Lara-Grimaldi v. County of Putnam et al

Filing 155

OPINION AND ORDER: For the foregoing reasons, the Motion is denied. The Clerk of the Court is respectfully requested to terminate the pending Motion. (Dkt. No. 144.) SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Kenneth M. Karas on 3/11/2022) (jca)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
NANCY LARA-GRIMALDI, individually and as
Administratrix of the Estate of Alexandra Grimaldi,
Plaintiff,
-vCOUNTY OF PUTNAM, et al.,
Defendants.

Appearances:
David Bruce Rankin, Esq.
Regina Powers, Esq.
Keith Michael Szczepanski, Esq.
Beldock Levine & Hoffman LLP
New York, NY
Counsel for Plaintiff
James A. Randazzo, Esq.
Portale Randazzo LLP
White Plains, NY
Counsel for County Defendants
Drew William Sumner, Esq.
Sumner Law LLP
White Plains, NY
Counsel for County Defendants
Caroline Beth Lineen, Esq.
Lewis R. Silverman, Esq.
Deanna L. Collins, Esq.
Silverman and Associates
White Plains, NY
Counsel for Defendant Nigro

No. 17-CV-622 (KMK)
OPINION & ORDER

KENNETH M. KARAS, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Nancy Lara-Grimaldi (“Plaintiff”), individually and as Administratrix of the
Estate of Alexandra Grimaldi (“Grimaldi”), brings the instant Action against Putnam County
Sergeant Karen Jackson (“Jackson”), Correction Officer Steven Napolitano (“Napolitano”),
Correction Officer Michelle Nigro (“Nigro”), John and/or Jane Doe Officers, and John and/or
Jane Doe Medical Officials (“Does”; collectively, “Individual Defendants”), and the County of
Putnam (“Putnam County”; together with all Individual Defendants except Nigro, the “County
Defendants”), for the wrongful death of Grimaldi due to her attempted suicide while in pretrial
detention at the Putnam County Correctional Facility (“PCCF”). (See generally Second Am.
Compl. (“SAC”) (Dkt. No. 74).) 1 Plaintiff brought six claims: (1) a federal claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against the Individual Defendants for deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s
Fourteenth Amendment rights; (2) a federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Putnam
County for Monell violations; (3) a state law wrongful death claim against Putnam County and
the Individual Defendants; (4) a state constitutional law claim under Article I § 6 against Putnam
County and the Individual Defendants; (5) a state law negligence claim against Putnam County
and the Individual Defendants; and (6) a state law respondeat superior claim against Putnam

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Plaintiff’s SAC names Putnam County Sheriff Donald Smith (“Smith”), Sergeant
William Spinelli (“Spinelli”), Correction Officer John Cassidy (“Cassidy”), Correction Officer
Anthony Colello (“Colello”), Correction Officer Trudy Giampaolo (“Giampaolo”), Correction
Officer Richard Greagor (“Greagor”), Correction Officer Angela McGoorty (“McGoorty”),
Correction Officer Keith Puhekker (“Puhekker”), and Correction Officer Jennifer Wilkinson
(“Wilkinson”), but the Court has dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against them. (See Op. & Order
(“2021 Op.”) (Dkt. No. 140); Op. & Order (“2019 Op.”) (Dkt. No. 111); (Op. & Order (“2018
Op.”) (Dkt. No. 43).) The SAC also names PCCF Nurse Christopher Stewart, but he died in
January 2019, and on September 6, 2019, he was dismissed from this Action. (See Dkt. No.
113.)

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County. (See generally id.) 2 In an Opinion & Order dated March 9, 2021, the Court granted
summary judgment on the deliberate indifference claim and deferred judgment on Plaintiff’s
Monell and state law claims. (See 2021 Op. at 36.) Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for
Entry of Partial Judgment (the “Motion”), pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), in
favor of Individual Defendants and against Plaintiff on the deliberate indifference claim. (See
Not. of Mot. (Dkt. No. 144).) For the reasons that follow, the Motion is denied.
I. Background
In total, the Court has issued three prior Opinions in this Action, one on March 29, 2018,
(2018 Op.), one on August 1, 2019, (2019 Op.), and one on March 9, 2021, (2021 Op.). The
Court assumes familiarity with the alleged facts of the case, as described in detail in these
Opinions. (See 2021 Op. at 3–21; 2019 Op. at 2–3; 2018 Op. at 3–8.) The Court also assumes
familiarity with the procedural history as discussed in these Opinions, (see 2021 Op. at 21–22;
2019 Op. at 4; 2018 Op. at 9), and will therefore only recount the procedural history pertinent to
the Instant Motion.
On May 17, 2021, Plaintiff filed her Motion for Entry of Judgment and accompanying
papers. (Dkt. Nos. 144, 145.) On June 14, 2021, the County Defendants and Defendant Nigro
filed their Oppositions. (Dkt. Nos. 146, 147.) On June 28, 2021, Plaintiff filed her Reply. (Dkt.
No. 148.)

