Doe v. Alexander et al
Filing
13
OPINION AND ORDER re: 7 MOTION to Proceed Anonymously . filed by Jane Doe. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed Anonymously is DENIED. Given the sensitivity of the allegations in this case, the Court STAYS the effect of this Order for seven days to allow plaintiff and her counsel to consider this ruling. Id. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate ECF No. 7. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Jeannette A. Vargas on 3/12/2025) (tg)
Case 1:25-cv-01631-JAV
Document 13
Filed 03/12/25
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
---------------------------------------------------------------------- X
:
JANE DOE,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
-v:
:
TAL ALEXANDER AND ALON ALEXANDER,
:
:
Defendants.
:
---------------------------------------------------------------------- X
Page 1 of 12
25-CV-01631 (JAV)
OPINION AND ORDER
JEANNETTE A. VARGAS, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff “Jane Doe” filed this suit against Tal and Alon Alexander
(“Defendants”) under New York’s Violation of the Victims of Gender-Motivated
Violence Protection Law. ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”). At issue is whether Plaintiff can
litigate this action under a pseudonym. For the reasons stated below, the motion to
proceed under a pseudonym is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
As alleged in the Complaint, in the summer of 2011, Plaintiff accepted an
invitation to meet with Alon and his brother Oren Alexander at their shared
apartment. Compl. at ¶¶ 11-12. While socializing with them in the living room, she
consumed two alcoholic drinks containing what she now believes to be date rape
drugs that diminished her faculties. Id. at ¶¶ 14-15. Alon Alexander then
proceeded to vaginally rape Plaintiff in one of the bedrooms. Id. at ¶¶ 17-23.
Following this assault, Defendant Tal Alexander entered the bedroom and also
raped her. Id. at ¶¶ 24-28.
Case 1:25-cv-01631-JAV
Document 13
Filed 03/12/25
Page 2 of 12
Defendants were indicted in December 2024 on federal sex trafficking
charges. Id. at ¶ 37. The indictment states that “from at least in or about 2010, up
to and including at least in or about 2021, the Alexander Brothers worked together
and with others to engage in sex trafficking, including by repeatedly drugging,
sexually assaulting, and raping dozens of female victims.” Id. at ¶ 38. The criminal
case, as well as a number of civil suits that have been brought against Defendants
and Oren Alexander, have generated a great deal of media attention. Id. at ¶¶ 3,
35-39.
On February 27, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Proceed Anonymously
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). ECF No. 7. Plaintiff’s counsel filed a declaration
in support of the motion, affirming that Plaintiff’s identity had been disclosed to
counsel for Tal Alexander, and that Plaintiff was prepared to provide a similar
disclosure to Alon Alexander once he had retained counsel. ECF No. 8. No medical
or mental health records, or any other evidence, were submitted in support of
Plaintiff’s motion.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under Rule 10(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a “complaint must
name all the parties.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). This requirement “serves the vital
purpose of facilitating public scrutiny of judicial proceedings and therefore cannot
be set aside lightly.” Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 188-89 (2d
Cir. 2008). A district court has discretion to grant an exception to the “general
2
Case 1:25-cv-01631-JAV
Document 13
Filed 03/12/25
Page 3 of 12
requirement of disclosure of the names of parties” to allow a party to proceed under
a pseudonym. Id. at 189 (citation omitted).
The Second Circuit sets forth a “non-exhaustive” list of ten factors that a
district court should consider when ruling on a motion to proceed anonymously. Id.
at 189-90. Under Sealed Plaintiff, the factors are:
1. whether the litigation involves matters that are highly
sensitive and of a personal nature;
2. whether identification poses a risk of retaliatory physical
or mental harm to the party seeking to proceed
anonymously or even more critically, to innocent nonparties;
3. whether identification presents other harms and the
likely severity of those harms, including whether the
injury litigated against would be incurred as a result of
the disclosure of the plaintiff’s identity;
4. whether the plaintiff is particularly vulnerable to the
possible harms of disclosure, particularly in light of his or
her age;
5. whether the suit is challenging the actions of the
government or that of private parties;
6. whether the defendant is prejudiced by allowing the
plaintiff to press his or her claims anonymously, whether
the nature of that prejudice (if any) differs at any
particular stage of the litigation, and whether any
prejudice can be mitigated by the district court;
7. whether the plaintiff’s identity has thus far been kept
confidential;
8. whether the public’s interest in the litigation is furthered
by requiring the plaintiff to disclose his or her identity;
3
Case 1:25-cv-01631-JAV
Document 13
Filed 03/12/25
Page 4 of 12
9. whether, because of the purely legal nature of the issues
presented or otherwise, there is an atypically weak public
interest in knowing the litigants’ identities; and
10. whether there are any alternative mechanisms for
protecting the confidentiality of the plaintiff.
