Alves v. Affiliated Care of Putnam, Inc. et al

Filing 33

OPINION & ORDER re: 15 MOTION to Certify Class to Proceed as a Collective Action, filed by Maria Alves. Plaintiff's Motion is granted. Counsel shall confer and submit an amended notice to the Court for its approval within 14 days of the date of this Order. The Clerk of Court is respectfully requested to terminate the pending Motion. (Dkt. No. 15.) SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Kenneth M. Karas on 2/7/17) (yv)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

MARIA ALVES, individually, and on behalf
of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff,
No. 16-CV-1593 (KMK)
v.
OPINION & ORDER
AFFILIATED HOME CARE OF PUTNAM,
INC., and BARBARA KESSMAN, in her
individual capacity,
Defendants.

Appearances:
Daniel C. Stafford, Esq.
McCabe & Mack LLP
Poughkeepsie, NY
Counsel for Plaintiff
Nathaniel K. Charny, Esq.
Charny & Associates
Rhinebeck, NY
Counsel for Plaintiff
Steven Felsenfeld, Esq.
Law Offices of Robert Hilpert
Croton-on-Hudson, NY
Counsel for Defendants
KENNETH M. KARAS, District Judge:
Maria Alves (“Plaintiff”) brings this collective Action on behalf of herself and others
similarly situated against Affiliated Home Care of Putnam, Inc. (“Affiliated”) and Barbara
Kessman (collectively, “Defendants”), seeking to recover overtime compensation pursuant to the
Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., and Article 6 of the New York
State Labor Law (“NYLL”). (See Am. Compl. ¶ 1 (Dkt. No. 10).) Plaintiff moves for: (1)

conditional certification of a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); (2) authorization
to send Court-approved notice of this Action to potential opt-in plaintiffs; and (3) an order
compelling Defendants to produce the names and addresses of such individuals. (See Mem. of
Law in Supp. of Pls.’ Mot. To Proceed as a Collective Action, for Court-Authorized Not. and for
Disclosure of the Names and Addresses of Potential Opt-In Pls.) (“Pl.’s Mem.”) 1 (Dkt. No.
16).) 1 For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Motion is granted.
I. Background
A. Factual Background
Plaintiff was employed by Defendants as a home health care aide from December 23,
2006 through December 4, 2015. (Am. Compl. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff’s responsibilities included
“bathing and grooming patients,” services Plaintiff asserts are “typically provided by home
health aides.” (Id. ¶ 20.) Plaintiff avers that at the direction of Defendants, she also performed
tasks “outside the scope of her employment,” (id. ¶ 21), such as “removing garbage, dusting,
cleaning refrigerators, cleaning ovens, cleaning common areas and areas of homes not ordinarily
used by patients, shoveling snow, ironing the patients’ clothes and sheets, ironing clothes
belonging to other members of the household, washing windows and curtains, transporting
firewood into homes, and caring for plants and gardens,” (id. ¶ 20). Plaintiff asserts that the
amount of time she and others employed by Defendants spent on such work “regularly
exceed[ed] [20] percent of the employees’ working time.” (Id.) 2 Plaintiff alleges that she
1

The Court notes that the memorandum of law indicates that it supports a motion brought
by multiple plaintiffs. (See Dkt. No. 16.) However, as additional plaintiffs have yet to join the
Action, in the current stage of the litigation, the Court will refer to the Motion and the
accompanying memorandum as one brought by a singular Plaintiff, Maria Alves.
2

While Defendants contend that “[n]owhere has [P]laintiff alleged in her Amended
[C]omplaint or in [the] Alves Dec[laration] that she expended over 20% of her time engaged in
work that would be deemed outside of the routine scope of [her] duties,” (Defs.’ Opp’n to Mot.
2

