Mutinsky v. Town of Clarkstown, a public municipal corporation of The State of New York et al

Filing 42

OPINION & ORDER: For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's objections are OVERRULED and Judge Davison's rulings are AFFIRMED. The parties are directed to appear at an in-person status conference before the undersigned on January 7, 2016 at 12:00 p.m. The previously scheduled status conference on December 21, 2015 at 10:00 a.m. is canceled. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Nelson Stephen Roman on 12/16/2015) (mml)

USDC SDNY
DOCUMENT
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

DOC II:

D \TE Ill.ED:

I

/rt) I <,,fdt>1S-

JAMES A. MUTINSKY,
Plaintiff,
-againstTOWN OF CLARKSTOWN, a public municipal
corporation of the State ofNew York, POLICE
OFFICER TARA PURCELL, POLICE OFFICER
JOHN MULLINS, and JOHN/JANE DOES 1-15,
being presently unknown persons who were Town of
Clarkstown police officers, law enforcement
personnel, or Town officials in their individual
capacities; jointly and severally,

No, 14-cv-7803 (NSR) (PED)
OPINION & ORDER

Defendants.

NELSONS. ROMAN, United States District Judge
Plaintiff James Mutinksy brings this action against Defendants alleging violations of state
and federal law arising out of his arrest on June 28, 2013, during which Plaintiff was subdued by
a Conducted Electrical Weapon ("CEW"), commonly referred to as a Taser. Before the Court
are Plaintiffs objections to ce1tain of Magistrate Judge Paul E. Davison's discovery rulings in
this action.
On September 11, 2015, Judge Davison orally denied Plaintiffs application to compel
production of: (1) certain training materials related to instructor certification, and (2) Response to
Resistance Reports from 2008 through 2013 for the display and discharge of CEWs or Tasers.
Judge Davison nevertheless ordered Defendants to produce training materials related to the use
of aerosols as well as Response to Resistance Reports for the three years prior to the incident at
issue in this action. By Declaration dated September 25, 2015, Plaintiff objects to Judge
Davison's rulings, arguing that he should have granted all of Plaintiffs disputed discovery

requests. (Objections by Declaration of Plaintiff’s Counsel to Magistrate’s Discovery Order
Dated September 11, 2015 Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 (“Decl.”), Docket No. 35.)
For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s objections are OVERRULED and Judge Davison’s
rulings are AFFIRMED.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A district judge must modify or vacate a nondispositive order of a magistrate judge to the
extent that it is “clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” 28 U.S.C. § 636; Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; see
Fielding v. Tollaksen, 510 F.3d 175, 178 (2d Cir. 2007). “Under this highly deferential standard
of review, magistrates are afforded broad discretion in resolving [non-dispositive] disputes and
reversal is appropriate only if their discretion is abused.” AMBAC Fin. Servs., LLC v. Bay Area
Toll Auth., No. 09 CIV.7062 RJH, 2010 WL 4892678, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2010) (quoting
Margrabe v. Sexter Warmflash, P.C., No. 07-cv-2798 (KMK)(GAY), 2009 WL 361830, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)). “Matters concerning discovery
generally are considered ‘nondispositive’ of the litigation.” Thomas E. Hoar, Inc. v. Sara Lee
Corp., 900 F.2d 522, 525 (2d Cir. 1990) (internal citations omitted). An order is “clearly
erroneous” if the reviewing court is “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed.” Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 242 (2001). “An order is contrary to law
when it fails to apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law or rules of procedure.” Thompson
v. Keane, No. 95 Civ. 2442 (SHS), 1996 WL 229887, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 1996) (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted).
DISCUSSION
I.

