Spooner v. Rose M Singer Center et al

Filing 7

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD The Court dismisses the complaint, filed IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), with 30 days' leave to replead. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction of any state law claims Plaintiff may be asserting. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). The Court directs the Clerk of Court to hold this matter open on the docket until a civil judgment is entered. (And as further set forth herein.) SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Laura Taylor Swain on 3/6/2025) (jca)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
RUTH KATHERINE SPOONER,
Plaintiff,
-againstROSE M. SINGER CENTER; DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS,

24-CV-8621 (LTS)
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD

Defendants.
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge:
Plaintiff, who currently is detained at the Rose M. Singer Center (“RMSC”) on Rikers
Island, brings this action, pro se, alleging that Defendants violated her rights. The Court
construes the complaint as attempting to assert federal constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Named as Defendants are RMSC and the New York City Department of Correction
(“DOC”). By order dated January 14, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in
forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. 1 For the reasons set forth below, the
Court dismisses the complaint, but grants Plaintiff 30 days’ leave to replead her claims in an
amended complaint.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must dismiss a complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious,
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480

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Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been
granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Plaintiff filed the complaint
without an IFP application and prisoner authorization. By order dated November 19, 2024, the
Court directed Plaintiff to cure this deficiency. The court received Plaintiff’s IFP application and
prisoner authorization on December 10, 2024.

F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on
any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills,
572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they
suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff states that the events giving rise to her claims occurred at RMSC in September
2024. Plaintiff alleges that the mattresses provided at RMSC are “very thin,” “not in good
shape,” and “always hurting” her. (ECF 1, at 4.) As a result, she has back pain and “breathing
problems,” and is unable to “sleep properly.” (Id.) Plaintiff can sometimes “feel the metal
thr[ough] the mattress.” (Id.)
Plaintiff seeks $5,000 in damages.
DISCUSSION
The Court construes Plaintiff’s allegations as attempting to assert claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 that Defendants violated her rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was
violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487
U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988).
A.

Rose M. Singer Center
The Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against RMSC, which is a building located on

Rikers Island, because it is not a “person” that may be sued under Section 1983. The Court

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therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against RMSC for failure to state a claim on which relief
may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
B.

Department of Correction and City of New York
Plaintiff’s claims against DOC must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New

York is not an entity that can be sued. N.Y. City Charter ch. 17, § 396 (“[A]ll actions and
proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the
name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by
law.”); Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Emerson v.
City of New York, 740 F. Supp. 2d 385, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff is generally
prohibited from suing a municipal agency.”).
In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status and clear intention to assert claims against the City of
New York, the Court construes the complaint as asserting claims against the City of New York.
When a plaintiff sues a municipality under Section 1983, it is not enough for the plaintiff to
allege that one of the municipality’s employees or agents engaged in some wrongdoing. The
plaintiff must show that the municipality itself caused the violation of the plaintiff’s rights. See
Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (“A municipality or other local government may
be liable under . . . section [1983] if the governmental body itself ‘subjects’ a person to a
deprivation of rights or ‘causes’ a person ‘to be subjected’ to such deprivation.” (quoting Monell
v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978))); Cash v. Cnty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d
Cir. 2011). In other words, to state a Section 1983 claim against a municipality, the plaintiff must
allege facts showing (1) the existence of a municipal policy, custom, or practice, and (2) that the
policy, custom, or practice caused the violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Jones
v. Town of East Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S.
397, 403 (1997) (internal citations omitted). If there is no underlying constitutional violation,
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however, the Court need not examine whether the municipality or other local government entity
is liable under Section 1983. See Segal v. City of New York, 459 F.3d 207, 219 (2d Cir. 2006).
C.

Conditions of confinement claim
The Court construes the complaint as asserting a conditions of confinement claim

because Plaintiff alleges that her mattress, issued by DOC, caused her to experience pain.
Because Plaintiff was in pretrial detention at the time the events underlying this claim occurred,
the Court treats this claim as arising under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See
Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2017) (noting that where an individual is in pretrial
detention, the Fourteenth Amendment applies).
To state a conditions of confinement claim, a prisoner must satisfy two elements: (1) an
“objective” element, which requires a showing that the challenged conditions are sufficiently
serious to pose an unreasonable risk to her health or safety, and (2) a “mental” element, which
requires a showing that a correction official acted with at least deliberate indifference to the
challenged conditions. See id. at 29-33. A plaintiff satisfies the objective element of a conditions
of confinement claim by “‘show[ing] that the conditions, either alone or in combination, pose an
unreasonable risk of serious damage to [her] health’” or safety, which “includes the risk of
serious damage to ‘physical and mental soundness.’” Id. at 30 (quoting Walker v. Schult, 717
F.3d 119, 125 (2d Cir. 2013), and LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974, 978 (2d Cir. 1972)).
To satisfy the subjective element, a plaintiff must allege “that the defendant-official acted
intentionally to impose the alleged condition, or recklessly failed to act with reasonable care to
mitigate the risk that the condition posed to the pretrial detainee even though the defendantofficial knew, or should have known, that the condition posed an excessive risk to health or
safety.” Id. at 35. The mere negligence of an official is not a basis for a claim of a federal

