Williams v. The City of New Rochelle

Filing 41

OPINION AND ORDER re: 37 MOTION to Dismiss, MOTION for More Definite Statement filed by Daniel Conca, Edward Siller, Adam Castagna, Sergeant Wilson, The City of New Rochelle Police Department, The City of New Rochelle, Joh n Inzeo. Defendants' motion to dismiss and motion for a more definite statement are GRANTED. Plaintiff should file a fifth amended complaint by June 30, 2014. The Clerk of Court is respectfully requested to terminate this motion (Doc. No. 37). SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Nelson Stephen Roman on 5/29/2014) (mml)

On October 6, 2011, Plaintiff, the City of New Rochelle, the New Rochelle Police
Department, and various police officers executed a General Release whereby Plaintiff released
and discharged the City of New Rochelle, the New Rochelle Police Department, and various
police officers from any and all claims he “ever had, now have or which hereafter can, shall or
may, have for, upon or by reason of any matter, cause or thing whatsoever from the beginning of
the world to the day of the date of this RELEASE including without limitation those arising from
incidents which occurred on JUNE 25, 2005 and JANUARY 9, 2006.” Def. Motion, Ex. C.
Plaintiff initiated this case pro se on May 16, 2013 and subsequently retained counsel.
Plaintiff filed a fourth amended complaint on December 12, 2013. Plaintiff alleges events, in
part, that pre-date his general release of October 6, 2011. For example, he challenges the 2008
award of the City of New Rochelle’s contract with Safeway Towing and that “the awarding of
contracts by the City of New Rochelle was not advertised.” (See Fourth Amended Complaint,
para. III, subparagraph C.) Plaintiff’s counsel filed a notice of appearance on March 28, 2014.
On May 20, 2014, Defendants moved to dismiss any claims occurring prior to October 6,
2011 by virtue of Plaintiff’s General Release. Defendants also moved for a more definite
statement.
In his opposition, Plaintiff’s counsel asserts that none of the claims asserted in the fourth
amended complaint occurred before October 6, 2011. (Opp. at para. 3.) With respect to
Defendants’ motion for a more definite statement of the remaining claims in the fourth amended
complaint, Plaintiff’s counsel argues that such is unnecessary because the claims “raised by
Plaintiff in the Fourth Amended Complaint are not indefinite or vague, but are very specific as to
dates, times, places and the police officers involved.” (Opp. at para. 6.)
II. MOTION STANDARDS
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On a motion to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), dismissal is proper unless the complaint “contain[s] sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007));
accord Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 160 (2d Cir. 2010). “Although for the purposes of a
motion to dismiss [a court] must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true, [it is]
‘not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “While legal conclusions can provide the framework
of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. at 679.
When there are well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint, “a court should assume
their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id.
A claim is facially plausible when the factual content pleaded allows a court “to draw a
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678.
Ultimately, determining whether a complaint states a facially plausible claim must be “a contextspecific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.” Id. at 679. When determining the plausibility of a complaint, “[i]n addition to
allegations in the complaint itself, the Court may consider documents attached as exhibits and
documents incorporated by reference in the complaint.” Lesesne v. Brimecome, 918 F. Supp. 2d
221, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing Halebian v. Berv, 644 F.3d 122, 131 n.7 (2d Cir. 2011);
Chapman v. N.Y. State Div. for Youth, 546 F.3d 230, 234 (2d Cir. 2008)).
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e), a party may move for a more definite
statement of a pleading if the pleading “is so vague or ambiguous, that the party cannot
reasonably prepare a response.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e). The movant must “point out the defects
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complained of and the details desired.” Id. As a general matter, Rule 12(e) motions are
disfavored because they can be used as a tool for delay. See, e.g., In re European Rail Pass
Antitrust Litig., 166 F.Supp.2d 836, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). But where “the movant shows that
there actually is a substantial threshold question that may be dispositive, such as a critical date,”
a more definite statement may be warranted. 5C Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
Practice & Procedure § 1376 at 336 (3d ed. 2004); accord Casanova v. Ulibarri, 595 F.3d 1120,
1125 (10th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he preferable procedure when a specific date could support a
dispositive defense motion is to require the plaintiff to provide a more definite statement under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e).”).
III. DISCUSSION
As a preliminary matter, all of Plaintiff’s claim against the New Rochelle Police
Department are dismissed. See East Coast Novelty Co. v. City of New York, 781 F.Supp. 999,
1010 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (“As an agency of the City, the Police Department is not a suable entity
[for suit under § 1983].”); see also Fanelli v. Town of Harrison, 46 F.Supp.2d 254, 257
(S.D.N.Y. 1999).
The General Release served as full and complete settlement of a separate state court
action that Plaintiff filed against the City of New Rochelle, the New Rochelle Police Department,
and various police officers. Plaintiff does not allege that he signed the General Release
involuntarily or under duress. Plaintiff’s sole argument against Defendants’ motion to dismiss is
that the fourth amendment complaint does not make allegations arising before the General
Release of October 6, 2011. Accordingly, he appears to concede that any claims arising before
October 6, 2011 are invalid. The General Release is a valid, enforceable legal document. See

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