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In the SAC, Plaintiff also brought a federal claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
Defendants Smith, McGoorty, Greagor, Colello, and Giampaolo, for denial of Plaintiff’s right of
familial association with Grimaldi. (See SAC ¶¶ 108 –115.) This claim was dismissed with
prejudice in the Court’s 2019 Opinion. (See 2019 Op. at 11–12.)
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II. Discussion
“Rule 54(b) provides an exception to the general principle that a final judgment is proper
only after the rights and liabilities of all the parties to the action have been adjudicated.” L-7
Designs, Inc. v. Old Navy, LLC, 964 F. Supp. 2d 299, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting Hogan v.
Consol. Rail Corp., 961 F.2d 1021, 1024–25 (2d Cir. 1992)). Specifically, Rule 54(b) provides:
When an action presents more than one claim for relief—whether as a claim,
counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim—or when multiple parties are involved,
the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all,
claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for
delay.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). “As explained by the Second Circuit, ‘Rule 54(b) authorizes a district
court to enter partial final judgment when three requirements have been satisfied: (1) there are
multiple claims or parties, (2) at least one claim or the rights and liabilities of at least one party
has been finally determined, and (3) the court makes an express determination that there is no
just reason for delay of entry of final judgment as to fewer than all of the claims or parties
involved in the action.’” Timperio v. Bronx-Lebanon Hosp. Ctr., No. 18-CV-1804, 2020 WL
9211177, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2020) (quoting Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 882 F.3d 314, 322–
23 (2d Cir. 2018)). Here, it is clear, and the Parties do not dispute, (see Def. Nigro’s Mem. in
Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. (“Def. Nigro’s Mem.”) at 4 (Dkt. No. 147); County Defs.’ Mem. in Opp’n to
Pl.’s Mot. (“County Defs.’ Mem.”) at 2 (Dkt. No. 146)), that the first two elements are clearly
satisfied: there are multiple claims and parties, (see generally SAC), and Plaintiff’s deliberate
indifference claim has been finally determined, (see 2021 Op. at 36).
“Even when the first two factors are satisfied, the district court must still make a finding
that entry of partial judgment is appropriate.” Lankler Siffert & Wohl, LLP v. Rossi, No. 02-CV10055, 2004 WL 541842, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2004), aff'd, 125 F. App’x 371 (2d Cir.

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2005). This is because “the mere separability of a claim does not warrant Rule 54(b)
certification.” United Bank of Kuwait PLC v. Enventure Energy Enhanced Oil Recovery Assocs.,
763 F. Supp. 729, 731 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (citing Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S.
1, 8 (1980)). “Even when a claim is separable, the just reasons for delay inquiry requires a
balancing of judicial administrative interests and the equities involved.” Id. (citing I.L.T.A., Inc.
v. United Airlines, Inc., 739 F.2d 82, 84 (2d Cir. 1984); see also Danaher Corp. v. The Travelers
Indem. Co., No. 10-CV-121, 2016 WL 1255739, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2016) (“[N]ot all final
judgments on individual claims should be immediately appealable, even if they are in some sense
separable from the remaining unresolved claims.” (quoting S.E.C. v. Frohling, 614 F. App’x 14,
17 (2d Cir. 2015))).
“The Second Circuit has cautioned that that Rule 54(b) motions should be granted ‘only
when there exists some danger of hardship or injustice through delay which would be alleviated
by immediate appeal . . . .’” Timperio, 2020 WL 9211177, at *2 (quoting Advanced Magnetics,
Inc. v. Bayfront Partners, Inc., 106 F.3d 11, 16 (2d Cir. 1997)). Entry of partial judgment may
be appropriate, “for example, where a plaintiff might be prejudiced by a delay in recovering a
monetary award, or where an expensive and duplicative trial could be avoided if, without
delaying prosecution of the surviving claims, a dismissed claim were reversed in time to be tried
with the other claims.” Id. (quoting Advanced Magnetics, 106 F.3d at 16). “Importantly, Rule
54(b) is to be invoked ‘sparingly,’” L-7 Designs, 964 F. Supp. 2d at 317 (quoting Hogan, 961
F.2d at 1025)), as “federal policy generally disfavors piecemeal appellate litigation,” Ginett v.
Comput. Task Grp., Inc., 962 F.2d 1085, 1093 (2d Cir.1992) (quotation marks omitted); see also
O'Bert ex rel. Estate of O'Bert v. Vargo, 331 F.3d 29, 40–41 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Rule 54(b) . . .
should be used only in the infrequent harsh case . . ., i.e., certification should be granted only if

