Stovall v. N.Y.S. Dept. of Comm. Supervision et al
Filing
28
OPINION & ORDER re: 19 FIRST MOTION to Dismiss the complaint under FRCP 12(b)(6), filed by Joyce Cruse, C. Wilkins. Defendants' Motion To Dismiss is granted, and the Complaint is dismissed. Because Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, h as yet to file an amended complaint, the Complaint will be dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff is given 45 days to submit an Amended Complaint addressing the deficiencies outlined above. If Plaintiff fails to submit an Amended Complaint within the allotted time, the Action may be dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk of Court is respectfully requested to terminate the pending Motion. (Dkt. No. 19.) SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Kenneth M. Karas on 9/29/16) (yv)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
JYWAN STOVALL,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 15-CV-2163 (KMK)
-vOPINION & ORDER
S.P.O. C. WILKINS and PAROLE
OFFICER JOYCE CRUSE,
Defendants.
Appearances:
Jywan Stovall
Peekskill, NY
Pro Se Plaintiff
Kruti D. Dharia, Esq.
Yan Fu, Esq.
State of New York Office of the Attorney General
New York, NY
Counsel for Defendants
KENNETH M. KARAS, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Jywan Stovall (“Plaintiff”), brings this pro se Action, pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983, against S.P.O. C. Wilkins (“Wilkins”) and Parole Officer Joyce Cruse (“Cruse”)
(collectively, “Defendants”), alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights when
Plaintiff injured himself en route to a mandatory parole meeting. (Dkt. No. 2.) Before the Court
is Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) (the “Motion”). (Dkt. No. 19.) For the following reasons, Defendants’ Motion is
granted.
I. Background
A. Factual Background
The following facts are drawn from Plaintiff’s Complaint and are assumed to be true for
purposes of resolving Defendants’ Motion.
On January 8, 2014, Plaintiff, a parolee, was in a car accident which resulted in a
compound fracture of his right ankle. (Compl. 4 (Dkt. No. 2).)1 After undergoing surgery at
Westchester Medical Center, which left him “with three screws to keep [his] heel bone in place
along a[n] open wound,” he was eventually released “with sp[e]cific instructions . . . to keep the
injured leg elevated until further notice.” (Id.) Plaintiff had two follow-up appointments at
which doctors once again instructed him not to apply pressure to his leg. (Id.) At the second of
the two appointments, Plaintiff’s ankle was put in a hard cast and he was told to “remain on bed
rest.” (Id.)
On March 3, 2014, Plaintiff obtained a doctor’s note excusing him from work and any
outdoor travel and “stating that [he] was in no condition to trav[el].” (Id. at 3, 4.) That same
day, Plaintiff faxed the note to Defendants. (Id. at 4.) Because he was scheduled “to make an
office report to parole” the following day, Plaintiff called the parole office to ensure that the fax
was received. (Id.) He was told by Wilkins that the fax was received but that “she was not going
to excuse [Plaintiff] from reporting and [that] if [Plaintiff] did not show[,] . . . it would [result] in
a violation of [his] parole and [Plaintiff] would be returned to a correctional facility.” (Id.)
Plaintiff tried to explain the contents of the doctor’s note to Wilkins and “how much pain he was
in and that traveling via public transportation in his condition as well as the conditions of the
1
Citations to Plaintiff’s Complaint refer to the ECF-generated page numbers on the top
of each page.
2
weather at the time were very haz[a]rdous to his health.” (Id.) Despite Plaintiff’s protestations,
Wilkins “made it clear that if [Plaintiff] failed to report to that office [then his] freedom would be
taken away.” (Id. at 5.)
At the time, Plaintiff was living in White Plains and the parole meeting was in New
Rochelle. (Id. at 4.) Because Plaintiff had no driver’s license (nor did he own a car), he had to
“resort to public transportation (train and bus) to make it to . . . New Rochelle . . . from . . . White
Plains.” (Id. at 5.) During his travels, Plaintiff “fell numerous times[,] sustaining minor cuts and
scrapes and landing on and breaking the hard cast causing [severe] pain to the right ankle as well
as the wo[u]nd that was not even halfway heal[e]d at the time.” (Id.) Plaintiff continues to have
“lots of pain and the wound is still not fully heal[e]d.” (Id.)
B. Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed the Complaint against Wilkins, Cruse, and the New York State Department
of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”), on March 19, 2015. (Dkt. No. 2.) On
April 24, 2015, the Court issued an Order instructing Plaintiff to show cause as to why his claims
against DOCCS should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the
Eleventh Amendment. (See Dkt. No. 10.) After Plaintiff failed to respond, the Court dismissed
Plaintiff’s claims against DOCCS on June 2, 2015, finding that the claims were barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. (See Dkt. No. 11.) Pursuant to a briefing scheduled ordered by the Court
(see Dkt. No. 18), Defendants filed their Motion and accompanying papers on October 8, 2015,
(see Dkt. Nos. 19–21). Although he sought, and was granted, an extension of time to file his
opposition papers, (see Dkt. No. 22), Plaintiff failed to submit any opposition. On January 26,
2016, the Court issued an Order providing Plaintiff an additional 30 days to respond to the
Motion and warning Plaintiff that if he failed to respond within the allotted time, the Court
3
would deem the Motion fully submitted and would rule based on the existing papers. (See Dkt.
No. 27.)2 Plaintiff never filed any opposition papers.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed
factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief
requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration,
citations, and internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked
assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (alteration and internal quotation marks
omitted). Instead, a complaint’s “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Although “once a claim has been stated
adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the
complaint,” id. at 563, and a plaintiff must allege “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face,” id. at 570, if a plaintiff has not “nudged [his or her] claim[] across the
line from conceivable to plausible, the[] complaint must be dismissed,” id.; see also Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 679 (“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the
2
This was the second such Order issued by the Court. (See Dkt. No. 25.)
4
pleader is entitled to relief.’” (citation omitted) (second alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2))); id. at 678–79 (“Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hypertechnical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a
plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.”).
“[W]hen ruling on a defendant’s motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the
factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per
curiam); see also Nielsen v. Rabin, 746 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 2014) (“In addressing the sufficiency
of a complaint we accept as true all factual allegations . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted));
Aegis Ins. Servs., Inc. v. 7 World Trade Co., 737 F.3d 166, 176 (2d Cir. 2013) (“In reviewing a
dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), we . . . accept all factual allegations in the complaint as
true . . . .” (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)). Further, “[f]or the purpose of
resolving [a] motion to dismiss, the [c]ourt . . . draw[s] all reasonable inferences in favor of the
plaintiff.” Daniel v. T&M Prot. Res., Inc., 992 F. Supp. 2d 302, 304 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing
Koch v. Christie’s Int’l PLC, 699 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 2012)).
Lastly, because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court must construe his pleadings
liberally and “interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Maisonet v.
Metro. Hosp. & Health Hosp. Corp., 640 F. Supp. 2d 345, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d
Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (same). This admonition “applies with particular force when a plaintiff’s
civil rights are at issue.” Maisonet, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 348; see also McEachin v. McGuinnis,
357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2004) (same). However, the liberal treatment afforded to pro se
litigants does not excuse a pro se party “from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and
substantive law.” Maisonet, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 348 (internal quotation marks omitted).
5
B. Analysis
1. Due Process
Because Plaintiff was a parolee at the time of the alleged constitutional violation, his
claim is appropriately analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, not the
Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Ciccone v. Ryan, No. 14-CV-1325, 2015 WL 4739981, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2015) (noting that the claims brought by the plaintiff, who was “on parole, not
incarcerated or institutionalized,” when the claims arose, were “appropriately analyzed under the
Fourteenth Amendment, not the Eighth”); Rodriguez v. Rivera, No. 12-CV-5823, 2013 WL
5544122, at *4 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2013) (“Because [the] plaintiff is not a convicted
prisoner, her deliberate indifference claim may only be brought under the Due Process Clause
and not the Eighth Amendment.”). Generally, however, the Due Process Clause “confer[s] no
affirmative right to government aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty,
or property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual.” DeShaney
v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989); see also Matican v. City of
N.Y., 524 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 2008) (same).
