Durso et al v. Al-Saleh Grocery Corp. et al

Filing 36

MEMO ENDORSED ORDER for 30 Motion for Default Judgment filed by Jacob Dimant, M.D., John Catsimatidis, Neil Gonzalvo, John R. Durso, Debra Bollbach, Teri Noble, Morton Sloan, Jon Greenfield, Angelo Avena, Joseph Fontano, 35 Report a nd Recommendations. ENDORSEMENT: No objections to this Report and Recommendation (the "R&R") have been received, and accordingly I review it for clear error. I find no error, clear or otherwise, and adopt the R&R as the decision of the C ourt. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the pending motion, (Doc. 30), enter judgment for Plaintiffs as described in the R&R, and close the case. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Cathy Seibel on 4/15/2019) (mml) Transmission to Orders and Judgments Clerk for processing.

Case 7:18-cv-02008-CS-PED Document 35 Filed 03/28/19 Page 1 of 14

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-X

JOI-IN R. DURSO, JOSEPH FONTANO,

NEIL GONZALVO, DEBRA BOLLBACH, REPORT ANB
TERI NOBLE, JON GREENFIELD, RECOMMENDATION
JOHN CATSIMATIDIS, ANGELO AVENA,
MORTON SLOAN, and JACOB DIMANT, M.D., 18-cv-02008 (CS) (PED)
as Trustees and Fiduciaries of the

LOCAL 338 RETIREMENT FUND,
Plaintiffs,
-against-

AL-SALEH GROCERY CORP,
AL SALEH LAUNDROMAT CORP,

No objections to this Report and Recommendation (the
"R&R") have been received, and accordingly I review it for
clear error. I find no error, clear or otherwise, and adopt the
R&R as the decision of the Court. The Clerk of Court is
respectfully directed to terminate the pending motion, (Doc.
30), enter judgment for Plaintiffs as described in the R&R,
and close the case.

169 MK GROCERY CORP., and

KAREEM LAUNDROMAT CORP.,
Defendants.

TO THE HONORABLE CATHY SEIBEL, United States District Judge:

4/15/19

I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs, as trustees and fiduciaries of the Local 338 Retirement Fund ("the Fund"),
brought this action against defendants Al-Saleh Grocery Corp., Al-SaIeh Laundromat Corp., 169
Grocery Corp., and Kareem Laundromat Corp., seeking to recover withdrawal liability pursuant
to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended by the Multiemployer
Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 ("ERISA"), and the Fund's
Reaffirmation and Restatement of Agreement and Declaration of Trust ("Trust Agreement").
Diet. 1 (Compl.),^!. By Order dated September 12, 2018, Your Honor granted defendants'
motion to withdraw their Answer and entered a default judgment. Dkt. 23. On September 13,
2018, Your Honor referred the matter to the undersigned to report and recommend the amount of

Case 7:18-cv-02008-CS-PED Document 35 Filed 03/28/19 Page 2 of 14

damages to be awarded plaintiffs, plus reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. Dkt 24. For the
reasons set forth below, I respectfully recommend that Your Honor award plaintiffs damages in

the amount of $193,181.15, plus $100.32 per day from October 16, 2018 through the date
judgment is entered.

II. BACKGROUND
Defendants were, at all relevant times, party to a series of collective bargaining

agreements (the CBAs) with Local 338, pursuant to which defendants agreed to submit monthly
remittance reports and make contributions to the Fund on behalf of defendants' employees
covered by the CBAs. Dkt 6 (Am. Compl.), ^9-11. Defendants ceased operations on or about
October 19, 2015, Dkt. 6, ^ 12, As of December of 2015, defendants ceased to make
contributions to the Fund. Dkt. 33 (Affidavit of Charles Hamilton), Exh. D.
By letter dated February 27, 2017, Charles Hamilton, Fund Administrator of the Local
338 Retirement Fund, notified defendants that the cessation of contributions to the Fund as of
December of 2015 effected a complete withdrawal from the Fund within the meaning of Section
4203(a) ofERISA. Dkt. 33, Exh. D. As a result, defendants were subject to payment of
withdrawal liability to the Fund. Dkt. 33, Exh. D. Using the "rolling five" method provided in

Section 421 l(c)(3) ofERISA, the Fund calculated the defendants' unpaid contributions to be
$101,720.00. Dkt. 33, Exh. D. Attached to that letter was a schedule of defendants' payments,
which were to begin on April 1, 2017. Dkt. 33, Exh. D. Defendants failed to make the initial
payment toward the withdrawal liability. Dkt. 6, ^ 19. To date, defendants have not made any
payment toward the withdrawal liability. Dkt 6, ^ 20. By letter dated June 7, 2017, Mr.

