Lewis v. Westchester County et al
OPINION AND ORDER re: 21 MOTION to Amend/Correct FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT filed by Theodore Lewis. The motion for leave to amend is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. By May 16, 2022, plaintiff shall file a second amended complain t consistent with this Opinion and Order. To be clear, plaintiff is granted leave only to add the malicious prosecution claim against Officer LePore and the John Doe Officers 15, in their individual capacities, based on plaintiff's prosecutio n for criminal possession of a forgery device. Leave to amend is otherwise denied. By May 30, 2022, defendant Officer LePore shall file an answer. The Court will separately schedule an initial pretrial conference. The Clerk is instructed to terminat e defendants Westchester County, Westchester County Department of Public Safety, and Thomas Gleason from this action. The Clerk is further instructed to terminate the motion. (Doc. #21). SO ORDERED. Richard LePore, Jr. answer due 5/30/2022. Westchester County Department of Public Safety, Thomas Gleason (Commissioner of Public Saftey, Acting in his Official Capacity) and Westchester County terminated. (Signed by Judge Vincent L. Briccetti on 5/9/2022) (mml)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
WESTCHESTER COUNTY; WESTCHESTER
COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
SAFETY; THOMAS GLEASON,
Commissioner of Public Safety, Acting in Both
his Official and Unofficial Capacities;
RICHARD LEPORE, JR., Shield Number 1159,
acting in both his Official and Unofficial
Capacities; and JOHN DOE OFFICERS 1–5,
Their True Names and Identities Presently
OPINION AND ORDER
20 CV 9017 (VB)
Plaintiff Theodore Lewis brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985
against defendants Westchester County, Westchester County Department of Public Safety,
Commissioner of Public Safety Thomas Gleason, Westchester County Police Officer Richard
LePore, Jr. (“Officer LePore”), and John Doe Officers 1–5. Plaintiff asserts claims for unlawful
search and seizure, false arrest and false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, supervisory
liability, failure to intercede, and conspiracy.
Now pending is plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend the first amended complaint
pursuant to Rule 15(a)(2). (Doc. #21).
For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
The Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
The Court presumes the parties’ familiarity with the factual and procedural background
of this case, and summarizes only the relevant factual allegations and procedural history below.
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In the first amended complaint, plaintiff asserted claims against defendants under
Sections 1983 and 1985 for excessive force, false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious
prosecution, supervisory liability, failure to intercede, and excessive bail, as well as certain state
law claims. (Doc. #9 (“FAC”)).
Plaintiff alleged that on or around August 19, 2017, he was riding in the rear
compartment of a U-Haul truck on the Hutchinson River Parkway in White Plains, New York,
along with other, unspecified individuals, when Officer LePore and/or John Does 1–5 stopped
the vehicle without probable cause, searched the vehicle’s rear compartment, and uncovered a
gun and an unspecified “forged instrument” (also described as a “forgery device”) in a bag
located in that compartment. (See, e.g., FAC ¶¶ 21, 23). According to plaintiff, each bag in the
truck “bore the name[ ] of the respective owner[ ] of the bag,” and none of the bags searched by
the officers was owned or possessed by plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 17). Plaintiff claimed that shortly after
the search, he was arrested and charged with “Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second
Degree” and “Criminal Possession of a Forgery Device/Counterfeit.” (Id. ¶ 22). Plaintiff
alleged both charges were dismissed and sealed on March 22, 2019. (Id. ¶ 31).
In an Opinion and Order dated September 1, 2021, the Court dismissed the FAC in its
entirety. (Doc. #20). Relevant here, the Court concluded plaintiff failed to state a false arrest
claim because the defendant officers had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for criminal
possession of a weapon under New York Penal Law § 265.15(3) (the “Automobile
Presumption”), which provides that a weapon found in a vehicle, but not on the “person” of any
of its occupants, can be presumed to be possessed by all the occupants. The Court also
concluded plaintiff failed to state a claim for malicious prosecution because plaintiff did not
allege the criminal prosecution terminated in a manner consistent with plaintiff’s innocence,
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which was a requisite element of a Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim under Second
Circuit precedent at the time. See Murphy v. Lynn, 118 F.3d 938, 948 (2d Cir. 1997) (collecting
cases). The Court permitted plaintiff to seek leave to amend the FAC.
