Colindres v. County of Westchester, New York et al

Filing 215

OPINION & ORDER re: 177 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Pre-Arrest Evidence filed by M. C., 181 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Defendants' Second Expert filed by M. C., 174 MOTION in Limine on behalf of WCDOH D efendants filed by Sherlita Amler, Germaine Jacquette, Laural Skelson, County of Westchester, New York, Cheryl Archbald, Huang, 179 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Five Categories of Evidence That is More Prejudicial than Probative filed by M. C., 184 MOTION in Limine to Preclude Defendants From Calling Witnesses Defendants Did Not Previously Identify filed by M. C. For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion to preclude all eviden ce that predates Plaintiff's April 23, 2015 arrest and involuntary hospitalization, (ECF No. 178) and GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Plaintiffs motion to preclude the introduction of statements made by or about Dennis Paterra, (ECF No. 179.) The Court DENIES Defendants' motion for an order precluding evidence of settlement discussions, GRANTS Defendants' motion to preclude Dr. George DiFerdinando's expert testimony, and GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants' mo tion to preclude Plaintiff from requesting a specific amount of damages and any damages from prior to May 23, 2015. (ECF No. 174.) The Court addressed the rest of the parties' motions on the record during the final pretrial conference held on April 8, 2022. (ECF Nos. 177, 181, and 184.) The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motions at ECF Nos. 174, 177, 179, 181, and 184. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Nelson Stephen Roman on 4/13/2022) (mml)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
M.C.,
Plaintiff,

4/13/2022

-againstCOUNTY OF WESTCHESTER, NEW YORK;
ADA HUANG; GERMAINE JACQUETTE; and
SHERLITA AMLER,

16-cv-3013 (NSR)
OPINION & ORDER

Defendants.
NELSON S. ROMÁN, United States District Judge
Plaintiff M.C. (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”)
against the County of Westchester, New York, Sherlita Amler, Ada Huang, and Germaine
Jacquette, (collectively, the “Defendants”) for claims arising from alleged retaliation in violation
of the First Amendment and abuse of process. 1 (ECF No. 155.) Trial is scheduled to begin on
April 25, 2022. In anticipation, both parties have filed pre-trial motions in limine. (ECF Nos. 174;
177; 179; 181; & 184.) For the following reasons, the parties’ motions are GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part.
BACKGROUND
This Opinion assumes the familiarity with the underlying claims, factual allegations, and
procedural history in this matter. See M.C. v. Cty. of Westchester, No 16-cv-3013 (NSR), 2020
WL 7481023 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2020).

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By Opinion and Order dated December 18, 2020, this Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’
motion for summary judgment, granting summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s claims against Westchester Medical
Center and Miral A. Subhani, and Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Fourth Amendment and substantive due process claims,
malicious prosecution claim, and false imprisonment claims against the remaining Defendants. (ECF No. 155). In
addition, on April 6, 2022, the Court so-ordered a stipulation dismissing all claims against Defendants Cheryl
Archibald and Laurel Skelson. (ECF No. 206.)

LEGAL STANDARD
“A district court’s inherent authority to manage the course of its trials encompasses the
right to rule on motions in limine.” Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P. v. Schneider, 551 F. Supp. 2d
173, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4 (1984)). An in limine
motion is intended “to aid the trial process by enabling the Court to rule in advance of trial on the
relevance of certain forecasted evidence, as to issues that are definitely set for trial, without lengthy
argument at, or interruption of, the trial.” Palmieri v. Defaria, 88 F.3d 136, 141 (2d Cir. 1996).
“Because a ruling on a motion in limine is ‘subject to change as the case unfolds,’ this ruling
constitutes a preliminary determination in preparation for trial.” United States v. Perez, No. 09–
CR–1153 (MEA), 2011 WL 1431985, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2011) (quoting Palmieri, 88 F.3d
at 139).
DISCUSSION
Both parties have moved in limine to preclude certain testimonial or documentary evidence.
The Court addressed the majority of the issues raised in the parties’ papers on the record during
the final pretrial conference held on April 8, 2022. Plaintiff’s only outstanding motions include
requests for an order (i) excluding evidence of events occurring prior to his April 23, 2015 arrest
and involuntary hospitalization, and (ii) excluding statements by or about Dennis Paterra in
relation to Plaintiff’s detention and treatment. (ECF Nos. 177 & 179.) Defendants’ remaining
motions include requests for an order (i) excluding evidence of settlement discussions in which
counsel for the County asked for a release; (ii) excluding the expert testimony of Dr. George
DiFerdinando; and (iii) precluding Plaintiff from seeking monetary damages relating to his
medical confinement. (ECF No. 174.) The Court will examine each in turn.

