Arriaga v. Gage et al

Filing 94

OPINION AND ORDER re: 90 MOTION to Dismiss Amended Complaint as to CO Alvarado filed by C.O. A. Alvarado. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion is DENIED. The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to terminate the Mo tion at ECF No. 90. Alvarado is directed to file an answer on before May 24, 2019. After filing an answer, Defendant is directed to confer with Plaintiff and submit a completed case management to the Court by June 14, 2019. The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff at his address as listed on ECF. C.O. A. Alvarado answer due 5/24/2019. (Signed by Judge Nelson Stephen Roman on 5/9/2019) (ne) Transmission to Docket Assistant Clerk for processing.

USDC SDNY
DOCUMENT
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
:;

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

~

ANTHONY ARRIAGA,
Plaintiff,
16-cv-1628 (NSR)

-againstDR. DANA GAGE (N.Y.S. D.O.C.C.S. SING SING
C.F. HEALTH CARE PROVIDER) Individually;
C.O. ALVARADO (SING SING C.F.
CORRECTION OFFICER) Individually,

OPINION AND ORDER

Defendants.
NELSON S. ROMAN, United States District Judge
Plaintiff Anthony Arriaga ("Plaintiff'), proceeding pro se, commenced this action on
March 3, 2016, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged Eighth and First Amendment violations,
(see Complaint, ("Compl."), ECF No. 2), against Defendants Dana Gage ("Dr. Gage"), Razia K.

Ferdous ("Dr. Ferdous"), Corrections Officer Alvarado ("Alvarado"), and Joshua Vematter ("Dr.
Vematter") (collectively, "Defendants"). On April 6, 2018, this Court ruled on Defendants' first
Motion to Dismiss the Complaint and a few other motions. (Opinion, ECF No. 79.) In its decision,
the Court: (1) dismissed the Complaint against Dr. Ferdous and Dr. Vematter with prejudice; (2)
dismissed the Complaint against Alvarado without prejudice; (3) dismissed all claims against
Defendants in their official capacities; (4) denied Plaintiffs Motion for a Preliminary Injunction
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; (5) denied Plaintiffs Motion for Sanctions; and (6)
denied Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Eighth and First Amendment claims against Dr. Gage.
The Court also granted Plaintiff permission to file an amended complaint for his claims against
Alvarado, which Plaintiff did on June 5, 2018. (See Amended Complaint, ("AC"), ECF No. 85.)