Hamilton sent defendants a final notice that demanded payment of the withdrawal liability within
sixty (60) days of receipt of such notice. Dkt. 33, Exh. E. Defendants did not respond to the
letter. Dkt. 6, ^[ 22.

2

Case 7:18-cv-02008-CS-PED Document 35 Filed 03/28/19 Page 3 of 14

On March 6, 2018, plaintiffs commenced this action pursuant to ERISA and the Trust

Agreement. Dkt 1,^1. Plaintiffs allege that defendants are obligated to pay unpaid
contributions, interest on the unpaid contributions, liquidated damages, attorneys' fees, and costs.

Dkt. 31 (Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion for Default Judgment), at
10.

On September 9, 2018 (approximately six months after the instant case was commenced),
defendants filed a motion to withdraw their Answer and consented to judgment. Dkt. 21. On
September 13, 2018, Your Honor granted defendants' motion to withdraw their Answer and
referred the matter to the undersigned for an inquest as to the amount of damages owed by
defendants. Dkts. 23-24. By letter dated September 20, 2018, defendants consented to the
amount of withdrawal liability demanded in the complaint and requested that the Court
determine what reasonable fees, costs, and interest should be included in the judgment. Dkt. 26.

On September 21, 2018,1 issued a Scheduling Order directing plaintiffs to file an appropriately
supported application for fees, costs, interest, and any other monetary relief, on or before
October 12, 2018, accompanied by a memorandum succinctly setting forth the legal basis for
each component of the relief requested. Dkt. 27. On October 5, 2018, I granted plaintiffs'
application to extend their time to file inquest submissions to October 19, 2018, and directed
defendants to file their response, if any, on or before November 2, 2018. Dkt. 28. On October
19, 2018, plaintiffs filed their inquest submission. See Dkts. 31, 32 (Declaration ofAmanda Bell

in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Default Judgment), and 33. Defendants did not file any
opposition..

III. DISCUSSION
ERISA provides, in relevant part:

Case 7:18-cv-02008-CS-PED Document 35 Filed 03/28/19 Page 4 of 14

In any action under this subchapter by a fiduciary for or on behalf of a plan to

enforce section 1145 of this title in which a judgment in favor of the plan is
awarded, the court shall award the plan (A) the unpaid contributions, (B) interest
on the unpaid contributions, (C) an amount equal to the greater of (i) interest on

the unpaid contributions, or (11) liquidated damages provided for under the plan in
an amount not in excess of 20 percent (or such higher percentage as may be
permitted under Federal or State law) of the amount determined by the court
under subparagraph (A), (D) reasonable attorney's fees and costs of the action, to

be paid by the defendant, and (E) such other legal or equitable relief as the court
deems appropriate.

29U.S.C. § U32(g)(2).
A. Unpaid Contributions
Plaintiffs seek $101,720.00 in unpaid contributions. Dkt. 6, ^| 9. The amount of unpaid
contributions owed by defendants is not in dispute, as defendants consented to the amount of

withdrawal liability demanded in the complaint. Dkt. 26. Additionally, plaintiffs submitted an
affidavit from Mr. Hamilton which substantiates the amount of defendants' unpaid contributions.
Dkt. 33, ^ 11. Accordingly, I conclude—and respectfully recommend that Your Honor
conclude—that plaintiffs are entitled to an award of $101,720.00 In unpaid contributions.
B. Interest on the Unpaid Contributions
Plaintiffs seek to recover an amount of $28,227.30 in interest on the unpaid contributions,

covering the period from April 1, 2017 (the date on which the first withdrawal liability payment
was due) through October 15, 2018, plus additional interest in the amount of $50,16 from
October 16, 2018 until the date judgment is entered. Dkt. 32, ^ 32. "[Ijnterest on unpaid
contributions shall be determined by using the rate provided under the plan, or, if none, the rate

prescribed under section 6621 of Title 26" 29U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(B).