See id. at 190 (cleaned up). “[A] district court is not required to list each of the
factors or use any particular formulation as long as it is clear that the court
balanced the interests at stake in reaching its conclusion.” Id. at 191 n.4.
“[P]seudonyms are the exception and not the rule, and in order to receive the
protections of anonymity, a party must make a case rebutting that presumption.”
United States v. Pilcher, 950 F.3d 39, 45 (2d Cir. 2020).
DISCUSSION
I.
Matters of a Highly Sensitive and Personal Nature
Under the first Sealed Plaintiff factor, the Court analyzes whether the
litigation involves matters of a sensitive and personal nature. Plaintiff contends
that the traumatizing nature of her sexual assault allegations easily meets this test.
ECF No. 9 (“Pl. Br.”) at 3. The Court agrees that “[a]llegations of sexual assault are
‘paradigmatic example[s]’ of highly sensitive and personal claims.” Rapp v. Fowler,
537 F. Supp. 3d 521, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (quotation omitted). The Court also
concurs with Plaintiff that this factor weighs particularly heavily in this case due to
the notoriety of Defendants. Plaintiff has a substantial privacy interest in
protecting herself from the public scrutiny she will endure if her identity is revealed
as an alleged victim of Defendants.
4
Case 1:25-cv-01631-JAV
Document 13
Filed 03/12/25
Page 5 of 12
But although this factor weighs in Plaintiff’s favor, it is not dispositive. Doe v.
Skyline Automobiles Inc., 375 F. Supp. 3d 401, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2019). As Judge
Liman recently explained in Doe 1 v. Branca USA, Inc., “a claim by an adult
plaintiff to have been the victim of sexual abuse and to have suffered physical or
psychological damage as a result, accompanied by sufficient facts to support that
claim, is not enough to entitle a plaintiff to proceed anonymously. Were it
otherwise, virtually all claims of adult sexual assaults would ipso facto proceed
anonymously.” No. 22-CV-3806 (LJL), 2022 WL 2713543, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 13,
2022). Accordingly, courts in this District have denied similar motions to proceed
anonymously in sexual assault cases, see Doe v. Freydin, 21 Civ. 8371 (NRB), 2021
WL 4991731, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2021) (collecting cases), including in cases
involving public figures such as Kevin Spacey, Harvey Weinstein, and Sean Combs.
Doe v. Combs, 23-CV-10628 (JGLC), 2024 WL 863705, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 29,
2024). “[T]he threat of significant media attention – however exacerbated by the
modern era – alone does not entitle a plaintiff to the exceptional remedy of
anonymity.” Rapp, 537 F. Supp. 3d at 527-28.
II.
Risk of Physical Retaliation or Mental Harm and Likelihood
and Severity of the Harm
The second and third Sealed Plaintiff factors address the harm that would
occur from the disclosure of Plaintiff’s identity. See Combs, 2024 WL 863705, at *3.
The relevant inquiry is “whether disclosure of the plaintiff's name in the course of
the lawsuit would ‘uniquely’ cause harm and ‘how grave the resultant harm would
prove to be.’” Branca, 2022 WL 2713543, at *2 (citing Rapp, 537 F. Supp. 3d at 528-
5
Case 1:25-cv-01631-JAV
Document 13
Filed 03/12/25
Page 6 of 12
29). A “plaintiff must establish with sufficient specificity the incremental injury
that would result from disclosure of her identity.” Freydin, 2021 WL 4991731, at *3
(citing Doe v. Gong Xi Fa Cai, Inc., No. 19 Civ. 2678 (RA), 2019 WL 3034793, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2019)).
Plaintiff does not provide any evidence that she will be, or has been,
subjected to any sort of threats or intimidation if her identity were to become
known. See Doe v. Combs, No. 24-cv-7777 (LJL), 2025 WL 722790, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 6, 2025). Although Plaintiff argues that the “likelihood of further
psychological injury overcomes any presumption of openness,” Pl. Br. at 7, Plaintiff
offers no “specific evidence [from a medical expert] predicting that revelation of
[Plaintiff’s] identity w[ould] likely cause psychological and emotional pain so
intense that it would threaten her stability, her safety, and even her life.” Branca,
2022 WL 2713543, at *4 (citing Doe v. Smith, 105 F. Supp. 2d 40, 43-44 (E.D.N.Y.
1999)). Without such corroborating evidence, this Court cannot “‘speculate’ about
the nature and severity of any mental injury from disclosure.” Doe v. Weinstein, 484
F. Supp. 3d 90, 95 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (quoting Doe v. Solera Cap. LLC, No. 18-cv-1769,
2019 WL 1437520, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2019)). Ultimately, this factor cuts
against Plaintiff’s request to proceed anonymously.
III.
