Davis v. Westchester County Family Court et al

Filing 61

OPINION & ORDER re: 24 MOTION to Dismiss filed by Rosa Cabanillas, Westchester County Family Court, 53 MOTION to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and/or Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure filed b y Westchester County. For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motions are granted. The Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate any of Plaintiffs claims. This dismissal is without prejudice because Plaintiff has not yet amended his Complaint. This dismissal is also without prejudice as to Plaintiffs ability to file a complaint for false arrest, excessive force, and malicious prosecution against the officer or officers responsible for that alleged conduct. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the pending Motions, (see Dkt. Nos. 24, 53). SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Kenneth M. Karas on 9/26/2017) (anc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

JAMEEL DAVIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
No. 16-CV-9487 (KMK)
WESTCHESTER COUNTY FAMILY
COURT; MAGISTRATE ROSA
CABANILLAS, in her official capacity;
MAGISTRATE ROSA CABANILLAS, in
her individual capacity; WESTCHESTER
COUNTY,

OPINION & ORDER

Defendants.

Appearances:
Jameel Davis
New York, NY
Pro Se Plaintiff
Michael A. Berg, Esq.
Office of the Attorney General, New York State
New York, NY
Counsel for Defendants Westchester County Family Court and Magistrate Rosa Cabanillas
Sean T. Carey, Esq.
Westchester County Attorney’s Office
White Plains, NY
Counsel for Defendant Westchester County
KENNETH M. KARAS, District Judge:
Plaintiff Jameel Davis, proceeding pro se, brought this Action against Defendants
Westchester County Family Court, Magistrate Rosa Cabanillas (together, “State Defendants”),
and Westchester County, challenging a judgment against him in state court ordering him to pay
certain amounts of allegedly past-due child support payments. (See Compl. (Dkt. No. 1).)

Before the Court are Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (See Dkt. Nos. 24, 53.) For the reasons to follow, the Motions
are granted.
I. Background
A. Factual Background
The following facts are taken from the Complaint and are assumed true for purposes of
the Motions.
On September 12, 2011, Plaintiff was deceived into signing an Acknowledgement of
Paternity at Phelps Memorial Hospital in Sleepy Hollow, New York. (See Compl. ¶ 25.)
Plaintiff believed that he was signing the birth certificate of a baby boy born to a woman with
whom he had had a relationship, (see id. ¶ 26), but he learned several years later that the
document was in fact an Acknowledgement of Paternity, (see id. ¶ 27). Plaintiff later also
learned that the Acknowledgement of Paternity designated him as a non-custodial parent and
obliged him to make payments and endure “regular billings, delinquency notices, liens on
property, seizure and sale of property, garnishment of wages, federal imprisonment, [and] fines.”
(Id. ¶ 29.) In Plaintiff’s view, the Acknowledgement of Paternity is “an adhesion document that
violates the fabric and fiber of the United States Constitution, New York Bill of Rights, and
freedom and liberty.” (Id. ¶ 30.) Plaintiff denies that he is a non-custodial parent or any other
title that would oblige him to make child support payments. (See id. ¶ 33.)
On October 3, 2013, Plaintiff attended an expedited proceeding in Westchester County
Family Court before Magistrate Christine Patneaude Krahulik. (See id. ¶ 34.)1 As a result of that

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Although Plaintiff alleges that the proceeding took place on October 13, 2013, (see
Compl. ¶ 34), the stipulation to which Plaintiff refers was issued on October 3, 2013, (see Decl.
of Michael A. Berg in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. To Dismiss Ex. B (Dkt. No. 25)). Because a court
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hearing, Plaintiff entered into a voluntary stipulation requiring him to pay child support, plus 60
percent of unreimbursed healthcare and childcare expenses. (See Decl. of Michael A. Berg in
Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. To Dismiss (“Berg Decl.”) Ex. B (Dkt. No. 25); see also Compl. ¶ 40.)
Plaintiff alleges that he “did not understand the nature of the proceeding,” (Compl. ¶ 37), and
that Magistrate Krahulik was “attempting to coerce [him] into entering a contract,” (id. ¶ 36).
There is no indication or allegation that Magistrate Rosa Cabanillas Thompson, a Defendant
named in this lawsuit, presided over or was otherwise involved in the October 3 proceeding.2
On April 19, 2016, Plaintiff attended an “expedited administrative hearing” in
Westchester County Family Court presided over by Magistrate Thompson. (See id. ¶¶ 90–91.)
At the hearing, Plaintiff was arrested by a court officer after being told by the officer multiple
times to “shut up” and to not “say one more word,” (id. ¶ 92), despite the fact that “Plaintiff was
not offensive, aggressive[,] or unlawful in anyway [sic],” (id. ¶ 93). Plaintiff was charged with
contempt of court, and the charge was subsequently dismissed after “five special appearance
hearings.” (Id. ¶¶ 94, 96.)
On June 16, 2016, at another proceeding in Westchester County Family Court, Magistrate
Thompson entered a money judgment against Plaintiff in the amount of $5,848 in past due child
support payments, as well as $25 in costs. (See Berg Decl. Ex. C; see also Compl. ¶ 112.) The
money judgment resulted in the filing of a lien against Plaintiff in the Westchester County
Clerk’s Office. (See Compl. ¶ 122.) On October 19, 2016, Plaintiff filed what he calls a
“certified demand for proof of jurisdiction,” but has never received any such proof. (See id.)

