Rosado v. Bondi et al
OPINION re: 32 MOTION to Transfer Case, MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, filed by Stephen Russell, Pamela Jo Bondi, Michael Brown, 41 MOTION to Dismiss, filed by Mike Scott, 44 MOTION to Dismiss, filed by Linda Doggett. In accordance with the foregoing, Defendant Scott's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction in GRANTED, Defendant Doggett's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is GRANTED, and Defendants Bondi, Brown and Russell's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is GRANTED. Plaintiff and the remaining Defendants Keith Wilkerson, Ryan W. Rich, Village of Goshen, and Gregory Keleman are directed to confer and submit a joint proposed case scheduling order for the Co urt's consideration within 21 days of this order. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motions at ECF No. 32, 41, and 44. The Clerk of Court is further directed to terminate Defendants Scott, Doggett, Bondi, Brown and Rus sel from this action because no claims remain against them, and as further set forth herein. (Linda Doggett, Stephen Russell, Mike Scott, Pamela Jo Bondi and Michael Brown terminated.) (Signed by Judge Nelson Stephen Roman on 10/27/2017) Copies Mailed By Chambers. (ras)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
PAMELA JO BONDI, MICHAEL BROWN,
STEPHEN RUSSELL, LINDA DOGGETT ET AL.,
NELSONS. ROMAN, United States District Judge
Prose Plaintiff Randal Rosado commenced this action on September 2, 2016, alleging
multiple civil rights violations by various patties from New York and Florida. This Court
liberally construed Plaintiffs claims as arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Order of Service at 5,
Rosado v. Bondi, 7:16-CV-6916 (NSR) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2016). Before the Comt are three
motions to dismiss on behalf of Defendants Mike Scott, Linda Doggett, Pamela Jo Bondi,
Stephen B. Russell, and Michael J. Brown. For the reasons set forth below, all three motions to
dismiss for Jack of personal jurisdiction are GRANTED without prejudice.
The following allegations are taken from the complaint. Plaintiff faces several criminal
charges in the State of Florida. In connection with those proceedings, Defendant Mike Scott
allegedly issued a warrant for Plaintiffs arrest. (Campi. at 8.) On June 28, 2016, police officers
and federal agents executed the search warrant on Plaintiffs home located in Goshen, New York
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at approximately 6:10am. (Id.) Members of the Lee County FBI awakened Plaintiff and his
wife as they entered the residence and announced their presence. (Id.)
Without explaining the cause of the arrest, the agents quickly handcuffed Plaintiff, asked
him to change, and turned him over to Defendant Keith Wilkerson of the Village of Goshen
Police Department (VOGPD). (Id. at 8–9.) Defendant Wilkerson then transported Plaintiff to
the VOGPD station. (Id. at 9.) At the police station, a man by the name of Robert Nichols 1
removed Plaintiff’s handcuffs and directed Plaintiff into Defendant Sergeant Ryan W. Rich’s
office. In the presence of an unidentified employee of the FBI, Nichols told Plaintiff that he
wished to speak with him and read Plaintiff his Miranda rights. (Id.) Nichols then gave Plaintiff
a waiver form prior to further questioning, which Plaintiff refused to sign. (Id.) Following
Plaintiff’s refusal to sign, Nichols informed Plaintiff that he was “accused of crimes involving
certain individuals and entities known to him who had contacted him for consultation in the
past.” (Id.) Nichols then left the room, noting that he looked forward to speaking with Plaintiff
in Florida. (Id. at 9–10.)
Wilkerson reapplied the handcuffs and took Plaintiff’s photograph, fingerprints, and
wrote the arrest report. (Id. at 10.) Defendant Rich assisted Defendant Wilkerson in processing
Plaintiff. Defendant Wilkerson and Defendant Rich took Plaintiff to the Town Hall for his
arraignment and then to the Orange County Jail. (Id.)
