Falls v. DuBois et al

Filing 72

OPINION AND ORDER re: 65 MOTION to Amend/Correct 2 Complaint, 28 Amended Complaint,. filed by Raiquan K. Falls, 59 MOTION to Dismiss . filed by Orange County, 38 MOTION to Dismiss plaintiff's amended complain t against the City of Newburgh. filed by City of Newburgh., City of Newburgh and Orange County terminated. Defendants' motions to dismiss are GRANTED. (Doc. #38, 59) Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a second amended complaint i s DENIED. (Doc. #65). The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. Unit ed States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). The Clerk is instructed to terminate the pending motions (Docs. ##38, 59, 65), and terminate defendants Orange County and the City of Newburgh. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Vincent L. Briccetti on 2/2/18) (yv)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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RAIQUAN K. FALLS,
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
ORANGE COUNTY, CITY OF NEWBURGH,
:
MYRA RUDE, TREVOR LORD, JONATHAN
:
SAINTICHE, WILLIAM ANDERSON, CHRIS
:
TABACHNICK, ROMAN SCUADRONI,
:
PATRICK BLOOMER, CARLOS CANARIO,
:
RICARDO RIVERA, JEFFREY PEREZ, and
:
JOHN THOMAS,
:
Defendants.
:
--------------------------------------------------------------x
Briccetti, J.:

OPINION AND ORDER
17 CV 1339 (VB)

Plaintiff Raiquan K. Falls, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging Orange County (the “County”), the City of Newburgh (the
“City”), police officers Myra Rude, Trevor Lord, Jonathan Saintiche, Chris Tabachnick, Roman
Scuadroni, Patrick Bloomer, Carlos Canario, Ricardo Rivera, Jeffrey Perez, and John Thomas,
and Sergeant William Anderson (collectively, the “officer defendants”), violated his Fourth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights in connection with a September 28, 2015, arrest,
detention, and subsequent legal proceedings.
On August 17, 2017, the officer defendants answered the amended complaint. (Doc.
#36).
Now pending before the Court are two motions to dismiss the amended complaint
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), filed separately by the City and the County (Docs. ##38, 59), and
plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. (Doc. #65).
For the reasons set forth below, defendants’ motions are GRANTED, and plaintiff’s
motion is DENIED.

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This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
BACKGROUND
For purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court accepts all factual allegations in
the amended complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor, as
summarized below. 1
On September 28, 2015, plaintiff was standing on a street corner when two police officers
exited a patrol car and approached him. An “information” submitted with plaintiff’s complaint
indicates one of the two officers was Myra Rude, who was investigating a complaint regarding
plaintiff’s possession of a firearm. (Compl. at 10). 2
Rather than answer questions, plaintiff “took these . . . officers on a foot pursuit,” but
“more officers came to the scene” and apprehended him. (Compl. at 3). Allegedly, several of
the officer defendants then beat plaintiff for about five minutes, while the other officer
defendants searched the surrounding area for weapons. No weapons were found.
Plaintiff was taken to the Newburgh police station, and charged with resisting arrest and
obstructing governmental administration. Plaintiff was strip searched at the station, but “nothing
was recovered from [his] person.” (Compl. at 3). According to plaintiff, his arrest was without
probable cause.
On September 29, 2015, plaintiff was arraigned before Judge Loren Williams in the
Newburgh City Court. Plaintiff’s bail was set at $5,000, and he was remanded to the Orange

1

In addition to the amended complaint, the Court has reviewed and considered plaintiff’s
complaint (Doc. #2), and opposition to defendants’ motions to dismiss. (Doc. #65).
2

As used herein, “Compl. at __” refers to the Court’s electronic case filing system page
number stamped at the top of each page of the complaint and its attachments, all of which are
filed together as a single document.
2

County Jail. After a hearing on October 15, 2015, plaintiff was released on his own
recognizance.
On March 7, 2016, plaintiff was granted an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal,
and the charges against him were subsequently dismissed.
DISCUSSION
I.

Standard of Review
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court evaluates the sufficiency of the operative

complaint under the “two-pronged approach” articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). First, plaintiff’s legal conclusions and “[t]hreadbare recitals
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” are not entitled
to the assumption of truth and are thus not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Id. at 678;
Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 161 (2d Cir. 2010). Second, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded
factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the allegations in the complaint must meet a standard
of “plausibility.” Id. at 678; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007). A claim is
facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks
for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.
The Court must liberally construe submissions of pro se litigants, and interpret them “to
raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d
471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Applying the

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pleading rules permissively is particularly appropriate when, as here, a pro se plaintiff alleges
civil rights violations. See Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir.
2008). “Even in a pro se case, however . . . threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d
162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Nor may the Court “invent
factual allegations” plaintiff has not pleaded. Id.
II.

Monell Claims
The County and the City argue plaintiff’s claims against them must be dismissed because

plaintiff fails to state a Monell claim. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
The Court agrees. 3
A.

