Jones et al v. New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision et al
Filing
79
OPINION AND ORDER re: 53 MOTION for Summary Judgment . filed by Leslie Malin, Michael Capra, Cheryl Morris. Defendants' motion for summary judgment is DENIED. Plaintiff and counsel for defendants are directed to appear for a st atus conference on September 21, 2018, at 12:00 p.m., at which time the Court will set a trial date and a schedule for pretrial submissions. The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be t aken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). The Clerk is instructed to terminate the motion. (Doc. #53). SO ORDERED. (Status Conference set for 9/21/2018 at 12:00 PM before Judge Vincent L. Briccetti.) (Signed by Judge Vincent L. Briccetti on 8/21/2018) Copies Mailed By Chambers. (mml)
Copy Mailed to Plaintiff, please note
on the docket. 8-21-18 DH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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MARLON JONES,
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
DR. LESLEY MALIN, CHERYL MORRIS,
:
and MICHAEL CAPRA,
:
Defendants.
:
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OPINION AND ORDER
15 CV 5381 (VB)
Briccetti, J.:
Plaintiff Marlon Jones, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion against
defendants Superintendent (“Supt.”) Michael Capra of Sing Sing Correctional Facility (“Sing
Sing”), Sing Sing Deputy Supt. of Programs Dr. Lesley Malin, and former New York State
Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”) Director of Ministerial,
Family and Volunteer Services Cheryl Morris.
Before the Court is defendants’ motion for summary judgment. (Doc. #53).
For the reasons set forth below, the motion is DENIED.
The Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
BACKGROUND
The parties have submitted briefs, declarations with exhibits, and statements of material
facts pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1, which reflect the following factual background.
According to defendants, on January 28, 2010, DOCCS entered into a settlement
agreement that provided for separate Jumu’ah (Friday noon services) for adherents of Sunni and
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Shi’a Islam (the “Settlement Agreement”). 1 Section 5(c) of the Settlement Agreement requires
DOCCS to provide separate Jumu’ah for Shi’a inmates when at least five self-identified Shi’a
Muslim inmates, one of whom must be an inmate who was a party to the Settlement Agreement,
desire separate Jumu’ah.
During the times relevant to this action, plaintiff was incarcerated at Sing Sing. Plaintiff
attended separate Shi’a Jumu’ah at Sing Sing until August 15, 2014, when Sing Sing suspended
the separate service. After plaintiff complained, Supt. Capra explained in a letter to plaintiff that
DOCCS’s Office of Family, Ministerial and Volunteer Services directed Sing Sing to
discontinue separate Shi’a Jumu’ah because the only Sing Sing inmate who was a party to the
Settlement Agreement no longer desired to participate in the separate service. According to
Morris, the Office of Family, Ministerial and Volunteer Services “understood that, because the
requirements of the [Settlement Agreement] were no longer met, the separate Jumu’ah services
for Shi’a inmates at Sing Sing were no longer required.” (Morris Decl. ¶ 15).
Sing Sing continued to offer weekly Jumu’ah open to Muslim inmates of all sects, as well
as classes for Shi’a Muslims on Friday nights and Saturday afternoons. According to plaintiff,
he did not attend the joint Jumu’ah because he believed his religion did not permit a Shi’a
Muslim to attend a Sunni service.
At the same time, Sing Sing officials deliberated over whether Sing Sing could continue
to provide separate Shi’a Jumu’ah, “given that the inmate who had been a party to the
1
Defendants purport to attach the Settlement Agreement to the Declaration of Michael J.
Keane as Exhibit B. Instead, defendants attached a Decision & Order, dated December 11, 2000,
from New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, in Cancel v. Goord, Dkt. No. 1999-09862
(2d Dep’t), which is not a settlement agreement and does not contain any of the information
defendants claim it contains. Nonetheless, because it does not affect the Court’s decision, the
Court assumes the truth of defendants’ description of the Settlement Agreement from their
statement of material facts.
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[Settlement Agreement] remained in the facility, and given that the administrative and security
obstacles to providing separate services for Shi’a inmates had been addressed and overcome
when Sing Sing had first instituted such services.” (Morris Decl. ¶ 18).