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Presently before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the AC. (Defendants’
Memorandum, (“Def. Mem.”), ECF No. 90.) For the following reasons, the motion is DENIED.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
All plausible facts from the Complaint and Amended Complaint are accepted as true for
the purpose of this motion. The majority of background facts need not be repeated here, as they
are undisputed as characterized in the Court’s previous Order. (See Opinion, at 2-6.) Because the
Court granted Plaintiff leave to re-plead its claims against Alvarado, (id. at 20), the only facts
added are those that have been re-pleaded regarding Alvarado’s conduct.
Plaintiff is an incarcerated pro se inmate at Sing Sing Correctional Facility. Plaintiff suffers
from herniated and bulging disks that cause him extreme back pain. In early April 2015, Plaintiff
began complaining about back pain to the nurses at sick call and sent letters to his then health care
provider, Dr. Ferdous, which went unanswered. On April 6, 2015, Plaintiff’s pain became so
intolerable that he was transferred to Montefiore Mount Vernon Hospital and admitted for three
days, unable to move. During his time there he was treated by Dr. Vernatter and underwent a CAT
scan, blood tests, and was prescribed Percocet and Baclofen for the pain. Dr. Vernatter told
Plaintiff he would also give him a shot for his back, which he purportedly never did.
When Plaintiff returned to Sing Sing, he was admitted to the facility’s infirmary, which
later discharged him with a medical pass granting: daily showers, use of a cane, and relief from
work and sports. The pass expired on April 27, 2015, and although Plaintiff tried to renew it, he
was unsuccessful. In the subsequent months, Plaintiff was also treated by Dr. Gage. After tedious
efforts at getting a new medical pass, Dr. Ferdous issued a pass that allowed Plaintiff to take daily
showers, carry a cane, receive feed-up (where food is brought to the inmate’s cell), and wear
transitional lenses. This pass had to be signed by Dr. Gage. When she finally signed it, she only
permitted Plaintiff to use a cane. Dr. Gage was eventually demoted and remains a party to this suit.
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Facts Pertaining to Alvarado
Plaintiff alleges that on May 26, 2015, while passing through the magnometer, Alvarado
maliciously and willfully confiscated his cane and his medical pass authorizing use of the cane
without authority to do so. Plaintiff then filed a grievance about the incident.
Subsequently, on December 14, 2015, Alvarado again, allegedly intentionally and
maliciously, confiscated Plaintiff’s prescription glasses and wrote a misbehavior report (“First
Report”) against him. At a hearing related to the misbehavior report, Plaintiff was found guilty,
but the hearing officer ordered that Plaintiff receive his glasses. Plaintiff never received his glasses
because another Corrections Officer mailed them to Plaintiff’s mother. Plaintiff then filed another
grievance for how Alvarado interfered, denied, and changed Plaintiff’s medical treatment by
confiscating his glasses. Plaintiff also filed an Article 78 proceeding, challenging the determination
made in Plaintiff’s initial misbehavior report. The proceeding reversed the first disposition and
ruled in Plaintiff’s favor.
Alvarado is not a medical staff member, Plaintiff’s Health Care Provider, nor an
Orthopedic Specialist. Plaintiff asserts that Alvarado was aware of Plaintiff’s medical condition
and was present numerous times when Plaintiff sought medical treatment due to his back pain and
saw Plaintiff walking with a cane, in pain, and bent forward. Plaintiff asserts that Alvarado never
consulted with medical staff, nor obtained authorization from them to wrongfully confiscate
Plaintiff’s cane and prescription eyeglasses.
Plaintiff states that Alvarado knows that a medical pass is prescribed by medical staff for
medical treatment, and therefore, Alvarado abused his authority and disregarded Plaintiff’s
medical needs. Plaintiff also claims that Alvarado retaliated against Plaintiff for filing the Article
78 proceeding. Plaintiff claims that Alvarado did so by filing the second misbehavior report on
September 15, 2017 (“Second Report”). This led Plaintiff to file another Article 78 proceeding that
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reversed the result of the Second Report in Alvarado’s favor. Plaintiff consequently seeks
monetary and punitive damages for his pain and suffering and for Alvarado’s “maliciousness.”
LEGAL STANDARD
Motion to Dismiss
On a 12(b)(6) motion, dismissal is proper unless the complaint “contain[s] sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When
there are well-pled factual allegations in the complaint, “a court should assume their veracity and
then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679.
The critical inquiry is whether the plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to nudge the claims
“across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A motion to dismiss
will be denied where the allegations “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
Courts must construe pro se pleadings in a particularly liberal fashion, Harris v. Mills, 572
F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them “to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest,”
Harris v. City of N.Y., 607 F.3d 18, 24 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
Nevertheless, a pro se plaintiff’s pleading must contain factual allegations that sufficiently “raise
a right to relief above the speculative level,” Jackson v. N.Y.S. Dep’t of Labor, 709 F. Supp. 2d
218, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), and the Court’s duty to construe the complaint liberally is not “the
equivalent of a duty to re-write it,” Geldzahler v. New York Medical College, 663 F. Supp. 2d 379,
387 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
Medical Deliberate Indifference
A claim for inadequate medical care is born out of the Eighth Amendment’s protection
against cruel and unusual punishment. Caiozzo v. Koreman, 581 F.3d 63, 69 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing
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Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 856 (2d Cir. 1996)). To be entitled to relief, a plaintiff must plead
and prove “deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.” Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d
63, 66 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)) (alterations omitted).
Deliberate indifference is a dual-pronged analysis requiring proof of both an objective and
subjective prong. Id. The objective prong mandates that the deprivation be, “in objective terms,
sufficiently serious.” Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotations
omitted). Then, to satisfy the subjective prong, a plaintiff must show that the official acted with
“a sufficiently culpable state of mind,” see Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991), in that the
official “must know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; [he] must both
be aware of facts from which the inference can be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011)
(quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)).
Retaliation
Prison officials are prohibited from retaliating against prisoners for exercising their
constitutional rights. See Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 872 (2d Cir. 1995). Courts should
consider retaliation claims with skepticism, Turner v. Sidorowicz, No. 12-CV-7048(NSR), 2014
WL 641454, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2014), as they are “prone to abuse since prisoners can claim
retaliation for every decision they dislike,” Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1996)
(quoting Flaherty v. Coughlin, 713 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 1983)) (internal quotations omitted). A
claim for retaliation is properly pled by allegations: “(1) that the speech or conduct at issue was
protected, (2) that the defendant took adverse action against the plaintiff, and (3) that there was a
causal connection between the protected speech and the adverse action.” Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d