regularly worked in excess of 40 hours per week, (id. ¶ 23), and for all services—both typical
and outside the scope of her employment—she was paid between $12.00 and $16.00 per hour,
(id. ¶ 22). Plaintiff alleges that “[d]espite regularly working in excess of 40 hours per week,”
Defendants never provided her overtime pay. (Id. ¶ 24.)
Plaintiff further asserts that Defendants failed to display the required federal and state
notices regarding wage and hour requirements. (Id. ¶¶ 28, 29.) Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants
engaged in the practice of issuing two checks for a single seven-day pay period—one for the first
40 hours and another for any hours in excess,” (id. ¶ 25), and that Defendants used the same
practice for Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees, (id. ¶ 26). Plaintiff contends that
such techniques allow Defendants to “manipulate[] payroll records” and “mask [Affiliated’s]
wrongdoing.” (Id.)
Plaintiff avers that she “became aware through observations and conversations that other
employees of Defendants performed the same or similar tasks” as Plaintiff and that Plaintiff
“observed these employees frequently working over 40 hours per week and not being paid
overtime wages.” (Decl. of Maria Alves (“Alves Decl.”) ¶ 6 (Dkt. No. 15-1).) Plaintiff asserts
that upon her knowledge, “Defendants presently employ approximately 30 other individuals with
the same responsibilities that [Plaintiff] once had.” (Id.)
B. Procedural History
Plaintiff filed her original Complaint on March 2, 2016, (Dkt. No. 1), and Defendants
filed an Answer on May 2, 2016, (Dkt. No. 9). Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on May
12, 2016, (Dkt. No. 10), and Defendants filed an Answer to the Amended Complaint and,

For Conditional Collective Cert. (“Defs.’ Opp’n”) 14 (Dkt. No. 22)), the Amended Complaint
contains such an allegation, (see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 20, 21, 22).
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additionally, a Counterclaim against Plaintiff on May 26, 2016, (Dkt. No. 11). Plaintiff filed an
Answer to Defendants’ Counterclaim on June 20, 2016. (Dkt. No. 12.) On August 17, 2016,
Plaintiff filed the instant Motion and accompanying memorandum of law. (Dkt. Nos. 15–16.)
On September 15, 2016, Defendants filed their opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion, (Dkt. No. 22),
and on September 29, 2016, Plaintiff filed her reply, (Dkt. No. 23). 3
II. Discussion
A. Applicable Law
1. The FLSA
The FLSA requires employers to pay their employees overtime wages, at a rate of one
and one-half times an employee’s normal hourly rate, for any hours worked in excess of 40 hours
in a single week. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207. For any violation of these requirements, the FLSA
authorizes an aggrieved employee to bring a collective action on behalf of herself and “other
employees similarly situated.” Id. § 216(b). Such a collective action falls outside the ambit of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and, therefore, does not require a showing of numerosity,
commonality, typicality, or adequacy of representation. See Davis v. Lenox Hill Hosp., No. 03CV-3746, 2004 WL 1926086, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2004) (“The requirements of Rule 23 do
not apply to FLSA actions and no showing of numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy
of representation need be made.”). Plaintiffs who wish to participate in a collective action under

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At a conference on September 12, 2016, the Court issued a scheduling order setting
forth a briefing schedule for Plaintiff’s Motion To Dismiss Defendants’ Counterclaim. (See Dkt.
(minute entry for Sept. 12, 2016); Dkt. No. 21.) On November 1, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Motion
To Dismiss Defendants’ Counterclaim and supporting papers. (Dkt. Nos. 27–29.) Defendants
filed an opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion To Dismiss on November 14, 2016, (Dkt. No. 30), and
on the same day filed an amended opposition, (Dkt. No. 31). Plaintiff filed a reply to
Defendants’ opposition to the Motion To Dismiss on December 2, 2016. (Dkt. No. 32.) The
Court will address that motion in a separate order.
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the FLSA must “opt-in” to the action by consenting in writing and filing such consents with the
court; the court may also provide notice to other potential similarly-situated employees to inform
them of the opportunity to opt-in and participate in the action. See Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v.
Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 169 (1989) (“[D]istrict courts have discretion, in appropriate cases, to
implement 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) . . . .”).
Courts apply a two-pronged approach when determining whether to certify a collective
action under § 216(b). First, the court makes “an initial determination to send notice to potential
opt-in plaintiffs who may be ‘similarly situated’ to the named plaintiffs with respect to whether a
FLSA violation has occurred.” Myers v. Hertz Corp., 624 F.3d 537, 555 (2d Cir. 2010). Second,
the “court will, on a fuller record, determine whether a so-called ‘collective action’ may go
forward by determining whether the plaintiffs who have opted in are in fact ‘similarly situated’
to the named plaintiffs.” Id. If the record reveals that such opt-in plaintiffs are not similarly
situated, the court may de-certify the action and dismiss the opt-in plaintiffs’ claims without
prejudice. See id. 4