On September 21, 2021, plaintiff filed his proposed second amended complaint. (Doc.
#22-3 (“SAC”)). In the proposed SAC, plaintiff largely asserts the same claims as in the FAC,
except he proposes a new Section 1983 claim for “unlawful search and seizure” in violation of
the Fourth Amendment, proposes additional requests for injunctive relief, removes all state law
claims and the claim for excessive bail, and removes Westchester County Department of Public
Safety as a defendant.
The proposed SAC also largely contains the same allegations as in the FAC, with a few
exceptions. Relevant here, plaintiff adds the allegations that he “was not the owner, lessor,
operator or person in control or operation of the aforementioned U-Haul at any time mentioned
herein” (SAC ¶ 15), and that the contraband uncovered in the U-Haul was found within a
“secured piece of luggage.” (Id. ¶ 22). The proposed SAC does not supply any additional details
regarding the “forgery device,” which is still used interchangeably with the term “forged
instrument.” (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 22–25).
The proposed SAC also attaches as an exhibit a “Notice to Defendant of Intention to
Offer Evidence Pursuant to Criminal Procedural Law § 710.30(1)(a),” purportedly provided to
plaintiff on June 25, 2018, by the Westchester County District Attorney’s Office in connection
with its criminal prosecution of plaintiff’s two criminal possession charges. (Doc. #22-1).
According to the notice, on August 20, 2017—the day following plaintiff’s arrest—plaintiff
explained to officers of the Westchester County Police Department that he was in the U-Haul
with two of his friends and one of those friend’s acquaintances named Jordan, on their way from
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Massachusetts back to New York. Plaintiff purportedly told the officers that he had originally
accompanied his friends in the same U-Haul truck from New York to Massachusetts, where his
friends visited family there and thereafter retrieved Jordan—whom plaintiff did not know—for
the return trip to New York. Further, according to the notice, plaintiff relayed to the officers that
Jordan had a number of bags and suitcases, which had already been placed in the rear
compartment of the U-Haul truck by the time plaintiff entered that compartment for the return
trip. Plaintiff also informed the officers that Jordan had been lying down on one of the bags and
“went into” another.
Rule 15(a)(2) provides the Court “should freely give leave” to amend a complaint “when
justice so requires.” Accordingly, “[i]n the absence of any apparent or declared reason,” such as
“failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing
party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.,” a motion for leave
to amend should be granted. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). 1
An amended complaint is futile when, as a matter of law, the proposed amended
complaint would not survive a Rule 12 motion, such as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted or a Rule 12(b)(1) motion for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Panther Partners Inc. v. Ikanos Commc’ns, Inc., 681 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 2012)
(Rule 12(b)(6)); Bandler v. Town of Woodstock, 832 F. App’x 733, 735–36 (2d Cir. 2020)
(summary order) (Rule 12(b)(1)).
Unless otherwise indicated, case quotations omit all internal citations, quotations,
footnotes, and alterations.
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To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the allegations in a complaint must meet a standard of
“plausibility.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 557–58 (2007). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “The plausibility standard is not akin
to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),
a district court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to the
complaint as exhibits, and documents incorporated by reference in the complaint.” DiFolco v.
MSNBC Cable L.L.C., 622 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2010).
To survive a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the allegations in the complaint must demonstrate,
among other things, that the plaintiff possesses Article III standing to seek the relief requested.
Conn. Parents Union v. Russell-Tucker, 8 F.4th 167, 172 (2d Cir. 2021).
Proposed Unlawful Search and Seizure Claim
Defendants argue plaintiff lacks standing to bring a claim for unlawful search and seizure
under the Fourth Amendment.
