K.C. et al v. Chappaqua Central School District

Filing 40

OPINION & ORDER re: 24 FIRST MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings as to the Plaintiffs' Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action in the Complaint filed by Chappaqua Central School District. For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's M otion is denied. Because discovery is needed in order to ascertain the timeliness of both the IDEA claims and the Section 504 and ADA claims relating to the 2011-2012 school year, within 30 days of the date of this Opinion & Order, the Parties are to submit a proposed discovery schedule. Briefing on any motions for summary judgment with respect to the IDEA claims will be stayed until the Parties have had an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery with respect to the timeliness of those claims. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the pending Motion. (See Dkt. No. 24.) (Signed by Judge Kenneth M. Karas on 6/1/2017) (mml)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

K.C., individually and on behalf of J.C.T.,
M.T., individually and on behalf of J.C.T.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

No. 16-CV-3138 (KMK)
OPINION & ORDER

CHAPPAQUA CENTRAL SCHOOL
DISTRICT,
Defendant.

Appearances:
Rachel S. Asher, Esq.
Asher Gaughran, LLP
Armonk, NY
Counsel for Plaintiffs
Mark C. Rushfield, Esq.
Shaw, Perelson, May & Lambert, LLP
Poughkeepsie, NY
Counsel for Defendant
KENNETH M. KARAS, District Judge:
Plaintiffs K.C. and M.T. (collectively, “Plaintiffs” or the “Parents”), bring this Action on
behalf of their son, J.C.T. (“C.T.”), alleging that Defendant Chappaqua Central School District
(“Defendant” or the “District”) denied C.T. a free and appropriate public education (“FAPE”) for
the 2011–2012 and 2012–2013 school years, in violation of the Individuals With Disabilities
Education Act (the “IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1415 et seq., New York Education Law, N.Y. Educ.
Law §§ 4401, 4404, 4410, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“Section 504”), 29 U.S.C.
§ 794 et seq., and discriminated against C.T. in violation of Section 504 and Title II of the
Americans With Disabilities Act (the “ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12132. (See Compl. (Dkt. No. 1).)

Defendant has moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) for judgment on the
pleadings with respect to the Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action, relating to the District’s alleged
discrimination against C.T. For the reasons to follow, the Motion is denied.
I. Background
A. Factual Background
The following facts are taken from the allegations in the Complaint and are taken as true
for purposes of this Motion.
C.T., the child of Plaintiffs, was born in 1999 and was classified by Defendant as a
disabled student with emotional disturbance. (See id. ¶¶ 10–11.) C.T.’s academic struggles
sharply escalated in third grade, during which a clinical psychologist evaluated C.T., prescribed
medication, and found that some intervention was needed to address “his emotional fragility and
unevenly developing skills.” (Id. ¶¶ 18–21.) At this time, Defendant classified C.T. as “Other
Health Impaired,” but otherwise failed to address C.T.’s emotional and academic needs. (Id.
¶ 22.) At the age of nine, C.T. was seeing a pediatric psychiatrist and a neurologist and was
prescribed additional medication. (See id. ¶ 24.) In fifth grade, C.T.’s grades dropped and he
received negative reviews from his teachers, who cited his inability to do homework and his
behavioral problems in the classroom. (See id. ¶¶ 25–26.) C.T.’s special education teacher
wrote a report discussing C.T.’s academic and behavioral problems, but the report was never
produced to the Parents. (See id. ¶¶ 26–28.) Although the Parents and C.T.’s doctors requested
that the District provide C.T. with additional academic and emotional support, the District gave
no meaningful response to those requests. (See id. ¶ 29.) In the summer after fifth grade, C.T.’s
diagnosis was changed to early onset bipolar disorder and he began to gain weight. (See id.
¶¶ 30–31.)

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At the beginning of sixth grade, the District recognized that C.T. had regressed over the
summer and acknowledged that he had difficulty working independently and that he had
significant limitations with respect to his classroom participation. (See id. ¶¶ 32–33.) C.T.’s
behavioral problems escalated throughout sixth grade, and his testing scores fell. (See id. ¶¶ 35–
36.) Despite C.T.’s continuing problems, the District took little action to improve C.T.’s
situation, keeping him in mainstream classes with only limited special education support. (See
id. ¶ 40.) Although C.T.’s aide and teachers knew that C.T. was struggling and discussed his
difficulties in internal emails, those concerns were not shared with the Parents. (See id. ¶¶ 41–
42.) In the summer before seventh grade, C.T. went to day camp, but continued to struggle with
his behavioral issues. (See id. ¶¶ 44–45.) During the summer, he was twice hospitalized at Four
Winds Psychiatric Hospital, and the Parents informed the District of those hospitalizations. (See
id. ¶¶ 46–49.)
C.T.’s seventh grade year started in 2011 and ran until 2012, and is the subject of this
Motion. C.T.’s Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) for seventh grade was virtually
identical to his IEP in sixth grade: C.T. was kept in large, mainstream classes and only received
counseling with a school guidance counselor. (See id. ¶ 50.) As the Parents learned in reports
that were not disclosed until 2014, C.T. struggled to interact with his fellow students and spent
much of the day wandering the halls. (See id. ¶ 52.) The District made no effort to address those
issues, although the Parents repeatedly asked that the District transfer C.T. to a smaller,
therapeutic school. (See id. ¶ 53.) C.T. continued to struggle academically, and he largely
refused to do homework. (See id. ¶ 55.)
At home, C.T.’s behavior became problematic, and the Parents called the police to their
home on four occasions during the school year when C.T. became violent and aggressive. (See

