Cuellar v. Love et al

Filing 45

DISCOVERY ORDER: Plaintiff's motion to compel disclosure is GRANTED. Disclosure shall be limited to relevant documents in existence on or before June 26, 2010. The Court declines to deny Plaintiff's motion on grounds of untimeliness, since discovery has been reopened as to expert testimony. No costs shall be awarded. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A)(ii)-(iii). SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Nelson Stephen Roman on 7/14/2014) (See ORDER as set forth) (lnl)

March 29, 2013; and (vi) all discovery would be completed by March 29, 2013. At pre-trial
conferences before Judge Edgardo Ramos on March 29 and May 24, 2013, the parties
represented that discovery was essentially complete, with the exception of Plaintiff’s medical
examination. Discovery was extended through August 26, 2013. On September 5, 2013, the
Court allowed a further extension of the discovery deadline through September 30, 2013, as new
counsel for Defendants sought to conduct Plaintiff’s medical examination and non-party
depositions. Defendants and former defendant City of White Plains (“City”) subsequently
moved for partial summary judgment. On April 11, 2014, the Court issued an opinion partially
granting the motion and dismissing all claims against the City.
On April 24, 2014, the parties sought leave to exchange expert reports “limited to the
area of police practices,” which leave was granted on May 1, 2014. (Doc. 41.) As requested, the
Court ordered the parties to exchange expert reports simultaneously on June 20, 2014, to
exchange rebuttal reports simultaneously on July 25, 2014, and to depose experts by August 29,
2014. (Id.)
On May 5, 2014, Plaintiff served upon Defendants a First Request for Production of
Documents (“Document Demand”). (Pl.’s Br. Ex. A.) The Document Demand seeks:
1. A copy of the training manual from 2010 relating to do with [sic] but not
limited to force to be utilized when arresting a suspect.
2. A copy of the Central Personnel Index of Police Officer Love and Police
Officer Ruggiero.
3. Any writings or communications given to the defendant police officers when
they became members of the force and/or training throughout their career as
police officers.
4. Any videos, photos and/or training[] material relating to the arrest of a suspect.
(Id. at 7.) Defendants objected to the Document Demand generally on grounds that, inter alia,
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none of the four requests (“Requests”) incorporates “time limitations.” (Pl.’s Br. Ex. B, at 2.)
Defendants objected to each Request separately on the grounds that they were “untimely” and
“not calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Id. at 3.) Defendants objected
further to Requests 3 and 4 on the grounds that they were overbroad and vague.
On June 2, 2014, the parties notified the Court of their discovery dispute, and Plaintiff
sought an order to compel production of the documents sought. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(1). On
June 4, 2014, the Court held a conference to discuss the discovery dispute. At the conference,
after a discussion of the timeliness of Plaintiff’s document requests and the relevance of the
documents sought, the Court ordered the parties to brief the issue of relevance.
II. DISCOVERY STANDARD OF LAW
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding
any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(1). Relevance in the context of discovery “is an extremely broad concept.” Chen-Oster v.
Goldman, Sachs & Co., 293 F.R.D. 557, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (internal quotation marks
omitted); accord Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978) (noting that Rule
26(b)(1) “has been construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably
could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case”); ACLU v.
Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 746 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). “Relevant information need not be
admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Furthermore, “discovery is not limited to issues
raised by the pleadings, for discovery itself is designed to help define and clarify the issues.”
Oppenheimer Funds, 437 U.S. at 351. “The Congressional policy in favor of broad enforcement
of the civil rights laws supports complete discovery when their violation is alleged.” Kinoy v.
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Mitchell, 67 F.R.D. 1, 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); see also Cox v. McClellan, 174 F.R.D. 32, 34
(W.D.N.Y. 1997) (“[A]ctions alleging violations of § 1983 require especially generous
discovery.”).
III. RELEVANCE TO EXCESSIVE FORCE CLAIM
The Fourth Amendment, which guarantees the right to be free from unreasonable
seizures, prohibits police officers from using excessive force in effecting an arrest. Tracy v.
Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 2010) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395
(1989)). Courts apply an objective reasonableness standard to determine whether the force used
was excessive. Id. (quoting Bryant v. City of New York, 404 F.3d 128, 136 (2d Cir. 2005)).
Thus, “the inquiry is necessarily case and fact specific and requires balancing the nature and
quality of the intrusion on the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing
governmental interests at stake.” Id. (citing Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113,
123 (2d Cir. 2004)). To determine whether the force used was reasonable, courts consider
“(1) the nature and severity of the crime leading to the arrest, (2) whether the suspect pose[d] an
immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others, and (3) whether the suspect was actively
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396;
Papineau v. Parmley, 465 F.3d 46, 61 (2d Cir. 2006)). The evidence is viewed “from the
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,” allowing for “the fact that police officers are
often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and
rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Id.
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Plaintiff argues generally that consideration of
the totality of the circumstances includes consideration of training materials and personnel files.