Legal Standard

Under Monell, a municipality is liable under Section 1983 only “when execution of a
government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts
may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the [plaintiff’s] injury.” Monell v. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. at 694. Thus, to assert a Section 1983 claim against the County or the City,

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Defendants do not address plaintiff’s potential state law claims. Nevertheless, the Court
notes that plaintiff fails to state a claim under New York law for malicious prosecution, false
arrest, or false imprisonment.
Under New York law, a malicious prosecution claim requires a favorable termination of
the underlying proceeding. An adjournment in contemplation of dismissal, such as plaintiff
received here, does not qualify as a favorable termination. See Smith-Hunter v. Harvey, 95
N.Y.2d 191, 197 (2000).
Plaintiff’s state law false arrest and false imprisonment claims accrued when he was
released from custody, and are subject to a one-year-and-ninety-day statute of limitations. See
N.Y. General Municipal Law § 50-i; Bellissimo v. Mitchell, 122 A.D.3d 560, 560 (2d Dep’t
2014). Because plaintiff did not initiate this action until February 22, 2017, more than one-yearand-ninety-days after his October 15, 2015, release from custody, his false arrest and false
imprisonment claims are time-barred.

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plaintiff must show the existence of an official policy or custom that caused injury and a direct
causal connection between that policy or custom and the deprivation of a constitutional right.
Jones v. Town of E. Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012).
A plaintiff may satisfy the “policy or custom” requirement by alleging one of the
following: (i) “a formal policy officially endorsed by the municipality”; (ii) “actions taken by
government officials responsible for establishing the municipal policies that caused the particular
deprivation in question”; (iii) “a practice so consistent and widespread that, although not
expressly authorized, constitutes a custom or usage of which a supervising policy-maker must
have been aware”; or (iv) “a failure by policymakers to provide adequate training or supervision
to subordinates to such an extent that it amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of those
who come into contact with the municipal employees.” Brandon v. City of New York, 705 F.
Supp. 2d 261, 276–77 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
“While Monell claims are not subject to a ‘heightened’ pleading standard beyond that
defined in Rule 8(a)(2), such claims nevertheless must meet the plausibility requirements of Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 572 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678,
(2009).” Guzman v. United States, 2013 WL 5018553, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2013) (quoting
Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168
(1993)). 4 “In other words, boilerplate allegations will not suffice.” Id. (internal quotation
omitted). “[T]he allegations [a defendant] acted pursuant to a ‘policy,’ without any facts
suggesting the policy’s existence, are plainly insufficient.” Missel v. Cty. of Monroe, 351 F.

4

Because plaintiff is proceeding pro se, he will be provided with copies of all unpublished
opinions cited in this ruling. See Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2009).
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App’x 543, 545–46 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary order) (citing Dwares v. City of New York, 985
F.2d 94, 100–02 (2d Cir. 1993)).
B.

Application

With respect to the County, plaintiff’s complaint, amended complaint, and opposition to
defendants’ motions to dismiss make no reference to an official policy or custom. Nor does
plaintiff reference how such official policy or custom caused his injury, or deprived him of a
constitutional right.
Accordingly, plaintiff’s Monell claim against the County must be dismissed.
With respect to the City, plaintiff makes more fulsome allegations. Nevertheless, many
of plaintiff’s allegations are too conclusory to state a claim. See Opp’n at 2 (The City has “de
facto policies, practices and . . . customs” including “use of excessive force when effectuating
arrests,” “failure to take corrective action to address repeated complaints,” and “failure to train,
supervise and . . . discipline their officers to prevent further violations of arrestee’s constitutional
rights.”). 5
However, plaintiff further asserts the City has “been aware for years . . . that many of
their officers lack the objectivity, temperament, maturity and discretion to be members of their
respective police department and are improperly trained with respect to laws and regulations
regarding the use of force when effectuating arrests.” (Opp’n at 2). In support of his assertion,
plaintiff states the City “has an extensive history of lawsuits and other complaints alleging

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The City argues the Court should not consider allegations made for the first time in
plaintiff’s motion papers. Because plaintiff is proceeding pro se, “it is appropriate . . . to
consider factual allegations made in [his] opposition papers, so long as the allegations are
consistent with the complaint.” Kelley v. Universal Music Grp., 2016 WL 5720766, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2016). Thus, the Court will consider allegations made for the first time in
plaintiff’s opposition, to the extent they are consistent with the allegations in plaintiff’s amended
complaint.
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similar incidents” and provides the names and docket numbers of nine lawsuits filed against the
City between 2006 and 2013. (Id. at 3).
Plaintiff’s allegations plainly do not identify a formal policy officially endorsed by the
City, or actions taken by government officials responsible for establishing municipal policies.
Thus, the first and second theories of Monell liability do not apply.
To the extent plaintiff seeks to establish a Monell claim against the City under the third or
fourth theories of liability, his allegations are insufficient.
Setting aside conclusory statements regarding the City’s “de facto” policies, plaintiff
principally supports his claim by reference to the prior lawsuits. Plaintiff provides scant
information about these lawsuits, but it is clear from the public dockets there is no commonality
between the defendant police officers named in those actions, and the officer defendants
complained of in this action. 6 As such, the earlier lawsuits are of questionable relevance to
plaintiff’s claims here.
It is also clear none of the earlier lawsuits resulted in an adjudication or admission of a
liability. Thus, they “involve[d] something less (settlements without admissions of liability and
unproven allegations) than evidence of misconduct.” Collins v. City of New York, 923 F. Supp.
2d 462, 479 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
Moreover, nine lawsuits over seven years is inadequate to allege plausibly a municipal
“custom” of using excessive when effectuating arrests. See, e.g., Calderon v. City of New York,
138 F. Supp. 3d 593, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (Plaintiff failed to allege a municipal custom, because