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id. ¶ 56.) Although the Parents informed the District each time they called the police, the District
offered no response. (See id. ¶ 57.) Meanwhile, C.T. began eating compulsively at school and
would go into the nurse’s office unattended to eat candy out of her cabinet. (See id. ¶¶ 60–61.)
The District took no action to address these issues. (See id. ¶ 62.)
According to Plaintiffs, the District repeatedly downplayed the extent of C.T.’s
behavioral problems, insisting that those problems occurred only at home. (See id. ¶ 63.)
Standardized testing indicated that C.T.’s academic performance continued to drop, and his
teachers reported that he struggled to work independently and frequently left class. (See id.
¶¶ 65–67.) C.T.’s behavior also became more erratic—Plaintiffs point to one instance in which
C.T. told them that he had been bullied on the bus, when in fact it was C.T. who had been the
aggressor. (See id. ¶¶ 68–69.) In response, the District recommended that C.T. no longer ride
the bus. (See id. ¶ 70.) No plan was made to address this behavior. (See id. ¶ 71.) In fact, the
District continued to insist to the Parents that C.T. was functioning well and that his placement in
mainstream education classes was appropriate. (See id. ¶ 74.) Despite this representation, the
Parents became aware several years later that C.T.’s school counselor was concerned about
C.T.’s progress and thought he needed a therapeutic placement, while his aide made several
notes about C.T.’s disruptive and erratic behavior. (See id. ¶¶ 75–80.) Again, no efforts were
made to address C.T.’s behavioral issues. (See id. ¶ 81.)
There were other behavioral problems that the Parents allegedly did not become aware of
until many years later. For example, C.T. once told his guidance counselor that he “wanted to
kill somebody,” and C.T. frequently wandered out of class without permission. (See id. ¶¶ 82–
83.) C.T. missed 197 classes during his seventh grade year, but the Parents claim they did not
learn about these absences until later. (See id. ¶ 84.)

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The Parents and C.T.’s psychologist, psychiatrist, and private tutor all repeatedly told the
District that C.T. required placement in a small, therapeutic school. (See id. ¶¶ 91–94.) The
District ignored these recommendations, insisting that C.T. was capable of functioning in
mainstream classes, and refused to consider placement in a therapeutic school. (See id. ¶¶ 95–
96.) At the same time, the District failed to develop or implement any meaningful behavioral
interventions, and its response to C.T.’s issues was limited to two 30-minute group counseling
sessions per month and two documents purportedly designed to help measure and track C.T.’s
issues and progress. (See id. ¶¶ 97–98.)
In August, the District designed a new IEP for C.T.’s eighth grade year, but the IEP was
similar to the seventh grade IEP in many ways and, in the Parents’ view, inadequate in the same
ways. (See id. ¶¶ 102–03.) Frustrated with the District’s inaction, the Parents unilaterally placed
C.T. at Westfield Day School, a nearby therapeutic day school in Rye, New York, for his eighth
grade year (2012–2013). (See id. ¶ 106.) C.T.’s behavior and academic progress improved
dramatically while at Westfield, and his behavior at home also improved. (See id. ¶¶ 108–13.)
The next school year, the District acknowledged C.T.’s need for placement in a therapeutic
environment and placed C.T. in such an environment. (See id. ¶ 114.) The District refused,
however, to reimburse the Parents for the expenses they incurred during the 2011–2012 school
year, and similarly refused to reimburse C.T.’s tuition at Westfield for the 2012–2013 school
year. (See id. ¶ 115.)
B. Administrative Proceedings
On May 28, 2014, Plaintiffs filed an administrative due process complaint, seeking, under
the IDEA, reimbursement for compensatory education for the District’s alleged failure to provide
a FAPE during the 2011–2012 school year, and tuition reimbursement for C.T.’s placement at

