Franza v. Stanford et al

Filing 107

ORDER denying 103 Motion for Reconsideration re 103 MOTION for Reconsideration re; 96 Memorandum & Opinion,. filed by Dominic M. Franza. The Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration is denied. The Clerk of Court is respectfully dir ected to mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff at the address listed on the docket and terminate the pending motion (Dkt. No. 103). SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Kenneth M. Karas on 6/28/21) (yv) Transmission to Docket Assistant Clerk for processing.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
DOMINIC M. FRANZA,
Plaintiff,
v.

No. 16-CV-7635 (KMK)

TINA M. STANFORD; EDWARD M.
SHARKEY; OTIS CRUZE; SALLY
VELASQUEZ-THOMPSON; GAIL
HALLERDIN; WALTER WILLIAM
SMITH, JR.,

ORDER

Defendants.
KENNETH M. KARAS, United States District Judge:
Pro se Plaintiff Dominic M. Franza (“Plaintiff”) brought an Action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, against New York State Board of Parole Chairwoman Tina M. Stanford (“Stanford”) and
Commissioners Edward M. Sharkey (“Sharkey”), Otis Cruze (“Cruze”), Sally VelasquezThompson (“Velasquez-Thompson”), Gail Hallerdin (“Hallerdin”), and Walter William Smith,
Jr. (“Smith”) (collectively, “Defendants”). (See Fourth Am. Compl. (“FAC”) (Dkt. No. 80).)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his rights under the Fourteenth and Eight Amendments
of the United States Constitution when they determined his eligibility for parole and evaluated
his appeal of that determination based upon an invalidly formulated and adopted decisionmaking procedure, 9 NYCRR § 8002.3. (See generally id.) On July 12, 2018, Defendants filed
a Motion To Dismiss. (Dkt. No. 85). Plaintiff filed an Opposition on August 3, 2018. (Dkt. No.
89). Defendants filed a Reply on October 24, 2018. (Dkt. No. 94). On February 5, 2019, the
Court issued an Opinion & Order that granted the Motion To Dismiss, dismissing Plaintiff’s
claims with prejudice. (“Opinion & Order” (Dkt. No. 96).) Before the Court is Plaintiff’s

Motion for Reconsideration (the “Motion”) of the Opinion & Order, which was filed on May 11,
2021. (Notice of Mot. (Dkt. No. 103).)
I. Discussion
“Motions for reconsideration are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and
Local Civil Rule 6.3, which are meant to ensure the finality of decisions and to prevent the
practice of a losing party examining a decision and then plugging the gaps of a lost motion with
additional matters.” Arthur Glick Truck Sales, Inc. v. Stuphen E. Corp, 965 F. Supp. 2d 402, 404
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citation and quotation marks omitted), aff’d, 577 F. App’x 11 (2d Cir. 2014).
The standard for such motions is “strict” and “should not be granted where the moving party
seeks solely to relitigate an issue already decided.” Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255,
257 (2d Cir. 1995); see also In re Gen. Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litig., No. 14-MC-2543,
2017 WL 3443623, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2017) (“It is well established that the rules
permitting motions for reconsideration must be narrowly construed and strictly applied so as to
avoid repetitive arguments on issues that have been considered fully by the [c]ourt.” (citation and
quotation marks omitted)). A movant may not “rely upon facts, issues, or arguments that were
previously available but not presented to the court.” Indergit v. Rite Aid Corp., 52 F. Supp. 3d
522, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citation omitted). Nor is a motion for reconsideration “the proper
avenue for the submission of new material.” Sys. Mgmt. Arts, Inc. v. Avesta Tech., Inc., 106 F.
Supp. 2d 519, 521 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). “Rather, to be entitled to reconsideration, a movant must
demonstrate that the [c]ourt overlooked controlling decisions or factual matters that were put
before it on the underlying motion, which, had they been considered might reasonably have
altered the result reached by the court.” Arthur Glick Truck Sales, 965 F. Supp. 2d at 405
(citation and quotation marks omitted); Shrader, 70 F.3d at 257 (same). In other words, “[a]

motion for reconsideration should be granted only when the [movant] identifies an intervening
change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or
prevent manifest injustice.” Alvarez v. City of New York, No. 11-CV-5464, 2017 WL 6033425,
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2017) (quoting Kolel Beth Yechiel Mechil of Tartikov, Inc. v. YLL
Irrevocable Tr., 729 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2013)); see also Indergit, 52 F. Supp. 3d at 523.
Here, Plaintiff has identified no intervening change of controlling law, availability of new
evidence, or need to correct a clear error. See Alvarez, 2017 WL 6033425, at *2. Instead,
Plaintiff reiterates the same arguments that were expressly considered and rejected in the Court’s
Opinion & Order. (See generally, Mem. in Supp. of Pl.’s 60(b)(4) Mot. (Dkt. No. 104).)
Because Plaintiff “seeks solely to relitigate an issue already decided,” Shrader, 70 F.3d at 257,
pointing to no issue that the Court did not expressly consider and no case law or fact that the
Court overlooked, the Motion is denied. See Cyrus v. City of New York, 450 F. App’x 24, 26 (2d
Cir. 2011) (affirming denial of motion for reconsideration where the plaintiff “fail[ed] to point to
any case law or other relevant information that the district court overlooked,” and his arguments
merely “amount[ed] to a disagreement with the district court’s conclusions with respect to the
case law that was already before it”); Bryant v. AB Droit Audiovisuels, No. 07-CV-6395, 2017
WL 2954764, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2017) (“[A] party’s disagreement with a [c]ourt’s
decision is simply not a basis for reconsideration.”); Women’s Integrated Network, Inc. v. U.S.
Specialty Ins. Co., No. 08-CV-10518, 2011 WL 1347001, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2011) (“The
Court will not re-litigate the merits of the underlying dispute on a motion for reconsideration.”),
aff’d, 495 F. App’x 129 (2d Cir. 2012); Grand Crossing, L.P. v. U.S. Underwriters Ins. Co., No.
03-CV-5429, 2008 WL 4525400, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2008) (“Because [the] [p]laintiff[]
present[s] no new factual information or law that requires a different outcome in the underlying

motion, reconsideration is inappropriate.” (citation omitted)); Davidson v. Scully, 172 F. Supp.
2d 458, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“Although plaintiff might see this motion as a way to vent his
frustration and point out where he believes the Court erred in its reasoning, that is not the
purpose of a Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration.”).
II. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration is denied. The Clerk
of Court is respectfully directed to mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff at the address listed on
the docket and terminate the pending motion (Dkt. No. 103).
SO ORDERED.
DATED:

June 28, 2021
White Plains, New York
____________________________________
KENNETH M. KARAS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE