The Estate of Larry Shaw et al v. Marcus et al

Filing 154

OPINION AND ORDER re: (50 in 7:14-cv-03849-NSR-JCM) MOTION to Dismiss the Amended Complaint filed by Gary Adelman, (75 in 7:14-cv-03849-NSR-JCM) MOTION for Sanctions Pursuant to Rule 11 filed by David Marcus, Melissa Steve ns, Meta Shaw Stevens, Sam Shaw Inc., Edie Shaw Marcus, (71 in 7:14-cv-03849-NSR-JCM) MOTION to Dismiss Notice of Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint filed by David Marcus, Melissa Stevens, Meta Shaw Stevens, Sam Shaw Inc., Edie Shaw Marcus. For the foregoing reasons, Adelman's motion to dismiss is GRANTED in its entirety and all claims asserted in the Second Amended Complaint against Adelman are DISMISSED. Shaw Family Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED with respect to claims 9, 12, 15, 19, and 21 and that much of claim 8 that relies on the theory that the 1998 Trust is invalid; the motion is DENIED in all other respects. Shaw Family Defendants' motion for Rule 11 sanctions is DENIED in its entiret y. The Court respectfully directs the Clerk to terminate Adelman as a Defendant in this action, to amend the caption to reflect his removal, and to terminate the motions at ECF Nos. 50, 71, and 75. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Nelson Stephen Roman on 9/22/2015) (mml)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
THE ESTATE OF LARRY SHAW and SUSAN
SHAW, as the Executor of the Estate of Larry Shaw,
asserting claims on behalf of a New York
corporation, SHAW FAMILY ARCHIVES, LTD.
on a sharnholder derivative basis and/or, when so
pleaded, individual claims for the benefit of the
ESTATE OF LARRY SHAW,
Plaintiffs,
-against-

No. 7:14-cv-3849 (NSR)

EDIE SHAW MARCUS aka Edith Marcus, MET A
SHAW STEVENS aka Meta Stevens, DAVID
MARCUS, MELISSA STEVENS, GARY
ADELMAN, ESQ., and SAL\1 SHAW INC.,
Defendants,
-andSHAW FAMILY ARCHIVES, LTD.,
as a Nominal Party to
the Action.

SAM SHAW, INC., META STEVENS, EDITH
MARCUS, MELISSA STEVENS, and DAVID
MARCUS,
Plaintiffs,
No. 7:14-cv-5653 (NSR)
-againstTHE ESTATE OF LARRY SHAW and SUSAN
SHAW,
Defendants.

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OPINION AND ORDER
NELSON S. ROMÁN, United States District Judge
Before the Court are three motions: (1) a motion to dismiss the Second Amended
Complaint filed by Sam Shaw, Inc., Meta Stevens, Edith Marcus, Melissa Stevens, and David
Marcus (the “Shaw Family Defendants”) 1; (2) a motion for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 filed
by Shaw Family Defendants; and (3) a motion to dismiss the initial Complaint filed by Gary
Adelman, Esq., which the Court construes as a motion to dismiss the Second Amended
Complaint. 2 For the following reasons: Adelman’s motion is GRANTED in its entirety; Shaw
Family Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part; and Shaw
Family Defendants’ Rule 11 motion is DENIED in its entirety.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 3
A.

The 1994 Action and the 1998 Trust

Sam Shaw (“Sam”) 4 was a photographer whose subjects included celebrities such as
Marilyn Monroe, Marlon Brando, and Aaron Copland. Sam had three children, Larry Shaw
(“Larry”), Edie Shaw Stevens (“Edie”), and Meta Shaw Marcus (“Meta”). Larry was also a
photographer. He and his father, Sam, had a contentious relationship. In 1994, Sam sued Larry
in New York Supreme Court to recover photographs that were in Larry’s possession, which Sam
claimed to have snapped (the “1994 Action”). Larry asserted cross-claims concerning the scope
of Larry’s right to commercially exploit certain photographs of Marilyn Monroe that Sam had

1

Shaw Family Defendants initially filed a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint, and after the Estate
filed a Second Amended Complaint, Shaw Family Defendants served supplemental briefing (with leave of the
Court) addressing the additional claims asserted in the new pleading. To the extent it is necessary, the Court
construes Shaw Family Defendants’ motion as one to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint.
2
Defendant Meister Selig & Feing, LLP initially joined in this motion, but it was dropped from the case
upon the filing of the Amended Complaint. (See ECF No. 19.)
3
All nonconclusory factual allegations in the Second Amended Complaint are accepted as true for purposes
of deciding the instant motions. Additional facts have been drawn from other judicially noticeable sources.
4
For clarity, the Court departs from its typical practice of using last names in this Opinion.

2

assigned to Larry. However, over the course of the succeeding eight years, the litigation
expanded into a contest over the attribution and ownership of virtually all photographs snapped
by either Larry or Sam during their lifetimes.
In 1998, during the pendency of the 1994 Action, Sam allegedly executed a trust
purporting to convey all copyrights he owned to a trust for the benefit of Edie and Meta, and
completely disinheriting Larry (the “1998 Trust”). (The Estate alleges that this trust was invalid
because the copyrights it purported to transfer were disputed at the time of execution.) Sam died
on April 5, 1999, and Edie and Meta continued to litigate the 1994 Action against their brother
Larry.
B.

The 1994 Action Settles in 2002

The 1994 Action ultimately settled on June 5, 2002, when the parties verbally set forth
the terms of their settlement in open court before a Judicial Hearing Officer (the “2002
Settlement”). (See Adams Decl. Ex. 1, ECF No. 90-1 [hereinafter 2002 Settlement].) The
instant litigation largely concerns the terms of that settlement, which was transcribed but never
reduced to a separate, written agreement.
The 2002 Settlement states that, in consideration for settling the 1994 Action:
An entity will be formed. . . . The name of that entity will be the Shaw Family
Archives. . . . Larry Shaw, Meta Shaw Stevens and Edith Shaw Marcus shall be
principals in that entity and their respective interests in that entity will be the following:
Larry Shaw shall own 50 percent of that entity. . . . Meta Shaw Stevens shall own 25
percent of that entity and Edith Shaw Marcus shall own 25 percent of that entity. That
entity shall own and take possession of, in a manner set forth below, all of the
photographs involved in this litigation. . . . That includes each and every photograph shot
by either Sam Shaw or Larry Shaw during the course of their respective careers [or]
lifetimes . . . together with those photographs taken by third parties which either of them
claim as being owned by them via some gift or sale from a third party, all subject to
claims by third parties. 5

5

Unless otherwise indicated, the Court will use the phrase “subject photographs” to refer to all photographs
snapped by either Larry or Sam during their lifetimes, and will use the phrase “subject copyrights” to refer to the
copyrights in the subject photographs.

3

(2002 Settlement at 3-5.) The 2002 Settlement does not explicitly mention “copyright” or
“exclusive rights.” Instead, it simply uses the word “photographs” or the phrase “photographs,
images, transparencies, negatives.” The 2002 Settlement transcript makes no mention of royalty
payments for use of the photographs. It does, however, include a penalty provision as follows:
In the event any of the parties herein from this date forward, June 5, 2002, market,
commercialize, attempt to sell, attempt to make any type of deal with respect to an image
involved in this transaction . . . [i]ncluding gifts, . . . without the majority agreement of
the other parties, then that person shall be penalized . . .