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Westfield during the 2012–2013 school year. Plaintiffs also sought a declaration that the
District’s IEP violated Section 504 and that the District’s conduct constituted discrimination
under Section 504 and Title II of the ADA. (See id. ¶ 116.) On June 10, 2014, Plaintiffs made
an educational records request, through which they received many of the internal teacher and
staff communications discussed above. (See id. ¶ 117.) As a result, Plaintiffs amended their Due
Process Complaint to include a claim that the District failed to provide them adequate
information to allow them to participate in the IEP-development process. (See id. ¶ 118.)
The independent hearing officer (“IHO”) assigned to hear Plaintiffs’ due process
complaint held hearings on October 16, 21, and November 5, 2014. (See Decl. of Rachel Asher,
Esq. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. on the Pleadings To Dismiss Pl.’s Fourth and Fifth Causes of
Action (“Asher Decl.”) Ex. C (“Interim Decision”) (Dkt. No. 33).) On January 11, 2015, the
IHO issued an Interim Decision wherein she determined that the “appropriate mechanism” for
raising Section 504 and ADA claims distinct from the IDEA claims would be via the District’s
Policy 3040, which instructs parents who feel that their child’s rights under Section 504 or the
ADA have been violated to file a grievance with the District’s Assistant Superintendent for
Human Resources. (See id. at 4; see also Aff’n in Supp. of Mot. for J. on the Pleadings as to
Pl.’s Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action in the Compl. (“Rushfield Aff’n”) Ex. I (Dkt. No. 28).)
The IHO then noted that Plaintiffs had, in fact, referred the Section 504 and ADA claims to the
appropriate entity. (See Interim Decision 4.) The IHO concluded:
I find that impartial hearing process is not the appropriate venue for
resolution of ADA claims; there is no apparent statute or regulation authorizing
IDEA Hearing officers to preside over such claims. Neither party has cited to any
such authorization. In addition, I find that the parents’ § 504 and ADA claims have
been properly referred to the Assistant Superintendent via District’s Policy 3040.
(Id.)

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Additional hearings were held on February 26, March 19, 24, and June 17, 2015. (See
Asher Decl. Ex. E (“IHO Decision”).) On November 4, 2015, the IHO rendered a final decision,
ruling in Plaintiffs’ favor on all remaining claims. (See id.; see also Compl. ¶ 120.) In her
decision, the IHO dismissed the District’s argument that all of the claims arising from the 2011–
2012 school year were time barred by the statute of limitations because the due process
complaint had not been filed within two years of when the claims accrued. (See IHO Decision
73.) The IHO reasoned that C.T.’s mother had “established that the basis of their claim did not
begin to accrue until 2014 when she became aware that the District withheld material
information pertaining to C.[T.]’s education,” and concluded that the claim was therefore tolled.
(See id.)
The District subsequently appealed the adverse decision to a State Review Officer
(“SRO”). (See Compl. ¶ 125.) On January 7, 2016, the SRO issued a decision reversing the
IHO’s decision in its entirety. (See Rushfield Aff’n Ex. C (“SRO Decision”); see also Compl.
¶ 126.) With respect to the statute of limitations regarding the IDEA claims raised for the 2011–
2012 school year, the SRO rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that their claims had been tolled because
of the District’s withholding of material, saying that the hearing record showed “that the
[P]arents knew or had reason to know about the student’s attendance issues and behaviors,” and
that Plaintiffs were aware of most of the information underlying their claims “as of the February
2012 CSE meeting at the latest.” (SRO Decision 13–14.) The SRO did not address the IHO’s
decision not to consider the Section 504 or ADA claims. (See Compl. ¶ 126.)
C. Procedural History
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in this Action on April 27, 2016, raising the same IDEA
claims asserted in their administrative due process claims and rejected by the SRO, and also

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asserting the Section 504 and ADA claims that the IHO declined to consider. (See Compl.)
Defendant filed its Answer on June 17, 2016, (see Dkt. No. 9), after which Defendant filed a
letter requesting a pre-motion conference to set a schedule for the ordinary summary judgment
motion practice that occurs in IDEA cases, (see Dkt. No. 11). After the Court scheduled the
conference, Defendant wrote another letter requesting that the Court also take up at the
conference a motion by Defendant to amend its Answer to include a statute of limitations
defense to the Section 504 and ADA claims. (See Dkt. No. 14.)
The Court thereafter held a conference on September 23, 2016, (see Dkt. (minute entry
for Sept. 23, 2016)), wherein Defendant expressed a desire to move for Judgment on the
Pleadings with respect to the Section 504 and ADA claims asserted as the Fourth and Fifth
causes of action in Plaintiff’s Complaint. Upon request by the Court, Plaintiffs submitted a letter
on September 30, 2016, outlining their arguments for why the Section 504 and ADA claims—
which are subject to a three-year statute of limitations, relate to events in 2012, and were not
filed until 2016—are not time barred. (See Dkt. No. 16.) Defendant filed a response on October
3, 2016, (see Dkt. No. 17), and filed its Amended Answer with counterclaims on October 6,
2016, (see Dkt. No. 19). The Court thereafter set a briefing schedule for Defendant’s Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings, (see Dkt. No. 22), and Plaintiffs filed their Answer to Defendant’s
counterclaims on October 24, 2016, (see Dkt. No. 23). The Motion was fully briefed on January
19, 2017.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
A motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of
Procedure is governed by the same standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See