1 Plaintiffs filed their inquest submissions on October 19, 2018, which calculated the amount of
unpaid contributions as of October 15, 2018.

4

Case 7:18-cv-02008-CS-PED Document 35 Filed 03/28/19 Page 5 of 14

Under the Trust Agreement, Art. VII, Section 5(a), "an Employer in default for five

working days shall be obligated to pay interest in the amount of one and a half percent (1 1/2%)
per month of each monthly amount due for each month from the date of the underpayment to the
date that it is actually paid[.]" Dkt. 33, Exh. C. Pursuant to the rate provided by the Trust

Agreement, the interest due from the period of April 1,2017 through October 15,2018 is
calculated as follows:

0.15 x 101/720.00 = $1,525.80 per month;
$1,525.80x18.5 months =$28,22730.
Under the Trust Agreement, the daily rate of interest is calculated as follows:
1.5% x 12 months = 18% per annum;

0.18 ,365 days = 0.0004931506849315068;
0.0004931506849315068x101,720.00-$50.16 per day.
Accordingly, I respectfully recommend that plaintiffs be awarded $28,227.30 in interest on the

unpaid contributions from April 17, 2017 to October 15, 2018, plus additional interest on the
unpaid contributions in the amount of $50.16 per day, from October 16, 2018 through the date
judgment is entered.
C. Liquidated Damages
In addition to the interest on the unpaid contributions, plaintiffs are entitled to "an
amount equal to the greater of (i) interest on the unpaid contributions, or (li) liquidated damages
provided for under the plan in an amount not in excess of 20 percent[.] 29 U.S.C.

1132(g)(2)(c). Twenty percent of $101,720.00 (the amount ofunpaid contributions) is
$20,344.00; the actual interest on the unpaid contributions, as set forth above, is a "greater
amount. Accordingly, as liquidated damages, I respectfully recommend that plaintiffs be

Case 7:18-cv-02008-CS-PED Document 35 Filed 03/28/19 Page 6 of 14

awarded $28,227.30 plus an additional $50.16 per day from October 16, 2018, through the date
of judgment.
D. Attorneys' Fees and Costs
Plaintiffs seek attorneys' fees in the amount of $39,542.50 and costs in the
amount of $6,276.55. Dkt. 31, at 16. As noted above, when "ajudgment in favor of the
plan is awarded, the court shall award the plan . . . reasonable attorney's fees and costs of

the action, to be paid by the defendant." 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2).
"The district court retains discretion to determine . . . what constitutes a reasonable fee."
Milled v. Mefro-North R.R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting LeBlcmc-Sfernberg
v. Fletcher, 143 F.3d 748, 758 (2d Cir.1998)). To determine whether the rate and hours
requested are reasonable, the court must "bear in mind all of the case-specific variables that [the
Second Circuit] and other courts have identified as relevant to the reasonableness of attorney's
fees." Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass !n v. Cty. of Albany, 493 F.3d 110, 190

(2d Cir. 2007), amended on other grounds, 522 F.3d 1 82 (2d Cir. 2008). These factors include:
(1) [T]he time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions;
(3) the level of skill required to perform the legal service properly; (4) the
preclusion of employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the
attorney's customary hourly rate; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7)
the time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount
involved in the case and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and

ability of the attorneys; (10) the "undesir ability" of the case; (11) the nature and
length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar
cases,

Id. at 186 n.3 (citing Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.3d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir.

1974)). The reasonable fee is calculated by multiplying the attorney's reasonable billing rate by
the reasonable number of hours spent working on the case. See Simmons v. N.Y.C, Transit Azith,,

575F.3d 170, 174 (2d Cir. 2009) (discussing Arbor Hill}. See also Arbor ?11,522 F.3d at 18690 (emphasis in original) (rather than a two-step calculation that adjusts the product of the

Case 7:18-cv-02008-CS-PED Document 35 Filed 03/28/19 Page 7 of 14

attorney's fees and hours by certain case-specific variables, "[t]he focus of the district court is no
longer on calculating a reasonable fee, but rather on setting a reasonable hourly rate, taking
account of all the case-specific variables").
1, Reasonable Hourly Rates
The hourly rate for an attorney should reflect "what a reasonable, paying client would be
willing to pay." Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 184. That rate must be "in line with those [rates]
prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonable comparable skill,
experience, and reputation." Reitner v. MTA N. Y.C. Transit Auth., 457 F.3d 224, 232 (2d Cir.

