIS WHITEHEAD,
Plaintiff,
-againstTHE WALT DISNEY COMPANY, et al.,

24-CV-02283 (MMG)
ORDER

Defendants.
MARGARET M. GARNETT, United States District Judge:
On December 10, 2024 (Dkt. No. 56), January 2, 2025 (Dkt. No. 61), 1 and January 3,
2025 (Dkt. No. 62), Plaintiff moved to stay the proceedings in this action pending his
interlocutory appeal of this Court’s November 19, 2024 Order, Dkt. No. 52. On January 7, 2025,
Defendants filed their opposition to Plaintiff’s motions to stay. See Dkt. Nos. 59 (in opposition
to Dkt. No. 56) & 71 (indicating Defendants rely on their prior opposition in response to Dkt.
Nos. 61 and 62). For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiff’s motions to stay are DENIED.
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The grounds of Plaintiff’s appeals and motions to stay are of the same nature and
substance as Plaintiff’s prior motion for injunctive relief, Dkt. No. 13, which the Court denied on
July 23, 2024, Dkt. No. 14 & 18 (denying Plaintiff’s motion to reconsider the July 23, 2024
Order), as well as Plaintiff’s prior motion to unseal, Dkt. No. 50, which the Court denied on
November 19, 2024, Dkt. No. 52. The Court has previously certified under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(3) that appeals taken from the July 23, 2024 and November 19, 2024 Orders “would
not be taken in good faith.” See Dkt. Nos. 14 & 52.
“[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to
control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for
counsel, and for litigants.” Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 96 (2d Cir.
2012) (quoting Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)). “[T]he decision whether to
issue a stay is [therefore] firmly within a district court's discretion.” LaSala v. Needham & Co.,
Inc., 399 F. Supp. 2d 421, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (internal marks omitted) (quoting Am. Shipping
Line v. Massan Shipping, 885 F. Supp. 499, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).

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The ECF docket text for Dkt. No. 61 is a “motion for discovery,” but because the nature of a
motion is determined by its substance, the Court construes Plaintiff’s January 2 motion as
another motion to stay. See Jones v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of America, 223 F.3d 130, 136 (2d Cir.
2000).

appeal:

Courts consider the below four factors when determining whether to issue a stay pending
(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to
succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent
a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties
interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.

Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987); see Cooper v. Town of East Hampton, 83
F.3d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 1996).
The Court finds that Plaintiff has not established that any of the four factors
counsel in favor of issuing a stay in this action.
First, as to the likelihood of success on his appeals, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s
appeals are unlikely to succeed for the same reasons underlying the denials of Plaintiff’s prior
motions for injunctive relief and to unseal, and that Plaintiff’s appeals are taken in bad faith. See
Dkt. Nos. 14 & 52 (certifying under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that appeals taken “would not be
taken in good faith”).
Second, as to irreparable harm, Plaintiff has not alleged or demonstrated any irreparable
harm necessitating a stay. See Rodriguez v. DeBuono, 175 F.3d 227, 234 (2d Cir. 1999) (“The
movant must demonstrate an injury that is neither remote nor speculative, but actual and
imminent and that cannot be remedied by an award of monetary damages.” (internal marks
omitted)). In his motions, Plaintiff simply reiterates the same arguments and requests he has
previously made.
Finally, as to the harm to Defendants and the public interest, the Court finds that staying
the proceedings in this action would unnecessarily and unfairly delay the case’s resolution, to
Defendants’ and the public’s detriment, especially given Plaintiff’s history as a repeat and
“vexatious litigant.” See Whitehead v. Netflix, Inc., No. 22-cv-00883 (LTS), Dkt. No. 14
(S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2022) (collecting cases and noting that “multiple courts have declared
[Plaintiff] a vexatious litigant and warned or imposed leave-to-file restrictions or other sanctions
on him”).
***
Plaintiff’s motions to stay the proceedings in this action, Dkt. Nos. 56, 61, and 62, are
hereby DENIED. The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this
order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the
purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

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The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate Dkt. Nos. 56, 61, and 62.
Dated: January 28, 2025
New York, New York
SO ORDERED.

MARGARET M. GARNETT
United States District Judge

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