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346, 352 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Dawes v. Walker, 239 F.3d 489, 492 (2d Cir. 2001)). It is well
settled that “the filing of prison grievances is a constitutionally protected activity.” Id.
Qualified Immunity
Absent abrogation by Congress, a state is immune from suit in federal court. Seminole
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54-56 (1996). This immunity extends to “arms of the state,”
which includes “officers employed by agencies such as” DOCCS. Dube, 900 F.2d at 594-95.
Section 1983 claims against state officers in their official capacity are ripe for dismissal, as those
officials are not considered “person[s] within the meaning of the statute.” Id. (citing Reynolds v.
Barrett, 685 F.3d 193, 204 (2d Cir. 2012)).
Further, “[q]ualified immunity shields government officials from liability for civil damages
as a result of their performance of discretionary functions.” Lennon v. Miller, 66 F.3d 416, 420 (2d
Cir. 1995). The shield operates insofar as government actors’ conduct “does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Id.
(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738 (1982)). The immunity
protects a government actor if it was “objectively reasonable” for him to believe that his actions
were lawful at the time of the challenged act.” Id. (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,
641 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3039 97 L. Ed. 2d 523, 640 (1987). “The objective reasonableness test is
met—and the defendant is entitled to immunity—if ‘officers of reasonable competence could
disagree’ on the legality of the defendant's actions.” Id. (citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
Deliberate Indifference
For Plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of deliberate indifference, he must satisfy both
the subjective and objective prongs of the deliberate indifference test for either the confiscation of
his cane, his eyeglasses, or both.
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A. Objective Prong
The objective prong requires a two-part inquiry. Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 280
(2d Cir. 2006). First, there must be an actual “deprivation of adequate medical care,” id. at 279;
reasonable care is not a deprivation, see Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844-47. Then, the Court must
determine whether that deprivation is sufficiently serious—that is, whether it produces “a
condition of urgency [or] may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain.” Hill, 657 F.3d at
122 (citing Hathaway v. Coughlin, 99 F.3d 550, 553 (2d Cir. 1996)).
Here, the fact that Plaintiff’s cane and eyeglasses were confiscated suffices as a
“deprivation.” That leaves the requirement that the deprivation be sufficiently serious such that it
results in a “condition of urgency” or produces “death, degeneration, or extreme pain.” Id.
In its last decision, the Court already held that “Plaintiff has alleged severe back pain which
results from his herniated and bulging discs, a sufficiently serious condition [because] such
condition is associated with extreme pain and leads to degeneration.” (Order at 10) (citations
omitted). The Court also held that the central claim against Alvarado—that he “interfered with
Plaintiff’s medical treatment when he confiscated Plaintiff’s cane despite [Plaintiff] having a
medical pass for it” was an actual deprivation because “by confiscating his cane, Alvarado denied
him medical treatment.” (Id. at 11.) Hence, the Court has already found that Alvarado’s depriving
Plaintiff of his cane – a prescribed medical treatment for his herniated disks – fully satisfies the
objective prong for deliberate indifference. In this regard, nothing has changed.
The Court next turns to Plaintiff’s eyeglasses. Here, it finds that Plaintiff’s repleaded
allegations add little beyond what was already in the Complaint. The Court finds that, as before,
the AC does not allege that Plaintiff’s eyeglasses were required to treat a “serious medical need”
related to vision. That is still the case, and Plaintiff has not elaborated, in his AC, what harm, if
any, the new deficiency has caused or will cause Plaintiff.
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In his brief, however, Plaintiff has added a few details relating to his need for glasses,
including that he was “prescribed transition eyeglasses for reading” and “transition lenses due to
headaches when out in the sun.” (Pl. Opp. at 5-6.) He also claims that he “suffered headaches at
the times when he was outdoors under the sun and was unable to do certain job assignment related
duties (read documents, briefs, do legal research, etc…), college homework… and everyday
reading.” (Id.) Defendants argue that such allegations do not make Plaintiff’s condition
“sufficiently serious” (Def. Rep. at 4.) Unlike the case Plaintiff cites, they state “Plaintiff does not
allege that the alleged headaches were debilitating or cause him severe and constant pain.” (Id.)
The Court agrees. Even forgiving the fact that these additional facts appear in Plaintiff’s
brief and not the AC, see Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, No. 10-cv-891, 2013 WL 4779639 (S.D.N.Y.
July 8, 2013) (permitting court to consider factual allegations contained in a pro se litigant’s
opposition papers that were not in four corners of complaint), such allegations do not rise to the
level of severity found in Koehl v. Dalsheim, 85 F.3d 86, 87 (2d Cir. 1996), nor the general level
of severity contemplated by the Eighth Amendment. Cf. Beauvoir v. Falco, 345 F. Supp. 3d 350,
373 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (NSR) (explaining that the Eight Amendment prohibits unduly harsh
penalties not de minimus deprivations).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims based on the deprivation of his eyeglasses do not meet the
objective prong of the deliberate indifference test as currently pleaded. Therefore, the Court
continues its analysis with regards to Alvarado’s confiscating Plaintiff’s cane and medical passes.
B. Subjective Prong
Where deliberate indifference is concerned, negligence or medical malpractice will not
“rise to the level of a constitutional violation unless the malpractice involves culpable
recklessness.” Hill, 657 F.3d at 123 (citing Chance, 143 F.3d at 703) (internal quotations and
alterations omitted). Relatedly, where a prisoner “receives adequate treatment”, he “does not have
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the right to choose” the treatment he receives. Id. (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. 97); see also Chance,
143 F.3d at 703 (noting that a prisoner’s preference for different treatment does not rise to the level
of an Eighth Amendment violation).
By a thread, Plaintiff has satisfied the subjective prong regarding Alvarado’s confiscation
of his cane. The AC alleges slightly more detail about Alvarado’s mental state than it did
previously – and not by simply inserting the conclusory boilerplate language that Alvarado
“intentionally and maliciously discriminated with willful or wanton negligence or recklessness or
conscious disregard of Plaintiff’s rights or conduct so reckless as to amount to such disregard with
evil motive or intent, deliberate indifference….” Rather, the AC substantively adds:
•

“This defendant was aware of Plaintiff’s medical condition when he was present
numerous times when Plaintiff had to seek medical treatment due to his back pain;
including when correction staff would occasionally inquire when Plaintiff was seen
walking with a cane in severe pain and bent forward.”

•

“Alvarado never consulted with medical or obtained authorization from medical staff
to wrongfully and illegally confiscate … Plaintiff’s cane and prescription eyeglasses
on two (2) separate occasions; changing and denying Plaintiff’s prescribed medical
care/treatment.”
These statements allow Plaintiff to overcome the flaws from his previous pleadings, which

relayed that Alvarado had only once tried to confiscate an item for which Plaintiff had a medical
need and had done so under the guidance of medical authority. The new allegations assert that
Alvarado’s conduct was subjective similarly to Dr. Gage’s and constituted “a deliberate choice to
deny the treatment.” (See Opinion at 13-15.) Therefore, Alvarado’s confiscating Plaintiff’s cane
and medical passes are plausibly alleged violations of his Eighth Amendment rights. Accordingly,
Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against Alvarado is denied.
Retaliation
A claim for retaliation is properly pled by allegations: “(1) that the speech or conduct at
issue was protected, (2) that the defendant took adverse action against the plaintiff, and (3) that
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there was a causal connection between the protected speech and the adverse action.” Davis v.
Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 352 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Dawes v. Walker, 239 F.3d 489, 492 (2d Cir.
2001)). Further, “[t]he causal connection must be sufficient to support an inference that the
protected conduct played a substantial part in the adverse action.” Baskerville v. Blot, 224 F.Supp.
2d 723, 732 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
Turning to the first requirement, it is well settled that “the filing of prison grievances is a
constitutionally protected activity”, see Davis, 320 F.3d at 352; thus, Plaintiff’s allegations that he
filed two grievances against Alvarado satisfy the first prong.
Focusing next on the adverse action, Plaintiff has pled this too. To be adverse, the
retaliatory conduct must “deter a similarly situated individual of ordinary firmness from exercising
his or her constitutional rights;” if not, “the retaliatory act is simply de minimis . . . .” Id. at 353.
The test is objective and applies “even where a particular plaintiff was not himself subjectively
deterred.” Gill v. Pidlypchak, 389 F.3d 379, 381 (2d Cir. 2004).
Construing Plaintiff’s complaint liberally, Plaintiff claims that Alvarado retaliated against
him by: 1) confiscating his prescription glasses and medical passes for his cane, bus, and shower;
and 2) by filing two false misbehavior reports against him. (AC at 6-8.) Both of these qualify as
adverse actions. See Williams v. Fisher, No. 02-CV-4558(LMM), 2003 WL 22170610, at *11
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2003) (finding revocation of necessary medical rehabilitative treatment
enough for adverse action); Arriaga v. Gage, No. 16-CV-1628 (NSR), 2018 WL 1750320
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2018) (finding that interferences with Plaintiff’s medical passes constituted
adverse actions).
This leaves the last prong—that there be a causal connection between the protected speech
and the adverse action. Defendants argue that there is no causal connection between the Plaintiff’s
grievance that was filed on May 2015 and Alvarado’s misbehavior report that was filed seven
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months later in December 2015. (Def. Mem. at 7.) They also argue that there is no connection
between the misbehavior report that Alvarado filed in September 2017, which was more than a
year after Plaintiff filed his second grievance. (Id. at 8.)
The Court disagrees with the Defendants. The facts reflect that Plaintiff filed his first
grievance on May 13, 2015, which regarded his being unable to get his medical passes signed.
Alvarado confiscated Plaintiff’s cane and medical passes on May 26, 2015. Thus, Alvarado’s first
set of allegedly retaliatory acts took place less than two weeks after Plaintiff engaged in
constitutionally protected activity and easily satisfy a showing of causation.