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constitutional violation under Section 1983. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 335-36
(1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986).
To state a conditions of confinement claim regarding the issuance of a mattress, a
plaintiff must allege facts suggesting that “‘the plaintiff had a medical condition requiring a nonstandard bed to protect against serious damage to h[er] future health’ or ‘that the medical
condition was itself created by an inadequate bed or mattress.’” Patterson v. Ponte, No. 16-CV3156 (PAE) (JCF), 2017 WL 1194489, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2017) (quoting Youmans v.
Schriro, No. 12-CV-3690 (PAE) (JCF), 2013 WL 6284422, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2013),
report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 1405753 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2017)). “Simply
alleging that a mattress is uncomfortable is insufficient to ‘show that the conditions . . . pose an
unreasonable risk of serious damage to [the plaintiff’s] health.’” White v. Schriro, No. 16-CV6769 (PAE) (JCF), 2017 WL 3268202, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2017) (quoting Walker, 717 F.3d
at 125).
Here, Plaintiff does not state facts satisfying either element of a conditions of
confinement claim. First, Plaintiff states that she suffers from back pain and sometimes has
“breathing problems.” (ECF 1, at 4.) While difficulty breathing could constitute a serious
medical condition, Plaintiff does not allege any additional facts about the nature or extent of the
breathing problems. Furthermore, while she states that she “would like to go to a chiropractor”
(id. at 5), she does not allege that she has actually sought medical care to treat her condition.
Second, even if Plaintiff had sufficiently alleged an excessive risk to her health or safety, she
does not allege facts suggesting that correctional staff knew, or should have known, of that risk
and disregarded that risk. She does not state any facts suggesting that she informed any staff of
her condition, or that any staff should have been aware of her condition, but ignored the risk

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posed by continuing to allow her to use the DOC-issued mattress. The complaint instead
suggests that Plaintiff suffered from back pain but did not receive medical care for her condition.
For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a conditions of confinement claim.
Because Plaintiff has not alleged a plausible underlying constitutional violation, the Court need
not examine whether the City of New York may be held liable under Section 1983. See Segal,
459 F.3d at 219. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s Section 1983 conditions-ofconfinement claims for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
D.

State law claims
A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction of state law claims

when it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
Generally, “when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and
only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction.”
Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988). Having dismissed the federal
claims of which the Court has original jurisdiction, the Court declines to exercise its
supplemental jurisdiction of any state law claims Plaintiff may be asserting. See Kolari v. New
York-Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Subsection (c) of § 1367 ‘confirms
the discretionary nature of supplemental jurisdiction by enumerating the circumstances in which
district courts can refuse its exercise.’” (quoting City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522
U.S. 156, 173 (1997))).
LEAVE TO AMEND GRANTED
Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts
generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its
defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir.
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2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has
cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to
amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid
claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v.
USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). Because Plaintiff may be able to allege
additional facts to address the deficiencies outlined above, the Court grants her 30 days’ leave to
amend her complaint to detail her claims. If Plaintiff seeks to assert Section 1983 claims against
the City of New York, she must allege facts suggesting that it has a policy, practice, or custom
that caused a violation of her constitutional rights. If she seeks to assert Section 1983 claims
against an individual correction officer or jail official, she must name that individual as a
defendant and allege facts showing how he or she was personally involved in the events giving
rise to her claims.
If Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint within the time allowed, the Court will
direct the Clerk of Court to enter judgment in this action.
CONCLUSION
The Court dismisses the complaint, filed IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), for failure to
state a claim on which relief may be granted, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), with 30 days’
leave to replead.
The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction of any state law claims Plaintiff
may be asserting. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would
not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See
Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

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The Court directs the Clerk of Court to hold this matter open on the docket until a civil
judgment is entered.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:

March 6, 2025
New York, New York
/s/ Laura Taylor Swain
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN
Chief United States District Judge

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