Leon et al v. Pelleh Poultry Corporation et al
Filing
95
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER: Defendants' motion to dismiss is DENIED. The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate the motion (Docket #84). SO ORDERED. (See MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER as set forth) (Signed by Magistrate Judge George A. Yanthis on 10/13/2011) (lnl)
DORIGINAL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
US DC SONY
----------------------------------------------------------------------)(
ISRAEL LEON, ADALBERTO RODRIGUEZ FLORES,
CARMEN RODRIGUEZ FLORES, GONZALO
PEREZ ARIAS, ANDREA REYES RODRIGUEZ,
LUCIA GONZALES RODRIGUEZ, JOSE LUIS
MARTINEZ, and JULIA GAVILAN on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated,
DOCUMENT
ELEC TRON::A .... Lv FILED
DOC#
DATE FILED: IIJ' 1$"'/1
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER
Plaintiffs,
10 Civ. 4719 (GAY)
-against-
PELLEH POULTRY CORPORATION, ROBERT
FRANKLIN, and NAOMI FRANKLlN1
Defendant.
----------------------------------------------------------------------)(
Plaintiffs Israel Leon, Adalberto Rodriguez Flores, Carmen Rodriguez Flores,
Gonzalo Perez Arias, Andrea Reyes Rodriguez, Lucia Gonzales Rodriguez, Jose Luis
Martinez and Julia Gavilan filed this action seeking monetary and injunctive relief on
behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, against defendants Pelleh Poultry
Corporation ("Pelleh") and its principal officers, Robert Franklin and Naomi Franklin,
alleging violations of the Federal Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.
and New York Labor Law. Plaintiffs also assert pendant state claims for unjust
enrichment and quantum meruit. Defendants have moved to dismiss the action for
failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
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....... - - -
--
The Court has corrected what it construes to have been spelling errors in the caption. Plaintiff Gonzalo
Perez Arias's name was spelled "Gonzalor" and defendant Robert Franklin's name was spelled "Franlin"
on the caption of the first amended complaint. In the body of that document, however, the names are
spelled as they now appear above. The Clerk of the Court is respectfully requested to amend the caption
accordingly.
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('FRCP") on statute of limitations and standing grounds. For the reasons that follow,
defendants' motion is denied.
I. BACKGROUND
The plaintiffs in this case are eight immigrant Latino manual workers employed at
various times by defendant Pelleh Poultry Corp., a poultry plant located in Sullivan
County, New York and headquartered in Rockland County, New York. Although
specific dates are not listed, according to the complaint, three plaintiffs-Carmen
Rodriguez Flores, Andrea Reyes Rodriguez and Gonzalo Perez Arias-ended their
employment in 2006 and two-Adalberto Rodriguez Flores and Jose Luis Martinez-left
in 2007. Plaintiff Lucia Gonzales Rodriguez ended her employment in December 2008,
plaintiff Israel Leon ended his employment in April 2009 and the remaining plaintiff, Julia
Gavilan, is still employed.
In their complaint, plaintiffs allege: (a) despite regularly working in excess of forty
hours per week, they were never paid overtime at a rate of time and one-half of their
regular hourly wages as required by the FLSA and Article 19 of New York Labor Law;
(b) despite regularly working in excess of ten hours per day, they were not paid spread
of hours wages in violation of New York Labor Law; and (c) they were not paid weekly
and did not receive their wages within seven calendar days of the end of the week in
which their wages were earned, in violation of New York Labor Law. Plaintiffs state that
they were not aware of their right to overtime pay and that defendants failed to post
official notices apprising them of this right. Plaintiffs claim that this constitutes a willful
violation in that defendants knew or should have known that their conduct was in
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violation of federal law. They further allege that defendants purposely avoided
assigning overtime to manual workers who spoke English because those workers would
more likely be aware of their rights to overtime pay. Plaintiffs assert that the defendants
"acted deceptively in perpetrating [this] scheme" as "part of a plan to minimize costs of
operation of the Defendants' business." Finally, plaintiffs state that they lacked actual
knowledge of the applicable three year statute of limitations for willful overtime violations
under the FLSA. By failing to post the official notices, they claim, defendants prevented
them from timely filing their claims.
II. DISCUSSION
A.
