Samuel Fratto III et, al vs. D. Wilson Electric, Inc. et, al
Filing
37
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: Defendants' motion for a stay is DENIED. All discovery deadlines remain in effect. (See Doc. #28.) (Signed by Judge Vincent L. Briccetti on 2/5/2016) (mml)
1.. ‘NITED STATES 1)1 STRICT COl T
RT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
flSDN=
‘)CUMENT
II
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T
SAMI FRA FTO III and JAMES
JOIIANNFMANN, as Trustees of I.B.E,W.
LOCAL 363 PENSION FUND. WELFARE
FUND, MONEY PURCHASE PENSION
FUND, VACA1’ION ANI) PAIl) hOLIDAY
IUND. SUPPLFMENTAL
I. ‘NEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT FUND,
LABOR MANAGEM ENT COOPERATIVE
FUND. and JOINT APPRENTICE TRAINING
FUND; and GILBERT HElM, as President of
the INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL UNION
Fir
Fr
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
15 CV 7966 (VB)
IN’.J. iO)
Plaintiffs,
V
I). WILSON ELECTRIC, INC.; LAROSSA
ELECTRIC. INC.: JOSEPH WILSON;
STEPIIEN STARZYK, JR.; and JOSEPH M.
LAROSSA.
Defendants.
x
1
By letter motion dated January 28, 2016, defendants Larossa Electric, Inc. (Larossa
Electric’). Joseph Wilson, and Joseph M. Larossa move to stay this action as to all defendants
because defendant D. Wilson Electric, Inc. (‘Wilson Electric”) has filed for bankruptcy.
(Doe. #34).
For the following reasons, defendants’ motion is DENIED.
The Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 If S C
§ 1331 and R67
Although filed as a letter, defendants’ submission seeks relief that can be sought b) letter
motion See Electronic Case Filing Rules & Instructions I 1 \ccordingl. the Court construes
this submission as a letter motion to sta\ this action
BACKGROUND
This case arises out of defendants’ alleged failure to comply with the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA”), the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(“ERISA”), and a collective bargaining agreement with the International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 363.
In essence, plaintiffs allege defendants, three individuals and two electrical contracting
companies. have operated as a single entity or as alter egos, funneling work through Larossa
Electric to avoid meeting Wilson Flectric’s pension and benefit fund contribution obligations
under a collective bargaining agreement. For this reason, plaintiffs contend, each defendant
should be jointly and severally liable for the neglected obligations of all others.
Though defendants deny these allegations, all parties agree Joseph Wilson and Stephen
Starzyk, Jr., own and operate Wilson Electric, and Joseph M. Larossa owns and operates Larossa
Electric.
Defendant Wilson Electric filed for bankruptcy on January 22, 2016. (Doe, #34). This
triggered an automatic stay of the claims against it in this case. See 11 U.S.C.
2
§
362(a). Now,
Wilson, Larossa, and Larossa Electric contend this stay applies to them because the claims
against these three defendants “are inextricably intertwined with and centered on identical
operative facts and allegations asserted against D. Wilson Electric and cannot be severed.”
(Doe. #34).
2
Defendant Stephen Starzyk. Jr.. has also declared bankruptcy, and all claims are stayed as
to him as well, (Doe. #6).
DISCUSSION
The filing of a bankruptcy petition triggers a stay that applies to, among other things, the
“continuation.
.
.
of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor
that was or could have been commenced before [the bankruptcy easel.” 1.1 U.S.C.
§
362(a)(1).
As a general rule, however, a debtor’s bankruptcy petition does not stay claims against non-
debtor co-defendants unless the claims “will have an immediate adverse economic consequence
for the debtor’s estate.” Queenie, Ltd. v. Nygard Int’l, 321 F.3d 282, 287 (2d Cir. 2003).
A claim against a non-debtor has an immediate adverse economic consequence for a
debtor’s estate if, for example, the debtor is the sole owner of the non-debtor against whom the
claim is brought; the debtor is a guarantor for the non-debtor’s obligation to pay the claim; the
claim is against the debtor’s insurer; or “there is such identity between the debtor and the thirdparty defendant that the debtor may be said to be the real party defendant.” Queenie, Ltd. v.
Nygard Int’l, 321 F.3d at 287-88 (quoting A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 999 (4th
Cir. 1986)).
None of these examples apply here. Wilson Electric, a corporation, obviously does not
own Joseph Larossa or Joseph Wilson, and nobody claims Wilson Electric owns Larossa
Electric, A judgment against any of the non-debtor defendants would not diminish or create a
financial obligation for Wilson Electric’s bankruptcy estate. Nor is Wilson Electric the real party
defendant for any of the non-debtor defendants under plaintifTh’ alter ego theory. ç Cocoletzi
yFSai’sj)izzCp1Ep, 2015 WL 4655164, at *45 (SDi.’.Y. Aug. 5. 2015) (declining to
extend the bankruptcy stay to cover claims against non-debtor defendants alleged to be an alter
ego of the debtor). Therefore, a judgment against Joseph Larossa, Larossa Electric, or Joseph
\\ilson would not have an immediate adverse economic consequence for the debtor. Wilson
Electric.
Staying this action entirely would he inappropriate for another reason. A stay under
§
362(a) does not extend to non-debtor co-defendants who are joint tortfeasors” or where ‘the
non-debtor’s liability rests
upon
his own breach of duty.” Variable—Parameter Fixture Dcv.
Corp. v. Morpheus Liehts, Inc.. 945 F. Supp. 603. 60$ (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (quoting A.H. Robins
Co. v. Piccinin. 788 F.2d at 999). here. plaintitis claim defendants are jointly and severally
liable because each defendant acted wrongfully. Therefore, the stay does not apply to the nondebtor defendants.
Defendants arguments to the contrary are not persuasive.
First, defendants argue a stay is warranted because the claims are 1nexiricably
intertwined.” (Doe. #34), Whether they are or not, that is not the standard for deciding whether
the stay applies to non-debtor defendants, and defendants cite no case law or other authority to
the contrarY.
Second. defendants argue severance is not appropriate” because plaintiffs “are only in
privitv of contract with D. Wilson Electric and lack standing in [their] claims against the other
named Defendants.” (Doe. #34 (citing Crossland Fed. Savings Bank v. A. Suna & Co., Inc., 935
F. Supp. 184 (E.L.N.Y. 1995)). It is unclear how this argument addresses the applicability of the
bankruptcy stay, and in any event. Crossland does not stand thr that proposition. To the extent
defendants seek to dismiss part of this actlon based on piaintiffs alleged lack 01 standing. a letter
motion is not
the appropriate mechanism to do so.
4
CONCLUSION
Defendants’ motion for a stay is DENIED. All discovery deadlines remain in effect.
(See Doe. #28.
Dated: February 5. 2016
White Plains. N’
SO ORDER El
r
ij
Vincent L. Briccetti
United States District Judge
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