Vulnerability and Age of Plaintiff
The fourth Sealed Plaintiff factor requires courts to determine “whether the
plaintiff is particularly vulnerable to the possible harms of disclosure . . .
particularly in light of [her] age.” Sealed Plaintiff, 537 F.3d at 190. A plaintiff’s age
6
Case 1:25-cv-01631-JAV
Document 13
Filed 03/12/25
Page 7 of 12
is a significant datapoint because “courts have been readier to protect the privacy
interests of minors in legal proceedings than of adults.” Combs, 2025 WL 722790,
at *3 (citing Solera Cap., 2019 WL 1437520, at *6). Plaintiff is an adult and does
not indicate whether she was a minor at the time of the alleged assault, or what
aspect of her age makes her vulnerable to the potential harms of disclosure. This
factor does not support Plaintiff's request to proceed anonymously.
IV.
Government Action or Private Action
The Court must also consider “whether the suit . . . challeng[es] the actions of
the government or that of private parties.” Sealed Plaintiff, 537 F.3d at 190.
“When a lawsuit challenges governmental actions, actors, or policies, the plaintiff
has a strong interest in proceeding anonymously.” Solera Cap., 2019 WL 1437520,
at *6. Defendants here are private individuals, and therefore, this factor weighs
against Plaintiff’s request to proceed anonymously.
V.
Scope, Extent, and Possible Mitigation of
Prejudice to Defendant
Also relevant to this analysis is the prejudice a defendant may face.
Specifically, “courts have examined difficulties in conducting discovery, the
reputational damage to defendants, and the fundamental fairness of proceeding
anonymously.” Freydin, 2021 WL 4991731, at *3 (cleaned up).
Plaintiff asserts that “Defendants would not be prejudiced by an anonymous
proceeding because Defendants know specifically who filed this lawsuit.” Pl. Br. at
5. “Although defendants know who plaintiff is, concealment of plaintiff's identity
from the public can still hamper defendants’ ability to conduct discovery.” Freydin,
7
Case 1:25-cv-01631-JAV
Document 13
Filed 03/12/25
Page 8 of 12
2021 WL 4991731, at *3 (citation omitted). For example, “persons with information
about [Plaintiff] or [her] allegations that would be helpful to the defense but were
unknown to the defendant might not come forward.” Combs, 2025 WL 722790, at *3
(citation omitted). “This is especially true . . . in a case like this that happened [over
ten years] ago where evidence and witnesses may be difficult to find.” Id.
Additionally, by bringing this action, Plaintiff “has put her credibility in
issue.” Doe v. Shakur, 164 F.R.D. 359, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Defendants are,
“therefore, entitled to investigate her background and challenge her allegations and
her credibility.” Doe v. Combs, No. 24-cv-8054 (MKV), 2024 WL 4635309, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2024) (citing Shakur, 164 F.R.D. at 361).
“This asymmetry between the parties not only would prejudice [Defendants],
but would hinder ‘the judicial interest in accurate fact-finding and fair
adjudication.’” Rapp, 537 F. Supp. 3d at 531 (cleaned up); see also Doe v. Delta
Airlines, Inc., 310 F.R.D. 222, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (recognizing the prejudice
against a defendant when a defendant is “required to defend itself publicly before a
jury while plaintiff could make her accusations from behind a cloak of anonymity”).
This one-sidedness creates a prejudicial imbalance against Defendants. As in
Freydin, these accusations are “serious” and “reputation threatening” and have
“already garnered significant media attention.” Freydin, 2021 WL 4991731, at *3.
Therefore, this factor cuts against Plaintiff’s motion.
8
Case 1:25-cv-01631-JAV
VI.
Document 13
Filed 03/12/25
Page 9 of 12
Status of Confidentiality in the Proceedings
The seventh Sealed Plaintiff factor is whether Plaintiff’s identity has been
kept confidential. Plaintiff claims that, other than the filing of her civil claims and
the disclosure of her identity to Defendants, she has kept the details of this case and
her identity confidential. Pl. Br. at 7. Plaintiff also states that she has not publicly
spoken to the media about her experiences with Defendants despite the “ample
opportunity with the news frenzy surrounding Defendants’ recent arrests.” Id.
“Assuming, arguendo, that [P]laintiff's representation is accurate, this factor
weighs in her favor even though [D]efendants know who she is.” Freydin, 2021 WL
4991731, at *3 (citing Gong Xi Fa Cai, 2019 WL 3034793, at *2). While this factor
weighs in Plaintiff’s favor, however, “the seventh factor is not significant enough to
tip the scales.” Id. (citing Weinstein, 484 F. Supp. 3d at 97).
VII.
Public Interest in Litigation Furthered by Disclosure
The Court also finds that the public interest would be furthered by requiring
Plaintiff to disclose her identity. “Courts have put weight on the right of the public
to know the identity of the litigants as well as on the interest of the accused to be
able publicly to confront the accuser.” Branca, 2022 WL 2713543, at *2. Therefore
“something more is required to rebut the presumption of public access, at least in
cases involving adult sexual assault, and that something more frequently has to be
evidence of real (and not conclusory) harm that is substantial and that will flow
directly from and is directly linked to disclosure of the party’s name.” Id.
