Williams v. Anderson et al

Filing 42

OPINION AND ORDER re: 28 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by George V. Krom, Jr., Adrian H. Anderson, Kirk A. Imperati.The motion to dismiss is GRANTED. By November 10, 2018, plaintiff shall file a second amended c omplaint. The Clerk is instructed to terminate the motion. (Doc. #28). The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied f or the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). (Amended Pleadings due by 11/10/2018.) (Signed by Judge Vincent L. Briccetti on 10/10/2018) Per chambers direction, copies have been mailed by chambers. (mml)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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STEVEN G. WILLIAMS, JR.,
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
ADRIAN H. ANDERSON (SHERIFF), KIRK A. :
IMPERATI (UNDERSHERIFF), and GEORGE
:
V. KROM, JR., (CORRECTIONS
:
ADMINISTRATOR),
:
Defendants.
:
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OPINION AND ORDER
17 CV 6918 (VB)

Briccetti, J.:
Plaintiff Steven G. Williams, Jr., proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging defendants Adrian H. Anderson, Kirk A. Imperati, and
George V. Krom, Jr., violated his constitutional rights.
Now pending is defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint 1 pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6). (Doc. #28).
For the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED. However, the Court grants
plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint, as described below.
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
BACKGROUND
For the purpose of deciding the motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all wellpleaded factual allegations in the amended complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in
plaintiff’s favor, as summarized below.

1

By Order dated March 13, 2018 (Doc. #26), the Court accepted plaintiff’s February 9,
2018, submission (Doc. #22), as an addendum to plaintiff’s original complaint (Doc. #2), and
construed the two documents together as the operative amended complaint in this matter.

1

Plaintiff challenges the calculation of his credit for time spent in custody following a
February 8, 2012, arrest in Dutchess County. After his arrest, plaintiff remained in jail until
April 18, 2012, when he was released to probation. However, plaintiff was “re-arrested” on May
24, 2012. (Doc. #2 Ex. A). On September 8, 2012, plaintiff pleaded guilty in Dutchess County
Court to assault and contempt of court.
Before plaintiff could be sentenced in state court, he was arraigned on unrelated federal
charges. Plaintiff was allegedly held at the Westchester County Jail on both the state and federal
charges until February 18, 2013, when he was transferred to the Metropolitan Detention Center
(“MDC”). On October 17, 2014, plaintiff was sentenced on the federal charges to sixty-six
months’ imprisonment.
Plaintiff was returned from MDC to Dutchess County Jail on October 21, 2014. Two
days later, plaintiff was sentenced in Dutchess County Court to a determinate sentence of three
years and six months’ imprisonment. Plaintiff began serving his state sentence on November 3,
2014. The Dutchess County Sheriff’s Office provided plaintiff a notice dated October 31, 2014,
reflecting 603 days of credit for time served in custody for the following periods: February 8 to
April 18, 2012; May 24, 2012, to October 25, 2013; and October 22 to November 2, 2014.
Plaintiff alleges he wrote to “inmate records” regarding a perceived miscalculation of his
credit for time served in custody, and received “numerous letters from records stating that this
was the time that they had received.” (Doc. #2 at 3).
On plaintiff’s behalf, James Bogin, Esq., of Prisoners’ Legal Services of New York,
wrote to the Dutchess County Sheriff’s Office Corrections Administrator, defendant George
Krom. Mr. Bogin’s letter, dated August 9, 2016, set forth the dates of plaintiff’s incarceration,

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and requested that plaintiff receive credit for time served between October 25, 2013, and October
17, 2014, the date of plaintiff’s federal sentencing.
On August 17, 2016, the Dutchess County Sherriff’s Office issued plaintiff an amended
notice reflecting 959 days of credit for time served. Thereafter, plaintiff was released to federal
custody.
According to plaintiff, 959 days in custody was “179 days” past his “expiration” date.
(Doc. #2 at 3). Information available on the New York State Department of Corrections and
Community Supervision (“DOCCS”) website indicates plaintiff’s “maximum expiration date” 2
was March 13, 2016. See Steven G. Williams Inmate Information,
http://nysdoccslookup.doccs.ny.gov/GCA00P00/WIQ3/WINQ130. However, plaintiff was not
released from DOCCS custody until September 1, 2016. The notation DOCCS provides for
plaintiff’s “latest release date” states “parole max exp other.” (Id.). No further explanation is
provided.
By Order dated March 3, 2018, the Court directed that if defendants moved to dismiss the
amended complaint, their motion should “address the question of whether or not plaintiff was
held in state custody 179 days longer than his sentence permitted.” (Doc. #26).
Defendants’ brief asserts defendants “cannot accurately state whether or not [plaintiff]
did spend more time in state prison than he otherwise would have but for the initial jail time
computation” reflected in the October 31, 2014, notice. (Defs. Br. at 1).