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Ideal Steel Supply Corp. v. Anza, 652 F.3d 310, 324 (2d Cir. 2011). “While a complaint attacked
by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s
obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration, citations, and internal quotation marks
omitted). Indeed, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “demands more than an
unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009).
“[W]hen ruling on a defendant’s motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the
factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
Furthermore, “[f]or the purpose of resolving [a] motion to dismiss, the Court . . . draw[s] all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Daniel v. T & M Prot. Res. Inc., 992 F. Supp. 2d
302, 304 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Koch v. Christie’s Int’l PLC, 699 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir.
2012)). Additionally, when adjudicating a motion to dismiss, “a district court must confine its
consideration to facts stated on the face of the complaint, in documents appended to the
complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference, and to matters of which judicial notice
may be taken.” Leonard F. v. Isr. Disc. Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
B. Analysis
1. Materials Considered
Before discussing the merits of the pending Motion, the Court must resolve a dispute
regarding what materials it may consider in this Motion. Defendant has offered, in support of its
argument, quotations and excerpts from the IHO’s and SRO’s respective opinions, (see Mem. of

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Law in Supp. of Mot. for J. on the Pleadings as to the Pls.’ Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action
(“Def.’s Mem.”) 4 (Dkt. No. 29)), but Plaintiffs object to Defendant’s allegedly impermissible
attempt “to privilege the determination of the SRO decision currently before this Court on appeal
for the alleged truth of its substantive content,” (see Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Def.’s Rule 12(c)
Mot. for J. on the Pleadings as to the Pls.’ Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action (“Pls.’ Opp’n”) 14–
16 (Dkt. No. 34)).
It is not clear to the Court what the disagreement on this issue is. There is no apparent
dispute that the Court is permitted to consider the IHO and SRO decisions on this Motion, as
they are both incorporated by reference in the Complaint (which cites to them extensively), see
DeLuca v. AccessIT Grp., Inc., 695 F. Supp. 2d 54, 60 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting that a document
is incorporated by reference where the complaint makes “a clear, definite and substantial
reference to the documents” (internal quotation marks omitted)), and are public filings of which
judicial notice may be taken, see Kavowras v. N.Y. Times Co., 328 F.3d 50, 57 (2d Cir. 2003)
(“Judicial notice may be taken of public filings . . . .”); see also Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of
Indians v. Rell, 463 F. Supp. 2d 192, 197 (D. Conn. 2006) (“Among the matters of which courts
may take judicial notice are decisions of an administrative agency.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Thomas v. Westchester Cty. Health Care Corp., 232 F. Supp. 2d 273, 276 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) (“[T]he [c]ourt may take judicial notice of the records of state administrative procedures,
as these are public records . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Plaintiffs’ contention that
“the federal rules are clear that only those facts in the annexed records that are undisputed may
be considered in the determination of the narrow statute of limitations motion” is without any
citation. (Pls.’ Opp’n 15–16.) The Court’s best guess is that Plaintiffs intend to invoke the
Second Circuit’s instruction that consideration of materials outside of the complaint is proper

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only if “no dispute exists regarding the authenticity or accuracy of the document,” and it is clear
“that there exist no material disputed issues of fact regarding the relevance of the document.”
Faulkner v. Beer, 463 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 2006). That precedent has no application here,
however, as there is no dispute that the IHO and SRO decisions attached to Defendant’s
declarations (as well as Plaintiffs’ declaration) are authentic, accurate, and relevant.
To the extent Plaintiffs object to Defendant’s use of the conclusions in those decisions,
that argument goes to the issue of collateral estoppel, discussed below. Importantly, Defendant
has not asked the Court to consider the SRO decision for its truthfulness or correctness, but
merely for its preclusive effect. It would be undisputedly improper for the Court to assume a fact
is true simply because an extrinsic document proclaimed it to be, but that is not the basis for
Defendant’s invocation of the SRO decision. As discussed in greater detail below, the issue is
whether the SRO’s findings regarding Plaintiffs’ knowledge of the operative facts of the IDEA
claims have preclusive effect or are otherwise entitled to deference. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’
objections to the consideration and use of the extrinsic documents offered by Defendant are
without merit.
2. Time of Accrual
Turning to the merits of the Motion, although the Parties dispute whether the claims were
equitably tolled during exhaustion of administrative remedies, the threshold question is when
Plaintiffs’ Section 504 and ADA claims accrued. The Section 504 and ADA claims are subject
to a three-year statute of limitations, see Gardner v. Wansart, No. 05-CV-3351, 2006 WL
2742043, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2006), so if Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that their claims
did not accrue until 2014, then the applicability (or inapplicability) of equitable tolling is
irrelevant at this stage, as the claims would be timely regardless. According to Plaintiffs, these