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In Morangelli v. Chemed Corp., 275 F.R.D. 99, 103 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 2011), Judge Cogan
described the unique procedural posture of the conditional certification stage under the FLSA:
Courts . . . and the Second Circuit, see e.g., Kuebel v. Black & Decker Inc., 643
F.3d 352, 357 (2d Cir. 2011), have called this stage of the FLSA proceeding,
“conditional certification.” This is a misnomer and may obfuscate the leniency of
the standard employed to authorize plaintiffs’ counsel to send notices of the
action. When the Court allows notices to be sent out, it is only making a
preliminary determination—often based solely on allegations—of whether
plaintiffs are “similarly situated” under 8 U.S.C. § 216. The Court is not
assuming that a class exists as Rule 23 used to permit courts to do; there is no
class in a collective action. Nor is the Court certifying anything—class or
otherwise.
(citations omitted).
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2. Home Care Final Rule
Prior to October 13, 2015, the FLSA exempted domestic service employees from
minimum wage and maximum hour requirements. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15) (“[Minimum
wage and maximum hour provisions of] this title shall not apply with respect to . . . any
employee employed in domestic service employment to provide companionship services for
individuals who (because of age or infirmity) are unable to care for themselves . . . .”). However,
the performance of general household work of the type Plaintiff contends she and others
performed is not exempt from overtime payment if such work exceeded 20 percent of the total
weekly hours worked. See 29 C.F.R. § 552.6(b) (“The term companionship services also
includes the provision of care if the care is provided attendant to and in conjunction with the
provision of fellowship and protection and if it does not exceed 20 percent of the total hours
worked per person and per workweek.” (emphasis added)).
On October 1, 2013, the Department of Labor (“DOL”) issued the “Home Care Final
Rule,” see Application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to Domestic Service, 78 Fed. Reg. 60,454
(Oct. 1, 2013) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 552), effecting changes to the DOL’s regulations
regarding domestic services employment. Among other changes, the new rule precluded thirdparty employers—such as Defendants—from claiming the exemption under the FLSA’s
overtime provisions for companionship services or live-in domestic service employees. See 29
C.F.R. § 552.109(a) (“Third party employers of employees engaged in companionship services
within the meaning of § 552.6 may not avail themselves of the minimum wage and overtime
exemption . . . .”). The Rule was intended to go into effect on January 1, 2015, see Application
of the Fair Labor Standards Act to Domestic Service, 78 Fed. Reg. at 60,494, however, in June
2014, associations of home care companies filed an action challenging the new rule, see

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Complaint, Home Care Ass’n of Am. v. Weil, 76 F. Supp. 3d 138 (D.D.C. 2014) (No. 14-CV967). In December 2014 and January 2015, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia issued opinions and orders vacating the rule’s revised third-party regulation and
revised definition of companionship services, respectively. See id. at 148 (“[T]he United States
Department of Labor’s Third Party Employer regulation, promulgated in 78 Fed. Reg.
60,557 and to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 552.109, is hereby VACATED.”); Home Care Ass’n of
Am. v. Weil, 78 F. Supp. 3d 123, 130 (D.D.C. 2015) (“[T]he United States Department of
Labor’s regulation defining ‘companionship services,’ promulgated in 78 Fed. Reg. 60,557 and
to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 552.6, is hereby VACATED.”). The DOL appealed and the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit issued a unanimous opinion affirming the validity
of the Home Care Final Rule and reversing the orders of the district court. Home Care Ass’n of
Am. v. Weil, 799 F.3d 1084, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2506 (2016). The
Rule became effective on October 13, 2015. See News Release, Dep’t of Labor, Statement by
US Labor Secretary Thomas E. Perez on Implementing Minimum Wage, Overtime Protections
for Home Care Workers (Oct. 6. 2015), https://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/opa/
OPA20151992.htm.
B. Analysis
1. Certification of Collective Action
Plaintiff seeks conditional certification of the instant Action on the basis of the claims
asserted in the Amended Complaint. (See Pl.’s Mem. 1.) Because, as is the case here, the
conditional certification of an action often takes place before discovery, the Second Circuit has
explained that, to warrant certification, a plaintiff need only make a “modest factual showing”
that she and potential opt-in plaintiffs “together were victims of a common policy or plan that