(2002 Settlement at 23.) Toward the end of the transcript, the presiding Judicial Hearing Officer
personally addressed Larry, Edie, Meta, and David and asked each in turn whether they “heard
the terms of the stipulation,” “discussed it with” counsel, and “agree with it,” and each party said
“yes.” The chief issue in this litigation is whether the 2002 Settlement effected a transfer of
copyrights from Larry, Edie, and Meta to the new entity, Shaw Family Archives.
Shaw Family Archives, Ltd. was formed shortly after the settlement. For the next several
years, during which time Larry effectively ran the company, Shaw Family Archives allegedly
marketed and licensed copies of the subject photographs, conspicuously identifying Shaw Family
Archives, Ltd. as the copyright owner on notices, treating licensing revenue as belonging to
Shaw Family Archives, and paying no royalties to Larry, Edie, or Meta. Larry, Edie, and Meta
instead received profit distributions as shareholders of Shaw Family Archives. Shaw Family
Archives, on the other hand, never took any action to register the subject copyrights in its name
with the Copyright Office. Larry died on October 19, 2007, and his Estate, by his wife Susan
Shaw, brings the instant action against Defendants.
C.

Edie and Meta’s Alleged Scheme to Divert Copyrights

The Estate alleges that Edie and Meta schemed to divest Shaw Family Archives of the
copyrights that it owned as a result of the 2002 Settlement.

4

The Estate alleges that David Marcus, Edie’s son and an attorney, sought to further Edie
and Meta’s scheme by manufacturing a false judicial record on the issue of copyright ownership.
In 2005, the Shaw family and the Marilyn Monroe family filed competing lawsuits concerning
photographs of Marilyn Monroe snapped by Sam Shaw. See Complaint, Shaw Family Archives,
Ltd. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., No. 05-cv-3939 (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 19, 2005). In the Complaint
and two amended complaints in that action, the plaintiffs Shaw Family Archives, Edie, and Meta
alleged that the copyrights in the photographs at issue passed from Sam Shaw to Edie and Meta
pursuant to the 1998 Trust. Id. ¶¶ 11-12. They further alleged that Shaw Family Archives had
only the right to market and commercially exploit the photographs as a result of the 2002
Settlement. Id. David Marcus signed the Complaint and the amendments thereto.
In 2008, Edie and Meta allegedly executed an assignment from themselves to Sam Shaw
Inc. (an entity that they jointly controlled) of copyrights in Sam’s photography (the “2008
Assignment”). They then began registering copyrights in the name of Sam Shaw Inc. with the
Copyright Office, and at some point caused Shaw Family Archives to pay royalties to Sam Shaw
Inc. The Estate alleges that the copyrights that Edie and Meta purported to assign actually
belonged to Shaw Family Archives as a result of the 2002 Settlement; Shaw Family Archives
had simply never formally registered those copyrights with the Copyright Office.
Finally, the Estate alleges that Defendants continued to attempt to build a judicial record
as to copyright ownership in the Bankruptcy Court once Shaw Family Archives filed for Chapter
11.
D.

Edie and Meta’s Alleged Scheme to Destroy the Estate’s Equity

The Estate also alleges that Edie and Meta sought to destroy or convert the Estate’s
equity in Shaw Family Archives by driving up Shaw Family Archives’ legal bills. This theory is
highly confusing and contradictory as described in the Second Amended Complaint. Essentially,
5

William Greenawalt and Jeffrey Tunick were two of the attorneys who represented the parties in
the 1994 Action, but were never paid for their services. The Estate alleges that their fees were
enforceable against the Shaw Family Archives collection, and that Shaw Family Archives had
the funds to pay the attorneys. The Estate further alleges that Edie and Meta refused to use Shaw
Family Archives’ funds to pay Tunick even though Tunick had obtained judicial rulings entitling
him to payment. At the same time, Edie and Meta expended enormous amounts of Shaw Family
Archives’ funds to contest Greenawalt’s fees, even though the litigation was frivolous. The
Estate alleges that this was part of a scheme to somehow destroy the Estate’s equity in Shaw
Family Archives, or somehow position Edie and Meta to convert the Estate’s equity, and it
ultimately drove Shaw Family Archives into bankruptcy.
E.

The Chapter 11 Action

On June 1, 2011, Shaw Family Archives filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition in the
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. In re Shaw Family Archives, Ltd., No.
11-23099-rdd, ECF No. 1 (S.D.N.Y. Bankr.) [hereinafter Chapter 11 Docket]. The chief
creditors were Tunick and Greenawalt, whose fees from the 1994 Action had still not been paid.
In the Chapter 11 proceeding, Shaw Family Archives did not assert ownership of
copyrights in any of the subject photographs. In its petition schedules, Shaw Family Archives
merely asserted that it owned “marketing and commercialization” rights pursuant to the 2002
Settlement. See Amended Schedule B, Chapter 11 Docket No. 65. Indeed, Melissa Stevens,
acting as the debtor’s operations manager, addressed Judge Drain directly to explain that, in her
view, copyrights in Sam’s photography passed by trust from Sam to Edie and Meta (her aunt and
mother), and that the 2002 Settlement conveyed to the Shaw Family Archives only marketing
and commercialization rights. See Transcript of December 5, 2013 Hearing at 19-25, Chapter 11
Docket No. 232. The Estate alleges that Shaw Family Archives made these representations and
6

did not assert copyright ownership because Shaw Family Defendants, whose interests were
adverse to the Estate’s, controlled Shaw Family Archives in the Chapter 11 proceeding.
The Estate filed four claims as a creditor in the Chapter 11 proceeding: Claim 8
described as “fraud re attorney lien” in the amount of $2 million, Claim 9 described as
“shareholder derivative” in the amount of $2 million, Claim 10 described as “shareholder
distributions” in the amount of $800 thousand, and Claim 18 described as “breach of fiduciary
duty” in the amount of $1 million. See Claims Register, Chapter 11 Docket. From a review of
the Declaration of Susan Shaw attached to the proofs of those claims, it appears those four
claims share a common nucleus of operative fact with the Estate’s claims in the instant litigation.
See id. The Estate withdrew these claims prior to plan confirmation, but secured a reservation of
rights in the final confirmed plan as follows:
The estate of Larry Shaw, deceased and [sic] Susan Shaw have contended that they have
claims and potential actions or causes of action against the Shaw Sisters and other
shareholders, officers or directors of SFA, based on various grounds, including, inter
alia, waste, mismanagement, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty and/or misfeasance in
the management of SFA and its business. The estate of Larry Shaw, deceased [sic] and
Susan Shaw shall retain and may assert any and all causes of action they may have based
on the foregoing on and after the Effective Date of the Plan, including but not limited to a
shareholder’s derivative action, against the Shaw Sisters or other shareholders, officers or
directors of SFA.