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I.

Plaintiff’s Motions
a. Evidence of Events Prior to April 23, 2015
Plaintiff first moves to preclude all evidence that predates Plaintiff’s April 23, 2015

arrest and involuntary hospitalization.

(ECF No. 178.)

Specifically, Plaintiff requests the

Court exclude four medical records and two administrative and judicial treatment orders that all
predate April 23, 2015, and testimony from six witnesses including Dr. Ada Huang, Dr.
Germaine Jacquette,

Dr.

Sherita

Amler,

Irma

Cosgriff,

Dr.

Joseph

Westchester County Department of Health outreach worker John Castaneda.

Cooke,

and

(Id. at 10.)

Plaintiff avers that the only remaining claims in this case involve Defendants’ decision to
continue holding Plaintiff, and this evidence would be more prejudicial than probative under
Rule 403 and would result in factual disputes that risk creating mini-trials within the trial that
would confuse the jury. (Id. at 10-21.) Plaintiff also avers that Rule 404 prohibits the use of this
evidence to prove his propensity for later conduct. (Id. at 21-23.)
In opposition, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s actions and conduct predating his arrest are
clearly relevant to determine whether there is a causal connection between the filing of the notice
of claim and Defendants seeking to extend his confinement. (ECF No. 188 at 3-5.) Defendants
intend to show that the extension of Plaintiff’s confinement would have been made regardless of
the notice of claim, and to do so Defendants must show the jury what they reasonably believed to
be Plaintiff’s actions before confinement. (Id. at 5-6.)
i. Rule 403
The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that only relevant evidence is admissible. Fed. R.
Evid. 402. Evidence is relevant if “it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than
it would be without the evidence; and . . . the fact is of consequence in determining the action.”

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Fed. R. Evid. 401(a)-(b). Relevant evidence may still be excluded by the Court “if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice,
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting
cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. Though the “standard of relevance established by the
Federal Rules of Evidence is not high,” United States v. Southland Corp., 760 F.2d 1366, 1375
(2d Cir. 1985), the Court has “broad discretion to balance probative value against possible
prejudice” under Rule 403. United States v. Bermudez, 529 F.3d 158, 161 (2d Cir. 2008).
Here, the Court holds that the probative value of the pre-arrest evidence is not outweighed
by any potential prejudice under Rule 403. To succeed on his First Amendment retaliation claim,
Plaintiff must show “(1) that the speech or conduct at issue was protected, (2) that the defendant
took adverse action against the plaintiff, and (3) that there was a causal connection between the
protected speech and the adverse action.” Scott v. Coughlin, 344 F.3d 282, 287 (2d Cir. 2003).
However, as argued by Defendants, “where the challenged action ‘is motivated by both proper and
improper reasons, the action may be sustained if it would have been taken even in the absence of
the improper reason.’” Williams v. Temple, 349 F. App’x 594, 596 (2d Cir. 2009). Defendants
intend to show at trial that the extension of Plaintiff’s detainment was sought for proper reasons,
including worries about his pre-arrest behavior. (ECF No. 188 at 3.) As the Court held in its
previous Opinion and Order, “Plaintiff rejected medical interventions on several occasions, which
is probative of whether Plaintiff could be trusted to manage his illness in concert with medical
professionals going forward . . . .” M.C., 2020 WL 7481023, at *12. Evidence regarding Plaintiff’s
diagnosis of TB and how he responded to treatment is plainly relevant to determining whether
Defendants had a reason, other than the notice of claim, to extend his confinement. This probative
value outweighs any Rule 403 factors of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading

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the jury. Any factual issues surrounding Plaintiff’s efforts to diagnose and treat his condition shall
be determined by the jury.
ii. Rule 404
Evidence of a party’s character trait or other bad acts or conduct are typically sought to be
introduced pursuant to Rule 404. Rule 404(a) states that “[e]vidence of a person’s character or
character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in
accordance with the character or trait.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)(1). Rule 404(b) provides in relevant
part, that:
Evidence of other crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove a person’s
character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in
accordance with the character. This evidence may be admissible for another
purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1)-(2). To determine the admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs
or acts under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), the Court conducts a three-part inquiry. Huddleston v. United
States, 485 U.S. 681, 691 (1988). A reviewing court must consider whether the evidence (1) is
offered for a proper purpose; (2) is relevant to a material issue in dispute; and (3) has probative
value such that it substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. Id. at 691–92. If after conducting
the relevant inquiry the evidence is deemed admissible, the Court shall give an appropriate limiting
instruction to the jury, if requested by the party opposing its admission. Id.
Here, the Court holds that Rule 404 does not prevent evidence of Plaintiff’s pre-arrest
behavior from being admitted. The evidence will be offered for a proper purpose—to show
Defendants’ reasoning as to why they sought to continue Plaintiff’s confinement. As Defendants
argue, they intend to present the evidence to the jury to show that Plaintiff’s prior actions

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influenced the Defendants’ decisions. (ECF No. 188 at 12.) Therefore, the evidence will not be
used to show Plaintiff’s propensity to act consistent with any character trait or prior acts.
Accordingly, evidence of Plaintiff’s pre-arrest actions will be admissible. The Court will
provide a limiting instruction to the jury to prevent any improper inference be drawn from this
evidence.
b. Statements Made by Dennis Paterra
Plaintiff next requests the Court preclude Defendants from introducing statements made
by or about Dennis Paterra, Plaintiff’s legal guardian. (ECF No. 180.) The testimony focuses on
Paterra’s comments and demeanor to medical professionals, and generally describes him as
“hostile” or “angry.” (Id. at 6-7.) Plaintiff argues these statements are inadmissible under Rule
403 as well as under Rule 802 as hearsay. (Id.) In response, Defendants aver this testimony is
probative as Plaintiff lacked capacity to understand his diagnosis and he was going to be living
with Paterra, and therefore Paterra’s views and demeanor are relevant to the Defendants’ treatment
of Plaintiff. (ECF No. 186 at 3-4.)
First, while the Court agrees that Paterra’s views about Plaintiff’s disease and treatment
are probative, comments about his demeanor are not, and the prejudicial nature of these comments
would outweigh any probative value.

Therefore, statements about Paterra’s demeanor are

inadmissible under Rule 403. Other statements about Paterra’s views regarding Plaintiff’s care
are probative and therefore admissible under Rule 403.
Second, the statements within the medical records are not hearsay. Under Federal Rules
of Evidence 801 and 802, hearsay is not admissible if offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted in the statement. Further, when a party intends to submit an out of court document which
itself contains out of court statements, the party must resolve each level of hearsay. See Rodriguez