“may . . . take judicial notice of the orders of another court,” Harasz v. Katz, 239 F. Supp. 3d
461, 474 (D. Conn. 2017), the Court will adopt the date in the stipulation.
2
Although Plaintiff sued “Magistrate Rosa Cabanillas,” (see Compl.), Defendants have
advised that her full name and title is, in fact, Magistrate Rosa Cabanillas Thompson, (see Mem.
of Law in Supp. of State Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss 1 (Dkt. No. 26)).
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Throughout the Complaint, Plaintiff refers to the “title IV-D” or the “IV-D” program.
(See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 74, 85.) To the best of the Court’s and Defendants’ understanding, Plaintiff
is referencing Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, which authorizes federal appropriations “for
the purpose of enforcing the support obligations owed by noncustodial parents to their children.”
42 U.S.C. § 651. In New York, the Department of Social Services is “designated as the single
state agency to supervise the administration of the state’s child support program,” N.Y. Soc.
Serv. Law § 111-a(1), and is authorized “to distribute to local districts the full amount of federal
incentive payments received under title IV-D of the federal social security act,” id. § 111-f.
Plaintiff seeks damages for what he alleges were various violations of his constitutional
rights. Specifically, Plaintiff brings the following claims: (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for
violation of his constitutional rights; (2) 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claim for conspiracy to violate his
constitutional rights; (3) 42 U.S.C. § 1986 claim for neglect or failure to prevent violation of his
constitutional rights; (4) undue influence; (5) civil conspiracy; (6) abuse of process; (7) breach of
fiduciary duty; (8) constructive fraud; (9) fraud in the inducement; (10) duress; (11) infliction of
emotional distress; and (12) “Promissory Note—House Joint Resolution 192-Promissory Note
Dishonor.” (See Compl. ¶¶ 123–64.) Under each of the first 11 counts, Plaintiff provides only
the following details:
Defendants violated [P]laintiff’s rights under the 1st, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 9th, 10th,
13th, and 14th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, paragraphs 1, 3, 4 and 5 of
the New York Bill of Rights and due process of law.
The intent of all defendants committing these torts are [sic] the federal incentive
program illustrated in 42 U.S.C. § 658(a)—Incentive Payments to States, 5 CFR
§ 304.21 Federal Financial Participation, and 45 CFR § 302.34 Cooperative
Arrangements with courts and law enforcement.
(See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 124–25.)

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B. Procedural History
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on December 8, 2016 in Manhattan, naming as Defendants
Westchester County Family Court, Westchester County Child Support Enforcement, and
Magistrate Rosa Cabanillas. (See Dkt. No. 1.) The Action was thereafter transferred to the
White Plains Division of the Southern District of New York. (See Dkt. No. 2.) On January 10,
2017, State Defendants filed a letter seeking leave to file a Motion To Dismiss. (See Dkt. No.
13.) During this time, Plaintiff filed a number of requests for miscellaneous relief. (See, e.g.,
Dkt. Nos. 9, 12, 14–16, 21.) On January 12, 2017, the Court entered a briefing schedule for State
Defendants’ Motion. (See Dkt. No. 18.) On February 6, 2017, the Court issued an Order
denying Plaintiff’s various requests for relief and directing the Clerk of Court to substitute
Westchester County in place of Westchester County Child Support Enforcement. (See Dkt. No.
22.)
On February 8, 2017, State Defendants filed their Motion To Dismiss and accompanying
papers. (See Dkt. Nos. 24–26.) Plaintiff filed his opposition on February 24, 2017, (see Dkt. No.
33), and State Defendants replied on March 2, 2017, (see Dkt. No. 37). Plaintiff continued to file
miscellaneous motions, (see Dkt Nos. 28, 31, 34–36, 40), which were again denied, (see Dkt. No.
43). On June 2, 2017, service of the summons and Complaint was effected on Westchester
County. (See Dkt. No. 50.) Westchester County filed a letter shortly thereafter asking for leave
to file its own Motion To Dismiss. (See Dkt. No. 48.) The Court granted that application and set
a briefing schedule. (See Dkt. No. 49.)
On June 29, 2017, Westchester County filed its Motion To Dismiss and accompanying
papers. (See Dkt. Nos. 53–56.) Plaintiff opposed the Motion on July 12, 2017, (see Dkt. No.
58), and Westchester County filed its reply papers on July 21, 2017, (see Dkt. No. 59).