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claims did not accrue until 2014, when Plaintiffs received discovery in the administrative
proceeding that revealed, for the first time, the extent of C.T.’s exclusion from regular school
activities. (See Pls.’ Opp’n 9.) More specifically, Plaintiffs contend that it was not until 2014
that they learned that C.T. had missed 197 classes during his seventh grade year, ate alone in the
cafeteria, wandered the halls without supervision, and was considered by his teachers and aides
to be in serious need of intervention. (See id. at 10.)
Defendant makes no attempt in this Motion to argue the substance of Plaintiffs’
allegations, instead contending that the SRO’s determination that Plaintiffs were on notice in
2012 of the issues C.T. faced at school is binding on this Court unless and until the Court
overturns the SRO’s decision. (See Def.’s Mem. 4–5; Reply Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for
J. on the Pleadings (or, Alternatively, for a Summ. J. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12[d] and 56) as to
the Pls.’ Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action in the Compl. (“Def.’s Reply”) 4–7 (Dkt. No. 36).)
Defendant also argues that because Plaintiffs previously pled (in their Complaint) that the
accrual of the claims arising out of the 2011–2012 claims were subject to equitable tolling, they
cannot now make “new allegations” through their opposition brief that those claims did not
accrue until 2014. (See Def.’s Reply 3–4.)
The Court will address Defendant’s second argument first. Plaintiffs have made no
arguments inconsistent with the allegations in their Complaint, and in fact, as Defendant seems
to recognize in its reply papers, Plaintiffs’ argument regarding accrual is consistent with their
argument before the SRO about whether the statute of limitations for the IDEA claim was tolled
as a result of Defendant’s conduct. (See Reply Aff’n in Supp. of Mot. for J. Under FRCP 12(c)
as to Pls.’ Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action in the Compl. (“Reply Aff’n”) ¶ 8 (Dkt. No. 35)
(citing Compl. ¶ 130).) Regardless of whether the argument is couched in terms of tolling or

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accrual, there is little dispute that the substance of this argument has been consistently raised by
Plaintiffs. And Plaintiffs were not required to plead their legal theory of why the claims are not
untimely; “complaints need not anticipate, and attempt to plead around, potential affirmative
defenses.” St. John’s Univ. v. Bolton, 757 F. Supp. 2d 144, 157 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted); cf. Gleis v. Buehler, No. 11-CV-663, 2012 WL 1194987, at *5 (D.
Conn. Apr. 10, 2012) (“[I]t is inappropriate to include legal argument and briefing within a
complaint . . . .”).
Defendant’s contention (in its reply affirmation) that Plaintiffs’ position now is in
contradiction with its allegation in the Complaint that the Action was “timely commenced within
four months after the date of the SRO decision rendered on January 7, 2016” is lacking in merit.
(See Reply Aff’n ¶ 3.) The IDEA requires that parties who wish to bring a civil action
challenging a state administrative agency’s decision do so within either 90 days of the date of
decision or within such time as the applicable state law allows. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(B).
New York provides that in such circumstances, a party has four months from the date of the
agency’s decision in which to bring a civil action challenging the agency’s determination. See
N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404(3)(a). Plaintiffs’ allegation of timeliness is an unambiguous recognition
of the four-month time constraint imposed by New York law, and not a concession that the
claims accrued in 2012. Defendant’s suggestion otherwise is therefore misplaced.
Upon closer inspection, the real argument being made by Defendant is that Plaintiffs
objected to consolidating the pending Motion with Defendant’s anticipated motion for summary
judgment regarding the IDEA claims (which were adjudicated by the IHO and SRO) on the
ground that resolution of the pending Motion would not implicate the issues raised by the IDEA
claims and would more efficiently streamline the litigation. (See Reply Aff’n ¶¶ 11–12; see also