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there exists some danger of hardship or injustice through delay which would be alleviated by
immediate appeal.” (italics omitted)).
Here, Plaintiff argues that entry of partial judgment is appropriate to promote judicial
efficiency. Specifically, Plaintiff argues, “[g]iven that the Monell and individual claims were
bifurcated, this action is well-positioned for entry of judgment under Rule 54(b), as entry of
judgment on [§] 1983 claims against Individual Defendants promotes judicial efficiency,
whereas failure to certify the issue for appeal delays litigation.” (Pls.’ Mem. of Law in Supp. of
Mot. for Entry of Judg. (“Pl.’s Mem.”) at 4–5 (Dkt. No. 145).) Plaintiff further argues that entry
of partial judgment on the deliberate indifference claim is warranted because the failure do so
could result in two separate trials. (See id. at 6–7.)
The Court finds Plaintiff’s arguments to be unavailing. “[U]nnecessary discovery and
trial costs . . . ‘are inherent in every denial of Rule 54(b) certification, and hardly rise to the level
of hardships that warrant immediate appeal.’” Negrete v. Citibank, N.A., No. 15-CV-7250, 2017
WL 2963494, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2017) (quoting TADCO Const. Grp. Corp. v. Dormitory
Auth. of N.Y., No. 08-CV-73, 2012 WL 3011735, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. July 23, 2012) (emphasis in
original)); see also FAT Brands Inc. v. PPMT Cap. Advisors, Ltd., No. 19-CV-10497, 2021 WL
1392849, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2021) (same). In fact, “the desire to ‘to avoid a second
trial . . . is one [that the Second Circuit] ha[s] explicitly rejected’ as a basis for entry of a partial
judgment, ‘particularly in cases where the dismissed and surviving claims are closely
interrelated.’” FAT Brands, 2021 WL 1392849, at *3 (quoting Adrian v. Town of Yorktown, 210
F. App’x 131, 133 (2d Cir. 2006)).
Indeed, Second Circuit has “advised against Rule 54(b) certification ‘if the same or
closely related issues remain to be litigated,’ because the interests of judicial economy are not

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generally served by ‘piecemeal appeals that require two (or more) three-judge panels to
familiarize themselves with a given case in successive appeals from successive decisions on
interrelated issues.’” Crespo v. Carvajal, No. 17-CV-6329, 2021 WL 4237002, at *4 (E.D.N.Y.
Sept. 14, 2021) (quoting Novick v. AXA Network, LLC, 642 F.3d 304, 311 (2d Cir. 2011)); see
also NYSA Series Tr. v. Dessein, 631 F. App’x 54, 56 (2d Cir. 2015) (“[A] ‘unified’ appeal ‘is
particularly desirable where . . . the adjudicated and pending claims are closely related and stem
from essentially the same factual allegations.’” (quoting Cullen v. Margiotta, 618 F.2d 226, 228
(2d Cir. 1980)) (alteration in original)); see also Negrete, 2017 WL 2963494, at *2 (denying
certification because dismissed and remaining claims arose out of the same factual
circumstances, even if they implicated different legal questions); Vaad L’Hafotzas Sichos, Inc. v.
Kehot Publ’n Soc’y, No. 10-CV-4976, 2014 WL 1026592, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2014)
(denying certification where there were “common issues” between the plaintiff's counterclaims
and issues remaining to the be litigated, and that even if that were not the case, “a Rule 54(b)
certification [of the counterclaims] would require two separate panels of the Second Circuit to
familiarize themselves with the rather tortured history of the parties’ dispute”). This is
particularly relevant here, where the deliberate indifference and Monell claims are based on the
same nexus of facts. (See Def. Nigro’s Mem. at 4 (“The deliberate indifference claims against
the [I]ndividual [D]efendants and the Monell claim against the County are closely related as they
arise from the same incident and arise out of related events . . . .”)).
Moreover, Plaintiff’s “desire for finality, while understandable, does not justify granting
a Rule 54(b) motion.” Timperio, 2020 WL 9211177, at *3; see also Ciccotelli v. Washington
Mut., Inc., No. 10-CV-16, 2013 WL 12226704, at *2 (D. Vt. Jan. 2, 2013) (“[The defendant]
argues that without a final judgment, it and counsel must continue to monitor this litigation