Fourth Amended Consolidated Chapter 11 Plan and Disclosure Statement at 63, Chapter 11
Docket No. 246.
The Estate also asserts aiding and abetting claims against Gary Adelman, an attorney
retained by Edie and Meta. In short, the Estate claims that Adelman advised Edie and Meta to
execute the 2008 Assignment and to litigate the Greenawalt fee action while declining to use
Shaw Family Archives’ funds to pay Tunick’s fees.
Shaw Family Defendants move to dismiss all of the claims in the Second Amended
Complaint (they do this by filing one motion directed to the Amended Complaint and
7

supplemental briefing directed to the additional claims asserted in the Second Amended
Complaint). Defendant Adelman moves to dismiss all of the claims asserted against him in the
initial Complaint, which the Court construes as a motion to dismiss all of the claims asserted
against him in the Second Amended Complaint. Shaw Family Defendants also move for
sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
STANDARD ON A MOTION TO DISMISS
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must supply “factual allegations sufficient
‘to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’” ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd.,
493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
In other words, the complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Starr v. Sony BMG Music Entm’t, 592 F.3d 314, 321 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In applying this standard, a
court should accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations, but should not credit “mere
conclusory statements” or “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action.” Id.
DISCUSSION
As the Estate explains in its briefings, there are two categories of claims in the Second
Amended Complaint. The first category comprises claims related to copyright ownership. The
Second Amended Complaint claims that Shaw Family Archives owns the subject copyrights, or,
in the alternative, is a beneficial owner. The Estate asks for declaratory and injunctive relief to
protect Shaw Family Archives’ purported ownership of the copyrights and to prevent Defendants

8

from acting adverse to Shaw Family Archives’ ownership claim, as well as disgorgement of any
royalties paid to Sam Shaw Inc.
The second category comprises claims related to Edie and Meta’s alleged waste and
mismanagement of Shaw Family Archives. With respect to these causes of action, the Second
Amended Complaint requests various forms of declaratory, injunctive, and compensatory relief.
I.

Copyright Ownership Claims
A.

Claims Concerning the 2002 Settlement

With respect to the Estate’s claims related to copyright ownership, the Second Amended
Complaint is very poorly drafted, highly unclear, and confusing. The Estate parses legal
arguments as separate claims for declaratory relief and unnecessarily duplicates claims. 6 In
substance, the Estate appears to seek three main forms of relief: (1) a declaratory judgment that
Shaw Family Archives is the owner of the subject copyrights, (2) injunctive relief compelling
Edie, Meta, David, Melissa, and Sam Shaw Inc. to take all steps necessary to permit or cause the
subject copyrights to be registered in the name of Shaw Family Archives and to take no further
actions incompatible with Shaw Family Archives’ ownership, and (3) disgorgement of copyright
royalties paid to Sam Shaw Inc. The Estate asserts two primary theories for its entitlement to
this relief. First, the Estate claims that the 2002 Settlement transferred copyrights (legally or
equitably) to Shaw Family Archives (Claims 1, 13, 14, 17, 18, and 21). Second, the Estate
argues that Edie and Meta or Sam Shaw Inc. are estopped from challenging Shaw Family

6

For example, Claim 1 asks for a declaratory judgment that Shaw Family Archives is the owner of the
subject copyrights based on the theory that the 2002 Settlement effected a transfer of the copyrights to Shaw Family
Archives. Claim 13 asks for a declaratory judgment that the 2002 Settlement transferred the copyrights to Shaw
Family Archives by operation of law. Claim 14 asks for a declaratory judgment that the 2002 Settlement transferred
the copyrights to Shaw Family Archives because it was a signed writing. Claim 17 asks for a declaratory judgment
that the 2002 Settlement conveyed beneficial ownership to Shaw Family Archives, if not full copyrights. Claim 18
asks for a declaratory judgment that the 2002 Settlement transferred the subject copyrights to Shaw Family Archives
because Edie and Meta disclaimed all right to make any decisions with respect to the subject photographs without a
majority vote (which is really just a contract interpretation argument).

9

Archives’ ownership claim based on representations made in contracts and to courts (Claim 12)
or based on Sam Shaw Inc.’s withdrawal of claims in the Chapter 11 action concerning Shaw
Family Archives (Claim 20).
1.

Legal or Equitable Transfer
a)

It is plausible that the 2002 Settlement is an enforceable transfer.

It is plausible that the 2002 Settlement transferred copyrights to Shaw Family Archives.
Copyright Act § 204(a) sets forth the prerequisites for transferring a copyright:
A transfer of copyright ownership, other than by operation of law, is not valid unless an
instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer, is in writing and
signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner’s duly authorized agent.

17 U.S.C. § 204(a). The principal purpose of the writing requirement is not to effectuate the
parties’ intent, but rather “to protect authors from those claiming, contrary to the author’s view
of the facts, that he or she transferred rights in the work.” Tjeknavorian v. Mardirossian, 56 F.
Supp. 3d 561, 565 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting 2 Patry on Copyright § 5:106). “It imposes a rigid
default in favor of letting creators retain their interests in copyrighted work.” Id. Although
§ 204(a) is occasionally referred to as copyright’s “statute of frauds,” it is “more stringent than
traditional statues of frauds” because it does not primarily serve an evidentiary function; rather,
“it ensures that a copyright will not be inadvertently transferred[,] forces a party who wants to
use the copyrighted work to negotiate with the creator to determine precisely what rights are
being transferred[, and] provides a guide for resolving disputes.” Id. at 565; 2 Patry on
Copyright § 5:106.
No particular form of transfer is required. See Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d
555, 557 (9th Cir. 1990) (“It doesn’t have to be the Magna Charta; a one-line pro forma
statement will do.”). But whatever the form, a transfer must be “clear.” Tjeknavorian, 56 F.
Supp. 3d at 567; Papa’s-June Music, Inc. v. McLean, 921 F. Supp. 1154, 1158-59 (S.D.N.Y.
10

1996); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Dumas, 831 F. Supp. 295, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), aff’d in part and
rev’d in part on other grounds, 53 F.3d 549 (2d Cir. 1995)). The writing need not explicitly
mention “copyright” or “exclusive rights,” but the better practice is that it should. Papa’s-June,
921 F. Supp. at 1159.
In Playboy Enterprises, a magazine publisher sought a declaratory judgment that it
owned copyrights in paintings it purchased from a freelance artist. 53 F.3d at 553. The
publisher claimed that the artist had transferred copyrights because the phrase “payee
acknowledges payment in full for the assignment to Playboy Enterprises, Inc. of all right, title
and interest in and to the [listed] items” appeared in a legend on the back of each check used to
pay for the subject paintings. Id. at 560. The district court held this language insufficient under
§ 204(a), reasoning that it referred only to “items”—i.e., the physical embodiment of a work,
which did not unambiguously include copyrights. Playboy Enters., 831 F. Supp. at 308. The
Second Circuit disagreed that the only way to interpret the language was that it transferred only
the physical embodiment. However, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal
because the evidence concerning the purported underlying agreement to transfer copyrights was
ambiguous. Playboy Enters., 53 F.3d at 564.
Other cases have held that language such as “all right, title and interest” may encompass
copyrights. See Shugrue v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 977 F. Supp. 280, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding
the phrase “all right, title and interest” to encompass software copyrights and citing analogous
cases); see also Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp., 969 F.2d 410, 413 (7th Cir. 1992)
(finding that a transfer of all assets, “tangible and intangible alike,” included copyrights); cf.
Mason v. Jamie Music Pub. Co., 658 F. Supp. 2d 571, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (construing the
transfer not to confer copyrights not specifically listed). The court in Shugrue noted that this is

11

especially true in the context of software, which is “not like paintings and other tangible
objects,” because nonconsumer purchasers would not be interested in the physical embodiment
of a computer program. Shugrue, 977 F. Supp. at 285
Here, the 2002 Settlement does not explicitly mention “copyright” or “exclusive rights.”
Nor does it use the phrase “all right, title, and interest,” or any analogous phrase. Instead, it
simply uses the word “photographs” or the phrase “photographs, images, transparencies,
negatives,” and includes a penalty provision as follows:
In the event any of the parties herein from this date forward, June 5, 2002, market,
commercialize, attempt to sell, attempt to make any type of deal with respect to an image
involved in this transaction . . . [i]ncluding gifts, . . . without the majority agreement of
the other parties, then that person shall be penalized . . . .