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The Court may take judicial notice of public records. See Blue Tree Hotels Inv.
(Canada), Ltd. v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., 369 F.3d 212, 217 (2d Cir. 2004)
(The Court “may also look to public records . . . in deciding a motion to dismiss.”).

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“[n]one of the lawsuits cited resulted in an adjudication or admission of liability and [16] suits
does not suggest a pervasive illegal practice.”); Tieman v. City of Newburgh, 2015 WL 1379652,
at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2015) (“[A]llegations of thirteen instances of excessive force during
arrests over four [or five] years (none of which involved findings or admissions of culpability)
during which hundreds, if not thousands, of arrests were made does not plausibly demonstrate
that the use of excessive force during arrest was so frequent and pervasive to constitute a
custom.”).
Accordingly, plaintiff fails to state a claim under the third theory of Monell liability.
To state a claim under the fourth theory of Monell liability, plaintiff must allege a failure
to train, supervise, or discipline that amounts to deliberate indifference. “[D]eliberate
indifference may be inferred where the need for more or better supervision to protect against
constitutional violations was obvious, but the policymaker fail[ed] to make meaningful efforts to
address the risk of harm to plaintiffs.” Cash v. Cty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 334 (2d Cir. 2011)
(internal quotations and citation omitted).
Here too, plaintiff’s allegations fall short. A litany of prior lawsuits may suffice to put
the City on notice that greater training, supervision, or officer discipline was needed, but plaintiff
makes only conclusory allegations regarding the City’s response to the lawsuits.
It is not clear from plaintiff’s complaint whether the City determined the officers’
conduct was unlawful. Further, as set forth above, none of the cited lawsuits resulted in an
adjudication of admission of liability. Thus, there is no basis for the Court to assess whether the
City made “meaningful efforts” to prevent unconstitutional officer conduct. See, e.g., Tieman v.
City of Newburgh, 2015 WL 1379652, at *21 (“There is no basis for the Court to conclude that
Plaintiff plausibly alleged that the past conduct was actually unconstitutional, and therefore it

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would not be deliberately indifferent of the City to fail to punish police officers for conduct that
was not improper or that they did not commit.).
Accordingly, plaintiff’s Monell claim against the City also must be dismissed.
III.

Leave to Amend
Plaintiff seeks leave to file a second amended complaint. (Doc. #65).
Rule 15(a)(2) instructs that courts “should freely give leave” to amend a complaint “when

justice so requires.” Liberal application of Rule 15(a) is warranted with respect to pro se
litigants who “should be afforded every reasonable opportunity to demonstrate that [they have] a
valid claim.” Matima v. Celli, 228 F.3d 68, 81 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Satchell v. Dilworth, 745
F.2d 781, 785 (2d Cir. 1984)). District courts “should not dismiss [pro se complaints] without
granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any
indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir.
2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)).
However, leave to amend may “properly be denied for . . . ‘futility of amendment.’”
Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371
U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). This is true even when plaintiff is proceeding pro se. See Martin v.
Dickson, 100 F. App’x 14, 16 (2d Cir. 2004) (summary order).
Here, reading the complaint liberally, the Court does not find any allegations that suggest
plaintiff has a valid Monell claim he has merely “inadequately or inartfully pleaded” and
therefore should be “given a chance to reframe.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d at 112. On the
contrary, the Court finds that repleading would be futile, because the problems with plaintiff’s
complaint are substantive, and supplementary and/or improved pleading will not cure its
deficiencies. See id.

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Moreover, because the individual officer defendants answered the amended complaint
(Doc. #36), plaintiff’s claims against the officer defendants are proceeding. To the extent
plaintiff is entitled to relief, it can be obtained from the officer defendants if plaintiff is
successful in proving his claims.
Granting plaintiff leave to amend as against the County and the City would likely result
in renewed motions to dismiss from those defendants, causing further delay to the progress of
plaintiff’s case. In light of the Court’s finding that repleading would be futile, such delay would
be unwarranted and contrary to the interests of justice.
Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint is denied.
CONCLUSION
Defendants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED. (Doc. #38, 59)
Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint is DENIED. (Doc. #65).
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order
would not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose
of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444–45 (1962).
The Clerk is instructed to terminate the pending motions (Docs. ##38, 59, 65), and
terminate defendants Orange County and the City of Newburgh.
Dated: February 2, 2018
White Plains, NY

SO ORDERED:

____________________________
Vincent L. Briccetti
United States District Judge

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