7

violated the law.” Myers, 624 F.3d at 555 (internal quotation marks omitted). While “[t]his
modest factual showing cannot be satisfied simply by unsupported assertions,” the showing
“should remain a low standard of proof because the purpose of this first stage is merely to
determine whether similarly[-]situated plaintiffs do in fact exist.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Lynch v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 491 F. Supp. 2d 357, 368 (S.D.N.Y.
2007) (noting the “burden for demonstrating that potential plaintiffs are ‘similarly situated’ is
very low at the notice stage”). Importantly, a plaintiff may satisfy this burden by relying on
“[her] own pleadings, affidavits, declarations, or the affidavits and declarations of other potential
class members.” Hallissey v. Am. Online, Inc., No. 99-CV-3785, 2008 WL 465112, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2008); see also Sanchez v. Gansevoort Mgmt. Grp., Inc., No. 12-CV-75, 2013
WL 208909, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2013) (“The burden may be satisfied through the pleadings
and affidavits alone.”). Indeed, courts in the Second Circuit have granted conditional collective
certification on the basis of just one or two affidavits establishing a common practice. See, e.g.,
Hernandez v. Bare Burger Dio Inc., No. 12-CV-7794, 2013 WL 3199292, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June
25, 2013) (granting certification based on a single affidavit of the named plaintiff); Sanchez,
2013 WL 208909, at *1 (finding the plaintiffs had met their “light burden” by submitting an
affidavit stating that one of the plaintiffs “observed other employees who performed the same job
duties that [she] performed” and had “knowledge that those other employees worked more than
[40] hours per week but were not separately paid an overtime premium” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Khamsiri v. George & Frank’s Japanese Noodle Rest. Inc., No. 12-CV-265,
2012 WL 1981507, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2012) (authorizing certification where the plaintiff
had submitted a single declaration “confirming that she and other non-exempt employees

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employed by [the] defendants . . . who performed work similar to hers[] were . . . paid less than
the statutory minimum wage and not paid overtime pay”).
Defendants contest Plaintiff’s allegations “that [Defendants] directed her and other like
employees to perform ‘work’ (such as chopping wood and shoveling snow) that might arguably
remove them from the ambit of the Overtime exemption as existed prior to October 13, 2015,”
(See Defs.’ Opp’n to Mot. for Conditional Collective Cert. (“Defs.’ Opp’n”) 3 (Dkt. No. 22)),
and assert that Plaintiff has failed to provide “so much as one affidavit or declaration in support,”
(id.). However, Plaintiff has, indeed, submitted a declaration swearing that based on her
“observations and conversations,” “other employees of Defendants performed the same or
similar tasks” as Plaintiff and that “these employees frequently work[ed] over 40 hours per week
and [were] not . . . paid overtime wages.” (Alves Decl. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff asserts that upon her
knowledge, “Defendants presently employ approximately 30 other individuals with the same
responsibilities that [Plaintiff] once had.” (Id.) As noted supra, Plaintiff’s own declaration is
sufficient to meet the light burden she faces at the notice stage, and Defendants’ competing
factual assertions may not defeat Plaintiff’s motion for conditional class certification. See Jeong
Woo Kim v. 511 E. 5th St., LLC, 985 F. Supp. 2d 439, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[I]f the plaintiff’s
allegations are sufficient on their face to support conditional certification, a defendant may not
defeat the plaintiff’s motion by presenting conflicting factual assertions.”); see also Colon v.
Major Perry St. Corp., No. 12-CV-3788, 2013 WL 3328223, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2013)
(“The [d]efendants . . . may not defeat a court’s determination that [the] [p]laintiffs are similarly
situated by submitting their own affidavits.”); In re Penthouse Exec. Club Comp. Litig., No. 10CV-1145, 2010 WL 4340255, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2010) (finding the defendants’
submission of competing affidavits “amount[ed] to a premature request to make credibility