The Court agrees.
“It is well settled that non-owner passengers cannot bring a Fourth Amendment challenge
to a search of the interior of a vehicle because they do not possess a reasonable expectation of
privacy in a vehicle that is not their own.” United States v. Bulluck, 2010 WL 1948591, at *11
(S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2010) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148 (1978)); Cooper v. City of
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New Rochelle, 925 F. Supp. 2d 588, 611 n.18 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (applying rule to a Section 1983
Here, plaintiff disclaims having any reasonable expectation of privacy in the U-Haul
truck or the bags he claims were illegally searched. Indeed, plaintiff expressly alleges he was
merely a passenger in the vehicle operated by his friend, he “was not the owner, lessor, operator
or person in control or operation of the aforementioned U-Haul at any time mentioned herein,”
and that he did not own or possess any of the bags searched by the officers. (SAC ¶¶ 14, 15, 18,
22). Therefore, even assuming defendants stopped and searched the U-Haul truck without
probable cause, plaintiff does not have standing to challenge the search.
Accordingly, the motion to amend is denied with respect to the proposed unlawful search
and seizure claim.
Proposed Amended False Arrest and False Imprisonment Claim
Defendants argue plaintiff does not plausibly allege additional facts sufficient to negate
the defendant officers’ probable cause defense to plaintiff’s false arrest claim.
The Court agrees.
As discussed in the Court’s prior Opinion and Order, the existence of probable cause is
an absolute defense to a claim of false arrest and false imprisonment. Betts v. Shearman, 751
F.3d 78, 82 (2d Cir. 2014). An officer has probable cause to arrest when he or she has
“knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that are sufficient
to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the person to be arrested has
committed or is committing a crime.” See Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1996).
“It is well-settled under New York law that the Automobile Presumption may provide
probable cause for the arrest of all occupants of a vehicle.” Matthews v. City of New York, 889
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F. Supp. 2d 418, 434 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). Subject to certain statutory exceptions not relevant here,
the Automobile Presumption creates a rebuttable presumption that all occupants of a vehicle
possess a weapon that is found in that vehicle but not found on the “person” of any given
occupant. N.Y. Penal Law § 265.15(3). This presumption may apply regardless of where the
weapon may be specifically located within the vehicle, the length of time an occupant was in the
vehicle prior to the arrest, or whether an occupant knows about the presence of the weapon in the
vehicle. See Matthews v. City of New York, 889 F. Supp. at 434. However, the presumption is
“evidentiary in nature and may be rebutted by [the] defendant's own testimony or by any other
evidence in the case” that sufficiently exculpates any given occupant of the vehicle from
possession, such as a confession of possession or ownership by another occupant. See Shabazz
v. Kailer, 201 F. Supp. 3d 386, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
Here, plaintiff’s additional allegations, even accepted as true, do not sufficiently change
the circumstances under which the gun was discovered in the U-Haul truck to rebut the
application of the Automobile Presumption. Indeed, the only additional allegation in this regard
is that the bag in which the gun was discovered was, in fact, a “secured piece of luggage not
owned or possessed by Plaintiff”—which, according to plaintiff, bears the name of its owner,
who was not plaintiff. (SAC ¶¶ 18, 22). But this additional fact does not plausibly suggest the
arresting officers, at the time of arrest, had reason to believe the gun belonged to any other
occupant of the vehicle more than it did to plaintiff. See, e.g., People v. Lemmons, 40 N.Y.2d
505, 511 (1976) (“[T]he placement of a weapon in a handbag does not necessarily indicate that
the owner of a handbag is in sole and exclusive possession of the weapon. . . . To hold that
merely because the weapons were found in a briefcase, handbag, shopping bag or carton the
presumption is nullified would defeat the legislative intent and render the statute nugatory.”) “In
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light of the foregoing and because plaintiff[ ] allege[s] that none of the vehicle occupants
admitted to possessing the firearm, the [arresting officer] acted within [his] discretion by
arresting [any of the] vehicle occupants pursuant to the Automobile Presumption.” Matthews v.