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v. Modern Handling Equip. of NJ, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 2d 612, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Double
hearsay is not admissible unless each level of hearsay is covered by an exception to the hearsay
rule.”). Here, Defendants aver that the statements about Paterra are contained in business records.
Business records, even if hearsay, are admissible if the following elements are met:
(A) the record was made at or near the time by—or from information transmitted
by—someone with knowledge; (B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly
conducted activity of a business, organization, occupation, or calling, whether or
not for profit; (C) making the record was a regular practice of that activity; (D) all
these conditions are shown by the testimony of the custodian or another qualified
witness . . . ; and (E) the opponent does not show that the source of information or
the method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness.
Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). Under Rule 803(6), “medical records are considered business records.”
Middleton v. Rivera, No. 05 Civ. 3145(SCR)(LMS), 2010 WL 4242852, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9,
2010). “Rule 803(6) favors the admission of evidence rather than its exclusion if it has any
probative value at all.” United States v. Kaiser, 609 F.3d 556, 574 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “‘[T]he principal precondition to admission of documents as business
records pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 803(6) is that the records have sufficient indicia of
trustworthiness to be considered reliable.’” Elsevier B.V. v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., 784 F. Supp.
2d 286, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting Potamkin Cadillac Corp. v. B.R.I. Coverage Corp., 38 F.3d
627, 632–33 (2d Cir. 1994)).
Plaintiff argues that the statements about Paterra within the business records consist of
double hearsay, and therefore must still be excluded. (ECF No. 199 at 3.) However, Defendants
aver that the statements within the records are being offered to show their effect on Defendants,
not to prove Paterra acted a certain way or made certain statements. (ECF No. 186 at 3.) “Where
statements are offered to show their effect on a listener’s state of mind, they are not hearsay.”
Denigris v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 552 F. App’x 3, 6 (2d Cir. 2013); see also

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Walker v. Kubicz, 996 F. Supp. 336, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding although prison physician’s
statement of nephrologist’s opinion was inadmissible to prove truth of matter asserted, such
statement was admissible to prove prison physician’s state of mind as to proper treatment for
inmate plaintiff). Therefore, the Court holds that the statements about Paterra’s reactions to
Plaintiff’s treatment within the records are not hearsay as they are not being admitted for their
truth.
II.

Defendants’ Motions
a. Evidence of Settlement Discussions
Defendants first move for this Court to issue an order precluding evidence of settlement

discussions. (ECF No. 176.) Specifically, Defendants aver that the June 17, 2015 email sent by
Defendants’ counsel offering to release Plaintiff from his involuntary hospitalization if he agreed
to certain conditions, including to sign a release for his claims set forth in his notice of claim,
should be precluded under Rules 408 and 407. (Id. at 3.)
Under Rule 408, evidence of “conduct or a statement made during compromise
negotiations about the claim” is not admissible to “prove or disprove the validity or amount of a
disputed claim or to impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or a contradiction.” Fed. R. Evid.
408(a)(2). Plaintiff argues he seeks to offer this evidence to prove a violation of his First
Amendment rights, not to prove the validity of his claims contained in the notice of claim or the
invalidity of the order to show cause. (ECF No. 195 at 2-3.) In the Court’s previous Opinion and
Order, it stated that Plaintiff had provided “evidence that [] Defendants expressly conditioned their
willingness to discharge Plaintiff upon his release of claims against them during discussions that
occurred while he was still detained.” M.C., 2020 WL 7481023, at *22. The June 17, 2015 email
is one such piece of evidence, not used to prove the validity of Plaintiff’s claims within the notice

