Moritz v. Town of Goshen et al
ORDER: Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant show cause in writing by December 21, 2017, why this action should not be dismissed, without prejudice to reasserting the state claims in state court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). (Signed by Judge Nelson Stephen Roman on 11/21/2017) (jwh)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
=-:--;--;-'7"'--DATE FrLED: !i/J. /(':J.o('J-
-againstTOWN OF WARWICK, TOWN OF GOSHEN,
MATTHEW IMPERIO, individually and as an
Employee of the Town of Goshen, BRETT M.
LUKACH, individually and as an employee of the Town
of Warwick, MICHELE LEA BIASO and JOY
No. l 5-cv-5424 (NSR)
NELSONS. ROMAN, United States District Judge
On July 13, 2015, Plaintiff Laura Moritz ("Plaintiff' or "Moritz") began this action against
Defendants the Town of Goshen, Matthew Imperio, individually and as an employee of the Town
of Goshen, the Town of Warwick, Brett M. Lukach, individually and as an employee of the Town
of Warwick, Michele Lea Biaso ("Biaso"), and Joy Gorish, alleging claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for denial of civil rights and conspiracy to deny civil rights, as well as state-law claims of
false arrest, malicious prosecution, malicious abuse of power, and failure to supervise or train.
(ECF No. 1.) The commencement of this action spurred a slew of counterclaims by multiple
Defendants based on various state-law claims. This Court's October 19, 2017, Opinion and Order
(ECF No. 204.), and successful settlement negotiations between Plaintiff and Defendants resolved
all federal claims and the majority of state-law issues. As a result, only pro se counterclaimant
Michele Biaso's state-law claims against Plaintiff remain. (ECF No. 27.)
When this Court has original jurisdiction over a civil claim, the Court has the statutory
authority to exercise supplemental jurisdiction "over all other claims that are so related to claims
in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form pa1t of the same case or controversy."
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is one of discretion and, generally,
"if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional
sense, the state claims should be dismissed as well." United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs,
383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). It is well settled in the Second Circuit that a Court has discretion to
dismiss claims over which it has supplemental jurisdiction after identifying a factual predicate
which corresponds to one of the§ 1367(c) categories. !tar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian
Kurier, Inc., 140 F.3d 442, 446-447 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that the adoption of28 U.S.C. § 1367
altered the Gibbs analysis by granting the Court discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction
only if founded upon an enumerated category of subsection 1367(c)). Where, as here, the Comt
dismissed the claims over which it had original jurisdiction, the Court may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction. See § 1367(c)(3).
The only remaining claims in the instant case are state-law claims with no independent
federal jurisdiction, by pro se Defendant Biaso against Plaintiff Moritz. The Comt has dismissed
all claims over which it had original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant show cause in writing by
December 21, 2017, why this action should not be dismissed, without prejudice to reasserting the
state claims in state court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
November 21, 2017
White Plains, New York
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