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id. Ex. C.) Now, Defendant argues, because Plaintiffs have offered a new rationale for why their
Section 504 and ADA claims are timely, the efficiency of the proposed disposition is more
complicated. In Defendant’s view, because the SRO has decided that Plaintiffs’ IDEA claims,
which are based on the same factual predicate as the Section 504 and ADA claims, were
untimely, the Court is bound by that decision unless and until it overrules the SRO’s decision,
presumably on a motion for summary judgment. But no such motion is currently before the
Court, and so the Court is left in the awkward position of trying to determine the timeliness of
claims whose factual basis is identical to claims that have already been held as untimely in a
decision currently on appeal to this Court.
Defendant’s argument is premised on the legal doctrines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel, and Defendant points out that courts have applied these doctrines in the IDEA context.
(See Def.’s Mem. 4 (citing C.L. v. Scarsdale Union Free Sch. Dist., 913 F. Supp. 2d 26, 40
(S.D.N.Y. 2012); K.B. v. Pearl River Union Free Sch. Dist., No. 10-CV-9170, 2012 WL 234392,
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2012).) But Defendant’s attempt to give preclusive effect to the
unreviewed findings and conclusions of the SRO is unavailing. Under federal law, judgments of
state courts are given preclusive effect in federal courts by way of 28 U.S.C. § 1738, which
provides that “judicial proceedings” of a state “shall have the same full faith and credit in every
court within the United States . . . as they have by law or usage in the courts of such [s]tate.” See
Chartier v. Marlin Mgmt., LLC, 202 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing § 1738 as the basis for
giving preclusive effect to judgments of courts in New York). “[N]either arbitrations nor
administrative adjudications,” however, “are state-court judgments within the coverage of
[§] 1738.” Burkybile v. Bd. of Educ. of Hastings-On-Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 411 F.3d
306, 310 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that the rule differs with respect to § 1983 actions, where “state

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administrative fact-finding is given the same preclusive effect as it would receive in courts of the
same state”); see also Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 794 (1986) (“28 U.S.C § 1738
governs the preclusive effect to be given the judgments and records of state courts, and is not
applicable to the unreviewed state administrative factfinding at issue in this case.”). And
common law principles of collateral estoppel do not aid Defendant, as the Second Circuit has
held that even under common law, an unreviewed state administrative decision has no preclusive
effect on ADA claims, see Kosakow v. New Rochelle Radiology Assocs., P.C., 274 F.3d 706, 735
(2d Cir. 2001) (“[T]o the extent [the plaintiff’s] employment discrimination claims were based
on the ADA, the determinations of the [New York State Division of Human Rights] would have
had no effect on subsequent federal litigation.”), and at least one court in the Second Circuit has
held similarly with respect to Section 504 claims, see Telesca v. Long Island Hous. P’ship, Inc.,
443 F. Supp. 2d 397, 405 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding, in the context of a Section 504 claim, that
“it is well-settled that unreviewed administrative determinations have absolutely no preclusive
effect on discrimination claims in federal court”). Unsurprisingly, none of the cases cited by
Defendant involves a federal court giving preclusive effect to the unreviewed decision of an IHO
or SRO. See Scarsdale Union Free Sch. Dist., 913 F. Supp. 2d at 40 (giving preclusive effect to
a prior federal civil action adjudicating an identical Section 504 claim); Pearl River Union Free
Sch. Dist., 2012 WL 234392, at *4–5 (upholding an SRO’s invocation of res judicata where the
plaintiff had already litigated identical claims in an earlier administrative proceeding); Grenon v.
Taconic Hills Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 05-CV-1109, 2006 WL 3751450, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 19,
2006) (same).
Moreover, res judicata serves to bar later litigation only “if an earlier decision was (1) a
final judgment on the merits, (2) by a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) in a case involving the

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same parties or their privies, and (4) involving the same cause of action.” EDP Med. Comput.
Sys., Inc. v. United States, 480 F.3d 621, 624 (2d Cir. 2007) (alteration and internal quotation
marks omitted).1 Plaintiffs’ Section 504 and ADA claims were not litigated before the IHO or
SRO, and thus the administrative proceeding did not “involve[] the same cause of action.” Nor
could the claims have been raised in the administrative proceeding, as the IHO declined to weigh
in on the merits of the Section 504 and ADA claims, (see Interim Decision), and res judicata has
no application where, as here, a claim was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, see St. Pierre v.
Dyer, 208 F.3d 394, 400 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[A] dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is
not an adjudication of the merits, and hence has no res judicata effect.”).
But notwithstanding the inapplicability, at this stage, of any common law preclusion
rules, the Court understands the conundrum raised by Defendant. In an ordinary IDEA case in
which Section 504 or ADA claims are also brought, if the IHO or SRO did not adjudicate the
Section 504 or ADA claims arising from the same course of conduct, the reviewing court would
address the Section 504 or ADA claims as it would any other claim for relief. See D.C. ex rel.
E.B. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 950 F. Supp. 2d 494, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Unlike the quasiadministrative standard for summary judgment that applied to analysis of the IDEA claim, the
ordinary standard for summary judgment applies to the Section 504 claim.”); Pinn ex rel. Steven
P. v. Harrison Cent. Sch. Dist., 473 F. Supp. 2d 477, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“Unlike in the case
of [the] [p]laintiff’s IDEA claim, summary judgment is appropriate in the case of their [sic]
Rehabilitation Act claim only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.” (internal