2006) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Blnm v. Stemon, 465
US. 886, 896 n.ll (1984)). "[Tjhe range of rates plaintiffs counsel actually charge their clients
... is obviously strong evidence of what the market will bear." Doe v. Umim Life Ins. Co of Am,
No. 12 Civ. 9327, 2016 US. Dist LEXIS 10706, at m-15. (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2016), report and
recommendation adopted. No. 12 Civ. 9327, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21928 (quoting Rozell v.
Ross-Holst, 576 F. Supp. 2d 527, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
Court must also bear in mind that "a reasonable, paying client wishes to spend the minimum
necessary to litigate the case effectively." Arbor Hill, 522 F.3d at 190.
The party seeking the award bears the burden of demonstrating that the fees requested are
reasonable. Blum, 465 U.S. at 897 (1984); Hemley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).
Here, plaintiffs submitted a Memorandum of Law detailing the education and experience of two
attorneys that worked on this case: one partner and one associate. Dkt.32, ^ 24. Plaintiffs also
submitted contcmporaneous billing records in support of their request for $39,542.50 in

Case 7:18-cv-02008-CS-PED Document 35 Filed 03/28/19 Page 8 of 14

attorneys' fees. Dkt. 32, Exh. F.2 The Court has reviewed these submissions and finds as
follows.

Partner Anusha Rasalingam graduated from Harvard Law School in 1999 and has
practiced labor and employment law since 2003. Diet. 32, ^ 24. She seeks an hourly rate of $490
for work completed in 2017 and an hourly rate of $515 for work completed in 2018.3 Exh. F.

Based upon a review ofERISA case law in this district, courts have found $515 to $600 to be a
reasonable hourly rate for partners, See, e.g., Durso v. Store 173 Food Corp., No. 16 Civ. 9456,

2018 WL 6268218, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2018) ($515 hourly rate for a partner with twentyfour years of labor and employment experience); Doe v. Umsm Life Ins. Co of Am, No. 12 Civ.
9327, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10706, at *14~15. (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2016), report and

recommendation adopted. No. 12 Civ. 9327, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21928 ($600 hourly rate for
a partner with thirty years' experience); Demofichcmx v. United Healthcare Oxford, Inc., No. 10

Civ.4491,2014 WL 1273772, at *7 (S.D.N.Y, Mar. 27, 2014) ($600 hourly rate for partner);
Levitan v. Sun Life & Helath Im. Co., No. 09 Civ. 2965, 2013 WL 3829623, at *8 (S.D.N.Y.

July 24, 2013) ($600 hourly rate for partner). Accordingly, I conclude—and respectfully
recommend that Your PIonor conclude—that Ms. Rasalingam's hourly rate of $490 for work
completed in 2017 and $515 for work completed in 2018 is reasonable.

Associate Amanda Bell graduated from Columbia Law School in 2012 and has practiced
hw and employment law since graduation. Dkt. 32, ^ 24. She seeks an hourly rate of $380 for
work performed in 2017 and an hourly rate of $400 for work performed in 2018. Exh. F. A

2 Hereinafter, "Exh. F" refers to Dkt. 32, Exh. F (Decl. ofAmanda Bell in Supp. of Pis. Mot. for
Default J.).
Though not explicitly stated by plaintiffs' counsel, I assume that the increase in the hourly rate
from 2017 to 2018 is due to an annual adjustment.

Case 7:18-cv-02008-CS-PED Document 35 Filed 03/28/19 Page 9 of 14

review of the case law in this district reveals that the rates she requests are higher than the usual
award for associates in ERISA cases. See, e.g,, Durso v. Store 173 Food Corp., No. 16 Civ.