City of New York, 889 F. Supp. at 436.
Accordingly, the motion to amend is denied with respect to the proposed amended false
arrest and false imprisonment claim.
Proposed Amended Malicious Prosecution Claims
Defendants argue plaintiff does not plausibly assert claims for malicious prosecution.
The Court agrees with respect to the criminal possession of a weapon charge, but
disagrees with respect to the criminal possession of a forgery device charge.
The elements of a Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim are borrowed from state law.
Cook v. Sheldon, 41 F.3d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 1994). To state a malicious prosecution claim under
New York law, a plaintiff must plausibly allege “(1) the initiation or continuation of a criminal
proceeding against plaintiff; (2) termination of the proceeding in plaintiff’s favor; (3) lack of
probable cause for commencing the proceeding; and (4) actual malice as a motivation for
defendant’s actions.” Manganiello v. City of New York, 612 F.3d 149, 161 (2d Cir. 2010).
With respect to the second element, the Supreme Court recently clarified that a claim for
malicious prosecution under Section 1983 “does not require the plaintiff to show that the
criminal prosecution ended with some affirmative indication of innocence.” Thompson v. Clark,
142 S. Ct. 1332, 1341 (2022). Rather, a plaintiff “need only show that the criminal prosecution
ended without a conviction.” Id.
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With respect to the third element, “the existence of probable cause is a complete defense
to a claim of malicious prosecution in New York, but unlike false arrest claims, the defendant
must have possessed probable cause as to each offense charged.” Costello v. Milano, 20 F.
Supp. 3d 406, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). The probable cause standard in the context of malicious
prosecution claims is “slightly higher” than the probable cause standard for false arrest claims.
See Stansbury v. Wertman, 721 F.3d 84, 95 (2d Cir. 2013). That is, for the purpose of a
malicious prosecution claim, probable cause is “such facts and circumstances as would lead a
reasonably prudent person to believe the plaintiff guilty.” Id. Nevertheless, “[i]f probable cause
existed at the time of arrest [for the at-issue offense], it continues to exist at the time of
prosecution unless undermined by the discovery of some intervening, [exculpatory] fact”
sufficient to dissipate the original probable cause determination. Johnson v. Constantellis, 221 F.
App’x 48, 50 (2d Cir. 2007) (summary order).
Finally, the “lack of probable cause [determined under the third element] generally raises
an inference of malice” with respect to the fourth element of the malicious prosecution claim.
Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth. 124 F.3d 123, 131 (2d Cir. 1997).
In the proposed SAC, plaintiff asserts malicious prosecution claims based on his
prosecution for (i) criminal possession of a weapon, and (ii) criminal possession of a forgery
As an initial matter, the Court concludes the first and second and second elements for
each proposed amended malicious prosecution claim are no longer at issue, as defendants do not
contest the initiation or continuation of criminal proceedings against plaintiff, and it is clear from
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the alleged dismissal of plaintiff’s charges that “the criminal prosecution[s] ended without a
conviction.” Thompson v. Clark, 142 S. Ct. at 1341.
Accordingly, the Court addresses the probable cause defenses central to the third and
fourth elements of each proposed amended malicious prosecution claim below.
Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree
Plaintiff fails plausibly to allege probable cause did not exist to prosecute him for
criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree.
Specifically, plaintiff fails to offer facts plausibly showing the probable cause that existed
at the time of plaintiff’s arrest for criminal possession of a weapon dissipated by the time of the
prosecution of those charges. Indeed, the only potential difference in facts allegedly known to
the defendant officers after the arrest is that, on the day after his arrest, plaintiff insisted to
certain defendant officers that several bags and suitcases belonging to the other occupants of the
U-Haul were already in the rear compartment of the U-Haul by the time he entered that
compartment for the return trip to New York, and that Jordan—one of the occupants of the
vehicle whom plaintiff allegedly did not know—told plaintiff he was “on the run.” (Doc. #22-1).