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of claim, but instead to prove the causal connection between Plaintiff’s notice of claim and his
continued confinement. Therefore, the evidence is admissible under Rule 408.
Rule 407 states there where “measures are taken that would have made an earlier injury or
harm less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove
negligence; culpable conduct; a defect in a product or its design; or a need for a warning or
instruction.” Fed. R. Evid. R. 407. Defendants argue that the June 17, 2015 email should be
precluded as it may allow Plaintiff to argue that “the willingness on June 16, 2015 to allow him to
be released under the Medical Conditions is evidence that there was no need for the May 18, 2015
application to extend his confinement” which is essentially arguing “his harm would have been
less likely to occur had Defendants taken the remedial measure of imposing the Medical
Conditions in May 2015.” (ECF No. 176 at 5.)
The Court is not convinced that Rule 407 applies here. As Defendants acknowledge, “the
facts on the ground were different in June than they were in May” and therefore it is hard to
understand how the June 17, 2015 email containing conditions for Plaintiff’s release in June could
be considered a measure taken that would have made an earlier injury or harm less likely to occur.
(ECF No. 196 at 4.) While Plaintiff is trying to prove that he should have been released by
Defendants earlier, the fact that Defendants provided several medical conditions in June does not
prove that these same conditions could have been made in May and could have prevented
Plaintiff’s harm.
Defendants lastly argue that the statements made in the email, sent by the County
Attorney’s Office, cannot be imputed to the remaining Defendants. (ECF No. 176 at 5-6.)
Defendants state that the attorney who sent the email, Castro-Blanco, was not retained by
Defendants, as they are required by law to utilize the Office of the County Attorney. (Id.)

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However, “[s]tatements made by an attorney concerning a matter within his employment may be
admissible against the party retaining the attorney.” United States v. Margiotta, 662 F.2d 131, 142
(2d Cir. 1981).

Here, it is undisputed that Castro-Blanco was retained by the individual

Defendants, even if they were required by law to do so.
Accordingly, the June 17, 2015 email is admissible. In an abundance of caution, the Court
will provide a limiting instruction to the jury that states the document may not be considered to
prove or disprove the validity of Defendant’s allegations within the notice of claim, or as evidence
that there were measures that could have been taken that would have made Plaintiff’s injury or
harm less likely to have occurred.
b. Dr. George DiFerdinando’s Expert Testimony
Next, Defendants aver that Dr. George DiFerdinando’s expert testimony should be
precluded under Rule 702. (ECF No. 176 at 7.) Plaintiff identified Dr. DiFerdinando’s testimony
to include “public health standards, protocols, and risk of infection related to tuberculosis treatment
and TB patient confinement/isolation.” (Id.) However, Defendants aver that in this Court’s
previous Opinion and Order, it held that Dr. DiFerdinando’s expert report failed to identify medical
standards and instead expressed his personal judgment. (Id.) Specifically, the Court held:
The DiFerdinando Report does not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether Defendants failed to meet applicable medical standards with respect to the
involuntary confinement of Plaintiff because Dr. DiFerdinando fails to identify any
standard generally accepted in the medical community. A review of the entire
report and each of the conclusions of Dr. DiFerdinando quoted by Plaintiff as
relevant to this inquiry reveals that Dr. DiFerdinando never purports to define any
generally accepted standard and that each of his conclusions were made without
reference to an operative accepted medical standard.
M.C., 2020 WL 7481023, at *18. In response, Plaintiff argues that the Court only addressed Dr.
DiFerdinando’s report in the context of Plaintiff’s substantive due process claim, which requires
expert testimony regarding applicable medical standards. (ECF No. 195 at 8-9.)
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The testimony of an expert at trial must be reliable and relevant. The standards governing
the admissibility of expert testimony are set forth in Rule 702, which provides that “[a] witness
who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in
the form of an opinion” if four conditions are met: (1) “the expert’s scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue”; (2) “the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data”; (3) “the testimony is the product
of reliable principles and methods”; and (4) “the expert has reliably applied the principles and
methods to the facts of the case.” Fed. R. Evid. 702.
This rule imposes a “gatekeeping” function upon courts, meaning that courts must ensure
“that an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.”
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993). Even so, the standard for
admissibility under Rule 702 is “liberal” and represents “a more permissive approach to expert
testimony.” Nimely v. City of New York, 414 F.3d 381, 395–96 (2d Cir. 2005). In fulfilling their
gatekeeping function, courts “must determine ‘whether the proffered testimony has a sufficiently
‘reliable foundation’ to permit it to be considered.’” Amorgianos v. Amtrak, 303 F.3d 256, 265
(2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Campbell v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 239 F.3d 179, 184 (2d Cir.
2001)).
Defendants aver that Dr. DiFerdinando’s failure to identify medical standards shows that
his opinion lacks foundation. (ECF No. 176 at 7-8.) The Court agrees. While the Court’s previous
Opinion and Order only analyzes Dr. DiFerdinando’s report in evaluating Plaintiff’s previous
substantive due process claim, the Court still concluded that Dr. DiFerdinando’s report failed to
include any standard generally accepted in the medical community.