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II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
“The standards of review for a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction and under 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim are substantively identical.”
Gonzalez v. Option One Mortg. Corp., No. 12-CV-1470, 2014 WL 2475893, at *2 (D. Conn.
June 3, 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Neroni v. Coccoma, No. 13-CV-1340,
2014 WL 2532482, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. June 5, 2014) (same), aff’d, 591 F. App’x 28 (2d Cir. 2015).
“In deciding both types of motions, the Court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint
as true, and draw inferences from those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”
Gonzalez, 2014 WL 2475893, at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Seemann v. U.S.
Postal Serv., No. 11-CV-206, 2012 WL 1999847, at *1 (D. Vt. June 4, 2012) (same). However,
“[o]n a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, . . . the party who invokes the Court’s jurisdiction bears the burden
of proof to demonstrate that subject matter jurisdiction exists, whereas the movant bears the
burden of proof on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Gonzalez, 2014 WL 2475893, at
*2; see also Sobel v. Prudenti, 25 F. Supp. 3d 340, 352 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (“In contrast to the
standard for a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff
asserting subject matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that it exists.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). This allocation of the burden of
proof is “[t]he only substantive difference” between the standards of review under these two
rules. Smith v. St. Luke’s Roosevelt Hosp., No. 08-CV-4710, 2009 WL 2447754, at *9 n.10
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2009), adopted by 2009 WL 2878093 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2009); see also
Fagan v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of N.Y., 644 F. Supp. 2d 441, 446–47 & n.7 (S.D.N.Y.
2009) (same).

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1. Rule 12(b)(1)
“A federal court has subject matter jurisdiction over a cause of action only when it has
authority to adjudicate the cause pressed in the complaint.” Bryant v. Steele, 25 F. Supp. 3d 233,
241 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Determining the existence of subject
matter jurisdiction is a threshold inquiry[,] and a claim is properly dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) when the district court lacks the statutory or
constitutional power to adjudicate it.” Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 170 (2d
Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d, 561 U.S. 247 (2010); see also Butler v. Ross,
No. 16-CV-1282, 2016 WL 3264134, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2016) (same). Nevertheless,
“[u]nlike Article III standing, which ordinarily should be determined before reaching the merits,
statutory standing may be assumed for the purposes of deciding whether the plaintiff otherwise
has a viable cause of action.” Coan v. Kaufman, 457 F.3d 250, 256 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation
omitted). While a district court resolving a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) “must take all
uncontroverted facts in the complaint . . . as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
the party asserting jurisdiction,” “where jurisdictional facts are placed in dispute, the court has
the power and obligation to decide issues of fact by reference to evidence outside the pleadings,
such as affidavits,” in which case “the party asserting subject matter jurisdiction has the burden
of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it exists.” Tandon v. Captain’s Cove Marina
of Bridgeport, Inc., 752 F.3d 239, 243 (2d Cir. 2014) (alteration and internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Ray Legal Consulting Grp. v. Gray, 37 F. Supp. 3d 689, 696 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(“[W]here subject matter jurisdiction is contested a district court is permitted to consider
evidence outside the pleadings, such as affidavits and exhibits.”).

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2. Rule 12(b)(6)
When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all factual
allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.
See Nielsen v. Rabin, 746 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 2014). The Court, however, is not required to
credit “mere conclusory statements” or “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 678 (internal
quotation marks omitted). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the [C]ourt to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. Specifically, the plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show “more
than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully,” id., and if the plaintiff has not
“nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, [the] complaint must be
dismissed,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the question “is not whether a plaintiff will
ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.”
Sikhs for Justice v. Nath, 893 F. Supp. 2d 598, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). Accordingly, the “purpose
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is to test, in a streamlined fashion, the formal
sufficiency of the plaintiff’s statement of a claim for relief without resolving a contest regarding
its substantive merits.” Halebian v. Berv, 644 F.3d 122, 130 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation
marks omitted). To decide the motion, the Court “may consider facts asserted within the four
corners of the complaint together with the documents attached to the complaint as exhibits, and