Rule 12(b)(6) Standard of Review
In evaluating a motion to dismiss a complaint under FRCP 12(b)(6), this Court is
"not to weigh the evidence that might be presented at a trial but merely to determine
whether the complaint itself is legally sufficient." See Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d
1059, 1067 (2d Cir. 1985). In doing so, the Court "'must accept as true all of the factual
allegations set out in plaintiff's complaint, draw inferences from those allegations in the
light most favorable to plaintiff, and construe the complaint liberally.'" Gregory v. Daly,
243 F.3d 687,691 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,45-46
(1957)). Ultimately, the Court must grant a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss if the plaintiff fails
to allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554,570 (2007).
"A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
3
misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.
Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citation omitted).
The court must analyze the complaint to determine which statements are well-pleaded
factual allegations, assume their veracity, and "then determine whether they plausibly
give rise to an entitlement to relief." See id. at 1950. Statements deemed "legal
conclusions" rather than factual allegations are not entitled to the assumption of truth.
See id. at 1950-51.
B.
Statute of Limitations
Defendants first argue that plaintiffs' claims are barred by the statute of
limitations. Specifically, they state that at least five of the eight named plaintiffs
terminated their employment more than three years before the complaint was filed on
June 17, 2010 and are therefore barred as to all claims. The remaining three plaintiffs,
defendants state, are barred from asserting any claims occurring more than two years
before commencement of the suit.
Under the FLSA, a cause of action for unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime
compensation or liquidated damages must be "commenced within two years after the
cause of action accrued" except for "a cause of action arising out of a willful violation
which may be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrued." 29
U.S.C. § 255(a). A claim for unpaid overtime accrues "when the employer fails to pay
the required compensation for any workweek at the regular pay day for the period in
which the workweek ends." 29 C.F.R. §790.21 (b).
A willful violation occurs when an employer "either knew or showed reckless
disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the Act." Young v.
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Cooper Cameron Corp., 586 F.3d 201,207 (2d Cir.2009) (citation omitted). Although
the plaintiff has the burden of proving willfulness, see Herman v. RSR Sec. Services
Ltd., 172 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1999), "for the purposes of pleading, willfulness qualifies as
a factual state of mind falling under Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) which states that the condition
of mind of a person may be averred generally." Moran v. GTL Const., LLC, No. 06 Civ.
168,2007 WL 2142343, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 24,2007) (internal quotations and citation
omitted).
The facts as alleged by plaintiffs-that defendants did not post the required
notices and assigned overtime only to non-English speaking workers-presumed at this
point to be true, tend to support an inference of willfulness. Plaintiffs are entitled to
every favorable inference that can be drawn from the factual allegations. In re NYSE
Specialists Securities Litigation, 503 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 2007).
C.
Equitable Tolling of the Statute of Limitations
Equitable tolling, which allows a plaintiff to initiate an action beyond the statute of
limitations deadline, is available in compelling circumstances in order to "prevent
unfairness to a plaintiff who is not at fault for her lateness in filing." See Veltri v. Bldg.
Servo 32B-J Pension Fund, 393 F.3d 318, 322 (2d Cir. 2004). "Although the remedy is
regularly granted where defendants have engaged in fraudulent concealment, 'the
application of the doctrine of equitable tolling is not limited to such cases,' and 'it does
not assume a wrongfUl-or any-effort by the defendant to prevent the plaintiff from
suing.'" Edwards
V.
City of New York, No. 08 Civ. 3134, 2011 WL 3837130, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. August 29, 2011) (quoting Valdez ex reI. Donely V. United States, 518 F.3d
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173, 182-83 (2d Cir. 2008). "The relevant question is not the intention underlying
defendants' conduct, but rather whether a reasonable plaintiff in the circumstances
would have been aware of his rights." Edwards, 2011 WL 3837130, at *5.
In Edwards, as in this case, plaintiffs' claim for equitable tolling rested entirely on
the defendants' alleged failure to conspicuously post Department of Labor ("DOL")
regulation § 516.4, promulgated under the FLSA, which provides:
Every employer employing any employees subject to the Act's minimum
wage provisions shall post and keep posted a notice explaining the Act, as
prescribed by the Wage and Hour Division, in conspicuous places in every
establishment where such employees are employed so as to permit them
to observe readily a copy. 29 C.F.R. § 516.4.