On October 17, 2014, Sing Sing permitted its Shi’a inmates to resume separate Jumu’ah.
According to Morris, “It was decided that the separate Jumu’ah services for Shi’a inmates could
resume, without jeopardizing the safety and security of the prison and obstructing the smooth
administration of the facility.” (Morris Decl. ¶ 19).
Plaintiff initiated this action on July 8, 2015, and was released from DOCCS’s custody on
November 19, 2015. On July 10, 2017, plaintiff testified he attended a Sunni Jumu’ah since he
was released.
Plaintiff seeks monetary damages for the interruption in separate Shi’a Jumu’ah from
August 15 to October 17, 2014.
DISCUSSION
I.
Legal Standard
The Court must grant a motion for summary judgment if the pleadings, discovery
materials before the Court, and any affidavits show there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and it is clear the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
A fact is material when it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law
. . . . Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary” are not material and thus cannot
preclude summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
A dispute about a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence upon which a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
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Inc., 477 U.S. at 248. The Court “is not to resolve disputed issues of fact but to assess whether
there are any factual issues to be tried.” Wilson v. Nw. Mut. Ins. Co., 625 F.3d 54, 60 (2d Cir.
2010) (citation omitted). It is the moving party’s burden to establish the absence of any genuine
issue of material fact. Zalaski v. City of Bridgeport Police Dep’t, 613 F.3d 336, 340 (2d Cir.
2010).
If the non-moving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element
of his case on which he has the burden of proof, then summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 323. If the non-moving party submits “merely colorable” evidence,
summary judgment may be granted. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 249–50. The
non-moving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to
the material facts, and may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation.”
Brown v. Eli Lilly & Co., 654 F.3d 347, 358 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted). The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving
party’s position is likewise insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could
reasonably find for him. Dawson v. Cty. of Westchester, 373 F.3d 265, 272 (2d Cir. 2004).
On summary judgment, the Court construes the facts, resolves all ambiguities, and draws
all permissible factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Dallas Aerospace, Inc.
v. CIS Air Corp., 352 F.3d 775, 780 (2d Cir. 2003). If there is any evidence from which a
reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the non-moving party on the issue on which
summary judgment is sought, summary judgment is improper. See Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford
v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 391 F.3d 77, 82–83 (2d Cir. 2004).
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In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court need only consider evidence that
would be admissible at trial. Nora Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Grp. of Am., Inc., 164 F.3d 736,
746 (2d Cir. 1998).
II.
Free Exercise Claim
Defendants argue plaintiff fails as a matter of law to state a First Amendment free
exercise claim based on cancelling separate Shi’a Jumu’ah from August 15 to October 17, 2014.
The Court disagrees.
“Inmates clearly retain protections afforded by the First Amendment, including its
directive that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion.” O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,
482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (internal citations omitted). “It is well established that prisoners have a
constitutional right to participate in congregate religious services.” Salahuddin v. Coughlin¸ 993
F.2d 306, 308 (2d Cir. 1993) (internal citations omitted). To prove a violation of his First
Amendment right to free exercise of religion, an inmate must show “at the threshold that the
disputed conduct substantially burdens his sincerely held religious beliefs.” Salahuddin v.
Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 274–75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal citation omitted). “The defendants then
bear the relatively limited burden of identifying the legitimate penological interests that justify
the impinging conduct.” Id. at 275. Finally, the inmate must show the articulated concerns were
irrational. Id.
Here, there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether cancelling separate
Shi’a Jumu’ah substantially burdened plaintiff’s sincerely held beliefs. “Sincerity is an issue for
the factfinder.” Pugh v. Goord, 571 F. Supp. 2d 477, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing Patrick v.
LeFevre, 745 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1984)). Moreover, according to plaintiff, his only option
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once separate Shi’a Jumu’ah was cancelled was to attend Sunni services that he believed were
forbidden by his Shi’a faith.
Defendants argue plaintiff’s religious beliefs were not substantially burdened because
plaintiff attended a Sunni mosque after he was released. The Court is not persuaded. Plaintiff
testified the Sunni service he attended after he was released, unlike the Sunni service offered at
Sing Sing, was “all inclusive.” (Keane Decl. Ex. A at 159). Thus, there is still a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether plaintiff’s religious beliefs were sincere and substantially burdened.