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any documents incorporated in the complaint by reference.” Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v.
Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 64 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Where, as here, a plaintiff proceeds pro se, the court must “construe[] [his] [complaint]
liberally and interpret[] [it] to raise the strongest arguments that [it] suggest[s].” Sykes v. Bank of
Am., 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, “the liberal
treatment afforded to pro se litigants does not exempt a pro se party from compliance with
relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” Bell v. Jendell, 980 F. Supp. 2d 555, 559
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Caidor v. Onondaga County, 517
F.3d 601, 605 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[P]ro se litigants generally are required to inform themselves
regarding procedural rules and to comply with them.” (italics and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
B. Analysis
Defendants argue primarily that the Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff’s claim
and invoke a number of doctrines in support of that argument. (See Mem. of Law in Supp. of
State Defs.’ Mot. To Dismiss (“State Defs.’ Mem.”) 6–12 (Dkt. No. 26); Mem. of Law in Supp.
of County Def.’s Mot. To Dismiss (“County Def.’s Mem.”) 10–12 (Dkt. No. 55).) Because
subject matter jurisdiction is, “conventionally and properly, the first question a court is called on
to consider,” Can v. United States, 14 F.3d 160, 162 n.1 (2d Cir. 1994), the Court will first
examine these arguments.
1. Eleventh Amendment
State Defendants argue first that Westchester County Family Court is entirely immune
from suit and Magistrate Thompson is immune from suit in her official capacity pursuant to the
Eleventh Amendment. (See State Defs.’ Mem. 6.) In opposition, Plaintiff cites two Supreme

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Court cases for the proposition that a state acting as a private entity should be regarded as an
individual separate from government, and also contends that sovereign immunity “can only
protect when public officers are doing their duty and upholding the Constitution.” (Pl.’s Opp’n
to Mot. To Dismiss (“Pl.’s State Opp’n”) ¶¶ 2–4 (Dkt. No. 33).)
“[A]s a general matter, states enjoy sovereign immunity from suit in federal court, even if
the claim arises under federal law.” Harrison v. New York, 95 F. Supp. 3d 293, 314 (E.D.N.Y.
2015) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also U.S. Const. amend. XI.3 “The immunity
recognized by the Eleventh Amendment extends beyond the states themselves to state agents and
state instrumentalities that are, effectively, arms of a state.” Woods v. Rondout Valley Cent. Sch.
Dist. Bd. of Educ., 466 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus,
under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, an individual may not sue a state, its agencies, or its
officials in federal court, absent that state’s consent or an express statutory waiver of immunity.
See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670
(1999); see also McGinty v. New York, 251 F.3d 84, 91 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[T]here are two
recognized exceptions to the [Eleventh Amendment] bar: when Congress authorizes a suit
through enforcement of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and where a state consents to being
sued.”).
“Although the [Eleventh] Amendment, by its terms, bars only federal suits against state
governments by citizens of another state or foreign country, it has been interpreted also to bar
federal suits against state governments by a state’s own citizens.” Woods, 466 F.3d at 236; see
also Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 16 (1890) (holding that sovereign immunity extends beyond

“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI.
3

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the text of the Eleventh Amendment such that a state cannot be sued by one of its own citizens
without consent); McGinty, 251 F.3d at 91 (“[S]overeign immunity extends beyond the literal
text of the Eleventh Amendment to bar a citizen from suing his own state under federal question
jurisdiction . . . .”). Furthermore, the Eleventh Amendment “bars suits that seek either money
damages or injunctive relief.” McGinty, 251 F.3d at 91 (citations omitted); see also Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985) (“Unless a State has waived its Eleventh Amendment
immunity or Congress has overridden it . . . , a State cannot be sued directly in its own name
regardless of the relief sought.”); Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 91 (1982) (“[T]he Eleventh
Amendment by its terms clearly applies to a suit seeking an injunction . . . .”); Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) (“Thus the rule has evolved that a suit by private parties
seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred
by the Eleventh Amendment.”). The party seeking immunity bears the burden of demonstrating
that it is an arm of the state. See Gorton v. Gettel, 554 F.3d 60, 62 (2d Cir 2009) (“The burden is
on the party seeking immunity to demonstrate that it is an arm of the state.”); see also Woods,
466 F.3d at 237 (holding that “the governmental entity invoking the Eleventh Amendment bears
the burden of demonstrating that it qualifies as an arm of the state entitled to share in its
immunity”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Courts have routinely held that New York has not waived, and Congress has not
abrogated, sovereign immunity with respect to claims for constitutional violations under § 1983.
See, e.g., Harrison, 95 F. Supp. 3d at 314 (“It is well established that New York State has not
waived its sovereign immunity from [§] 1983 claims. Moreover, Congress did not abrogate that
immunity when it enacted [§] 1983.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Marino v.
City Univ. of N.Y., 18 F. Supp. 3d 320, 335 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (“It is well settled that Congress did