The plaintiffs in Edwards were New York City Department of Corrections
officers who were paid overtime compensation pursuant to a Collective
Bargaining Agreement, but were claiming that they should also have received
overtime compensation for time spent donning and doffing uniforms and for late
shift relief.
kL at *1.
In denying the plaintiffs' claim for equitable tolling, the
Edwards court held that regardless of whether defendant posted the required
notice, the officers were aware of their right to overtime compensation by virtue
of the fact that they were receiving it.
kL at *6.
Unlike the Edwards plaintiffs, there is no indication that plaintiffs in the instant
case have ever been paid overtime compensation. The required posted notices could
conceivably have been the only way they would have become aware of their right to
such compensation under the FLSA. Moreover, plaintiffs, according to their complaint,
are immigrant Latino manual workers routinely working longer than ten hours per day
and forty hours per week. Their ability to learn of this and other legal rights "under the
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complex web of labor and social legislation that governs the modern workplace is not
great.,,2 See Ramirez v. CSJ & Co., Inc., No. 06 Civ. 13577,2007 WL 1040363, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. April 3, 2007). A possible basis is therefore established for equitable tolling.
D.
Standing
Defendants claim that six of the named plaintiffs-Carmen Rodriguez Flores,
Lucia Gonzales Rodriguez, Adalberto Rodriguez Flores, Andrea Reyes Rodriguez,
Gonzalo Perez Arias and Jose Luis Martinez-are not listed in the employment records
of Pelleh Poultry and thus, do not have standing. Although similarly named plaintiffsCarmen Rodriguez, Lucia Gonzales, Adalberto Rodriguez, Andrea Reyes, Gonzalo
Perez and Jose Luis Martinez-Hernandez-are listed, defendants claim U[t]here is
uncertainty as to whether the named six plaintiffs were ever employed by Pelleh .... "
Second, defendants argue that the employment dates listed in the amended
complaint for "several" of the plaintiffs do not match their employment records. To
illustrate these discrepancies, defendants rely upon an Employee Contact List, which
was attached as Exhibit B to the Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss, as well as a declaration from Sarah Rabinovich, Pelleh's bookkeeper. It is
well-settled that a court, in deciding a motion to dismiss, "is generally limited to the facts
as presented within the four corners of the complaint, to documents attached to the
complaint, or to documents incorporated within the complaint by reference." McCarthy
v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2007). Such documents as relied
2 Once plaintiffs had actual knowledge that a cause of action had accrued, of course, they were required
to file their lawsuit within the appropriate time period. See Edwards, 2011 WL 3837130. at *5. See also
8aba v. Grand Cent. P'ship, No. 99 Civ. 5818, 2000 WL 1808971 (S.D.NY Dec. 8,2000) (denying
defendant's motion for summary judgment striking an equitable tolling argument, but granting leave to
renew upon further discovery relating to the issue of knowledge).
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upon by the defendants are outside the four corners of the complaint and cannot be
considered.
Third, defendants assert that since the pleading states two different overall
timeframes, the action should be dismissed as to all plaintiffs or at least as to the six
mentioned above. Plaintiffs specify the relevant timeframe as both 1998 to 2008 (First
Am. Compl.
~
2) and as various times between 1998 and the present (id.
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35-42).
"To qualify for standing, a claimant must present an injury that is concrete,
particularized, and actual or imminent, fairly traceable to the defendant's challenged
behavior, and likely to be redressed by a favorable ruling." Davis v. Federal Election
Com'n, 554 U.S. 724 (2008) (citation omitted). On a motion to dismiss, it is
"presume[ed] that general allegations [in a litigant's complaint] embrace those specific
facts that are necessary to support the claim." Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,
497 U.S. 871,889 (1990) (citation omitted). Here, the plaintiffs have alleged that they
were employed at Pelleh Poultry Corporation at various times between 1998 and the
present, that they did not receive proper or timely compensation, and that the requested
relief would remedy these injuries. Sufficient facts have been set forth to establish
standing at the pleading stage.
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III. CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion to dismiss is DENIED.3 The
Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate the motion (Docket # 84).
Dated: OctoberE,2011
White Plains, New York
3
SO ORDERED
The court declines to convert the motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment.
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