One exception to this general rule exists when there is a special relationship between the
state and a plaintiff. See Matican, 524 F.3d at 155; Ciccone, 2015 WL 4739981, at *4. The
Second Circuit has explained that some form of “involuntary custody” is the “linchpin of any
special relationship exception.” Matican, 524 F.3d at 156. Specifically, “when the State takes a
person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a
corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-being.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). Such a duty “arises solely from ‘the State’s affirmative act of
restraining the individual’s freedom to act on his own behalf through incarceration,
6
institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty.’” Id. (alteration omitted)
(quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200); see also DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200 (explaining that the
“affirmative duty to protect arises . . . from the limitation which [the state] has imposed on [the
individual’s] freedom to act on his own behalf”).
As a parolee required to report for certain meetings, Plaintiff’s “freedom to act on his
own behalf,” Matican, 524 F.3d at 156 (internal quotation marks omitted), was not limitless.
Indeed, the Second Circuit has recognized that “[a] parolee, although not in the state’s physical
custody, is nonetheless in its legal custody, and his or her freedom of movement, while not as
restricted as that of an incarcerated prisoner, is nonetheless somewhat curtailed.” Jacobs v.
Ramirez, 400 F.3d 105, 106 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam); see also Gibson v. Wood, 563 F. Supp.
2d 341, 347 (D. Conn. 2008) (same). In a case analogous to this one, a district court in the
Second Circuit found that a parolee and his parole officer shared a “special relationship” to the
extent that the parole officer required that the parolee report to a meeting despite the parolee’s
concerns for his safety. See Gibson, 563 F. Supp. 2d at 347. Likewise, given his status as a
parolee required to report to certain meetings, Plaintiff can be said to have a “special
relationship” with the state, giving rise to at least some duties on behalf of the state to protect
Plaintiff. See Ciccone, 2015 WL 4739981, at *5 (“Under Jacobs, . . . [the plaintiff] and [the
defendant, his parole officer,] clearly had the kind of ‘special relationship’ which could subject
[the defendant] to liability notwithstanding the general rule of DeShaney.”); Gibson, 563 F.
Supp. 2d at 347 (same); cf. George v. Rockland State Psychiatric Ctr., No. 10-CV-8091, 2014
WL 5410059, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2014) (finding that a special relationship did not exist
between parolee and state where parolee “was free to find his own medical treatment and there
[was] no evidence that he was required to receive treatment [at a] specific[] [hospital]”).
7
However, “[b]ecause the limitations imposed by the state are minimal, so too are the
duties it assumes.” Jacobs, 400 F.3d at 107; see also Ciccone, 2015 WL 4739981, at *5 (same);
Rodriguez, 2013 WL 5544122, at *7 (noting that “whether and to what extent the State has
assumed a duty of care under the special relationship exception turns on whether and to what
extent the State has affirmatively acted to restrain an individual’s freedom to act on her own
behalf”). Here, the limitations imposed were extremely minimal: Plaintiff was merely required
to report to a certain location at a certain time. (See Compl. 4.) While Plaintiff allegedly
expressed concern about using public transportation to travel to the meeting given his condition,
there are no allegations that Defendants required him to use such transportation. (Id.) The Court
is skeptical that such a minimal limitation—the need to report—could give rise to a duty as
substantial as one that requires parole officers to ensure safe transit for parolees, and Plaintiff has
offered no legal authority suggesting such a duty.