11

not abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity by enacting § 1983 and New York has not waived
its immunity.”); Goonewardena v. New York, 475 F. Supp. 2d 310, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“The
State of New York has not waived its sovereign immunity in regard to [§] 1983 actions nor has
its sovereign immunity been abrogated.”).
With respect to Westchester County Family Court, the Second Circuit has squarely held
that “the New York State Unified Court System is unquestionably an arm of the State,” and
therefore “a lawsuit against the Unified Court System is in essence one for the recovery of
money from the state, so that the state is the real substantial party in interest and is entitled to
invoke its sovereign immunity from suit.” Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 368 (2d Cir. 2009)
(alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). For that reason, “any claims against the
Family Court, a court that is part of the New York State Unified Court System, must be
dismissed because it is entitled to sovereign immunity as guaranteed by the Eleventh
Amendment.” Dyer v. Family Court, No. 16-CV-6876, 2016 WL 7494864, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.
Dec. 28, 2016); see also Jainity v. Sarway, No. 13-CV-89, 2013 WL 816216, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.
Mar. 5, 2013) (granting the Family Court of Kings County immunity because it “is an arm of the
State of New York and hence immune from suit for damages in federal court under the 11th
Amendment”); McKnight v. Middleton, 699 F. Supp. 2d 507, 521 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“The County
of Kings Family Court is a part of the New York State Unified Court system and is, therefore,
also protected by the State’s sovereign immunity from suit in federal court.”).
Plaintiff argues that “[c]hild [s]upport is not a part of the family court system,” and cites
45 C.F.R. § 304.21, a federal regulation relating to federal reimbursement of certain costs arising
from the execution of federal–state cooperation agreements. (Pl.’s State Opp’n ¶ 9.) Plaintiff
reasons that because a judge presiding over a child support proceeding may be indirectly entitled

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to reimbursement via § 304.21, the proceeding must not be “judicial” in nature. (See id. ¶ 11.)
This specious argument is wrong on two levels. First, the question is not whether Westchester
County Family Court complies with the demands of due process as Plaintiff sees them, but rather
whether Westchester County Family Court is a creature of New York State by virtue of its place
in the New York State Unified Court System. The answer to this question, as the above cases
demonstrate, is plainly yes. Second, Plaintiff has, in any event, misread the regulation. Section
304.21(b) provides that federal financial participation (reimbursement) “is not available in: . . .
(2) Costs of compensation (salary and fringe benefits) of judges.” 45 C.F.R. § 304.21(b)
(emphasis added). To the extent any impropriety could be inferred from federal reimbursement
of state judicial salaries, the regulation has preempted such an attack. In any event, nothing
about this regulatory scheme punctures the Eleventh Amendment’s application here.
Regarding Plaintiff’s claims against Magistrate Thompson in her official capacity, the
Second Circuit has held that “[t]o the extent that a state official is sued for damages in [her]
official capacity, such a suit is deemed to be a suit against the state, and the official is entitled to
invoke the Eleventh Amendment immunity belonging to the state.” Gan v. City of New York,
996 F.2d 522, 529 (2d Cir. 1993). Accordingly, suits against state officials in their official
capacity seeking damages are routinely dismissed on immunity grounds. See, e.g., Nguyen v.
Milliken, 104 F. Supp. 3d 224, 229 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (“To the extent [the plaintiff] brings claims
for damages against [the defendants] in their official capacities as representatives of [state
colleges], such claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”); Harrison, 95 F. Supp. 3d at
316 (“Sovereign immunity also bars [the] [p]laintiff’s Bivens claims to the extent they have been
brought against [the defendant] in his official capacity.”); Zherka v. Ryan, 52 F. Supp. 3d 571,