The purported retaliation related to Plaintiff’s second grievance is harder to see. While the
AC reflects that Plaintiff filed a grievance in response to the December 14, 2015 incident, shortly
after Alvarado confiscated Plaintiff’s glasses and issued the first misbehavior report, there is no
date provided for when the second grievance was filed and when the related Article 78 proceeding
commenced or culminated. Absent any additional facts regarding the temporal proximity of
Plaintiff’s second grievance and Alvarado’s second misbehavior report, the Court finds it near
impossible to find a causal relationship sufficient to support retaliation based on timing alone.
That said, the series of events with Alvarado’s pattern of repeatedly filing misbehavior
reports shortly after Plaintiff files grievances related to his medical needs, in conjunction with the
repeated outcomes of the Article 78 hearings, certainly support a theory of retaliation, particularly
since Alvarado filed his first misbehavior report hardly two weeks after Plaintiff’s first grievance.
Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the retaliation claim against Alvarado is denied.
Qualified Immunity
The Court already ruled in its last decision that qualified immunity protects each Defendant
in their official capacity. The issue here is whether there are enough facts to establish that Alvarado
was acting in his official capacity, and not according to his personal prerogative.
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Defendant argues that Alvarado is entitled to qualified immunity because in addition to
Plaintiff not establishing the violation of a clearly protected constitutional right, “the facts alleged
do not plausibly show that Plaintiff suffered a sufficiently serious deprivation of medical care to
due to CO Alvarado’s alleged deliberate indifference.” (Def. Mem. at 9) (emphasis added). In
other words, Defendant argues, “the facts alleged do not establish that CO Alvarado personally
made the decision to confiscate Plaintiff’s cane and/or eyeglasses.” (Id.) (emphasis added).
Defendant adds that Alvarado is entitled to qualified immunity “for the additional reasons that he
reasonably believed that confiscating Plaintiff’s cane upon the direction of medical staff did not
violate any clearly established federal right belonging to the Plaintiff.” (Id.)
The Court has already found that Plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated. Hence,
Defendant’s first argument is a non-starter. As to the argument that the alleged facts reflect that
Alvarado did not personally make the decision to confiscate Plaintiff’s cane or eyeglasses, but did
so upon the direction of medical staff, the AC states otherwise:
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“Alvarado… intentionally and maliciously discriminated…by confiscating my cane
and medical passes for my cane, bus, shower, etc… (allegedly under the direction of
‘medical staff’)” (AC at 6.)

•

“Alvarado had no authority to change or take away my medical treatment since he is
not my doctor; nor can medical staff give him authorization to do so.” (Id.)

•

“Alvarado never consulted with medical or obtained authorization from medical staff
to wrongfully and illegally confiscate (these confiscations are outside the scope of
Defendant’s job duties and violations of law) Plaintiff’s cane and prescription
eyeglasses…” (Id. at 7.)

•

“Alvarado does not claim that he consulted with medical staff nor is there any evidence
to support this lie.” (Id.)
Giving the AC a liberal construction, it certainly alleges that Alvarado made these

decisions independently, and based on no oral or written authority from any medical staff, despite
his statements to the contrary. On these facts, Defendant’s claim of qualified immunity cannot
stand. Hence, the motion to dismiss the other claims on this basis, too, is denied.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion is DENIED. The Clerk of the Court is
respectfully directed to terminate the Motion at ECF No. 90. Alvarado is directed to file an answer
on before May 24, 2019.
After filing an answer, Defendant is directed to confer with Plaintiff and submit a
completed case management to the Court by June 14, 2019. The Clerk of the Court is respectfully
directed to mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff at his address as listed on ECF.

Dated: May 9, 2019
White Plains, New York

SO ORDERED:

it::!ELSON S. ROMAN
United States District Judge

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