The Training Materials Rulings
Plaintiff sought to compel Defendants to produce certain training materials, including a

“defensive packets manual,” “written materials for [aerosol] instruction training,” and “reality2

based training” materials. (Transcript of September 11, 2015 Discovery Conference (“Tr.”),
Docket No. 40, at 3:5-7.) Plaintiff argued that the materials were relevant to the officers’
training and the options available to them when using force, and even if not admissible, were
reasonably calculated to lead to relevant evidence. (Id., at 3:13-4:1.) Plaintiff further argued that
the materials were directly relevant to his Monell claim, which alleges that the Town failed to
properly train its officers. (Id., at 4:2-11.) In response, Defendants argued that the defensive
tactics training materials and reality based training materials were instructor’s materials only
provided to Sergeant Chernick, the Clarkstown Police Department’s training officer, and were
never provided to the defendant officers. (Id., at 6:11-8:3.) The aerosol training materials,
however, were included in a PowerPoint presentation shown to the defendant officers. (Id., at
8:24-9:4.)
After hearing these arguments, Judge Davison ruled that: (1) the aerosol training
materials must be produced because they were part of the training the defendant officers
received, and (2) the defensive tactics training materials and reality based training materials did
not need to be produced because they were never disseminated to the defendant officers. (Id., at
13:7-20.)
Plaintiff’s objections to Judge Davison’s rulings consist of only three fairly conclusory
paragraphs. Plaintiff argues that his request for these training materials is “clearly calculated to
lead to relevant evidence under Rule 26 [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] regarding the
officers’ training prior to confronting the Plaintiff.” (Decl. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff continues that
Defendants asserted “no valid reason . . . not to produce the material” and that Judge Davison’s
rulings were “clearly erroneous and contrary to law.” (Id. ¶¶ 4, 6.)

3

Despite Plaintiff’s contentions to the contrary, Plaintiff fails to adequately explain why
these training materials are clearly calculated to lead to relevant evidence; fails to assert in any
more than conclusory terms why Judge Davison’s rulings were clearly erroneous; and except for
citing to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, provides the Court with no contrary law upon
which it could overturn Judge Davison’s rulings. Without so much as a single citation to
relevant precedent or an adequate explanation of why Judge Davison’s rulings were clearly
erroneous, Plaintiff fails to meet his burden to overturn the rulings.
Even analyzing Plaintiff’s arguments under the broad parameters of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(b)(1), which permits parties to “obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged
matter that is relevant to any party’s claim,” it is clear that Judge Davison found, following
consideration of the parties’ arguments, that the instructor’s training materials provided to
Sergeant Chernick, a non-party to the action, were not relevant to Plaintiff’s claims. In light of
the broad discretion given to magistrate judges to resolve non-dispositive disputes, the Court
cannot conclude that Judge Davison abused his discretion. AMBAC Fin. Servs., LLC, 2010 WL
4892678, at *2.
II.

The Response To Resistance Reports Ruling
Plaintiff also sought to compel the production of Response to Resistance Reports from

2008 through 2013. The reports contained information related to the “display and discharge” of
Tasers by the Clarkstown Police Department. (See Tr. 13:24-14:1.) Plaintiff argued that the
documents were relevant to determining whether there was a pattern, policy, or practice of Taser
use by the Clarkstown Police Department in support of his Monell claim. (Id., at 14:3-6; Decl. ¶
7.) Judge Davison agreed that the reports were relevant, but limited disclosure to the three years
prior to the date of the incident. (Id., at 27:7-9.)

4

Plaintiff now argues that disclosure of all five years of reports is required because "a fiveyear period is the ve1y minimum," (Deel.

iJ 7) (emphasis in original), period of time needed to

determine whether a pattern or practice existed with regard to Taser use. Plaintiff does not cite
to any statute or decision in supp01t of this contention.
Plaintiff fails once again to explain why Judge Davison's ruling was clearly erroneous or
contrary to law. In any event, it is well-settled that a comt may limit discovery under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26 ifthe burden of discovery outweighs its benefit. Garcia v. Berifamin
Grp. Enter. Inc., 800 F. Supp. 2d 399, 403-404 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). A review of the record

indicates that Judge Davison limited the scope of discovery specifically due to the burden it
would impose on Defendants to locate and produce five years ofreports. (Tr. 25:21-27:9.)
Accordingly, the Comt finds that Judge Davison's ruling was not clearly erroneous or
contrary to law, and Plaintiffs objection is overruled.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs objections are OVERRULED and Judge Davison's
rulings are AFFIRMED. The parties are directed to appear at an in-person status conference
before the undersigned on January 7, 2016 at 12:00 p.m. The previously scheduled status
conference on December 21, 2015 at 10:00 a.m. is canceled.

Dated:

December~' 2015
White Plains, New York

5