2

DOCCS provides a definition for “maximum expiration date,” which states: “If an
inmate is not released by the Parole Board or by conditional release, he or she will remain in
custody until his or her maximum expiration date. Upon reaching the maximum expiration date,
the individual’s legal obligation to serve a custodial sentence or period of parole supervision
ends.” Inmate Information Data Definitions,
http://www.doccs.ny.gov/univinq/fpmsdoc.htm#me.

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DISCUSSION
I.

Standard of Review
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court evaluates the sufficiency of the operative

complaint under the “two-pronged approach” articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). First, plaintiff’s legal conclusions and “[t]hreadbare recitals
of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” are not entitled
to the assumption of truth and are thus not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Id. at 678;
Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 161 (2d Cir. 2010). Second, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded
factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the allegations in the complaint must meet a standard
of “plausibility.” Id. at 678; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007). A claim is
facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks
for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.
In considering a motion to dismiss, “a district court may consider the facts alleged in the
complaint, documents attached to the complaint as exhibits, and documents incorporated by
reference in the complaint.” DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C., 622 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir.
2010). The court may nevertheless consider a document not incorporated by reference if the
complaint “‘relies heavily upon its terms and effect,’ thereby rendering the document ‘integral’
to the complaint.” Id. (quoting Mangiafico v. Blumenthal, 471 F.3d 391, 398 (2d Cir. 2006)).
However, “it must be clear on the record that no dispute exists regarding the authenticity or

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accuracy of the document.” DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C., 622 F.3d at 111 (quoting
Faulkner v. Beer, 463 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 2006)). “It must also be clear that there exist no
material disputed issues of fact regarding the relevance of the document.” DiFolco v. MSNBC
Cable L.L.C., 622 F.3d at 111 (quoting Faulkner v. Beer, 463 F.3d at 134).
The Court must liberally construe submissions of pro se litigants, and interpret them “to
raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d
471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Applying the
pleading rules permissively is particularly appropriate when, as here, a pro se plaintiff alleges
civil rights violations. See Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir.
2008). “Even in a pro se case, however . . . threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d
162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Nor may the Court “invent
factual allegations” plaintiff has not pleaded. Id.
II.

Application
Liberally construed, plaintiff’s complaint asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for

violations of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment, and his
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.
A.

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment Claim

Defendants argue plaintiff fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim.
The Court agrees.
To state an Eighth Amendment claim based on prolonged incarceration, plaintiff must
allege “defendants were deliberately indifferent to his” prolonged incarceration. Calhoun v.
N.Y.S. Div. of Parole Officers, 999 F.2d 647, 654 (2d Cir. 1993).

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To state an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference, plaintiff’s allegations
must satisfy a two-prong test. First, plaintiff must plausibly allege he suffered a sufficiently
serious constitutional deprivation. Second, plaintiff must plausibly allege the defendants acted
with deliberate indifference. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
Plaintiff’s alleged incarceration for 179 days—roughly six months—beyond the
expiration of his sentence is, if true, a sufficiently serious constitutional deprivation. Compare
Calhoun v. N.Y.S. Div. of Parole Officers, 999 F.2d at 654 (“the five-day extension of
[plaintiff’s] release date did not inflict a harm of a magnitude that violates a person’s eighth
amendment rights”) (citations omitted), with Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1110 (3d Cir.
1989) (plaintiff’s detention for nine months beyond the expiration of his sentence gave rise to an
Eighth Amendment violation).
However, plaintiff fails to allege that any of the named defendants acted with deliberate
indifference to his prolonged incarceration. It is well settled in the Second Circuit that “to
establish a defendant’s individual liability in a suit brought under § 1983, a plaintiff must show
. . . the defendant’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Grullon v.
City of New Haven, 720 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2013).
Here, although plaintiff alleges he wrote “inmate records in search of answers” and
received “numerous letters from records” (Doc. #2 at 3), he does not attach any of those letters to
his amended complaint, and makes no allegation to suggest any of the named defendants
received or responded to his letters, or took any action to impede his timely release.
Accordingly, plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim must be dismissed.

6

B.

Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment Claim

Defendants do not specifically address plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due
process, but they argue plaintiff fails to allege their personal involvement in any constitutional
deprivation.
The Court agrees.
To allege a violation of due process, plaintiff must plead “(1) that he possessed a liberty
interest and (2) that the defendant(s) deprived him of that interest as a result of insufficient
process.” Giano v. Selsky, 238 F.3d 223, 225 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
It is clear plaintiff possessed a liberty interest “in being released upon the expiration of
his maximum term of imprisonment.” Calhoun v. N.Y.S. Div. of Parole Officers, 999 F.2d at
653.
However, plaintiff fails to allege the named defendants’ personal involvement in the
deprivation of due process. For example, plaintiff makes no allegation that any of the named
defendants denied plaintiff a hearing, or received plaintiff’s letters and failed to respond, or
otherwise denied plaintiff the opportunity to be heard.
Accordingly, plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim must be dismissed.
C.

Plaintiff’s Monell Claims

To the extent plaintiff’s claims are asserted against the individual defendants in their
official capacities, defendants argue they must be dismissed because plaintiff fails to state a
Monell claim. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
The Court agrees.

7

“[A] suit against a governmental officer ‘in his official capacity’ is the same as a suit
‘against [the] entity of which [the] officer is an agent.’” McMillian v. Monroe Cty., 520 U.S.
781, 785 n.2 (1997) (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985)).
Thus, to the extent plaintiff’s claims against the individual defendants are asserted against
the individual defendants in their official capacities, those claims are evaluated under the
standard set forth in Monell.
To state a Monell claim, plaintiff must allege the “execution of a government’s policy or
custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to
represent official policy, inflicts the [plaintiff’s] injury.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. at 694. A government official may be liable in his official capacity if plaintiff alleges the
official violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights by establishing a custom or policy fostering the
violation. Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995).
Plaintiff has not alleged any of the individual defendants established a custom or policy
which fostered the alleged violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
Accordingly, to the extent plaintiff’s claims against the individual defendants are asserted
against those defendants in their official capacities, those claims are dismissed.
III.

Leave to Amend
Rule 15(a)(2) instructs that courts “should freely give leave” to amend a complaint “when

justice so requires.” Liberal application of Rule 15(a) is warranted with respect to pro se
litigants who “should be afforded every reasonable opportunity to demonstrate that [they have] a
valid claim.” Matima v. Celli, 228 F.3d 68, 81 (2d Cir. 2000). District courts “should not
dismiss [pro se complaints] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading

8

of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu,
222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation omitted).
However, leave to amend may “properly be denied for . . . futility of amendment.”
Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371
U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). This is true even when plaintiff is proceeding pro se. See Martin v.
Dickson, 100 F. App’x 14, 16 (2d Cir. 2004) (summary order). 3
Here, because a liberal reading of plaintiff’s amended complaint indicates valid claims
might be stated, the Court grants plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint.
To the greatest extent possible, plaintiff’s amended complaint must address the
deficiencies identified in this Opinion and Order and must:
1. give the names and titles of all relevant persons, including relevant persons who are
not currently named as defendants in this action;
2. describe all relevant events, stating the facts that support plaintiff’s case including
what each defendant personally did or failed to do;
3. give the dates and times of each relevant event or, if not known, the approximate date
and time of each relevant event;
4. give the location where each relevant event occurred;
5. describe how each defendant’s acts or omissions violated plaintiff’s rights and
describe the injuries plaintiff suffered; and
6. state what relief plaintiff seeks from the Court, such as money damages, injunctive
relief, or declaratory relief.

3

Because plaintiff is proceeding pro se, he will be provided with copies of all unpublished
opinions cited in this decision. See Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2009).
9

Essentially, the body of plaintiff’s second amended complaint must tell the Court: who
violated his federally protected rights; what facts show that his federally protected rights were
violated; when such violation occurred; where such violation occurred; and why plaintiff is
entitled to relief. Because plaintiff’s second amended complaint will completely replace, not
supplement, the amended complaint, any and all facts or claims that plaintiff wishes to
maintain must be included in the second amended complaint.
In addition, plaintiff is strongly encouraged to contact the New York Legal Assistance
Group, the contact information for which is attached hereto, for free legal assistance in preparing
his second amended complaint.
Once plaintiff has filed his second amended complaint, the Court will screen the second
amended complaint and, if necessary, issue an order directing the Clerk to complete the USM285 form with the address for any additional defendants and deliver all documents necessary to
effect service to the U.S. Marshals Service.

10

CONCLUSION
The motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
By November 10, 2018, plaintiff shall file a second amended complaint.
The Clerk is instructed to terminate the motion. (Doc. #28).
The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order
would not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose
of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444–45 (1962).
Dated: October 10, 2018
White Plains, NY
SO ORDERED:

____________________________
Vincent L. Briccetti
United States District Judge

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