Parker v. Angioletti et al

Filing 31

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER re: 23 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Daren Cummings, Enkler, Frank Tasciotti, Tylar Wyman. For the reasons stated above, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is respectfully requested to terminate the motion (Doc. 23) and close the case. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Nelson Stephen Roman on 6/30/2014) (mml)

attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, which plea establishes probable
cause. For the following reasons, the motion to dismiss is granted.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 3
Plaintiff and his residence—located at 134 Morgan Court, Apartment A, Poughkeepsie,
New York—were the subjects of a search warrant related to a drug investigation conducted
jointly by the Task Force and the Poughkeepsie Police Department. On June 20, 2012, the Task
Force Officers searched Plaintiff’s residence, wherein they discovered narcotics and a firearm.
They proceeded to arrest Plaintiff at a gas station convenience store. Allegedly, Angioletti
informed Plaintiff he was under arrest and Cummings placed Plaintiff in handcuffs. Angioletti,
Cummings, Wyman, and Sassi then allegedly questioned Plaintiff concerning his acquaintances
and the location of narcotics. Angioletti, Cummings, Wyman, and Sassi searched Plaintiff’s
person, finding a green leafy substance, but did not charge Plaintiff for possessing it. The other
Task Force Officers allegedly failed to ensure Plaintiff was not improperly arrested.
On August 28, 2012, Plaintiff subsequently indicted by a grand jury in the County Court,
County of Dutchess (“Dutchess County Court”), on nine counts of criminal sale of a controlled
substance in the third degree, two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second
degree, and one count of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree. On
February 28, 2013, Plaintiff pleaded guilty to a lesser included offense of attempted criminal
possession of a weapon in the second degree, in satisfaction of the indictment. On June 11,
2013, the Dutchess County Court sentenced Plaintiff to a determinate term of five (5) years’
imprisonment and two and a half (2½) years’ post-release supervision.

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The following facts are taken from allegations in the AC and from matters of which judicial notice may be taken.
See Fed. R. Evid. 201.

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II. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD
On a motion to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), dismissal is proper unless the complaint “contain[s] sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007));
accord Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 160 (2d Cir. 2010). A claim is facially plausible
when the factual content pleaded allows a court “to draw a reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; accord Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556. The court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Betts v. Sherman, No. 12 Civ. 3195 (JPO), 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11139, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2013) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 572; In re
NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 2007); cf. Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514
F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir. 2008). Labels or a recitation of the elements of a cause of action
supported merely by conclusory statements will not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). However, “legal conclusions can provide the framework of a
complaint” so long as they are “supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; accord
Liddle v. Garret, 720 F. Supp. 2d 417, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). “Facial plausibility does not impose
a probability requirement at the pleading stage.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
In deciding a motion to dismiss, a district court may consider documents attached as an
exhibit to or incorporated by reference in the complaint, and matters of which judicial notice may
be taken. Roe v. Johnson, 334 F. Supp. 2d 415, 419-420 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Thomas v.
Westchester Cnty. Health Care Corp., 232 F. Supp. 2d. 273, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); cf. Lesesne v.
Brimecome, 918 F. Supp. 2d 221, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing Halebian v. Berv, 644 F.3d 122,
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131 n.7 (2d Cir. 2011); Chapman v. N.Y. State Div. for Youth, 546 F.3d 230, 234 (2d Cir. 2008)).
A district court may take judicial notice of matters of public record pursuant to Rule 201(b) of
the Federal Rules of Evidence. Shmueli v. City of New York, 424 F.3d 231, 233 (2d Cir. 2005);
Roe, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 420; Calcutti v. SBU, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 2d 691, 696 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
III. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 FALSE ARREST
Plaintiff asserts his false arrest claim under § 1983, which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges that because there was neither a warrant for his arrest nor any
illegal contraband found on his person, there was no probable cause or justification for his arrest.
Thus, Plaintiff asserts, without probable cause his arrest violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV. “In analyzing § 1983 claims for unconstitutional false arrest, [the
Second Circuit has] generally looked to the law of the state in which the arrest occurred.” Jaegly
v. Couch, 439 F.3d 149, 151 (2d Cir. 2006); Ackerson v. City of White Plains, 702 F.3d 15, 19
(2d Cir. 2012) (“‘A § 1983 claim for false arrest . . . is substantially the same as a claim for false
arrest under New York law.’” (quoting Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1996))).
Under New York Law, a plaintiff “must show: (1) the defendant intended to confine the plaintiff,
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(2) the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the
confinement, and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged.” Bernard v. United State,
25 F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 1994).
“Probable cause ‘is a complete defense to an action for false arrest’ brought under New
York law or § 1983.” Ackerson, 702 F.3d at 19 (quoting Weyant, 101 F.3d at 852). “Probable
cause to arrest exists when the officers have . . . reasonably trustworthy information as to[] facts
and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that
an offense has been . . . committed by the person to be arrested.” Id. (quoting Zellner v.
Summerlin, 494 F.3d 344, 368 (2d Cir. 2007)). A conviction or guilty plea conclusively
establishes that probable cause existed and bars a § 1983 claim for false arrest, see Cameron v.
Fogarty, 806 F.2d 380, 386 (2d Cir. 1986) (“[A] conviction of the plaintiff following the arrest is
viewed as establishing the existence of probable cause.” (citing Broughton v. New York, 37
N.Y.2d 451, 458 (1975))); Weyant, 101 F.3d at 852, even if the conviction or plea is to a lesser
charge, see Rodriguez v. Vill. of Ossining, 918 F. Supp. 2d 230, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
Defendants proffer the transcript of Plaintiff’s plea allocution before the Dutchess County
Court and the sentencing disposition for the indictment. These documents in the public record
demonstrate that Plaintiff pleaded and was adjudicated guilty before a court to the lesser included
charge of attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree in satisfaction of the
indictment filed in connection with his arrest on June 20, 2012. In his opposition, Plaintiff
asserts that his guilty plea was forced. However, a review of the plea allocution transcript
demonstrates that he voluntarily pleaded guilty. The transcript also demonstrates that he was not
“threatened, coerced, forced or pressured by anybody into pleading guilty.” (Defs.’ Ex. D, Plea
Allocution Script 23:12-15.) The Court may take judicial notice of this transcript and the
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