9456,2018 WL 6268218, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2018) (finding $275 hourly rate reasonable
for an associate with similar experience); Trs. of N. Y.C, Dist. Council of Carpenters Pension
Fund v, B&L Moving & Installation, Inc., No. 16 Civ. 4734,2017 WL 4277175, at ^ (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 26, 2017) (finding $225 hourly rate reasonable for associate with three years' experience);
Trs. ofN.Y.C. Dist. CoimcU of Carpenters Pension Funcfv. Dependable Office Installation, LLC,
No. 14 Civ. 9502, 2017 WL 934713, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2017), report and recommwdation

adopted. No. 14 Civ. 09502, 2017 WL 1157118 (finding $225 hourly rate reasonable for
associates with three to ten years' experience). Given Ms. Bell's experience and the rates
prevailing in the community for associates with commensurate experience, I conclude—and
respectfully recommend that Your Honor conclude—that an hourly rate of $275 is appropriate
for Ms. Bell.
2. Reasonable Number of Hours Expended
The Court must now decide the number of hours reasonably expended on the case to
arrive at the presumptively reasonable fee. "The relevant issue [ ] is not whether hindsight
vindicates an attorney's time expenditures, but whether, at the time the work was performed, a
reasonable attorney would have engaged in similar time expenditures. Danatier Corp. v.

Travelers Mem, Co., No. 10 Civ. 0121 (JPO) (JCF), 2015 WL 409525, at *3 (quoting Grant v.
Martinez, 973 F.2d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 1992)) (alteration in original). "A court should exclude from
the ... calculation 'excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary hours.'" Id. (quoting

Quarafmo v. Tiffany & Co., 166 F.3d 422, 425 (2d Cir. 1997)). In addition, "the Court may
reduce the fees requested for billing entries that are vague and do not sufficiently demonstrate
what counsel did." Doe v. Unwn Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 12 Civ. 9327, 2016 US. Dlst. LEXIS

Case 7:18-cv-02008-CS-PED Document 35 Filed 03/28/19 Page 10 of 14

10706, at *18 (S.D.N.Y Jan. 28, 2016). Finally, "[a] trial judge ... may limit the hours allowed
for specific tasks ... on the basis of [the court's] assessment of what is appropriate for the scope
and complexity of the particular litigation." N. Y. Stale Ass 'n for Retarded Children v, Carey,

711 F.2d 1136, 1146 (2d Cir. 1983). The Second Circuit has cautioned that "attorney's fees are
to be awarded with an eye to moderation, seeking to avoid either the reality or the appearance of
awarding windfall fees." Id. at 1139, The Court can accomplish this "by making specific
deductions or 'by making an across-the-board reduction in the amount of hours."' Dcmaher

Corp, 2015 WL 409525, at *3 (quoting Luciano v, Olsten Corp., 109 F.3d 111, 117 (2d Cir.

1997)).
Here, the billing records reflect a total ofninety-five and a half (95.5) hours expended on

the instant litigation (thirteen (13) attributable to Ms. Rasalingam; eighty-two and a half (82.5)
attributable to Ms. Bell). Exh. F. The Court notes that the underlying issues in this case are not
complex. At first blush, the number of hours expended by plaintiffs counsel in this litigation
appear to be substantially greater than what is normally required in an ERISA litigation where a
defendants or defendants default. See, e.g., Durso, 2018 WL 6268218, at *5-6 (finding 52.5

hours of work reasonable); B&L Moving & Installation, Inc., 2017 WL 4277175, at *^ (finding
30.35 hours of work reasonable); Dependable Office Installation, LLC, 2017 WL 934713,at *^
(finding 36 hours of work reasonable). However, prior to defendants' withdrawal of their
Answer, plaintiffs incurred expenses for seventeen (17) weeks of discovery, during which time
defendants failed to produce documents and deponents as requested. Dkt. 32, fl 26-28. As a
result, plaintiffs' counsel worked many hours in preparation for litigation that was ultimately
unnecessary due to defendants' consent to an entry of default judgment. Additionally, as noted
above, defendants did not submit any opposition to plaintiffs' requested amount of attorneys

10

Case 7:18-cv-02008-CS-PED Document 35 Filed 03/28/19 Page 11 of 14

fees. Thus, I conclude that the general overall number of hours expended on this litigation is not
unreasonable.