(2002 Settlement at 23.) The words “photographs, images, transparencies, negatives” refer to the
physical embodiments of a photograph. But the penalty provision implies that the parties also
intended to convey to Shaw Family Archives (and to take away from Larry, Edie, and Meta
individually) the exclusive right to “make any type of deal” with respect to the “photographs,
images, transparencies, [and] negatives.” True, physical embodiments of photographs may be
sold, marketed, commercialized, and dealt with, and the right to do so is not one of the exclusive
rights granted to owners of copyrights. 7 But even if certain vintage prints are highly valuable,
the right to sell transparencies and negatives (i.e., undeveloped film), without the right to market
prints made from them, is not particularly valuable to a nonconsumer like Shaw Family
Archives. Such an interpretation is nonsensical in the context of the 2002 Settlement and the
resulting business model of Shaw Family Archives. For example, as Melissa Stevens testified in
the Chapter 11 proceeding in describing how Shaw Family Archives does business, “The ABG

7

Owners of copyrights in photographs have the following exclusive rights: (1) to “reproduce the
copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;” (2) to “prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;”
(3) to “distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;” and (4) to “display the copyrighted work publicly.” 17 U.S.C. § 106.

12

transaction requires us to deliver . . . all of our Marilyn Monroe photographs by Sam Shaw. So
in doing so, you know, again, obviously we’re not going to hand them a thirty-five-millimeter
negative from 1956. We’ll make the delivery in the form of digital files [i.e., copies].”
Transcript of March 15, 2012 Hearing at 11:25-12:4, Chapter 11 Docket No. 107. Furthermore,
by agreeing to a penalty provision whereby Larry, Edie, and Meta would be penalized for
making side deals, it is plausible that the parties contemplated that Larry, Edie, and Meta were
transferring away whatever individual rights, including copyrights, they each had with respect to
the subject photographs. The parties made no provision for Shaw Family Archives to pay
royalties for its use of the subject photographs to Larry, Edie, Meta, or any other purported
copyright owner.
In sum, it is plausible to interpret the 2002 Settlement as transferring more than just the
right to market the physical embodiments of the subject photographs, but as also conveying the
exclusive, perpetual, irrevocable right to market copies of the subject photographs, images,
transparencies, and negatives (without the payment of any royalties to any other person), which
subsumes one or more (or all) of the exclusive rights granted to copyright owners. 8 Defendant’s
argument that the 2002 Settlement “obviously” conveys only a license to market the subject
photographs is unpersuasive, because the penalty provision expressly excludes Larry, Edie, and
Meta from “mak[ing] any type of deal” concerning the subject photographs on their own and
makes no provision for royalty payments to Larry, Edie, or Meta (which the parties certainly
would not have left wholly unaddressed had they intended to convey a license).

8
If Defendants meant to distinguish copyright ownership from ownership of the exclusive, perpetual,
irrevocable right to “make any type of deal” with respect to copies of the subject photographs free and clear of any
obligation to pay royalties, Defendants have not done so persuasively at this stage. If Defendants seek to rely on
such a distinction in the future, they will need to explain exactly what that difference is, both on the law and in terms
of practical implications.

13

This interpretation accords with the context of the 2002 Settlement. Despite its narrower
origins, by the time of the 2002 Settlement, the litigation had evolved into a contest over the
ownership of virtually all photographs snapped by either Larry or Sam during their lifetimes, and
all rights of commercial exploitation of those photographs. 9 If Shaw Family Archives was
created to effect a global settlement of claims to the subject photographs, it is hard to imagine
what purpose would be served by Shaw Family Defendants’ purported interpretation of the 2002
Settlement. Transferring to Shaw Family Archives physical custody of the subject photographs,
vintage prints, and physical film, along with a license to market those photographs, but not
copyrights, would leave unresolved the principal economic dispute in that litigation: who among
Larry, Edie, and Meta would be entitled to the money derived from exploiting the photographs.
This interpretation also accords with much of the alleged post-settlement course of
conduct. For years following the 2002 Settlement, Shaw Family Archives openly marketed and
licensed copies of the subject photographs, conspicuously identifying Shaw Family Archives,
Ltd. as the copyright owner on notices and treating all licensing revenue as revenue to Shaw
Family Archives, without paying royalties to Larry, Edie, or Meta (who instead received profit
distributions as shareholders of Shaw Family Archives (see Second Am. Compl. ¶ 190)). See
Mahan v. Roc Nation, LLC, No. 14 CIV. 5075 LGS, 2015 WL 1782095, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
15, 2015) (“[The] absence of any royalties sent to Plaintiff also gave him reason to know of his

9

Defendants’ assertions to the contrary are not persuasive. The Appellate Division did not “find” that the
1994 Action involved ownership of “tangible” photographs. See Shaw v. Bressler, 688 N.Y.S.2d 525 (App. Div.
1999) The word “tangible” does not appear in that court’s decision at all, and the difference between tangible and
intangible rights was not an issue on that appeal. And in nearly the same breath, Defendants contend that the 1994
Action concerned “marketing” rights. The other cases cited by Defendants do not persuade the Court that this issue
is collaterally estopped. From a review of those decisions, it appears that no judge has ever “found” that the 1994
Action concerned only tangible rights.

14

injury.”). Moreover, Edie’s testimony in Greenawalt’s charging lien fixing proceeding 10 favors
the Estate:
She testified [that] before Greenawalt c[a]me on to the case she and her sister,
[Meta] Stevens, had a 100% interest in Sam Shaw photographs, but upon settlement she
and her sister ended up with 25% each and her brother a 50% interest.
[Edie] testified that upon her father’s death, she and her sister [Meta] Stevens
became the sole owners to the Sam Shaw photographs and that Larry Shaw had no legal
interest in any of the Sam Shaw photographs. Thus, by the time Greenawalt came on to
the case, defendant Larry Shaw had no interest in the subject photographs.