Although officers cannot disregard such potentially exculpatory facts, plaintiff’s selfserving denial and speculation would not, standing alone, “make apparent” to the officers the
“groundless nature” of the charge for criminal possession of a weapon as against plaintiff.
Lowth v. Town of Cheektowaga, 82 F.3d 563, 571 (2d Cir. 1996). This is particularly true when,
as here, there is no allegation that any of the occupants of the vehicle admitted to owning the
firearm and each occupant can be presumed to have possessed the firearm under the Automobile
Presumption. Compare Shabazz v. Kailer, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 394 (plaintiff adequately pleaded
lack of probable cause to prosecute plaintiff for possession of a weapon in a vehicle when
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plaintiff alleged another occupant “told [the defendant officer] at the stationhouse that the gun
belonged to her,” among other exculpatory facts), with Matthews v. City of New York, 889 F.
Supp. 2d at 436 (plaintiff failed to state a claim for false arrest because a gun was found in a
vehicle, despite allegations that plaintiff could not have reasonably been deemed to “exercise
dominion over the firearm because he had been seriously injured”).
Accordingly, the motion to amend is denied with respect to the proposed amended
malicious prosecution claim based on plaintiff’s prosecution for criminal possession of a
Criminal Possession of a Forgery Device
In contrast, plaintiff plausibly alleges there was no probable cause to prosecute him for
criminal possession of a forgery device.
It is well settled that, even with respect to possession crimes for which a statutory
presumption of possession does not apply, officers may still have probable cause to infer
possession of contraband found in a car—and not on the person of any individual occupant—on
a common law theory of common, constructive possession. See, e.g., Turyants v. City of New
York, 2020 WL 804900, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2020). That is, when the officer arrests or
charges an occupant of a vehicle based on possession of contraband found in that vehicle, he
must have a reasonable basis to find the occupant had “the power and intention to exercise
dominion and control” over the contraband or the area in which the contraband was found such
that possession by that occupant may be inferred. See United States v. Rodriguez, 392 F.3d 539,
548–49 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Turyants v. City of New York, 2020 WL 804900, at *4
(probable cause existed to believe passenger in front seat of a car constructively possessed
purportedly forged documents in the front compartment of the car).
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However, unlike the Automobile Presumption, a theory of constructive possession
requires an examination of the totality of the circumstances. See Matthews v. City of New York,
889 F. Supp. 2d at 435. 2 Courts evaluating probable cause on a theory of constructive
possession look to factors including, but not limited to, that person’s proximity to the
contraband, the visibility of the contraband to the officers’ view, or other indicia of ownership or
control over the contraband. See, e.g., Campbell v. City of New York, 2019 WL 569768, at *5–
7 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2019) (“If there was not marijuana in public view, Defendants’ argument
for probable cause collapses: [The arresting officer] would not have observed marijuana in
Plaintiff’s car within reach, and would not reasonably have been able to impute constructive
possession of marijuana to Plaintiff.”). Accordingly, “[m]ere presence at the location of
contraband does not establish possession.” United States v. Rios, 856 F.2d 493, 496 (2d Cir.
1988) (per curiam).
Here, the Automobile Presumption does not apply to the forgery-related possession
crimes for which plaintiff could have been charged, 3 so the Court must instead consider whether
As the court in Matthews noted, the Automobile Presumption was enacted to “ease the
burden of establishing probable cause” under the common law theory of constructive possession
and “avoid the difficulties in proving possession of weapons hidden in occupied automobiles”
under the common law. Matthews v. City of New York, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 435.
Plaintiff describes the crime for which he was charged as “Criminal Possession of a
Forgery Device/Counterfeit, a Class D Felony,” which corresponds to N.Y. Penal Law § 170.40.
