Jean-Louis v. Adams

Filing 3

ORDER OF DISMISSAL UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g): The Court denies Plaintiff's request to proceed IFP, and the complaint is dismissed without prejudice under the PLRA's "three-strikes" rule. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Plainti ff remains barred from filing any future action IFP while he is in custody, unless he is under imminent threat of serious physical injury. The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would not be take n in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in this action. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Laura Taylor Swain on 11/25/2024) (sac)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
JOE W. JEAN-LOUIS,
Plaintiff,
-against-

24-CV-8873 (LTS)
ORDER OF DISMISSAL UNDER
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)

MAYOR ADAMS,
Defendants.

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge:
Plaintiff, who currently is detained on Rikers Island, brings this action pro se. Because
Plaintiff did not submit the $405.00 in fees with the complaint, the Court understands Plaintiff to
be seeking to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. Plaintiff is
barred, however, under the “three-strikes” provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), from filing any new action IFP while he is a prisoner. See JeanLouis v. Onafer Nuclear Power Plant, No. 12-CV-1071 (JEM) (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2012) (listing
strikes). 1
Section 1915(g) provides that:
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action [IFP] if the prisoner has, on 3 or
more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an
action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds
that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

1

Included among the strikes are the following cases: Jean-Louis v. United States Att’y
Gen., No. 4:06-CV-40136 (RCL) (D. Mass. July 2, 2007) (dismissed for failure to state a claim);
Jean-Louis v. Reno, No. 1:94-CV-2648 (HHG) (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 1994) (dismissed for failure to
state a claim); Jean-Louis v. Dinkins, No. 7:94-CV-1387 (CLB) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 1994)
(dismissed as frivolous under former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)); Jean-Louis v. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm’n, No. 1:83-CV-1857 (UNA) (D.D.C. Sept. 7, 1994) (same).

Although Plaintiff has filed this new action seeking IFP status, his complaint does not
show that he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury. 1 Instead, Plaintiff’s complaint, like
many of his prior actions, alleges that the City of New York is unprepared to respond to a
“nuclear attack.” (ECF 1 at 1.) Plaintiff is therefore barred from filing this action IFP.
CONCLUSION
The Court denies Plaintiff’s request to proceed IFP, and the complaint is dismissed
without prejudice under the PLRA’s “three-strikes” rule. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 2 Plaintiff
remains barred from filing any future action IFP while he is in custody, unless he is under
imminent threat of serious physical injury. 3 Id.
The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this order
would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal.
See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

1

An imminent danger is one “existing at the time the complaint is filed.” Malik v.
McGinnis, 293 F.3d 559, 563 (2d Cir. 2002). A danger “that has dissipated by the time a
complaint is filed” is not sufficient. Pettus v. Morgenthau, 554 F.3d 293, 296 (2d Cir. 2009).
2

Plaintiff may commence a new action by paying the required fees. If Plaintiff does so,
that complaint will be reviewed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the Court to dismiss
any civil rights complaint from a prisoner if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
3

The Court may bar any vexatious litigant (including a nonprisoner) from filing future
actions (even if the filing fee is paid) without first obtaining leave from the Court. See In re
Martin-Trigona, 9 F.3d 226, 227-30 (2d Cir. 1993) (discussing sanctions courts may impose on
vexatious litigants, including “leave of court” requirement).
2

The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in this action.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:

November 25, 2024
New York, New York
/s/ Laura Taylor Swain
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN
Chief United States District Judge

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