(Crespo Report at 27.) Viewing this testimony in the light most favorable to the Estate, it
demonstrates Edie’s belief that the 2002 Settlement stripped her of all rights (including
copyrights) that she had in Sam’s photographs in exchange for a 25% stake in Shaw Family
Archives. Similarly, David Marcus in the Tunick fee litigation submitted an affirmation on
behalf of Edie, Meta, and Shaw Family Archives that stated, “The settlement herein pertained to
the ownership of the photographic images and copyrights, it did not contemplate the splitting of
any insurance settlement.” (Adams Decl. Ex. J, ECF No. 90-10, at A779-A780.) 11
To be clear, the Court is not holding that the 2002 Settlement effected a transfer of any of
copyrights to Shaw Family Archives. The Court is simply holding that the language of the 2002
Settlement transcript, viewed in light of the factual allegations in the Second Amended
Complaint, raise a plausible inference sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. This conclusion
may change at summary judgment depending on the evidence adduced. Mason v. Jamie Music
Pub. Co., 658 F. Supp. 2d 571, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Any ambiguities or doubts concerning the
scope of rights assigned by the [authors] . . . must be construed in favor of the [authors].”
10

The charging lien was referred to Special Referee Louis Crespo for “fixing” (i.e., determining reasonable
attorneys’ fees). Referee Crespo held hearings from July 2009 through May 2010 and issued a Report and
Recommendation (the “Crespo Report”). (See Adams Decl. Ex. 2-3, ECF No. 90-2, 90-3 [hereinafter “Crespo
Report”].)
11
Defendants allege (without certification from the Copyright Office) that SFA never took steps to register
the copyrights in its own name with the Copyright Office. This fact, though relevant, it is insufficient at the Rule
12(b)(6) stage to find that the parties did not transfer copyrights.

15

(quoting Jim Henson Prods., Inc. v. John T. Brady & Assocs., Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 259, 285
(S.D.N.Y. 1997)); Jim Henson, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 285 (“Thus, under both the 1909 and 1976
Copyright Acts, unless the author has given up his or her rights under copyright in a clear and
unequivocal manner, he or she retains these rights.”); Papa’s-June Music, Inc. v. McLean, 921 F.
Supp. 1154, 1160 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“[T]ransfer agreements should be construed in favor of
copyright transferor because section 204(a) reflects the policy judgment that copyright owners
should retain all rights unless specifically transferred.”); Cohen v. United States, 98 Fed. Cl. 156,
164 (2011) (“Courts have held that a license of rights in a given medium includes only such uses
as fall within the unambiguous core meaning of the term and excludes any uses that lie within
the ambiguous penumbra. Thus, any rights not expressly (in this case meaning unambiguously)
granted are reserved.”); 2 Patry on Copyright § 5:108 (explaining that “transfer of copyright
ownership,” as used in § 204(a) “is a defined term and cannot be ignored with a wink and a
nudge that we all know what was meant”).
The Court rejects Shaw Family Defendants’ argument that the 2002 Settlement is
insufficient because the transferee, Shaw Family Archives, did not exist on the date of the
settlement. The language “That entity [Shaw Family Archives] shall own and take possession
of [the subject photographs]” can plausibly be interpreted as being self-executing upon the
formation of Shaw Family Archives. The language does not suggest any obvious condition
precedent to the parties’ obligation to assign the photographs to Shaw Family Archives. 12
Killette v. Pittman, 127 F.3d 1099 (4th Cir. 1997) (rejecting the district court’s finding that a
settlement agreement did not provide a “present transfer” of copyright where the “language used
by the parties in the settlement agreement [did] not expressly condition the transfer of the

12

And even if one were to view the formation of Shaw Family Archives as a condition precedent, the
condition was satisfied when the entity was formed two weeks later.

16

copyright upon . . . payment”); SCO Grp., Inc. v. Novell, Inc., No. 2:04CV139DAK, 2004 WL
4737297, at *5 (D. Utah June 9, 2004) (denying a motion to dismiss because, even though the
transfer document contained “no transfer language in the form of ‘seller hereby conveys to
buyer’” but instead stated “seller ‘will’ sell, convey, assign, and buyer,” it was ambiguous
“whether the parties contemplated a separate writing to actually transfer the copyrights after the
‘required’ copyrights were identified”); cf. Manney v. Nole, No. 12-CV-0050 SJF WDW, 2012
WL 2131185, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. June 11, 2012) (“This e-mail, even read in context with plaintiffs’
complaint, does not demonstrate that plaintiffs are entitled to a declaratory judgment regarding
ownership in the music catalogue. As an initial matter, any potential transfer of ownership rights
was plainly subject to a condition precedent (i.e., the recovery of ‘current out of pocket
expenses’), and there is no indication that this condition was ever satisfied.”); Monarch
Licensing, Ltd. v. Ritam Int’l Ltd., Inc., No. 92 CIV. 3108 (PNL), 1992 WL 150641, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. June 15, 1992) (finding that a transfer had not occurred where an agreement provided
that “[u]pon termination,” the assignor “agrees to assign all rights, title and interest in the
trademark and/or copyrights to” the assignee, but “[n]othing in the Agreement suggest[ed] that
the assignment of trademark and copyrights provision [was] self-executing”).
The Court also rejects Shaw Family Defendants’ judicial estoppel argument. Shaw
Family Defendants argue that Shaw Family Archives represented in a Complaint (and
amendments thereto) that Edie and Meta owned the copyrights to Sam Shaw’s collection, and
that this representation should estop Larry and his Estate from asserting otherwise because the
court in that action relied on that representation. This argument is unavailing at this stage
because the question of whether these representations are fairly attributable to Larry is a factual
issue. Edie’s son David Marcus is the attorney who signed the relevant Complaint (and the

17

amendments thereto) on behalf of Shaw Family Archives. It seems inequitable to hold Larry’s
Estate to a representation where (1) the representation was apparently drafted by his adversary’s
son, (2) Larry did not “control” Shaw Family Archives on his own because Defendants were
allegedly acting in concert against his interests, and (3) there is no evidence or factual allegation
that suggests that Larry personally ratified the representation. Therefore, judicial estoppel fails
at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage.
b)

The allocution satisfies the signature requirement.

The Court also rejects Shaw Family Defendants’ argument that the transcript cannot
satisfy § 204(a) because it was not signed. 13 Signature requirements are typically imposed to
ensure that parties to an agreement have the present intention to adopt or accept a writing. See
N.Y. U.C.C. § 1-201(37); see also PH Int’l Trading Corp. v. Nordstrom, Inc., 555 F. App’x 9, 11
(2d Cir. 2013) (“The purpose of the signature requirement [in the N.Y. U.C.C.] is to confirm that
the party had ‘present intention to authenticate the writing.’” (quoting a prior version N.Y.
U.C.C. § 1-201 cmt. 39)). Here, the court’s allocution at the end of the 2002 Settlement
transcript serves that very purpose. The Judicial Hearing Officer personally addressed Larry,
Edie, Meta, and David at the end of the proceedings and asked each in turn whether they “heard
the terms of the stipulation,” “discussed it with” counsel, and “agree with it,” and each party said
“yes.” There is no genuine question concerning the parties’ intent to be bound by the terms
expressed on the record—it was the single most unambiguous manifestation of intent in the
entire transcript. 14 The Court will not dismiss on this basis.

13
Defendants do not dispute that a transcript constitutes a writing under § 204(a). The Court thus does not
address that question.
14
Edie and Meta’s unqualified assent to these terms renders irrelevant, at this stage, the issue of whether
they appeared in the action individually or as administrators of Sam Shaw’s estate. It is plausible to infer from their
unqualified assent that Edie and Meta agreed to transfer copyrights to the extent they personally owned any in Sam
Shaw’s photography.