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A. Training Materials
Plaintiff asserts that “in federal civil rights actions, information relating to a police
officer’s training is routinely disclosed in claims alleging the use of excessive force.” (Pl.’s Br.
5.) He asserts that the information sought in Requests 1, 3, and 4 is relevant to corroborate
Defendants’ deposition testimony, wherein they testified to having been trained on arresting
suspects, and to determine whether Defendants followed procedure. Plaintiff argues that if he
shows Defendants did not follow established procedures, such a showing “may lead a trier of fact
to determine that [Defendants] did not act reasonably under the circumstances.” (Id. at 7); see
also Richir v. Vill. of Fredonia, No. 05CV76S, 2008 WL 687436, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 11,
2008) (finding one possible use of training materials is “to show the standard and level of
training of the defendant [police officers] and how much they received as of the date of the . . .
incident on dealing with potential arrest . . . situations”). Plaintiff also asserts that the training
materials may lead to admissible evidence in the form of his expert’s opinion. His expert’s
report could then purportedly aid a trier of fact in determining whether Defendants’ actions
constituted excessive force. Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that the training materials are equally
relevant for the failure to intervene claims against Love. Potentially, the materials could
demonstrate that Love, based on the training he received, had reason to know Ruggiero used
excessive force.
Defendants counter that the training materials would be relevant only to the alreadydismissed Monell claim and state-law negligence claims against the City. Defendants assert that
the City based its for motion for summary judgment on the complete lack of evidence to
establish a municipal policy or practice of using excessive force or allowing such force to be
used, as well as the absence of proof to demonstrate it was negligent in hiring, training, or
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supervising Defendants. Defendants also assert that Plaintiff’s relevance argument based on the
potential inclusion of evidence in his expert’s report is moot, as the parties have already
exchanged expert reports. Defendants do not explain why the Requests are irrelevant to the
currently pending claims.
In light of the broad standard of discovery, the Court concludes that the training materials
sought in Requests 1, 3, and 4 are relevant to Plaintiff’s claims. It is reasonable that a trier of
fact could consider Defendants’ actions in light of the training they received through June 26,
2010, the date of the incident, as part of the totality of the circumstances. Accordingly, the
motion to compel must be granted as to these Requests. The Court makes no finding as to the
admissibility of this evidence at trial.
B. Personnel Files
Plaintiff asserts that long-established Second Circuit precedent allows for discovery of
personnel records and evidence of past misconduct in civil rights cases. See McKenna v. Inc.
Vill. of Northport, No. CV 06-2895 (SJF) (ETB), 2007 WL 2071603, at *7–9 (E.D.N.Y. July 13,
2007) (citing Barrett v. City of New York, 237 F.R.D. 39 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); Unger v. Cohen, 125
F.R.D. 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); King v. Conde, 121 F.R.D. 180 (E.D.N.Y. 1988)). In McKenna,
which involved allegations of excessive force, the court found that personnel records of
defendant officers were discoverable despite an assertion of state-law privilege, as “no federal
rule prohibits discovery of police personnel documents.” Id. at *7. In Session v. Rodriguez, No.
3:03CV0943, 2008 WL 2338123 (D. Conn. June 4, 2008), a false arrest and malicious
prosecution case, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion to compel personnel files and internal
investigations of alleged police misconduct, noting that in civil rights actions against police
officers, “internal investigation files are discoverable when they involve allegations of similar
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misconduct . . . whether substantiated or not.” Id. at *2. In Unger v. Cohen, which involved
allegations of excessive force and related claims, the court noted that “information in the
administrative files about [similar] accusations [of misconduct] is an obvious source of ‘leads’
which resourceful counsel may pursue to evidence bearing on intent or other factors in issue.”
125 F.R.D. at 70-71.
Plaintiff asserts that information in Defendants’ personnel files could be relevant as to
whether Defendants willfully violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights as well as to any defenses
Defendants may offer. Defendants counter that information in their personnel files, if it showed
they were disciplined for prior similar conduct, would be inadmissible to prove that excessive
force was used. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). Defendants also proffer an affidavit from
Lieutenant FitzMaurice (“FitzMaurice”) of the City’s police department, wherein he avers that
he reviewed their files but neither was ever disciplined for using excessive force. (Defs.’ Br. Ex.
A.) FitzMaurice also avers that Ruggiero was the subject of a 2008 complaint alleging the use of
excessive force, but that such complaint was deemed unfounded. (Id. ¶ 5.)
As case law indicates, whether an administrative complaint is unfounded is irrelevant to
its discoverability. See Unger, 125 F.R.D. at 70-71. Additionally, admissibility of disciplinary
records is not the issue, but relevance for discovery purposes. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
Moreover, depending on the actual contents of the files, Plaintiff could potentially offer the
evidence for some reason other than showing Defendants acted in conformity with other prior
acts. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). Finally, as Defendants expended the effort to have
FitzMaurice review their files, it is not unreasonable to require them to produce those files so
that Plaintiff may review them. Accordingly, the motion to compel must be granted as to
Request 2. The Court makes no finding as to the admissibility of this evidence at trial.
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