However, even assuming Defendants had a “special relationship” with Plaintiff, and that
Defendants violated an attendant duty owed to Plaintiff by requiring him to travel to his meeting
despite his injuries, Defendants can be held liable only if their “behavior was ‘so egregious, so
outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.’” Matican, 524
F.3d at 155 (quoting Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848 n.8 (1998)); see also
Ciccone, 2015 WL 4739981, at *6 (same); Gibson, 563 F. Supp. 2d at 347 (noting that a parole
officer “could be liable for [the parolee’s] injuries if his requirement that [the parolee] report to
see him despite [the parolee’s] concerns for his safety shock[s] the conscience” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). To be actionable, the conduct “must be truly ‘brutal and offensive to
human dignity.’” Lombardi v. Whitman, 485 F.3d 73, 81 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Smith v. Half
Hollow Hills Cent. Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 168, 173 (2d Cir. 2002)). Such a requirement “screens
8
out all but the most significant constitutional violations.” Matican, 524 F.3d at 155. To guide
courts as to what conduct may be conscience-shocking, the Supreme Court has explained that
“negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due process,”
while “conduct intended to injure in some way[,] unjustifiable by any government interest[,] is
the sort of official action most likely to rise to the conscience-shocking level.” Lewis, 523 U.S.
at 849; see also Lombardi, 485 F.3d at 82 (same); Ciccone, 2015 WL 4739981, at *6 (same).
And falling somewhere between these two poles is “deliberate indifference,” which can support a
substantive due process claim, but with a “potent” qualification:
Deliberate indifference that shocks in one environment may not be so patently
egregious in another, and our concern with preserving the constitutional
proportions of substantive due process demands an exact analysis of circumstances
before any abuse of power is condemned as conscience-shocking.
Lombardi, 485 F.3d at 82 (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 850).
Plaintiff alleges that he faxed to Defendants a doctor’s note stating that he was in no
condition to travel due to a broken ankle he had suffered and for which he remained in a hard
cast. (Compl. 4.) According to the Complaint, Wilkins confirmed that the fax was received and
Plaintiff further explained to Wilkins over the phone that he was in pain and that traveling to the
meeting via public transportation was hazardous to his health. (Id.) Despite this, Wilkins made
clear to Plaintiff that if he failed to report, it would be a violation of his parole and Plaintiff
“would be returned to a correctional facility.” (Id.) In his efforts to travel to the meeting,
Plaintiff fell numerous times, causing severe pain that lasts to this day. (Id. at 5.)
Nothing alleged in the Complaint shocks the contemporary conscience, or is brutal or
offensive to human dignity. The Complaint does not suggest that Defendants intended that
Plaintiff suffer additional injuries by requiring him to report to his pre-scheduled parole meeting.
Nor does the Complaint allege that Defendants required Plaintiff to use a particularly dangerous
9
form of transportation. The Complaint merely alleges that Defendants required a parolee with a
hard cast on his foot to attend a parole meeting roughly 10 miles away from his home. This is
not offensive to human dignity. See Ferran v. Town of Nassau, 471 F.3d 363, 369–70 (2d Cir.
2006) (“To establish a substantive due process violation, [a plaintiff] must show that the
[defendant’s] alleged acts . . . were ‘arbitrary,’ ‘conscience-shocking,’ or ‘oppressive in the
constitutional sense,’ not merely ‘incorrect or ill-advised.’” (quoting Lowrance v. C.O. S. Achtyl,
20 F.3d 529, 537 (2d Cir. 1994))); cf. Pena v. DePrisco, 432 F.3d 98, 114 (2d Cir. 2005)
(holding that police officers’ conduct shocked the conscience where they allegedly failed to
prevent—and even encouraged or condoned—a fellow officer’s off-duty drinking and driving
that resulted in death of pedestrians); Cotz v. Mastroeni, 476 F. Supp. 2d 332, 361–62 (S.D.N.Y.
2007) (finding that conduct of police officers who “responded to [the] plaintiff’s residence at the
request of her former husband and attempted to coerce plaintiff to allow [the former husband]
visitation by threatening her with arrest and the filing of criminal charges against her,” and
“yelled and threatened [the] plaintiff, banged on doors and windows and, on one occasion,
forcibly entered her home without consent or a warrant,” although “unwise,” did not rise to the
level of conscience-shocking). Moreover, conduct by government officials is less likely to be
conscience-shocking when the officials are “subjected to the ‘pull of competing obligations.’”