18

c)

Shaw Family Defendants’ statute of limitations argument is

unavailing.
The Court also rejects Shaw Family Defendants’ statute of limitations argument. Shaw
Family Defendants’ entire argument relies on the faulty presumption that the three-year statute of
limitations under § 507(b) of the Copyright Act applies to the Estate’s claims. Section 507(b)
provides: “No civil action shall be maintained under the provisions of this title unless it is
commenced within three years after the claim accrued.” 17 U.S.C. § 507(b). But the Estate’s
claims are not brought under the provisions of the Copyright Act. They are contract, trust, and
equity claims, to which a six-year statute of limitations applies under New York law. The Estate
does not claim, for example, infringement or authorship. Shaw Family Defendants’ statute of
limitations argument is therefore legally deficient and the Court will not dismiss on that basis.
*

*

*

Because the Court has found plausible the Estate’s claim that the 2002 Settlement
transferred copyrights to Shaw Family Archives, it need not address the Estate’s beneficial
ownership, express trust, or constructive trust theories. Shaw Family Defendants’ motion to
dismiss is denied as to claims 1, 4, 5, 13, 14, 17, 18, and 21.
2.

Estoppel
a)

The Estate’s equitable estoppel claims must be dismissed.

The Estate’s transfer by estoppel claims must be dismissed. Claim 12 in the Second
Amended Complaint alleges that Defendants are estopped from denying that Shaw Family
Archives owns the subject copyrights because of unidentified “representations and warranties” in
a licensing agreement with an entity called “ABG,” which Judge Drain relied upon in the
Chapter 11 proceeding. Claim 12 must be dismissed because it fails to allege sufficient detail to
place Defendants on notice of the basis of this claim. The Second Amended Complaint does not
19

excerpt or summarize the purported representations. It does not provide the factual context of
the agreement. It does not explain how the purported representations were relied upon in the
Chapter 11 proceeding. It is patently insufficient.
Presumably, the Estate is referring the following transaction: At one point in the Chapter
11 proceedings, the debtor sought leave to enter into an agreement with an entity called
MM-ABG to license photographs of Marilyn Monroe snapped by Sam. On March 14, 2012,
Judge Drain issued an order granting the debtor permission to enter into the licensing agreement.
Chapter 11 Docket No. 102. The “Exclusive Copyright License Agreement” provided:
As of the date of this Agreement, all of the Assets are owned by Sam Shaw Inc. and/or
[Shaw Family Archives.] [Shaw Family Archives] has the sole and exclusive right to
license the Assets throughout the Territory for the full term of the copyright and any
extension or renewal thereof whether now in existence or hereafter created, and [Shaw
Family Archives] has the sole and exclusive right to grant, transfer, deliver and set over
under MM-ABG all of the rights granted by [Shaw Family Archives] to MM-ABG
hereunder.

Exclusive Copyright License Agreement § 3.01(a), Chapter 11 Docket No. 67-1. By its express
terms, the agreement is consistent with Shaw Family Defendants’ position in the instant
litigation, so it cannot estop them. Therefore, even if the Estate had provided sufficient detail in
its pleadings, Claim 12 would still lack merit.
b)

The ownership issue is not subject to collateral estoppel.

Claim 20 must be dismissed. Claim 20 asserts that the Chapter 11 proceeding collaterally
estops Defendants from asserting that Sam Shaw Inc. owns any copyrights. The Court applies
the preclusion law of New York. Evans v. Ottimo, 469 F.3d 278, 281 (2d Cir. 2006). “Under
New York law, collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue when (1) the identical issue
necessarily was decided in the prior action and is decisive of the present action, and (2) the party
to be precluded from relitigating the issue had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in
the prior action.” Id. “[C]ollateral estoppel effect will only be given to matters actually litigated
20

and determined in a prior action,” because “[i]f an issue has not been litigated, there is no
identity of issues.” Id. at 282 (quoting Kaufman v. Eli Lilly & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 449, 456 (1985)).
Collateral estoppel does not apply here because the issue of copyright ownership was not
actually litigated or decided in the Chapter 11 action. In a December 5, 2013 hearing concerning
plan confirmation, the debtor’s and creditors’ counsel explained to Judge Drain that in
negotiating a proposed Chapter 11 plan, they could not agree on what assets were encumbered by
Tunick and Greenawalt’s liens. Tunick and Greenawalt’s position was that their liens
encumbered the entire Shaw Family Archives collection and all related rights, including
copyrights. Shaw Family Archives’ position was that the liens encumbered only the marketing
and commercialization rights that Shaw Family Archives obtained pursuant to the 2002
Settlement. Melissa Stevens, Shaw Family Archives’ operations manager (and Meta’s daughter),
addressed the court directly. Transcript of December 5, 2013 Hearing at 19-25, Chapter 11
Docket No. 232. Ms. Stevens, despite her duties as an officer of Shaw Family Archives, argued
that Shaw Family Archives never owned copyrights because the 2002 Settlement conveyed only
marketing and commercialization rights. She claimed that the copyrights at issue passed from
Sam Shaw by trust or will to Edie and Meta, who then transferred the copyrights to Sam Shaw
Inc. in 2008. Id. The court noted that if anyone should be raising this point, it should not be the
debtor (Shaw Family Archives), but the creditor Sam Shaw Inc., which had not raised this
objection. Id. at 20-21. “The debtor . . . should . . . want[] to have the copyrights as extensively
as possible in the debtor.” Id. at 21. Recognizing the brazen conflict of interest that Ms. Stevens
had just demonstrated, the court suggested to Tunick and Greenawalt’s counsel, “I think you
should move for a trustee . . . . And I also think you should amend the plan, because that would
be a faster way to get rid of management.” Id. at 24. As Judge Drain fittingly remarked: “I’m

21

appalled.” Id. at 25. Thereafter, Shaw Family Archives, Edie, Meta, and Sam Shaw Inc. entered
into a stipulation stating that Tunick and Greenawalt’s liens encumbered the Shaw Family
Archives collection and all related rights, including copyrights, “wherever located and in
whosoever [sic] hands they may be.” Stipulation, Chapter 11 Docket No. 237.
Although this Court joins in Judge Drain’s sentiment, the issue of copyright ownership
was never litigated or decided in the Chapter 11 action. Shaw Family Archives did not claim
copyright ownership. Shaw Family Archives merely asserted that it owned marketing and
commercialization rights pursuant to the 2002 Settlement. See Amended Schedule B at 3,
Chapter 11 Docket No. 65. Therefore, no third party had the need or opportunity to contest
ownership. The December 5 hearing did not force the issue because the subsequent stipulation
mooted any potential dispute over the copyrights as between Shaw Family Archives and Sam
Shaw Inc. Therefore, the order confirming the Chapter 11 plan did not decide the issue of
copyright ownership in Shaw Family Archives’ favor.
The Estate also argues that Sam Shaw Inc.’s withdrawal of claims in the Chapter 11
action operates as res judicata or collateral estoppel as to the copyright ownership issue. Sam
Shaw Inc. was listed as a creditor in the amount of $21,000 on Shaw Family Archives’
schedules, but never filed a proof of claim. Fourth Amended Consolidated Chapter 11 Plan and
Disclosure Statement at 36, Chapter 11 Docket No. 246. Sam Shaw Inc. withdrew any claims
that it had against Shaw Family Archives prior to plan confirmation. Id.; Chapter 11 Docket No.
238. But the Estate is incorrect in its assertion that this withdrawal constitutes a concession on
the issue of copyright ownership. Shaw Family Archives did not claim copyright ownership, so
Sam Shaw Inc. had no opportunity to litigate the issue (if it had attempted to file a claim, motion,

22

or adversary proceeding claiming copyright ownership, it would have been moot). At best, Sam
Shaw Inc.’s withdrawal constitutes a waiver of royalties. Claim 20 must be dismissed.
B.