There are also genuine issues of material fact concerning whether defendants’ cancelling
separate Shi’a Jumu’ah was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. A regulation
that burdens a protected right must be reasonably related to legitimate penological interests to
pass constitutional muster. Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d at 274. Courts evaluate four factors
in determining reasonableness:
[i] whether the challenged regulation or official action has a valid, rational
connection to a legitimate governmental objective; [ii] whether prisoners have
alternative means of exercising the burdened right; [iii] the impact on guards,
inmates, and prison resources of accommodating the right; [iv] and the existence
of alternative means of facilitating exercise of the right that have only a de
minimis adverse effect on valid penological interests.
Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d at 274 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90–91 (1987)
(footnote omitted)).
Here, only two months after it first cancelled separate Shi’a Jumu’ah, DOCCS decided
“the separate Jumu’ah services could resume under the circumstances present at Sing Sing at that
time, without jeopardizing the safety and security of the prison, without great financial cost, and
without obstructing the smooth administration of the facility.” (Capra Decl. ¶ 16). Moreover,
Supt. Capra stated Sing Sing officials, in deciding to resume offering separate Shi’a Jumu’ah,
concluded, “the administrative and security obstacles to providing separate services for Shi’a
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inmates had been addressed and overcome when Sing Sing had first instituted such services.”
(Id.).
Defendants nevertheless argue they had a legitimate penological interest in relying on the
Settlement Agreement when cancelling separate Shi’a Jumu’ah. But the Settlement Agreement
is merely a private agreement requiring DOCCS to provide separate Shi’a Jumu’ah when certain
conditions are met. It says nothing about whether DOCCS is constitutionally required to provide
separate Shi’a Jumu’ah to other inmates absent those conditions.
Accordingly, summary judgment on plaintiff’s First Amendment free exercise claim is
denied.
III.
Qualified Immunity
Defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff’s First Amendment
free exercise claim.
The Court disagrees.
Qualified immunity shields government officials whose conduct “does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The scope of qualified immunity is
broad, and it protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the
law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). “A qualified immunity defense is established
if (a) the defendant’s action did not violate clearly established law, or (b) it was objectively
reasonable for the defendant to believe that his action did not violate such law.” Salim v. Proulx,
93 F.3d 86, 89 (2d Cir. 1996). “[F]or a right to be clearly established for purposes of
a qualified immunity defense, the precise conduct at issue need not previously have been ruled
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unlawful.” Griffin v. Amatucci, 611 F. App’x 732, 734 (2d Cir. 2015) (summary order) (quoting
Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, 357 (2d Cir. 2000) (alterations in original)). 2
Here, plaintiff’s “right to a reasonable opportunity to worship—by way
of separate Jumah services for Shi’ites and Sunnis—was clearly established.” Pugh v. Goord,
571 F. Supp. 2d at 512. Moreover, “[t]he Second Circuit has held that qualified immunity is not
appropriate at the summary judgment stage where genuine issues of material fact exist as to
whether defendants had legitimate penological justifications for denying plaintiffs certain
opportunities for religious exercise.” Id. (collecting cases).
Defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity because their reliance on the
Settlement Agreement, as well as DOCCS’s Protocol for Shi’ite Muslim Programs and Practices,
was objectively reasonable. The Court is not persuaded. At most, defendants raise a genuine
issue of material fact best resolved by the factfinder at trial.
Accordingly, summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity is not warranted.
2
Because plaintiff is proceeding pro se, he will be provided with copies of all unpublished
opinions cited in this ruling. See Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2009).
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CONCLUSION
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED.
Plaintiff and counsel for defendants are directed to appear for a status conference on
September 21, 2018, at 12:00 p.m., at which time the Court will set a trial date and a schedule for
pretrial submissions.
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order
would not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose
of an appeal. See Coppedge v United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444–45 (1962).
The Clerk is instructed to terminate the motion. (Doc. #53).
Dated: August 21, 2018
White Plains, NY
SO ORDERED:
____________________________
Vincent L. Briccetti
United States District Judge
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