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578 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“[The] [d]efendants are correct in arguing that they are immune from suit
in their official capacities.”).
Plaintiff does request, in his Complaint, some unspecified “injunctive relief,” (Compl. at
22), which could conceivably invoke the doctrine of Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). That
doctrine permits a plaintiff to “sue a state official acting in his official capacity—notwithstanding
the Eleventh Amendment—for prospective, injunctive relief from violations of federal law.”
State Emps. Bargaining Agent Coalition v. Rowland, 494 F.3d 71, 95 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal
quotation marks omitted). But as State Defendants point out, (see State Defs.’ Mem. 9),
“conclusory requests for ‘injunctive relief’” are not sufficient to trigger the Young doctrine,
Falcon v. City Univ. of N.Y., No. 15-CV-3421, 2016 WL 3920223, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. July 15,
2016); see also Emmons v. City Univ. of N.Y., 715 F. Supp. 2d 394, 407 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)
(dismissing claims against state officials where the “complaint itself [was] far less clear in its
request for equitable relief,” and “[o]n the face of the complaint, the Young exception [was] not
supportable”); Pierre v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., No. 05-CV-275, 2009 WL 1583475, at
*18 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2009) (holding that the Young doctrine did not apply where the plaintiff
“alleged no ongoing violation” and offered only “conclusory language requesting unspecified
injunctive relief”). Plaintiff makes no effort to rebut this contention in his opposition, (see Pl.’s
State Opp’n), and the Court otherwise agrees with State Defendants that the Young doctrine is
not implicated here. Accordingly, absent an exception, Plaintiff’s claims against Magistrate
Thompson in her official capacity are barred by sovereign immunity.
Plaintiff does not resist the basic framework of sovereign immunity, instead offering two
arguments for its inapplicability here. First, he contends that “[w]hen money is exchanged[,]
[g]overnments descend to private person or corporation,” thereby, in his view, divesting them of

14

the protections of sovereign immunity. (Pl.’s State Opp’n ¶ 2.) But the cases cited by Plaintiff
in support are inapposite. In Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943), the
immunity of a state or its entities was not in dispute. Instead, the issue was whether the “rights
and duties of the United States on commercial paper which it issues” were governed by federal
law or local law. Id. at 366. Nowhere did the Supreme Court discuss the availability of
sovereign immunity. In Bank of United States v. Planters’ Bank of Georgia, 22 U.S. 904 (1824),
the Court did discuss the Eleventh Amendment, but only insofar as it held that the fact that a
state holds shares in a corporation does not entitle the corporation itself to sovereign immunity.
See id. at 907. Neither of these cases even remotely addresses the application of sovereign
immunity in situations where, as here, the state entities are undoubtedly acting in their capacity
as arms of the state.
Plaintiff argues also that “[s]overeign [i]mmunity can only protect when public officers
are doing their duty and upholding the Constitution.” (Pl.’s State Opp’n ¶ 4.) This assertion is
entirely without any legal support and, if true, would eviscerate centuries-old precedent holding
that states are immune from suit regardless of the basis for the suit. There are only two
exceptions to sovereign immunity, and neither of them involves situations where the plaintiff
alleges the state entities violated the Constitution. See McGinty, 251 F.3d at 91. There is no
authority supporting the proposition that sovereign immunity extends only to violations of state
law or federal statutes—while Plaintiff is correct that the Constitution is the supreme law of the
land, that does not lead to the inexorable conclusion that his claims here may be vindicated in
federal court. After all, Eleventh Amendment Immunity itself is a constitutional command.

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Accordingly, Westchester County Family Court is completely immune from suit here,
and Magistrate Thompson is immune insofar as the Complaint alleges claims against her in her
official capacity.
2. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
All Defendants argue that all of Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. (See State Defs.’ Mem. 9–10; County Def.’s Mem. 10–11.) Plaintiff contends only
that Rooker-Feldman is not implicated because the state judgments were procured through fraud.
(See Pl.’s State Opp’n ¶ 22.)
“Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts lack jurisdiction over suits
that are, in substance, appeals from state-court judgments.” Phillips ex rel. Green v. City of New
York, 453 F. Supp. 2d 690, 712 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005), the Supreme Court
emphasized that the doctrine is “narrow” and applies only to federal lawsuits brought by “statecourt losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district
court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those
judgments.” Id. at 284. After Exxon Mobil, the Second Circuit reexamined the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine and laid out four conditions that, if met, require the Court to dismiss a plaintiff’s claims
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction: (1) “the federal-court plaintiff must have lost in state
court”; (2) “the plaintiff must complain of injuries caused by a state-court judgment”; (3) “the
plaintiff must invite district court review and rejection of that judgment”; and (4) “the state-court
judgment must have been rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.” Hoblock
v. Albany Cty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 2005) (alterations and internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Vossbrinck v. Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., 773 F.3d 423, 426 (2d