1

As the Second Circuit has recognized, “[t]he terminology of preclusion law can be
confusing.” Nestor v. Pratt & Whitney, 466 F.3d 65, 70 n.5 (2d Cir. 2006). Like the Second
Circuit, however, the Court will “use the term ‘res judicata’ in its narrow sense, as a synonym for
‘claim preclusion.’” Id. (italics omitted).
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quotation marks omitted)). This ordinarily poses no problem because “[t]he scope of protection
under [Section 504] differs from that under the IDEA” in that “Section 504 offers relief from
discrimination, whereas [the] IDEA offers relief from inappropriate education placement,
regardless of discrimination.” D.C., 950 F. Supp. 2d at 518 (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also Schreiber v. E. Ramapo Cent. Sch. Dist., 700 F. Supp. 2d 529, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(“Section 504 relief is conditioned on a showing of discrimination, which requires something
more than proof of a mere violation of [the] IDEA—i.e., more than a faulty IEP.” (alteration and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
Here, however, the posture of this case frustrates any such simple distinction. At issue on
this Motion is not the substance of the Section 504 and ADA claims, but their timeliness. If the
SRO was correct that Plaintiffs’ IDEA claims relating to the 2011–2012 school year were
untimely because they accrued by the end of that school year, that conclusion likely would apply
with equal force to the Section 504 and ADA claims, which arise out of the same factual
predicate as the IDEA claims. Indeed, the precise argument raised here—whether Plaintiffs were
not on notice of the nature and extent of Defendant’s alleged misconduct until 2014—was
considered and rejected by the SRO. (See SRO Decision 13–16.) The Court must thus decide
what deference, if any, is owed to the SRO’s decision on this point, and how such deference
impacts the disposition of the Motion.
In the context of IDEA cases, the general rule is that some measure of deference is owed
to the conclusions of the SRO because the Court “is not an expert on education or childhood
learning disabilities.” S.A. ex rel. M.A.K. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 12-CV-435, 2014 WL
1311761, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2014); see also L.K. v. Dep’t of Educ. of the City of N.Y., No.
09-CV-2266, 2011 WL 127063, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2011) (“The SRO’s findings of fact are

17

due appropriate deference by this Court, which is not an expert on education or childhood
learning disabilities.”). The Second Circuit has held, however, that while deference is generally
owed to the SRO’s decision, the level of deference depends on the type of issue being decided,
see M.H. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 685 F.3d 217, 244 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that “the weight
due administrative determinations” “will vary based on the type of determination at issue”), and
courts have accordingly held that “the question of the weight due the administrative findings of
fact[] should be left to the discretion of the trial court,” M.S. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 13CV-3719, 2013 WL 6028817, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2013) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also R.H. v. Bd. of Educ. of Saugerties Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 16-CV-551, 2017 WL
401237, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2017) (same). Thus, “[a]lthough [the Court] must give due
weight to the state proceedings, mindful that [it] lack[s] the specialized knowledge and
experience necessary to resolve questions of educational policy, [it] need not defer to the
findings of state administrative officers on questions . . . that fall outside of their field of
expertise.” E.M. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 758 F.3d 442, 456–57 (2d Cir. 2014) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the question of when Plaintiffs’ claims accrued does not implicate the SRO’s
“greater educational expertise.” M.H., 685 F.3d at 246. Accordingly, where “the issue on
review is the application of the IDEA’s statute of limitations,” the Court is called upon “to
interpret the statutory provisions and the law regarding claim accrual,” which “does not implicate
educational policy decisions.” K.H. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., No. 12-CV-1680, 2014 WL
3866430, at *15 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2014). Because issues regarding when the statute of
limitations began to run “fall within the purview of the lawyer’s expertise, not that of the
educator,” id. (internal quotation marks omitted), deference is not owed to the SRO’s

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determination regarding the accrual of Plaintiffs’ claims, whether under the IDEA, Section 504,
or the ADA, see id.; see also R.B. ex rel. A.B. v. Dep’t of Educ. of City of N.Y., No. 10-CV-6684,
2011 WL 4375694, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2011) (noting, in the context of an IDEA claim
in which a statute of limitations defense was raised, that “where the administrative decision
concerns an issue of law, the district court need not adhere to the Rowley rule of deference,” and
reviewing the statute of limitations issue de novo), reconsideration denied, 2012 WL 2588888
(July 2, 2012), mot. to set aside judgment denied, 2013 WL 1890263 (Apr. 11, 2013). This
conclusion accords with the Second Circuit’s instruction that where deference is due to a state
administrative agency, “it is not because of the factfinder’s status as a state agency, but because
of the factfinder’s inherent expertise on technical matters foreign to the experience of most
courts.” Bartlett v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law Exam’rs, 156 F.3d 321, 327 (2d Cir. 1998), vacated,
527 U.S. 1031 (1999).2
Thus, contrary to Defendant’s suggestion, the fact that the SRO found that Plaintiffs’
IDEA claims—and, by extension, their Section 504 and ADA claims—accrued in early 2012 is
neither dispositive nor entitled to deference in this case. The SRO employed no educational
expertise in deciding the time of accrual for Plaintiffs’ claims, and Plaintiffs are entitled to have
this Court adjudicate that question.
With this background in mind, the Court turns now to the substance of Plaintiffs’
argument—that their Section 504 and ADA claims did not accrue until 2014. Section 504 and