9

determinations and factual findings, something that is inappropriate at the notice stage”). “The
court’s limited role at this stage is simply to determine whether the plaintiff has sufficiently
alleged that [s]he and other employees were victims of a common compensation policy that
violated the FLSA.” Jeong Woo Kim, 985 F. Supp. 2d at 446. The Court thus finds that Plaintiff
has made the requisite “modest factual showing,” Myers, 624 F.3d at 555, and grants Plaintiff’s
motion for conditional certification. 5
2. Court-Authorized Notice
Plaintiff also seeks Court-authorized notice of this Action to potential opt-in plaintiffs,
(see Pl.’s Mem. 1), and submits a notice to the Court, (see Court-Authorized Notice and Consent
to Become a Party Pl. (“Proposed Notice”) 1 (Dkt. No. 16-1)). The benefits of collective actions
“depend on employees receiving accurate and timely notice concerning the pendency of the
collective action, so that they can make informed decisions about whether to participate.”
Hoffman-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 170. “By monitoring preparation and distribution of the notice, a
court can ensure that it is timely, accurate, and informative.” Id. at 172.

5

In their opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion, Defendants make much of the distinction
between Personal Care Aides (“PCAs”) and Home Health Care Aides (“HHAs”). (See Defs.’
Opp’n 2.) Defendants assert that Plaintiff and “the other putative members of the ‘class’” were
employed by Defendants as PCAs, “essentially . . . glorified babysitter[s]” and that “[P]laintiff
insists that she and they be certified as a class of Home Health Care Aides.” (Id.) However, for
the purpose of Plaintiff’s Motion To Proceed as a Collective Action, the distinction between
PCAs and HHAs is immaterial. The FLSA authorizes an employee to bring a collective action
on behalf of herself and “other employees similarly situated,” 29 U.S.C.
§ 216(b), and
“the purpose of this first stage is merely to determine whether similarly[-]situated plaintiffs do in
fact exist,” Myers, 624 F.3d at 555 (emphasis omitted). Should the Court authorize notice to be
sent to potential opt-in plaintiffs, Defendants can submit a motion to de-certify the Action. This
second phase will necessarily involve a “more stringent factual determination,” Lynch, 491 F.
Supp. 2d at 368, where the Court will, “on a fuller record, determine whether [the collective
action] may go forward [because] the plaintiffs who have opted in are in fact ‘similarly situated’
to the named plaintiffs,” Myers, 624 F.3d at 555.
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While Plaintiff brings claims under both the FLSA and NYLL, (see Am. Compl. ¶ 1), she
seeks certification only pursuant to the FLSA, and does not seek to certify a Rule 23 class under
the NYLL. For willful violations of the FSLA, as Plaintiff here alleges, (see id. ¶ 56), the
maximum statute of limitations is three years. See 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) (“[A] cause of action
arising out of a willful violation may be commenced within three years after the cause of action
accrued.”). Under the FLSA, the statute of limitations is not tolled until a plaintiff opts in to the
action, that is, files written consent with the court. See id. § 256 (“[A] collective or class action
instituted under the [FLSA] . . . shall be considered to be commenced in the case of any
individual claimant—(a) on the date when the complaint is filed, if he is specifically named as a
party plaintiff in the complaint and his written consent to become a party plaintiff is filed on such
date in the court in which the action is brought; or (b) if such written consent was not so filed or
if his name did not so appear—on the subsequent date on which such written consent is filed in
the court in which the action was commenced.”).
“[N]otice is generally directed to those employed within three years of the date of the
mailing of the notice,” Bittencourt v. Ferrara Bakery & Cafe Inc., 310 F.R.D. 106, 116
(S.D.N.Y. 2015); Whitehorn v. Wolfgang’s Steakhouse, Inc., 767 F. Supp. 2d 445, 451 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) (same), however, “because equitable tolling issues often arise for prospective plaintiffs,
courts frequently permit notice to be keyed to the three-year period prior to the filing of the
complaint, with the understanding that challenges to the timeliness of individual plaintiffs’
actions will be entertained at a later date,” Hamadou v. Hess Corp., 915 F. Supp. 2d 651, 668
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Slamna v. API Rest. Corp., No. 12CV-757, 2013 WL 3340290, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2013) (same). The Court finds that it is
appropriate to calculate the three-year period for notice from the filing of this Action on March

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2, 2016. Therefore, March 2, 2013 is the earliest that a potential plaintiff could have been
employed by Defendants in order to have a timely claim pursuant to the FLSA. Defendants are
free, however, to challenge the timeliness of a potential plaintiff’s claims in the future.
Therefore, Plaintiff must amend the Proposed Notice to direct the notice to “[a]ll non-exempt
manual workers who were employed at or by Affiliated Home Care of Pelham, Inc. and/or
Barbara Kessman from March 2, 2013 to present.”
In the instant Motion, “Plaintiff proposes a nine month opt-in period to allow sufficient
time for prospective plaintiffs to be apprised of this [A]ction.” (Pl.’s Mem. 5 n.2.) Courts in the
Second Circuit routinely restrict the opt-in period to no more than 60 days. See Yap v. Mooncake
Foods, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 3d 552, 566–67 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (imposing a 60-day opt-in period); Fa
Ting Wang v. Empire State Auto Corp., No. 14-CV-1491, 2015 WL 4603117, at *11–12
(E.D.N.Y. July 29, 2015) (setting the opt-in period at the “standard [60] days” and collecting
cases in which a 60-day period was imposed). While some courts have granted longer opt-in
periods, they generally do so when agreed upon by the parties or where special circumstances
warrant an extended period. See, e.g., Fang v. Zhuang, No. 10-CV-1290, 2010 WL 5261197, at
*4 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2010) (providing for 90-day period “in light of the frequent, long-term
international travel of many of the prospective plaintiffs”). Plaintiff does not persuasively argue
that the circumstances of this suit necessitate an extended opt-in period, and the Court is aware
of no reason that the standard 60 days would be insufficient. 6 Thus, the Proposed Notice is to be

6

Plaintiff suggests that her status (and potentially that of other employees) as a “migrant
worker” entitles her to a longer opt-in period. (See Alves Decl. ¶ 9; Pl.’s Mem. 5 n.2.). As
support, Plaintiff cites Roebuck v. Hudson Valley Farms, Inc., 239 F. Supp. 2d 234 (N.D.N.Y.
2002), in which the court found that a nine-month opt-in period for a class of migrant farm
workers was “not unreasonable” due to the anticipation of “significant difficulties in locating
potential opt-in plaintiffs,” noting that they “migrate not only within North America, but from as
far away as Bangladesh.” Id. at 240–41 (alteration omitted). Here, Plaintiff offers no arguments
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amended to require opt-in plaintiffs to consent to join the Action within 60 days of the date of the
notice, provided that the Court will entertain untimely motions to join on a showing of good
cause for the delay.
3. Disclosure of the Names and Addresses of Potential Opt-In Plaintiffs
Plaintiff additionally requests an order compelling Defendants to produce the names and
last-known addresses of potential opt-in plaintiffs. (See Pl.’s Mem. 5–6.) “It is now
commonplace in this Circuit to require the provision of personal contact information to class
counsel for the purposes of notifying a class of a collective action and enabling class counsel to
obtain relevant discovery.” In re Deloitte & Touche, LLP Overtime Litig., No. 11-CV-2461,
2012 WL 340114, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2012) (collecting cases). Accordingly, Defendants
shall provide to Plaintiff a list of potential opt-in plaintiffs who were employed on or after March
2, 2013 within 14 days of the date of this Order. The list shall include names, last-known
addresses, and dates of employment for each individual.

regarding challenges in locating potential opt-in plaintiffs. Indeed, Plaintiff asserts that
Defendants presently employee approximately 30 similarly-situated individuals. (See Alves
Decl. ¶ 6.)
However, Plaintiff does state that both she and other similarly-situated employees face
“linguistic . . . barriers.” (Id. ¶ 9.) Should Plaintiff find that translation of the notice would be
useful due to these alleged language barriers, (id.), such translation can be accomplished within
the 60-day period, see Fa Ting Wang, 2015 WL 4603117, at *12 (finding proposed translations
of the notice into Chinese, Korean, and Spanish adequately addressed a concern about language
barriers and that the standard 60-day opt-in period was appropriate.).
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III . Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs Motion is granted . Counsel shall confer and
submit an amended notice to the Court for its approval within 14 days of the date of this Order.
The Clerk of Court is respectfull y requested to terminate the pending Motion. (Dkt. No. 15 .)

SO ORDERED.
DATED:

February~, 2017
White Plains, New Y ark
DGE

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