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Cir. 2014) (same). “The Second Circuit has classified the first and fourth requirements as
‘procedural’ and the second and third requirements as ‘substantive.’” Done v. Wells Fargo, N.A.,
No. 12-CV-4296, 2013 WL 3785627, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. July 18, 2013) (citing Hoblock, 422 F.3d
at 85).
Plaintiff does not dispute any of the elements of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and a
review of the Complaint and state court records make clear that this case satisfies each element.
First, Plaintiff was, by his own admission, the loser in state court, as Magistrate Thompson
entered a money judgment against him. (See Berg Decl. Ex. C.) The fourth element is also met,
as the judgment was entered on April 19, 2016, (see id.), and this Action commenced on
December 8, 2016, (see Dkt. No. 1).
While the satisfaction of the second and third elements is, perhaps, less intuitive, even a
cursory review of the Complaint and existing case law confirms that Plaintiff’s Action satisfies
each of these elements: “Courts have repeatedly invoked Rooker-Feldman in cases in which
plaintiffs challenge family court decrees setting child support arrears.” Kneitel v. Palos, No. 15CV-2577, 2015 WL 3607570, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. June 8, 2015) (alterations and internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Remy v. NYS Dep’t of Taxation & Fin., No. 09-CV-4444, 2010 WL
3926919, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2010) (holding that where a plaintiff sought compensatory
damages under § 1983 for purported constitutional violations in connection with a child support
proceeding, “the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bar[red] consideration of [the] [p]laintiff’s claims”),
aff’d, 507 F. App’x 16 (2d Cir. 2013); Cogswell v. Rodriguez, 304 F. Supp. 2d 350, 355–56
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2004) (holding that the plaintiff’s “allegations that [the hearing examiner]
denied her due process and equal protection” in setting a child support amount were
“inextricably intertwined with the state court’s determinations” and were therefore barred by

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Rooker-Feldman). Here, Plaintiff makes clear throughout this Complaint that his alleged
damages arise from the constitutional violations he claims were inflicted on him by way of the
Westchester County Family Court proceedings and the resulting judgment against him. (See
Compl. ¶¶ 1, 10–11, 105–07, 109–22.) Plaintiff is seeking damages arising directly out of the
state court proceedings and judgment rendered against him, and his claims therefore fall within
Rooker-Feldman.
The fact that Plaintiff is challenging the constitutional adequacy of the proceedings is of
no help to him, as many of the cases cited above (and others) have arisen in identical contexts.
See, e.g., Remy, 2010 WL 3926919, at *3 (dismissing claims that “the state court decision[]
upholding the [child support] judgment violated [the plaintiff’s] constitutional rights” and that
the “state court judgment was issued without jurisdiction,” holding that allowing such claims to
go forward “would obliterate the Rooker-Feldman doctrine”); Cogswell, 304 F. Supp. 2d at 355–
56 (applying Rooker-Feldman where “[t]he plaintiff’s principal complaint [was] that she was
denied due process because she was not given a hearing to determine the amount of child support
that was owed and that she was not given notice that her vehicle would be seized due to her
failure to pay child support”). Nor does it aid Plaintiff that he claims he has paid his child
support obligations, (see Pl’s State Opp’n ¶¶ 15–21), as this precise claim has been dismissed on
Rooker-Feldman grounds, see Fernandez v. Turetsky, No. 12-CV-4092, 2014 WL 5823116, at *4
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2014) (applying Rooker-Feldman where the plaintiff asked the court to review
a family court decision “setting arrears on the grounds that the decision was erroneous because
he had complied with all previous child support obligations and thus could not be liable for
arrears”), aff’d, 645 F. App’x 103 (2d Cir. 2016).

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Finally, with respect to Plaintiff’s claim that Rooker-Feldman does not apply where the
state court judgment was allegedly procured by fraud, (see Pl.’s State Opp’n ¶ 22), Defendants
are correct that no such defense is available. In support, Plaintiff cites only out-of-circuit
authority from the 1960s, (see id.), thus overlooking the fact that the Second Circuit has “never
recognized a blanket fraud exception to Rooker-Feldman,” Kropelnicki v. Siegel, 290 F.3d 118,
128 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Federal district courts in the Second
Circuit have consistently enforced this rule. See, e.g., Brady v. Goldman, No. 16-CV-2287, 2017
WL 111749, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2017) (“[The] [p]laintiff’s attempts to bypass the RookerFeldman doctrine . . . ignore clear and controlling law in th[e] [Second] Circuit, which does not
recognize a fraud exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine . . . .”); Gurdon v. Bank, No. 15CV-5674, 2016 WL 721019, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2016) (“[T]here is not a fraud exception to
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.”), adopted by 2016 WL 3523737 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2016);
Sorenson v. Wolfson, 96 F. Supp. 3d 347, 369 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“Courts in th[e] [Southern]
District consistently have held that there is no fraudulent procurement exception to the RookerFeldman doctrine.”). Plaintiff has not pointed to a single case in the Second Circuit where the
court exercised jurisdiction in these circumstances, and while Plaintiff may believe the law
should be otherwise, this Court is bound by the Second Circuit’s decisions. Accordingly,
Rooker-Feldman bars all of Plaintiff’s claims, and this Court lacks jurisdiction.
3. Domestic Relations Exception
Finally, Defendants argue that even if the above analysis is incorrect, the domestic
relation exception provides another jurisdictional bar. (See State Defs.’ Mem. 11–12; County
Def.’s Mem. 11–12.) Plaintiff did not respond to this argument. (See Pl.’s State Opp’n; Pl.’s
Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. To Dismiss (Dkt. No. 58).)

