Lewis v. Ellen et al

Filing 129

ORDER: Regina Lewis ("Plaintiff") has submitted a letter to the Court requesting to reopen thisAction. (See Letter from Regina Lewis to Court ("Lewis Letter") (January 19, 2023) (Dkt. No.128).) The Court dismissed Plaintiff' ;s case with prejudice pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 37 on July13, 2021 because of Plaintiff's refusal to comply with her discovery obligations and her abusivebehavior toward other litigants and the Court. (See Order ("Dismissal Order") ( Dkt. No.124).) Plaintiff appealed that dismissal to the Second Circuit (see Not. of Appeal (Dkt. No.125)), and the Second Circuit dismissed her appeal because, based on orders issued in priorappeals she had filed, she was required to seek the Second Circuit's leave before filing a newappeal but failed to do so. (See Dkt. No. 127.) For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff's request toreopen her case is denied. As further set forth in this order. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Kenneth M. Karas on 1/27/2023) (ks)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
REGINA LEWIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
BARRY MARLOW AND EDWARD
CAMPBELL,

No. 17-CV-8101 (KMK)
ORDER

Defendants.
Appearances:
KENNETH M. KARAS, United States District Judge:
Regina Lewis (“Plaintiff”) has submitted a letter to the Court requesting to reopen this
Action. (See Letter from Regina Lewis to Court (“Lewis Letter”) (January 19, 2023) (Dkt. No.
128).) The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s case with prejudice pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 37 on July
13, 2021 because of Plaintiff’s refusal to comply with her discovery obligations and her abusive
behavior toward other litigants and the Court. (See Order (“Dismissal Order”) (Dkt. No.
124).) Plaintiff appealed that dismissal to the Second Circuit (see Not. of Appeal (Dkt. No.
125)), and the Second Circuit dismissed her appeal because, based on orders issued in prior
appeals she had filed, she was required to seek the Second Circuit’s leave before filing a new
appeal but failed to do so. (See Dkt. No. 127.) For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s request to
reopen her case is denied.
“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) governs motions for relief from a final judgment
or order and provides six independent grounds for relief.” Burda Media, Inc. v. Viertel, 417 F.3d
292, 298 (2d Cir. 2005). Motions for relief filed under Rule 60(b)(1)-(3) must be made within

one year of “the entry of the . . . order [terminating the case].” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(c)(1). “The oneyear limitation period for Rule 60(b) motions is ‘absolute.’” Martha Graham Sch. & Dance
Found., Inc. v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 466 F.3d 97, 100 (2d
Cir.2006) (quoting Warren v. Garvin, 219 F.3d 111, 114 (2d Cir.2000)). Plaintiff’s case was
closed on July 13, 2021—over 18 months ago—so she cannot proceed on any of those bases.
Under Rule 60(b)(4) or (5), a party may request relief from a judgment where “the
judgment is void,” or where “the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based
on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no
longer equitable,” but these bases are unavailable to Plaintiff because her case was terminated
because of her abusive behavior during litigation and her failure to comply with discovery
deadlines, (see generally Dismissal Order), not because of a judgment, see, e.g., Castelluzzo v.
Consol. Edison Co. of New York, Inc., No. 08-CV-2000, 2016 WL 7336863, at *4 (E.D.N.Y.
Dec. 15, 2016) (denying request to reopen case under Rule 60(b)(4) or (5) because the order
dismissing the case for failure to prosecute was “not ‘void,’ it was not a judgment that has ‘been
satisfied,’ it was not based upon a prior decision that has ‘been reversed or otherwise vacated,’
and it [was] not the case that ‘it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have a
prospective application.’”) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4)–(5))).
Finally, under Rule 60(b)(6), a party may move for relief from a judgment for “any other
reason that justifies relief.” However, the Second Circuit has interpreted Rule 60(b) to provide a
basis for relief only in “extraordinary circumstances, or where the judgment may work an
extreme and undue hardship,” Pichardo v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 46, 56 (2d Cir.2004) (quoting
Matarese v. LeFevre, 801 F.2d 98, 106 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 908 (1987)), “and
when the asserted grounds for relief are not recognized in clauses (1)-(5) of [Rule 60(b)],”

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Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 63 (2d Cir.1986) (citing Matter of Emergency Beacon Corp.,
666 F.2d 754, 758 (2d Cir.1981).
Plaintiff does not suggest that there are any extraordinary grounds for the relief she
requests. In addition to claims and injuries that she previously alleged resulted from her
treatment while committed at Mid-Hudson Psychiatric Center (see Compl. (Dkt. No. 1); Am.
Compl. (Dkt. No. 21)), Plaintiff now also claims that her 2016 arrest was the result of malicious
prosecution because the statute she pled to violating was not the same as the statute under which
she was initially charged, (see Lewis Letter 1–2). However, adding new claims is insufficient to
justify relief from dismissal with prejudice, particularly since the dismissal of Plaintiff’s case
resulted from her failure to comply with her discovery obligations. See, e.g., Dunn v. Albany
Med. Coll., No. 09-CV-1031, 2010 WL 11527112, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2010), aff’d, 445 F.
App’x 431 (2d Cir. 2011) (denying plaintiff’s 60(b) motion after dismissal under Rule 37 in part
because “[d]efendant . . . had to make multiple requests upon [p]laintiff for the latter to comply
with his obligations, investing time and resources into prodding [p]laintiff to prosecute his case.
[p]laintiff [did] nothing but delay in response.”); Heendeniya v. St. Joseph’s Hosp. Health Ctr.,
830 F. App’x 354, 359 (2d Cir. 2020) (summary order) (finding district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Rule 60(b) motion after dismissal pursuant to Rule 37 where plaintiff
”presented new evidence in support of his post-judgment motion, but it . . . had no bearing on his
ability to timely respond to the defendants’ discovery demands and thus no bearing on whether
his [pre-dismissal] failure to do so was excusable.”).

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SO ORDERED.
Dated:

January 27, 2023
White Plains, New York

KENNETH M. KARAS
United States District Judge

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