Two days later, on June 30, 2016, Plaintiff appeared before Orange County Supreme
Court Judge Nicholas DeRosa for an extradition hearing. Judge DeRosa informed Plaintiff of
the charges against him, and Plaintiff refused extradition to Florida. (Id. at 10–11.) Plaintiff
again appeared before Judge DeRosa on July 28, 2016 for his second extradition hearing.
Plaintiff alleges that Nichols “represented” Defendant Stephen Russell in New York simply because Nichols is
“from” Defendant Russell’s office. (Compl. at 9.)
Plaintiff’s attorney attempted to convince Plaintiff to waive extradition, but Plaintiff refused.
Plaintiff then notified his attorney that he had filed a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he was
not in Lee County, or likely not even in Florida, at the time of the alleged underlying crime. (Id.)
Plaintiff was eventually extradited to Florida, where he is currently being held.
The moving parties move to dismiss the complaint.
Standard on a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
“The lawful exercise of personal jurisdiction by a federal court requires satisfaction of
three primary requirements.” Jonas v. Estate of Leven, 116 F. Supp. 3d 314, 323-24 (S.D.N.Y.
2015) (citing Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50, 59 (2d Cir.
2012)). First, “the plaintiff’s service of process upon the defendant must have been procedurally
proper”; second, “there must be a statutory basis for personal jurisdiction that renders such
service of process effective”; and third, “the exercise of personal jurisdiction must comport with
constitutional due process principles.” Licci ex re. Licci, 673 F.3d at 59-60.
The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction and must make a prima facie
showing that jurisdiction exists. See Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc. v. Am. Buddha, 609 F.3d 30, 34–
35 (2d Cir. 2010). “Such a showing entails making legally sufficient allegations of jurisdiction,
including an averment of facts that, if credited[,] would suffice to establish jurisdiction over the
defendant.” Id. at 35 (internal quotation marks omitted). The plaintiff must also “establish the
court's jurisdiction with respect to each claim asserted.” Sunward Elecs., Inc. v. McDonald, 362
F.3d 17, 24 (2d Cir. 2004).
Further, “[p]rior to discovery, a plaintiff challenged by a jurisdiction testing motion may
defeat the motion by pleading in good faith, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, legally sufficient allegations
of jurisdiction.” Ball v. Metallurgie Hoboken-Overpelt, S.A., 902 F.2d 194, 197 (2d Cir. 1990);
accord Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 566 (2d Cir. 1996).
In deciding a Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) motion, the district court may
consider materials outside the pleadings, including affidavits and other written materials.
MacDermid, Inc. v. Deiter, 702 F.3d 725, 727 (2d Cir. 2012); Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 937
F. Supp. 295, 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997). The court assumes the
verity of the allegations “to the extent they are uncontroverted by the defendant's affidavits.”
MacDermid, Inc., 702 F.3d at 727 (internal quotation marks omitted). Nonetheless, all factual
doubts or disputes are to be resolved in the plaintiff's favor. See, e.g., A.I. Trade Fin., Inc. v.
Petra Bank, 989 F.2d 76, 79–80 (2d Cir. 1993).
A district court must have a statutory basis for exercising personal jurisdiction. See
Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd. v. Pryor, 425 F.3d 158, 165 (2d Cir.2005). This a
federal question case where a defendant resides outside the forum state and the federal statute, 42
U.S.C. § 1983, does not specifically provide for national service of process. Barclay v. Hughes,
462 F.Supp.2d 314, 315, n. 3 (D. Conn. 2006); see PDK Labs., Inc. v. Friedlander, 103 F.3d
1105, 1108 (2d Cir.1997) (noting that the Court must first look to the federal statute to see
whether it provides for national service of process). Thus, we apply “the forum state’s personal
jurisdiction rules” and therefore look to New York State long-arm statute. Marvel Characters,
Inc. v. Kirby, 726 F.3d 119, 128 (2d Cir. 2013).
Pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 301, a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction if he is
domiciled in New York, served with process in New York, or continuously and systematically
does business in New York. See Landoil Res. Corp. v. Alexander & Alexander Servs., Inc., 77
N.Y.2d 28, 33, 563 N.Y.S.2d 739, 565 N.E.2d 488 (1990); Pichardo v. Zayas, 122 A.D.3d 699,
702, 996 N.Y.S.2d 176, 180 (2d Dept. 2014); see also Wells Fargo Bank Minnesota, N.A. v.
ComputerTraining.Com, Inc., No. 04-CV-0982, 2004 WL 1555110, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. July 9,
2004). “Although the ‘doing business’ test is most often used to find jurisdiction over a corporate
defendant, this test can be applied to a nonresident individual.” Patel v. Patel, 497 F.Supp.2d
419, 425 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). In addition, a defendant may be subject to New York's long-arm
statute, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302, if he engages in the following acts either in person or through an
agent and such acts relate to an asserted claim: (1) transacts any business within the state or
contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state; (2) commits a tortious act within the
state; (3) commits a tortious act outside the state but injures a person or property in the state; or
(4) owns, uses, or possesses any real property in the state. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a).
Although the “plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of establishing jurisdiction over the
defendant by a preponderance of evidence,” Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Org., 835 F.3d
317, 334 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda Ltd., 101 F.3d 863, 865 (2d Cir.
1996)), the Court will “construe the pleadings and any supporting materials in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff[ ]” when considering whether such a showing has been made. Licci, 732
F.3d at 167 (citing Chloe v. Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC, 616 F.3d 158, 163 (2d Cir. 2010)).
Further, “[w]here, as here, a plaintiff proceeds pro se, the court must ‘construe  [his]
[complaint] liberally and interpret [it] to raise the strongest arguments that [it] suggest[s].’ ”
Askew v. Lindsey, No. 15-CV-7496 (KMK), 2016 WL 499261, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2016)
(citing Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013)). Yet, “the liberal treatment
afforded to pro se litigants does not exempt a pro se party from compliance with relevant rules of
procedural and substantive law.” Id. (citing Bell v. Jendell, 980 F. Supp. 2d 555, 559 (S.D.N.Y.
Plaintiff alleges that the moving Defendants violated his constitutional rights as a result
of the executed search warrant in New York. Plaintiff also alleges that the moving Defendants
violated various federal statutes in their individual and official capacities.
Plaintiff accuses Defendant Mike Scott, the Sheriff of Lee County, Florida, of issuing an
allegedly baseless Florida warrant that culminated in his arrest and detention in New York.
(Compl. at 6, 8.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Mike Scott: (1) violated Title 18 U.S.C. § 241
and § 242 by conspiring against the Plaintiff’s rights in issuing the arrest warrant (Id. at 6.); (2)
created a warrant using false and fabricated evidence in order to force jurisdiction by labeling
Plaintiff as a fugitive of Florida in order to enslave him (Id. at 35); and (3) denied Plaintiff’s
right to a reasonable defense. (Id. at 36.)
Plaintiff accuses Defendant Linda Doggett, Clerk and Comptroller for Lee County,
Florida, of: (1) violating her oath of office, 18 U.S.C. § 3571; (2) conspiring against the Plaintiff
and depriving him of his rights under color of law; and (3) filing a civil case against Plaintiff in
Leon County, Florida, without any lawful justification. (Compl. at 4.)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Florida Attorney General Pamela Jo Bondi made false
statements and fabricated evidence in Lee County, Florida, and filed an unmeritorious civil suit
against him in Florida. In doing so, Plaintiff accuses her of: (1) violating 18 U.S.C. § 241 and §
242 by conspiring against him and violating her state oath of office; and (2) depriving him of his
constitutional rights. (Compl. at 3, 18.)