That statute criminalizes “mak[ing] or possess[ing] with knowledge of its character any plate, die
or other device, apparatus, equipment, or article specifically designed for use in counterfeiting or
otherwise forging written instrument.” N.Y. Penal Law §170.40(1). However, plaintiff also
describes the at-issue contraband as a “forged instrument” (SAC ¶ 22), which could implicate
N.Y. Penal Law § 170.25 instead. That statute makes “criminal possession of a forged
instrument” a Class D Felony as well, but it includes a specific intent element: a person must
“utter or possess any forged instrument” “with knowledge that it is forged and with intent to
defraud, deceive or injure another.” N.Y. Penal Law § 170.25. Because the Court concludes
there was, in the first instance, insufficient probable cause to infer possession of the
device/instrument, it need not decide at this time which statute would apply.
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probable cause existed based on plaintiff’s apparent ability to exercise dominion and control over
the forgery device.
At this early stage of the case, and assuming the truth of the allegations in the proposed
SAC, plaintiff plausibly alleges the defendant officers lacked probable cause to presume
sufficient dominion and control over the forgery device. Indeed, plaintiff alleges the luggage in
which the contraband was found was “secured,” that it bore the name of its owner (which was
not plaintiff), and that the other occupants of the vehicle were closer in proximity to the suitcase.
Viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff, such allegations suggest it was apparent to the
officers that the suitcase in which the forgery device was found lay outside of plaintiff’s
dominion and control, and thus defendants lacked probable cause to arrest or prosecute him for
that offense. Of course, evidence adduced from discovery may ultimately bear out that the
totality of the circumstances compels the same conclusion of probable cause as the Automobile
Presumption, but the aforementioned alleged facts negating the officers’ ability to determine
plaintiff’s dominion and control over the forgery device preclude such a determination as a
matter of law.
Accordingly, the proposed amended malicious prosecution claim based on the criminal
possession of a forgery device may proceed.
Proposed Amended Supervisory Liability, Failure to Intercede, and Municipal Liability
Defendants argue the proposed SAC fails to include any additional well-pleaded
allegations to support plaintiff’s claims for supervisory liability, failure to intercede, and
The Court agrees.
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To the extent the proposed SAC includes any additional allegations that attempt to rectify
the deficiencies with these claims identified by the Court’s prior Opinion and Order, those
allegations are wholly conclusory and thus not entitled to the presumption of truth. (See SAC
¶¶ 6, 33, 41, 49, 50, 55).
Accordingly, the motion to amend must be denied with respect to the proposed amended
claims for supervisory liability, failure to intercede, and municipal liability. 4
Although the proposed SAC removes plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim, plaintiff
nevertheless includes additional allegations regarding plaintiff’s “excessive bail.” (See, e.g.,
SAC ¶¶ 32, 49). To the extent plaintiff’s motion can be construed to seek leave to amend the
FAC to include claims relating to his bail, that motion is denied for lack of personal involvement
of any defendant in setting the bail. Sullivan v. City of N.Y., 2015 WL 5025296, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2015) (citing N.Y. Crim. Proc. L. § 530.10 et seq.), aff'd, 690 F. App'x 63
(2d Cir. 2017) (summary order) (“[T]here can be no Eighth Amendment liability for a person
who merely makes a recommendation regarding the appropriate level of bail”).
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The motion for leave to amend is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
By May 16, 2022, plaintiff shall file a second amended complaint consistent with this
Opinion and Order. To be clear, plaintiff is granted leave only to add the malicious prosecution
claim against Officer LePore and the John Doe Officers 1–5, in their individual capacities, based
on plaintiff’s prosecution for criminal possession of a forgery device. Leave to amend is
By May 30, 2022, defendant Officer LePore shall file an answer.
The Court will separately schedule an initial pretrial conference.
The Clerk is instructed to terminate defendants Westchester County, Westchester
County Department of Public Safety, and Thomas Gleason from this action.
The Clerk is further instructed to terminate the motion. (Doc. #21).
Dated: May 9, 2022
White Plains, NY
Vincent L. Briccetti
United States District Judge
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