Therefore, Dr.

DiFerdinando has failed to show his expert opinions are a product of reliable principles and
methods, and
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therefore do not rest on a reliable foundation. Accordingly, Dr. DiFerdinando’s opinion testimony
will be precluded.
c. Monetary Damages Relating to Medical Confinement
Lastly, Defendants request the Court preclude Plaintiff from requesting a specific amount
of damages, and any damages from prior to May 23, 2015. (ECF No. 176 at 10-11.) Although the
Second Circuit has cautioned against this practice, stating “specifying target amounts for the jury
to award is disfavored,” Consorti v. Armstrong World Indus., 72 F.3d 1003, 1016 (2d Cir. 1995),
vacated on other grounds, 518 U.S. 1031 (1996), the determination of whether to allow a plaintiff
to request a specific amount of damages from the jury is within the Court’s discretion. See
Lightfoot v. Union Carbide Corp., 110 F.3d 898, 912 (2d Cir. 1997) (“It is best left to the discretion
of the trial judge, who may either prohibit counsel from mentioning specific figures or impose
reasonable limitations, including cautionary jury instructions.”). Therefore, the Court holds that
Plaintiff’s counsel will be permitted to suggest a specific amount of non-lost wage damages during
closing statements. However, Plaintiff’s counsel must notify Defendants’ counsel of the specific
amount before closing statements begin, in order to allow Defendants to respond if they choose to
do so.
In addition, the Court will preclude Plaintiff from seeking damages for the events prior to
the date that Defendants became aware of the notice of claim. The only remaining claims are for
retaliation and abuse of power relating to the extension of Plaintiff’s confinement. Any alleged
damages related to Defendants’ conduct before they became aware of the notice of claim are
therefore irrelevant and inadmissible. 2

Defendants also appear to argue that Plaintiff should be precluded from seeking compensatory damages
relating to his confinement as the Court previously ruled that “the superseding cause of Plaintiff’s detention was his
consent to continued confinement.” (ECF No. 176 at 10.) While Defendants appear to abandon this argument in
their reply, the Court will deny the request as this holding only applies to the extensions to Plaintiff’s confinement
2

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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to preclude all evidence
that predates Plaintiff’s April 23, 2015 arrest and involuntary hospitalization, (ECF No. 178) and
GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Plaintiff’s motion to preclude the introduction of statements
made by or about Dennis Paterra, (ECF No. 179.) The Court DENIES Defendants’ motion for an
order precluding evidence of settlement discussions, GRANTS Defendants’ motion to preclude
Dr. George DiFerdinando’s expert testimony, and GRANTS in part and DENIES in part
Defendants’ motion to preclude Plaintiff from requesting a specific amount of damages and any
damages from prior to May 23, 2015. (ECF No. 174.) The Court addressed the rest of the parties’
motions on the record during the final pretrial conference held on April 8, 2022. (ECF Nos. 177,
181, and 184.)
The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motions at ECF Nos. 174,
177, 179, 181, and 184.

Dated:

April 13, 2022
White Plains, New York

SO ORDERED:

________________________________
NELSON S. ROMÁN
United States District Judge

due to court adjournments, only relevant to Plaintiff’s previous Fourth Amendment and malicious prosecution
claims.

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