Plaintiff accuses State Attorney Stephen B. Russell of: (1) conspiring with a non-party to
violate and deprive him of his rights by unlawfully seizing property from his residence in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241, § 242, and § 2112; (2) violating his Fourth Amendment rights and,
as a result, 18 U.S.C. § 3571; (3) police misconduct in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 14141; and (4)
defamation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 4101. (Compl. at 3–4, 9, 10.) Plaintiff also alleges that
Russell stole numerous items in a search and seizure executed by Defendant Russell at Plaintiff’s
residence in New York and at a storage unit he rents in Vero Beach, Florida. (Compl. at 14, 19,
Finally, Plaintiff accuses Assistant State Attorney Michael J. Brown of blatantly lying,
conspiring, and making false written statements against the Plaintiff concerning real estate in
Palm Beach and Collier Counties, Florida. (Compl. at 3, 17.) Plaintiff accuses Defendant Brown
of: (1) violating 18 U.S.C. § 241, § 242 by falsely accusing Plaintiff of forging deeds in Florida;
(2) violating 28 U.S.C. § 4101 for defamation of character through actions taken in Florida
(Compl. at 3, 17.); (3) violating Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights by searching his property in
Vero Beach, Florida (Compl. at 34.); and (4) violating his oath of office under 18 U.S.C. § 3571.
(Compl. at 3.)
Defendants seek to dismiss on several grounds pursuant to Rule 12(b), or in the
alternative, transfer the case to the Middle District of Florida. The Court opts to consider the
jurisdictional questions first, see Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574 (1999), and
finds that they dispose of each of the pending motions, and therefore does not reach the issue of
whether the complaint sets forth valid claims for relief pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See Sinochem
Int'l Co. v. Malaysia Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 425 (2007) (stating that if “a court can
readily determine that it lacks jurisdiction over the cause or the defendant, the proper course
would be to dismiss on that ground.”).
Plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege sufficient facts for the Court’s exercise of personal
jurisdiction over the moving Defendants. Plaintiff’s pro se complaint does not explicitly argue
that this Court has personal jurisdiction over the Defendants. Even interpreting the complaint
liberally, see Askew, No. 15-CV-7496 (KMK), 2016 WL 499261, at *2, sufficient facts do not
exist warranting exercise of personal jurisdiction. At a minimum, Plaintiff “need only allege
facts constituting a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction to survive a Rule 12(b)(2)
motion.” Tannerite Sports, LLC v. NBCUniversal Media LLC, 135 F.Supp.3d 219, 228
(S.D.N.Y. 2006). Here, Plaintiff failed to meet that threshold with respect to the moving
Defendants. Given the volume of Defendants, the Court takes each in turn.
Defendant Mike Scott is the Sheriff of Lee County, Florida. Plaintiff alleges that
he issued a baseless warrant in Florida which lead to his arrest and detention in New York, along
with other federal violations. (Compl. at 6, 8.) The allegations against Defendant Scott are
insufficient to create personal jurisdiction under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 301 or § 302 because the
allegations occurred in Florida, with insufficient activity in New York.
Determining personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state Defendant requires “we look to the
law of the forum state to determine whether personal jurisdiction will lie.” Licci ex rel. Licci v.
Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 732 F.3d 161, 168 (2d Cir. 2013). Under New York Law, this
Court can exercise general jurisdiction pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 301 if the Defendant is
“doing business” in the state. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 95 (2d
Cir.2000). A Defendant is “doing business” in the state for the purposes of § 301 when
Defendant engages in “continuous, permanent and substantial activity in New York.” Landoil
Resources Corp. v. Alexander & Alexander Servs., Inc., 918 F.2d 1039, 1043 (2d Cir.1990).
Under New York Law, this Court can exercise specific jurisdiction pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. §
302 when the Defendant engages in the enumerated activities.