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indefinitely while [the plaintiff] and the remaining defendants continue to litigate their
claims. . . . [However,] the duty to monitor ongoing litigation applies in every case where a party
is dismissed prior to final judgment, and does not give rise to the sort of exceptional
circumstances or hardship that would warrant entry of a final judgment.” (quotation marks
omitted)).
In sum, Plaintiff has not “articulate[d] ‘any unusual hardship’ or injustice [that] it, or any
other party, would endure if required ‘to await, in accordance with normal federal practice, the
disposition of the entire case before obtaining’” a final judgment. City of New York v. Milhelm
Attea & Bros., Inc., No. 06-CV-3620, 2012 WL 4959502, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2012)
(quoting Hogan, 961 F.2d at 1025). The Court therefore concludes that “the interrelatedness of
the dismissed and surviving claims makes certification of a final judgment in this case
inappropriate . . . .” Maroney v. Vill. of Norwood, No. 819-CV-1404, 2022 WL 92473, at *5
(N.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2022); see also Crespo, 2021 WL 4237002, at *6 (finding that the plaintiffs
“failed to demonstrate that equitable considerations, including . . . [the] [p]laintiffs’ advanced
age, illness, or the protracted nature of the litigation . . . warrant[ed] Rule 54(b) certification[,] as
the delay caused by having to wait to appeal until after final judgment is entered is inherent in
every denial of Rule 54(b) certification.”); Samtani v. Cherukuri, No. 11-CV-2159, 2013 WL
2181037, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. May 20, 2013) (finding plaintiff did not present an “unusual hardship”
or “injustice” in having “to wait for a separate trial to pursue damages”); TADCO Constr. Grp.
Corp., 2012 WL 3011735, at *7 (finding that the “prejudice [caused by] having to wait until
completion of a trial to pursue his other claim” is a hardship “inherent in every denial of Rule
54(b) certification, and hardly rise[s] to the level of hardship[ ] that warrant[s] immediate
appeal” (quoting Hogan, 961 F.2d at 1025) (alteration in original)); Doolittle v. Ruffo, No. 88-

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CV-1175, 1997 WL 151882, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1997) (concluding that “[t]he ages of
some of the defendants, notwithstanding, . . . it would be an abuse of its discretion to enter a final
judgment with respect to some of the claims and some of the parties to this action” because
judicial administrative interests “weigh[ ] heavily against granting defendants’ motion for Rule
54(b) certification”); Hogan, 961 F.2d at 1025 (reversing the district court’s Rule 54(b)
certification because the district court gave no indication that “the case was an exceptional one or
that there would be any unusual hardship in requiring [the parties] to await, in accordance with
normal federal practice, the disposition of the entire case before obtaining appellate review of the
dismissal of their claims”). 3

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The fact that Plaintiff asserts both federal and state law claims does not change this
result, because the two sets of claims are factually related. See Samtani, 2013 WL 2181037, at
*3 (denying Rule 54(b) certification where the plaintiff’s “dismissed federal claims and
surviving state law claims are closely interrelated such that the interests of sound judicial
administration will not be served by entering final judgment on the [federal] claims” and because
“further proceedings on the remaining state law claims . . . may reveal facts relevant to the
validity of the [federal claims] and/or the propriety of the [c]ourt’s dismissal order.” (quotation
marks omitted); Uni-Rty Corp. v. Guangdong Bldg., Inc., 249 F.R.D. 149, 151–52 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (finding that Rule 54(b) “certification is not in the interest of sound judicial administration
or efficiency, as the remaining state law claims are not factually distinct from the dismissed
[federal] claims.”); Bldg. Indus. Fund v. Loc. Union No. 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO,
992 F. Supp. 162, 192 (E.D.N.Y.), on reconsideration, 992 F. Supp. 192 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d,
141 F.3d 1151 (2d Cir. 1998) (denying Rule 54(b) certification where “the court is persuaded
that all of [the] plaintiffs[’] [federal and state] claims in this action are inextricably interrelated,
and that they should try the claims that remain in this action before proceeding to the Second
Circuit.”).
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III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion is denied. The Clerk of the Court is respectfully
requested to terminate the pending Motion. (Dkt. No. 144.)
SO ORDERED.
DATED:

March 11, 2022
White Plains, New York

____________________________________
KENNETH M. KARAS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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