Claims Concerning the 2008 Assignment

The Estate also seeks a judgment invalidating the 2008 Assignment because Edie and
Meta allegedly had no bona fide claim to the copyrights they attempted to convey. The Estate
advances two theories: (1) that Edie and Meta had no copyrights because Shaw Family Archives
owned the copyrights and (2) that Edie and Meta had no copyrights because the 1998 Trust,
which purported to convey copyrights from Sam to Edie and Meta, was invalid as a fraudulent
conveyance (Claims 8 and 19).
The Estate’s fraudulent conveyance theory with respect to the 1998 Trust is barred by the
statute of limitations. A fraudulent conveyance claim must be commenced either within six
years from the date of the fraud or within two years after the plaintiff discovered the fraud or
could, with reasonable diligence, have discovered the fraud. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 213(8). The date of
the alleged fraud is the trust’s execution date (in 1998), because the 1998 Trust was allegedly
fraudulent from its inception. This action was filed well beyond six years after that date.
Therefore, the claim is timely only if it was filed within two years after the Estate could, with
reasonable diligence, have discovered the fraud. In 2008, Edie and Meta registered the 1998
Trust with the Copyright Office. (See Marcus Decl. Ex. 5, ECF No. 74-17.) A registration with
the Copyright Office gives “all persons constructive notice of the facts stated in the recorded
document.” See Mahan v. Roc Nation, LLC, No. 14 CIV. 5075 LGS, 2015 WL 1782095, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2015). Therefore, the Estate was on constructive notice of the existence of
the 1998 Trust, and therefore the fraud, in 2008 as a matter of law. This action was filed more
than two years later. Claim 19 must be dismissed and claim 8 must be dismissed to the extent
that it relies on the purported invalidity of the 1998 Trust.
23

However, because the Court has found, supra, that it is plausible that the 2002 Settlement
transferred copyrights to Shaw Family Archives, it is plausible as a corollary that the 2008
assignment was invalid. Therefore, Claim 8 survives to the extent that it relies on the effect of
the 2002 Settlement.
II.

Corporate Governance Claims
A.

Board Composition and Management Salary Claims

Claims 2, 3, 6 and 7 are board composition and management salary claims. Claim 2 asks
for an order installing an independent board member, on a theory of specific performance of the
2002 Settlement. Claim 3 asks for an order declaring that the board is not validly constituted per
the 2002 Settlement and invalidating its actions nunc pro tunc. Claim 6 asks for disgorgement of
salaries paid to Edie and Meta on the theory that Edie and Meta fraudulently paid themselves
salaries to make up for profit distributions that they would have received had they not conveyed
a portion of their shares to their children. Claim 7 asks for injunctive relief equitably
restructuring the board to comport with the 2002 Settlement.
Shaw Family Defendants argue that these claims are barred by res judicata because of
orders issued by the Bankruptcy Court in the Chapter 11 proceeding. However, the confirmed
Chapter 11 plan provides:
The estate of Larry Shaw, deceased and [sic] Susan Shaw have contended that they have
claims and potential actions or causes of action against the Shaw Sisters and other
shareholders, officers or directors of SFA, based on various grounds, including, inter
alia, waste, mismanagement, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty and/or misfeasance in
the management of SFA and its business. The estate of Larry Shaw, deceased [sic] and
Susan Shaw shall retain and may assert any and all causes of action they may have based
on the foregoing on and after the Effective Date of the Plan, including but not limited to a
shareholder’s derivative action, against the Shaw Sisters or other shareholders, officers or
directors of SFA.

(Chapter 11 Plan, at 63.) Confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan is a final judgment on the merits
with preclusive effect. Sure-Snap Corp. v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 948 F.2d 869 (2d Cir.
24

1991). A reservation of rights included in a Chapter 11 plan that is specific and unequivocal
preserves claims that would otherwise be barred by res judicata. See In re Futter Lumber Corp.,
473 B.R. 20, 31 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (explaining the various approaches followed by different courts
to have addressed this question). The Court finds that the reservation of rights meets the
requisite level of specificity to cover claims 2, 3, 6, and 7. 15 Shaw Family Defendants do not
address the reservation of rights except to assert, without citation to any case law, that the
Estate’s reservation of rights gave the Estate the right to bring derivative claims, but not claims
that might conflict with an order of the bankruptcy court. Shaw Family Defendants provide no
basis in law or in the language of the plan for such an interpretation. Although this Court
strongly disfavors duplicative litigation, Defendants could easily have prevented this. If
Defendants expected that the confirmation of the Chapter 11 plan would bar the Estate from
bringing these claims, they should have objected to the Estate’s reservation of rights. Defendants
did not object at the time and they cannot do so now.
B.

Waste/Mismanagement and Fiduciary Duty Claims

Claims 9 and 15 seek damages for waste and breach of fiduciary duty resulting from Edie
and Meta’s decision to decline to pay Tunick’s fees and to expend Shaw Family Archives’ funds
contesting Greenawalt’s fees. “The essence of a claim of . . . waste is the diversion of corporate
assets for improper or unnecessary purposes.” Aronoff v. Albanese, 446 N.Y.S.2d 368, 370
(App. Div. 1982). To prove corporate waste under New York law, a claimant must “demonstrate
that no person of ordinary sound business judgment would say that the corporation received fair
benefit.” Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 279 n.9 (2d Cir. 1986).
“[U]nder the New York business judgment rule, the actions of corporate directors are subject to
judicial review only upon a showing of fraud or bad faith.” Stern v. Gen. Elec. Co., 924 F.2d
15

The effect of this reservation on claims asserted against Adelman is treated separately, infra.

25

472, 476 (2d Cir. 1991). “[A]llegations of ‘waste,’ standing alone, will not be enough.” Id. The
business judgment rule does not apply when directors or officers have an interest in a decision.
In re Croton River Club, Inc., 52 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 1995). “Directors are self-interested in a
challenged transaction where they will receive a direct financial benefit from the transaction
which is different from the benefit to shareholders generally.” Marx v. Akers, 88 N.Y.2d 189,
202 (1996).
Here, the business judgment rule requires dismissal of the Estate’s claims. The Estate
alleges that Edie and Meta caused Shaw Family Archives to decline to pay Tunick’s fees and to
spend Shaw Family Archives’ funds frivolously contesting Greenawalt’s fees. This may have
been ill-advised, but that is not enough to state a claim absent allegations of fraud or bad faith.
The Estate attempts to meet this standard by summarily alleging that Edie and Meta sought to
destroy or convert the Estate’s equity in Shaw Family Archives. But the logical link between the
fees litigation and the destruction of the Estate’s equity is simply not apparent. It is unclear how
running up attorneys’ fees could have harmed the Estate’s equity without also harming Edie and
Meta’s equity pro rata. The Second Amended Complaint does not make clear how these actions
were meant to inure to Edie and Meta’s benefit in a way that was “different from the benefit to
shareholders generally.” Claims 9 and 15 are dismissed.
III.

Aiding and Abetting
The Estate asserts aiding and abetting claims against David Marcus, Melissa Stevens, and

Gary Adelman. “Viable claims for the recovery of damages for the aiding and abetting of any
tort rest upon allegations of fact constituting the elements of the existence of the underlying tort,
knowledge thereof by the aider and abettor, and substantial assistance by the aider and abettor in
the achievement of the tortious act.” Hudson v. Delta Kew Holding Corp., 43 Misc. 3d 1223(A)
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014).
26

A.