Plaintiff alleges insufficient facts to create personal jurisdiction under N.Y. C.P.L.R. §
301 or § 302. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Scott issued a baseless warrant in Florida which
lead to his arrest and detention in New York. Plaintiff also alleges violations of federal law for
other conduct in Florida. Plaintiff does not allege facts which would place Defendant Scott
within N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 301 or § 302.
Reading the complaint liberally, Plaintiff does not allege facts which indicate that
Defendant Scott’s purported actions were “continuous, permanent and substantial activity in
New York” within the meaning of N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 301. Landoil Resources Corp., 918 F.2d at
1043. Nor does a liberal reading of the complaint situate Defendant Scott’s actions within the
reach of New York’s long-arm statute. The complaint alleges that Defendant Scott’s actions took
place in Florida. See Doe v. Delaware State Police, 939 F. Supp. 2d 313 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(analyzing the effect of transient out of state police activity within the meaning of § 302).
Defendant Scott was never in New York, nor did he participate in the execution of the search
warrant in New York. Thus, this Court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction under N.Y. C.P.L.R.
§ 301 or § 302. Accordingly, this Court dismisses all claims against Defendant Scott for lack of
personal jurisdiction, without prejudice.
Defendant Linda Doggett serves as Clerk and Comptroller for Lee County,
Florida. Plaintiff alleges that she violated his constitutional rights and various federal laws as a
result of actions that took place in Florida. Plaintiff alleges insufficient facts warranting the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over her.
Defendant Doggett is based in Florida. The facts alleged by Plaintiff took place in
Florida, with insufficient ties to New York. The Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Doggett
fabricated evidence to “create an unlawful arrest warrant in order to claim jurisdiction to kidnap
Plaintiff. . .” (Compl. at 21.) The alleged fabrication, and the ensuing warrant, occurred in
Florida. Defendant Doggett also named Plaintiff as a party to an allegedly retaliatory civil case in
Florida (Id. 30.). That allegedly retaliatory offense is currently pending in Florida. Additionally,
Plaintiff alleges that Doggett possesses some of the evidenced seized during the New York
search, presumably in Florida where she resides. (See id. at 32.) Plaintiff also alleges that
Doggett is “manipulating and tainting the evidence to suit an agenda without oversight” and
using the evidence to “commit additional crimes against them to deliberately damage their
reputation and to cause malice” (Id. at 33.), again, in Florida. Finally, Doggett presumably
“denied [Plaintiff’s] right to a reasonable defense” by issuing the warrant and not allowing the
Plaintiff to address the false allegations in his Florida state criminal trial. (Id. at 36.)
Under these facts, there is no reasonable argument that this court can exercise personal
jurisdiction over Defendant Doggett under § 301 or § 302. All the allegations against her
concern actions taken in Florida with repercussions in Florida. Even if the allegation of her false
statements leading to the arrest warrant are true, the actions (the fabrication and issuance of the
warrant) occurred in Florida. See Penguin Group (USA) v. American Buddha, 609 F.3d 30, 39
(2d Cir. 2010). The allegations are insufficiently related to any actions, or continued actions,
concerning Defendant Doggett and the State of New York. Thus, the claims against Defendant
Doggett are out of the jurisdictional reach of N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 301 or § 302. The claims against
Defendant Doggett are dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, without prejudice.
Defendant Bondi, Defendant Russell, & Defendant Brown
Defendants Bondi, Russell, and Brown moved together for dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims
for lack of personal jurisdiction. Each defendant faces different allegations, therefore this Court
will review them in turn.
Defendant Bondi is the Attorney General of the State of Florida. Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant Bondi “signed off to seek charges against Plaintiff and the filing of a civil case in
Leon County [Florida] without lawful merit.” (Compl. at 18.) Further, Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant Bondi violated 18 U.S.C. § 241 and § 242 “for conspiracy and deprivation of rights
under color of law, and for violating her oath of office (Title 18 U.S.C. 2571)” for conduct
occurring in Florida.