However, my review of the records reveals some specific, minor discrepancies. There
are twenty-two (22) billing entries reflecting consultations between Ms. Rasalingam and Ms.
Bell regarding this litigation. Exh. F. Both Ms. Rasalingam and Ms. Bell charged for these
consultations in increments of one-quarter hour. Exh. F. Of those twenty-two entries, there are

six (6) that reflect a different amount of time recorded by Ms. Rasalingam and Ms. Bell for the

same consultations. Exh. F (Invoices dated: (1) May 18, 2018; (2) June 7, 2018; (3) July 10,
2018; (4) July 24, 2018; (5) September 6, 2018; and (6) September 10, 2018). Fairness dictates
that the lower amount of time logged for each of these six (6) entries should control.
Accordingly, I respectfully recommend that Ms. Rasalingam's entries be reduced as follows:
Date of Entry

Original Entry

Reduced Entry

May 18,2018

.50 hours

.25 hours

June 7, 2018

.75 hours

.50 hours

July 24, 2018

.50 hours

.25 hours

September 10,2018

.50 hours

.25 hours

In total, this amounts to a one hour reduction for Ms. Rasalingam, reducing her total hours spent

on the instant litigation from thirteen (13) to twelve (12). In addition, I respectfully recommend
that the Ms. Bell's entries be reduced as follows:
Date of Entry

Original Entry

Reduced Entry

July 10,2018

.50 hours

.25 hours

September 6, 2018

.50 hours

.25 hours

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Case 7:18-cv-02008-CS-PED Document 35 Filed 03/28/19 Page 12 of 14

In total, this amounts to a .50 hour reduction for Ms. Bell, reducing her total hours spent on the

instant litigation from cighty-two and a half (82.5) to cighty-two (82).
3. Reasonable Hourly Rate Multiplied by Reasonable Number of Hours Expended
The Court must now calculate reasonable attorneys' fees based on the hourly rates and
total number of hours expended on the instant litigation. The new calculation is as follows:

Hourly Rate

Hours Reasonably Expended

Total Fees

Ms. Rasalingam

$515

12 hours

$6,180.00

Ms. Bell

$275

82 hours

$22,550.00

94 hours

$28,730.00

Total:

Accordingly, I respectfully recommend that plaintiffs be awarded $28,730.00 in attorneys' fees.
4. Costs

Plaintiffs seek costs of $6,276.55, representing reimbursement for court filings fees,
service of process fees, computer-assisted research fees, and court reporter's fees for three

depositions. Dkt. 32, ^{31. Plaintiffs provided a contemporaneous record that specifies the date
and cost of these additional charges. Exh. F. Accordingly, I conclude and respectfully
recommend that plaintiffs be awarded costs in the amount of $6,276.55.

IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, I conclude—and respectfully recommend that Your Honor
should conclude—that plaintiffs be awarded damages as follows:

1. $101,720.00 in unpaid contributions;
2. $28,227.30 in interest on the unpaid contributions from April 17, 2017, to October

15, 2018 (plus daily interest of $50.16 for each day from October 16, 2018,
through the date of judgment);

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3. $28,227.30 in liquidated damages (plus additional daily interest of $50.16 for
each day from October 16, 2018, through the date ofjudgment);
4. $28,730.00 m attorney's fees; and
5. $6,276.55 in costs.
Accordingly, I conclude and respectfully recommend that plaintiffs are entitled to an award in

the total amount of $193,181.15, plus $100.32 per day from October 16, 2018 through the date
judgment is entered.

Dated: March 28, 2019
White Plains, New York

Respectfully subrnitted

Paul E. Davison, U.S.M.J.

NOTICE
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from service of this Report and
Recommendation to serve and file written objections. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 6(a). Such
objections, if any, along with any responses to the objections, shall be filed with the Clerk of the
Court with extra copies delivered to the chambers of the Honorable Cathy Scibel, at the
Honorable Charles L. Brieant JR. Federal Building and United States Courthouse, 300 Quarropas
Street, White Plains, New York 10601, and to the chambers of Judge Paul E. Davison at the
same address.

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Case 7:18-cv-02008-CS-PED Document 35 Filed 03/28/19 Page 14 of 14

Failure to file timely objections to this Report and Recommendation will preclude later
appellate review of any order of judgment that will be entered.
Requests for extensions of time to file objections must be made to Judge Seibel.

14