David Marcus

The Estate has alleged substantial assistance by David Marcus. Specifically, the Estate
claims that David Marcus drafted the Complaint, and amendments thereto, in the CMG/MMLLC
action, which falsely alleged that Edie and Meta owned the subject copyrights. (Second Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 198-205.) The Estate alleges that David Marcus knowingly did this to manufacture a
judicial record furthering Edie and Meta’s scheme to divert copyrights from Shaw Family
Archives to Edie and Meta. (Id.) Shaw Family Defendants relied upon that Complaint in the
instant motion as the basis for their argument that judicial estoppel should bar the Estate from
claiming that Shaw Family Archives owns the subject copyrights. See supra Part I.A.1.a. This
is enough, at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, to permit claims to proceed against David Marcus.
B.

Melissa Stevens

The Estate has also alleged substantial assistance by Melissa Stevens. Specifically, the
Second Amended Complaint alleges that Melissa Stevens appeared before the Bankruptcy Court
in the Chapter 11 action and advocated for the proposition that Shaw Family Archives did not
own the copyrights at issue, knowing this to be untrue. (Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 249-64.)
Stevens allegedly sought to further Edie and Meta’s scheme to divest Shaw Family Archives of
copyright ownership. This is enough, at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, to permit claims to proceed
against Melissa Stevens.
C.

Gary Adelman

All of the claims asserted against Defendant Gary Adelman must be dismissed based on
claim preclusion. To determine whether claim preclusion bars a subsequent action, the Court
must consider whether: “1) the prior decision was a final judgment on the merits, 2) the litigants
were the same parties, 3) the prior court was of competent jurisdiction, and 4) the causes of
action were the same.” Corbett v. MacDonald Moving Servs., Inc., 124 F.3d 82, 87-88 (2d Cir.
27

1997). In the Second Circuit, the Court must also consider “whether an independent judgment in
a separate proceeding would ‘impair, destroy, challenge, or invalidate, the enforceability or
effectiveness’ of the reorganization plan.” Id. at 88 (quoting Sure-Snap Corp. v. State St. Bank
& Trust Co., 948 F.2d 869, 875-76 (2d Cir. 1991)). “This last inquiry may also be viewed as an
aspect of the test for identity of the causes of action.” Id.
An order confirming a Chapter 11 plan is a final judgment on the merits with preclusive
effect. In re Layo, 460 F.3d 289, 294 (2d Cir. 2006). The Estate and Adelman were both
participants (whether or not they were named parties) in the Chapter 11 action. Farahzad v.
Lawyers Title Ins. Co., No. 10-CV-6010 JS AKT, 2012 WL 4344325, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 21,
2012). Also, the Estate does not contest the Bankruptcy Court’s jurisdiction.
The causes of action here are the same. “Claims are identical for the purposes of the
Court’s res judicata analysis if they ‘could have or should have [been] raised before
confirmation of a bankruptcy plan.’” Farahzad, 2012 WL 4344325, at *4. The core factual
allegations occurred before the filing of the Chapter 11 petition. The subject copyrights were, by
the Estate’s own admission, Shaw Family Archives’ most valuable asset. It is likely that the
reorganization plan would have differed depending on (1) whether Shaw Family Archives owned
the subject copyrights, (2) whether or not Shaw Family Archives had any obligation to pay
royalties for its use or licensing of copies of the photographs, and (3) whether the debtor’s
present management had a conflict of interest with creditors and shareholders. Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, the Estate did, in fact, bring these claims in the Chapter 11 action.
The Estate filed four claims: Claim 8 for “fraud re attorney lien” in the amount of $2 million,
Claim 9 for “shareholder derivative” in the amount of $2 million, Claim 10 for “shareholder
distributions” in the amount of $800 thousand, and Claim 18 for “breach of fiduciary duty” in the

28

amount of $1 million. See Claims Register, Chapter 11 Docket. According to the Declaration of
Susan Shaw attached to the proofs of those claims, the Estate’s claims in the Chapter 11 action
share a common nucleus of operative fact with the Estate’s instant claims. See id.
The only question that remains is whether the Estate’s reservation of rights in the
confirmed Chapter 11 plan preserves the claims against Adelman. Any “such preservation must
be specific and unequivocal.” In re Futter Lumber Corp., 473 B.R. 20, 30 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). The
Estate’s reservation of rights is specific and unequivocal, but is expressly limited to claims
“against the Shaw Sisters or other shareholders, officers or directors of SFA.” Fourth Amended
Consolidated Chapter 11 Plan and Disclosure Statement at 63, Chapter 11 Docket No. 246. It
does not cover claims asserted against Adelman. Accordingly, Adelman’s motion, construed as
a motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint must be granted and all claims against
Adelman must be dismissed.
IV.

Rule 11 Motion
Shaw Family Defendants’ Rule 11 Motion is denied. Rule 11(b) provides:
By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper--whether by signing,
filing, submitting, or later advocating it--an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that
to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances: (1) it is not being presented for any improper
purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of
litigation; (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing
law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or
for establishing new law; (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if
specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and (4) the denials of factual
contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably
based on belief or a lack of information.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). For purposes of Rule 11, an argument constitutes a frivolous legal position
if, under an “objective standard of reasonableness,” it is “clear . . . that there is no chance of
success and no reasonable argument to extend, modify or reverse the law as it stands.” May Ship
Repair Contracting Corp. v. Barge Columbia New York, 160 F. Supp. 2d 594, 600 (S.D.N.Y.
29

2001). If the Court finds that an attorney has violated Rule 11(b), it “may impose an appropriate
sanction.” Id. 11(c). Sanctions are discretionary.
Shaw Family Defendants assert that the Estate’s claims and arguments are so frivolous
that sanctions are warranted. This Opinion and Order makes clear that the Estate’s claims and
arguments are not so frivolous as to warrant sanctions; indeed, many of the Estate’s claims have
survived Shaw Family Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
Shaw Family Defendants’ Rule 11 Motion also claims that the Estate has made additional
miscellaneous “misrepresentations” to the Court. But Shaw Family Defendants either omit
important context that temper the Estate’s statements, or simply disagree with the Estate about
the import of certain facts. Although the Estate may have engaged in hyperbole or rhetoric,
which is unwelcome, the Court declines to impose sanctions at this time.
CONCLUSION 16
For the foregoing reasons, Adelman’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED in its entirety and
all claims asserted in the Second Amended Complaint against Adelman are DISMISSED. Shaw
Family Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED with respect to claims 9, 12, 15, 19, and 21
and that much of claim 8 that relies on the theory that the 1998 Trust is invalid; the motion is
DENIED in all other respects. Shaw Family Defendants’ motion for Rule 11 sanctions is
DENIED in its entirety. The Court respectfully directs the Clerk to terminate Adelman as a
Defendant in this action, to amend the caption to reflect his removal, and to terminate the
motions at ECF Nos. 50, 71, and 75.

16

The Court has considered the parties’ remaining arguments and finds them unpersuasive.

30

Dated:

d

Septembe1, o2~ 2015
White Plains, New York

SO ORDERED:

United States District Judge

31