The alleged facts that Defendant Bondi “signed off” on the “Commencement of Action”
as Plaintiff alleges (Id.), and conspired against him, are insufficient to satisfy New York’s
jurisdictional statutes. All the allegations against Defendant Bondi occurred in Florida and are
tied to the underlying criminal charges against Plaintiff. The complaint does not allege that
Defendant Bondi committed actions, or is involved in actions, that fall under the New York
jurisdictional statutes. Thus, this Court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendant
Bondi under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 301 or § 302.
Defendant Russell is a State Attorney in Florida’s Twentieth Judicial Circuit. Plaintiff
accuses him of violating his rights in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241, § 242 and §2112. (Compl. 3–
4, 9, 10.) Plaintiff also alleges a Fourth Amendment violation, police misconduct violation under
42 U.S.C. §14141, and defamation under 28 U.S.C. §4101. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
Russell stole items in a search and seizure executed by Defendant Russell at a storage unit in
Vero Beach, Florida. (Compl. at 19–20.) Defendant Russell, allegedly under the representation
of Robert Nichols, lead a conspiracy against the Plaintiff, violating his rights under the
Constitution and participating in grand theft of property from the Plaintiff’s residence. (Id. 3–4.)
This court lacks personal jurisdiction to adjudicate these claims. At the outset, it bears
clarifying that, according to the complaint, Defendant Russell never stepped foot in New York. 2
Thus, all the allegations against Defendant Russell stem from his actions in Florida. It was
Robert Nichols, not Defendant Russell, who was present in New York when Plaintiff’s home
was searched, and who interacted with the Plaintiff in his home and at the VOGPD station. Since
the allegations strictly concern Defendant Russell’s conduct in Florida, and the complaint does
not allege that Defendant Russell committed actions, or is involved in actions, that fall under the
New York jurisdictional statutes, the facts alleged against Defendant Russell are insufficient to
create personal jurisdiction pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 301 or § 302.
Finally, Defendant Brown is a former Assistant State Attorney for Florida’s Twentieth
Judicial Circuit. Plaintiff accuses him of lying, conspiring, making false written statements
against the Plaintiff, and defamation in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 4101, 18 U.S.C. § 241 and §
242. (Compl. at 3, 5.) Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Brown supplied lies and incorrect dates of
forged deeds that went into a report to the Governor of Florida, with the purpose of defaming
Plaintiff. (Id. at 17.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Brown participated in an unlawful
search and seizure of Plaintiff’s property in Vero Beach, Florida. (Id. at 34.) Finally, Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant Brown fabricated evidence to create an unlawful arrest warrant in order to
claim jurisdiction to kidnap him. (Id. at 21.)
Even if the Court construes the claims against Defendant Russell under an agency theory, the fleeting activity in
New York is insufficient for the Court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendant Russell. See Doe v.
Delaware State Police, 939 F. Supp. 2d 313 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
This Court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendant Brown. Plaintiffs
allegations strictly concern Defendant Brown's actions in Florida, and the complaint does not
allege that Defendant Brown committed actions, or is involved in actions, that fall under the New
York jurisdictional statutes. Thus, the facts alleged against Defendant Brown are insufficient to
create personal jurisdiction pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 301 or§ 302.
In accordance with the foregoing, Defendant Scott's motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction in GRANTED, Defendant Doggett's motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction is GRANTED, and Defendants Bondi, Brown and Russell's motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction is GRANTED.
Plaintiff and the remaining Defendants Keith Wilkerson, Ryan W. Rich, Village of
Goshen, and Gregory Keleman are directed to confer and submit a joint proposed case
scheduling order for the Court's consideration within 21 days of this order.
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motions at ECF No. 32, 41,
and 44. The Clerk of Court is further directed to terminate Defendants Scott, Doggett, Bondi,
Brown and Russel from this action because no claims remain against them.
October2 7, 2017
White Plains, New York
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