DMAC LLC et al v. City of Peekskill et al
Filing
127
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER: The Court has thoroughly and carefully reviewed the briefs and voluminous record submitted in conjunction with the instant motions. Upon due consideration, I conclude that numerous triable issues of fact preclude summar y judgment in any party's favor. Accordingly, the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment are DENIED. The Clerk of the Court is respectfully requested to terminate the motions (Dkt. #74, #78 and #95). SO ORDERED. (Signed by Magistrate Judge George A. Yanthis on 10/29/2013) (lnl)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
DMAC LLC and FOURMEN CONSTRUCTION, INC.
x
P Ia I ntiffs
-aginst
CITY OF PEEKSKILL. CITY OF PEEKSKILL
MAYOR AND COMMON COUNCIL, CITY OF
PEEKSKILL ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS,
CITY OF PEEKSKILL PLANNING COMMISSION,
CITY OF PEEKSKILL DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING,
DEVELOPMENT AND CODE ASSISTANCE, CITY OF
PEEKSKILL DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS,
CITY OF PEEKSKILL DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
WORKS BUILDING DEPARTMENT, CITY OF
PEEKSKILL CITY PLANNER, DIRECTOR OF THE
CITY OF PEEKSKILL DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING,
DEVELOPMENT AND CODE ASSISTANCE, DAVID
GREENER in his official capacity as the DIRECTOR
OF PUBLIC WORKS and any successor to such
position, VICTOR PIZZELLA, in his official capacity as
the CITY OF PEEKSKILL BUILDING INSPECTOR and
any successor to such position, JEFFREY P. ROMA,
in his official capacity as the CITY OF PEEKSKILL
CODE ENFORCEMENT OFFICER and any successor
to such position, and THE WESTSIDE
NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER
09 Civ. 5093 (GAY)
Defendants.
A
Plaintiffs are the owners/developers of the subject property located in the City of
Peekskill. New York. In early 2003, in conjunction with their proposal to construct five
townhouses on the subject property, plaintiffs began the process of obtaining the
necessary land use approvals. On January 23, 2007, plaintiffs filed the signed Site Plan
Subdivision Plat with the County of Westchester and, shortly thereafter, began
construction on five townhouses in a development known as The Cove, located on
Simpson Place in Peekskill. After plaintiffs had completed all grading, drainage and
foundations and most of the framing, the Westside Neighborhood Association began to
strongly vocalize their opposition to the townhouses’ construction. In March 2007, the
City of Peekskill issued a Stop Work Order. On June 1, 2009, plaintiff commenced the
instant action alleging that defendants, motivated solely by political concerns, engaged
in a persistent course of conduct designed to prevent plaintiffs from completing
construction in violation of their constitutionally protected property rights including, but
not limited to, plaintiffs’ substantive due process and equal protection rights.
Presently before this Court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment
pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”). Pursuant to
1
FRCP 56(a), summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When deciding a
summary judgment motion, the court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all factual
inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion.
LaSalle Bank Nat’l Ass’n v.
Nomura Asset Capital Corp., 424 F.3d 195, 205 (2d Cir. 2005). “Assessments of
credibility and choices between conflicting versions of the events are matters for the
jury, not for the court on summary judgment.” Jeifreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d
549, 554 (2d Cir, 2005). However, “[tjhe mere existence of some alleged factual
dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for
summary judgment” Scott v. Harris, 550 US. 372, 380 (2007). The question is
whether, in light of the evidence, a rational jury could find in favor of the nonmoving
This action is before me for all purposes on the consent of the parties, pursuant
to 28 USC. §636(c).
party. See Beyer v. County of Nassau, 524 F.3d 160, 163 (2d Cir. 2008). Summary
judgment must be denied, therefore, if the court finds “there are any genuine factual
issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may
reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477
U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
The Court has thoroughly and carefully reviewed the briefs and voluminous
record submitted in conjunction with the instant motions. Upon due consideration, I
conclude that numerous triable issues of fact preclude summary judgment in any party’s
favor. Accordingly, the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment are DENIED.
The Clerk of the Court is respectfully requested to terminate the motions (Dkt.
#74, #78 and #95).
Dated: October 29. 2013
White Plains, New York
so
ORGE A.
U.S.M.J.
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