2

Bartlett was vacated by the Supreme Court on other grounds because of a change in
law, see 527 U.S. 1031, but on remand, the Second Circuit reaffirmed its holding regarding the
deference owed to state administrative agencies, see Bartlett v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law Exam’rs,
226 F.3d 69, 78 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[F]or the reasons stated in [the prior opinion], we hold that the
Board is not entitled to deference on the question of whether [the plaintiff] suffers from a
disability under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act . . . .”).
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ADA claims accrue when the plaintiff “knew or had reason to know of the injury serving as the
basis for his claim.” Harris v. City of New York, 186 F.3d 243, 247 (2d Cir. 1999). “[T]he
proper focus is on the time of the discriminatory act, not the point at which the consequences of
the act become painful.” Morse v. Univ. of Vt., 973 F.2d 122, 125 (2d Cir. 1992) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
As Plaintiffs point out, (see Pls.’ Opp’n 9), they have alleged in numerous places in their
Complaint that Defendant withheld information from them that would have alerted Plaintiffs that
C.T. was suffering an injury actionable under Section 504 or the ADA. In particular, Plaintiffs
allege that they were unaware until 2014 that:
-teachers and staff knew that C.T. was struggling and admitted as much in internal
communications, (see Compl. ¶¶ 41–42);
-C.T.’s school counselor privately expressed his concern to the chair of the
Committee on Special Education that C.T. was not functioning well in a
mainstream setting and needed a therapeutic placement, (see id. ¶ 76);
-C.T.’s aide made extensive notes indicating that C.T. struggled greatly in the
classroom, (see id. ¶¶ 78–79);
-C.T. made comments to his guidance counselor that, among other things, he
“wanted to kill somebody,” (see id. ¶ 82); and
-C.T. frequently wandered the halls and missed a total of 197 classes during the
2011–2012 school year, (see id. ¶¶ 83–84).
Defendant makes almost no effort to rebut any of these allegations or to argue that they are
insufficient at this stage to plead that Plaintiffs’ claims accrued in 2014, when they became
aware of the above information.
There are serious questions about Plaintiffs’ ability to establish the timeliness of their
claims. For instance, the SRO pointed out that much of the information regarding the classes
C.T. missed and his behavioral problems was either available online or was provided to Plaintiffs

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at various times during the year. (See SRO Decision 14.) And while Plaintiffs allege that they
did not know “the extent” to which C.T. would leave the classroom unsupervised, (see Compl.
¶ 83), they do allege that Defendant acknowledged “directly” to them that “C.T. was not able to
access his education, frightened and alienated other students, and wandered the halls much of the
day,” (id. ¶ 52). Moreover, as Defendant points out, Plaintiffs were surely aware that C.T. had
been prohibited from riding the school bus during the 2011–2012 school year. (See Reply Aff’n
3 n.1.) But as Defendant has not otherwise contested the merits of Plaintiffs’ claim for delayed
accrual of their Section 504 and ADA claims, and as the Court must take Plaintiffs’ allegations
as true at this stage of the proceeding, the Court finds the allegations in the Complaint sufficient
to plausibly allege that Plaintiffs’ Section 504 and ADA claims did not accrue until they obtained
discovery from Defendant in 2014 in connection with the due process complaint. See K.H., 2014
WL 3866430, at *19 (recognizing that other courts have held that “IDEA claims [do] not accrue
until the family gain[s] new information that ma[k]e[s] them aware of inadequacies in the
student’s prior special education program” and holding that the plaintiff’s claim did not accrue
until he was evaluated as being in need of additional educational services); BD v. DeBuono, 130
F. Supp. 2d 401, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding, in the context of a Section 504 claim, that “when
[the] plaintiffs knew or could have known that they were aggrieved parties present[ed] an issue
of fact”).
Because Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that their claims accrued in 2014, the Court
need not reach the question of whether any equitable tolling applies to Plaintiff’s claims, as their
claims would have been timely even if no equitable tolling applied.

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III . Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion is denied. Because discovery is needed in
order to ascertain the timeliness of both the IDEA claims and the Section 504 and ADA claims
relating to the 2011-2012 school year, within 30 days of the date of this Opinion & Order, the
Parties are to submit a proposed discovery schedule. Briefing on any motions for summary
judgment with respect to the IDEA claims will be stayed until the Parties have had an adequate
opportunity to conduct discovery with respect to the timeliness of those claims. The Clerk of
Court is respectfully directed to terminate the pending Motion. (See Dkt. No . 24.)
SO ORDERED.
DATED:

JuneJ_, 2017
White Plains, New York

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