9
Case 1:25-cv-01631-JAV
Document 13
Filed 03/12/25
Page 10 of 12
Plaintiff alleges that “there are still more victims of the [Defendants] who
have not yet spoken out” and, if this Court grants her anonymity, then “more
women will feel that they are able to come forward.” Pl. Br. at 7. The Court agrees
that there is a public interest in protecting sexual assault victims so that other
victims will not be discouraged from pursing legal actions. But “it does not follow
that the public has an interest in maintaining the anonymity of every person who
alleges sexual assault or other misconduct of a highly personal nature.” Branca,
2022 WL 2713543, at *2 (citing Rapp, 537 F. Supp. 3d at 533); see Freydin, 2021 WL
4991731, at *4. Otherwise, this factor would, in effect, heavily favor anonymity in
every sexual assault case. See Doe v. Juan Gonzales Agency Corp., 21-CV-00610
(PMH), 2022 WL 3100669, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2022); Weinstein, 484 F. Supp. 3d
at 98. The generalized interest in encouraging sexual assault victims to come
forward has been “repeatedly rejected by courts in this District as an adequate basis
by itself to warrant anonymity.” Combs, 2024 WL 863705, at *5 (quoting Doe v.
Telemundo Network Grp. LLC, No. 22-CV-7665 (JPC), 2023 WL 6259390, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2023)); see also Rapp, 537 F. Supp. 3d at 532-33; Weinstein, 484
F. Supp. 3d at 98.
It also must be recognized that there is a public interest in “being able to
publicly confront an accuser.” Combs, 2024 WL 863705 at *5. In that same vein,
“the public has a significant interest in open judicial proceedings and the public’s
interest in the litigation is furthered by transparency, including exposure of the
parties’ identities.” Doe v. Leonelli, No. 22-CV-3732 (CM), 2022 WL 2003635, at *4
10
Case 1:25-cv-01631-JAV
Document 13
Filed 03/12/25
Page 11 of 12
(S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2022). Taking the competing interests as a whole, they cut
against Plaintiff’s request for anonymity.
VIII. Nature of the Issues
The ninth Sealed Plaintiff factor is “whether, because of the purely legal
nature of the issues presented . . . , there is an atypically weak public interest in
knowing the litigants’ identities.” 537 F.3d at 190. Here, there are no abstract
questions of law at issue such as “abstract challenges to public policies, but rather .
. . particular actions and incidents.” N. Jersey Media Grp. Inc. v. Doe Nos. 1-5, 12cv-6152, 2012 WL 5899331, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2012).
Additionally, cases raising claims of sexual assault “are of the type that
‘further the public’s interest in enforcing legal and social norms.’” Skyline
Automobiles Inc., 375 F. Supp. 3d at 408 (citation omitted). As the court explained
in that case, “any analysis and litigation in this case will be factual in nature, and
the public interest in sexual assault . . . is very high.” Id. Therefore, this factor
weighs against allowing the Plaintiff to proceed anonymously.
IX.
Alternative Mechanisms for Protecting Confidentiality
The Court finds that there are alternative mechanisms that could protect
Plaintiff’s interest in confidentiality. Weinstein, 484 F. Supp. 3d at 98. Like the
alternative mechanisms proposed in Weinstein, Plaintiff could seek to either redact
certain sensitive information or seek a protective order. Id. Accordingly, this factor
weighs against Plaintiff’s request to proceed anonymously.
11
Case 1:25-cv-01631-JAV
Document 13
Filed 03/12/25
Page 12 of 12
CONCLUSION
“Plaintiff’s allegations are not to be taken lightly, and her desire to proceed
anonymously is understandable and not to be trivialized.” Doe v. Townes, No. 19-cv8034, 2020 WL 2395159, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2020). This Court, however, must
apply the law to the facts. At bottom, Plaintiff has not effectively rebutted the
presumption of public access. The majority of the Sealed Plaintiff factors do not
weigh in Plaintiff’s favor and she has not sufficiently demonstrated that “her
“interest in anonymity” outweighs the prejudice to Defendants and “the customary
and constitutionally-embedded presumption of openness in judicial proceedings.”
Freydin, 2021 WL 4991731, at *4 (citing Sealed Plaintiff, 537 F.3d at 189).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed Anonymously is DENIED. Given
the sensitivity of the allegations in this case, the Court STAYS the effect of this
Order for seven days to allow plaintiff and her counsel to consider this ruling. Id.
The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate ECF No. 7.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 12, 2025
New York, New York
______________________________
JEANNETTE A. VARGAS
United States District Judge
12
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?