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“[T]he domestic relations exception . . . divests the federal courts of power to issue
divorce, alimony, and child custody degrees.” Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703
(1992). Since the Supreme Court announced this rule, “[t]he exception has consistently been
applied to child support judgments as well.” Csikota v. Tolkachev, No. 08-CV-5283, 2010 WL
370284, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2010); see also Southerland v. Banks, No. 15-CV-6088, 2015
WL 9581818, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2015) (“Without determining the merits of [the]
plaintiff’s claims, the court cannot review his child support obligations as this is a matter of state
domestic relations law.”); Joseph v. Stewart, No. 13-CV-1678, 2013 WL 3863915, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. July 24, 2013) (“[The] [p]laintiff challenges the enforcement and effect of his child
support obligations, and although he invokes his constitutional rights, the essence of his
allegations concern state law domestic relations matters.”). And, as with the other jurisdictional
bars, the fact that Plaintiff is challenging the constitutionality of his child support obligations is
of no help, as the domestic relations exception applies regardless of the theory of liability. See,
e.g., Watty v. Cuomo, No. 12-CV-2660, 2013 WL 812491, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2013) (“[The
plaintiff] invokes constitutional and other rights, but the substance of his claims about the impact
on him of child support orders concerns state law domestic relations matters, matters that are
better adjudicated in state court . . . .”), adopted by 2013 WL 816284 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2013);
Sullivan v. Xu, No. 10-CV-3626, 2010 WL 3238979, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2010) (“Although
[the] plaintiff invokes his constitutional rights, the substance of his claims concern state law
domestic relations matters. Therefore, this action is dismissed . . . .”).
In the absence of any authority cited by Plaintiff in opposition, and in light of the case
law above, the Court holds that the domestic relations exception precludes any adjudication of

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the claims presented by Plaintiff here, as they all involve monetary damages arising out of the
judgment entered against him for delinquent child support payments.
C. Additional Claims
Although not pressed by Plaintiff in his opposition papers, the Court notes that the
Complaint alleges that Plaintiff was falsely arrested on April 19, 2016, assaulted for exercising
his First Amendment rights, and charged with false criminal charges. (See Compl. ¶¶ 91–97.)
Plaintiff has not, however, named as a defendant the officer who allegedly assaulted and arrested
him, or the officer responsible for filing the allegedly false charges. Plaintiff’s claims plainly
cannot proceed without such defendants being named, as there are no allegations that Defendants
played any role in that conduct. Accordingly, the dismissal of the claims asserted herein is
without prejudice to Plaintiff’s ability to file a new complaint, if he wants to present these
claims.
D. State Law Claims
Having dismissed all of Plaintiffs federal claims, the Court will not exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over any of Defendant’s claims that may be construed as state law claims. (See id.
¶¶ 132–164.) Federal district courts have supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims “that
are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the
same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(a). “Federal courts may exercise jurisdiction over related state-law claims when an
independent basis of subject-matter jurisdiction exists.” Chenensky v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 942 F.
Supp. 2d 388, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing Montefiore Med. Ctr. v. Teamsters Local, 642 F.3d
321, 332 (2d Cir. 2011)). The Supreme Court has held that “if the federal claims [in an action]
are dismissed before trial . . . the state claims should be dismissed as well,” United Mine Workers

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ofAm. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966), but "[t]he decision whether to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction is entirely within the court's discretion and is not a litigant's right," Chenensky, 942
F. Supp. 2d at 391 (internal quotation marks omitted). "District courts weigh several factors in
determining whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, including 'the values of judicial
economy, convenience, fairness and comity."' Id. (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill,
484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)). "In weighing these values, courts look to ' the circumstances of each
particular case."' Id. at 391-92 (alteration omitted) (quoting City of Chicago v. Int '! Coll. of
Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997)). Because the Court has dismissed all federal claims against
Defendants, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any of Plaintiffs state
law claims.
III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motions are granted. The Court lacks jurisdiction
to adjudicate any of Plaintiffs claims. This dismissal is without prejudice because Plaintiff has
not yet amended his Complaint. This dismissal is also without prejudice as to Plaintiffs ability
to file a complaint for false arrest, excessive force, and malicious prosecution against the officer
or officers responsible for that alleged conduct.
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the pending Motions, (see Dkt.
Nos. 24, 53).
SO ORDERED.
DATED:

Septembera (:, , 2017
White Plains, New York

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