Lombardi, 485 F.3d at 83. Here, Defendants were “faced [with] the competing interests of [the
parolee’s] claimed threat to his safety [upon his reporting to a parole meeting] and the public’s
interest in [the parolee’s] compliance with the conditions of his release.” Gibson, 563 F. Supp.
2d at 348. Because Defendants’ conduct does not shock the contemporary conscience, Plaintiff’s
due process rights were not violated and his claim fails.
10
2. Qualified Immunity
Further, even if their conduct ran afoul of the Due Process Clause, Defendants would still
be entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity shields a “government official[] from
liability for civil damages insofar as [his or her] conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). The protection attaches
“only if (a) the defendant’s action did not violate clearly established law, or (b) it was objectively
reasonable for the defendant to believe that his action did not violate such law.” Coggins v.
Buonora, 776 F.3d 108, 114 (2d Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct.
2335 (2015). In this context, a court “is guided by two questions: first, whether the facts show
that the defendants’ conduct violated [the] plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, and second, whether
the right was clearly established at the time of the defendants’ actions.” Golodner v. Berliner,
770 F.3d 196, 201 (2d Cir. 2014) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). To
determine whether a right was clearly established, the Court looks to “(1) whether the right was
defined with reasonable specificity; (2) whether Supreme Court or court of appeals case law
supports the existence of the right in question[;] and (3) whether under preexisting law a
reasonable defendant would have understood that his or her acts were unlawful.” Scott v.
Fischer, 616 F.3d 100, 105 (2d Cir. 2010).
As Defendants concede, the Second Circuit did “recognize[] that the State owes parolees
some duty” in Jacobs. (See Mem. of Law in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. To Dismiss 8–9 (Dkt. No.
20).) However, neither Jacobs nor later Second Circuit precedent clearly establishes that a
state’s duty to parolees extends to the provision of safe transport to parole meetings when the
parolee’s freedom to arrive in any manner is not otherwise restricted by the state. See Ciccone,
11
2015 WL 4739981, at *7 (recognizing that Jacobs established “that some duty is owed to a
parolee if limitations are imposed upon him,” but finding that “there is no clearly established
right of a parolee to have clothing provided by the government, or assistance in finding a warm
place to congregate during the winter when the parolee’s freedom of movement is not otherwise
restricted”); cf. Rodriguez, 2013 WL 5544122, at *10 (“Here, [the] defendants would have had to
predict that Jacobs v. Ramirez would be viewed expansively. This they need not do.”).
Accordingly, even if Defendants’ conduct was found to violate the Due Process Clause, the
claims would still be dismissed because Defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity.3
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss is granted, and the Complaint
is dismissed. Because Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, has yet to file an amended complaint, the
Complaint will be dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff is given 45 days to submit an Amended
Complaint addressing the deficiencies outlined above. If Plaintiff fails to submit an Amended
3
Plaintiff’s claim against Cruse is subject to dismissal on the additional ground that
Plaintiff has failed to allege the personal involvement of Cruse in the alleged constitutional
violation. “It is well settled that, in order to establish a defendant’s individual liability in a suit
brought under § 1983, a plaintiff must show . . . the defendant’s personal involvement in the
alleged constitutional deprivation.” Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir.
2013); see also Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470, 484 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[P]ersonal involvement of
[the] defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages
under § 1983.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Plaintiff’s only allegation with respect to Cruse is that Plaintiff faxed the doctor’s note to
both Wilkins and Cruse. (See Compl. 4.) However, there are no allegations that Cruse spoke
with Plaintiff about the meeting or was at all involved in the decision to require Plaintiff to
attend his parole meeting despite his injuries. (See generally id.) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim
against Cruse fails for the additional reason that he has failed to allege Cruse’s personal
involvement in the alleged constitutional violation.
12
Complaint within the allotted time, the Action may be dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk of
Court is respectfull y requested to terminate the pending Motion. (Dkt. No. 19.)
SO ORDERED.
elL
2016
Dated: September
White Plains, New York
13
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?